Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2025-08-01 — TX
Operator
Holly Energy Partners - Operating, L.p.
Cause
Equipment Failure
Commodity
Refined And/or Petroleum Product (Non-Hvl) Which Is A Liquid At Ambient Conditions
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$5,000
Incident datetime
2025-08-01 09:08
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
On august 1, 2025, at approximately 9:04 a.M. Cdt, technicians arrived at throckmorton station to perform scheduled pigging activities. Upon arrival, they discovered a leak originating from mainline pumping unit #2. Technicians immediately notified the qualified individual (qi), who in turn contacted the artesia control center. The pipeline was shut down by stopping all mainline pumping units and closing all associated motor operated valves (movs) on the system. While the shutdown was in progress, technicians observed product beginning to flow outside the station boundaries and onto the pipeline right-of-way. Using shovels, they quickly constructed an earthen berm to prevent further migration of product. Once the pipeline was fully isolated, the technicians blocked out both pumping units and placed collection buckets under the release point to capture residual flow. These efforts were slowed due to hazardous vapors, requiring the use of air monitoring equipment to continue safely with lockout/tagout procedures. Remediation activities began immediately, aided by a vacuum truck already onsite for the planned pigging operations. Subsequent inspection determined the failure originated from a 1/2-inch stainless steel tubing line on the suction side of pump unit #2, which had cracked approximately one inch from the tubing ferrule. The initially reported release volume of 155 barrels of gasoline was later corrected to 75 barrels of jet fuel. Free product was recovered, and contaminated soil that could be safely accessed was excavated and staged for offsite disposal. The failed tubing was sent to swagelok for metallurgical evaluation, which concluded the tubing failed due to fatigue, likely caused by flow-induced vibration and insufficient support near rotating equipment. The tubing met material hardness specifications (hrb 81) and showed no workmanship deficiencies. Swagelok�s findings were supported by a becht engineering review, which identified vibration and lack of support as the primary contributors to the failure. Following the investigation, the tubing was replaced and additional mechanical supports were installed along the run to improve stability and reduce vibration. In accordance with becht�s recommendations, two 0.125-inch orifices were installed along the straightest section of the tubing, spaced at least six inches apart and left unreamed to maintain sharp edges, to reduce flow velocity and mitigate flow-induced vibration during operation. These modifications were completed prior to returning unit #2 to service. On behalf of hf sinclair, trc has initiated coordination with the texas commission on environmental quality (tceq incident # 20252627) and is preparing to submit a self-implication notice. This submittal will outline the plan to chemically remediate remaining contaminated soils due to the complexity of excavating around in-service piping. The remediation process is expected to begin in november 2025, with confirmatory sampling planned for early 2026. This approach has been discussed with tceq and is not anticipated to be challenged.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2025-08-27 00:00:00
Iyear
2025
Report Number
20250200
Supplemental Number
41535
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
32011
Name
Holly Energy Partners - Operating, L.p.
Operator Street Address
2323 Victory Ave. Suite 1400
Operator City Name
Dallas
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
75219
Local Datetime
2025-08-01 09:04:00
Time Zone
Central
Daylight Savings Ind
Yes
Location Latitude
33.254253
Location Longitude
-99.200362
Commodity Released Type
Refined And/or Petroleum Product (Non-Hvl) Which Is A Liquid At Ambient Conditions
Commodity Subtype
Diesel, Fuel Oil, Kerosene, Jet Fuel
Unintentional Release Bbls
75
Recovered Bbls
75
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
Incident Identified Datetime
2025-08-01 09:08:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Pump/meter Station Equipment And Piping
On Off Shore
Onshore
Status When Identified
Normal Operation, Includes Pauses Between Batches And During Maintenance
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Shutdown Datetime
2025-08-01 09:10:00
Restart Datetime
2025-08-01 14:13:00
Communication State Fed Ind
No
On Site Datetime
2025-08-01 09:08:00
Confirmed Discovery Datetime
2025-08-01 09:08:00
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2025-08-01 09:55:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1438559
Additional Nrc Report Numbers
1438797
Ignite Ind
No
Notify Qualified Indiv Ind
Yes
Qualified Indiv Notif Datetime
2025-08-01 09:10:00
Oil Spill Removal Org Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Big Spring To Wichita Falls 6/8
Segment Name
Throckmorton Station To Archer Station 498
Onshore State Abbreviation
Tx
Onshore Postal Code
76483
Onshore City Name
Not Within A Municipality
Onshore County Name
Throckmorton
Designated Location
Milepost
Designated Name
160.38
Federal
No
Location Type
Pipeline Right-Of-Way
Incident Area Type
Aboveground
Incident Area Subtype
Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Intrastate
Item Involved
Pump
Pump Type
Centrifugal
Pump Service Type
Mainline
Installation Year
Unknown
Manufactured Year
Unknown
Material Involved
Material Other Than Carbon Steel
Material Details
Stainless Steel Tubing
Release Type
Other
Release Type Details
Stainless Tubing Sheered, Likely Caused By Vibration
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
Yes
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
Yes
Soil Remed Ind
Yes
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
No
Commodity Reached Hca
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
6900
Est Cost Prop Damage
5000
Est Cost Emergency
15000
Est Cost Environmental
263424
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
290324
Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght
0
Num Injured Treated By Emt
0
Num Resident Building Affctd
0
Num Business Building Affctd
0
Accident Psig
519
Mop Psig
863
Mop Cfr Section
Component Design Pressure �195.406(A)(2)
Maop Established Date
2006-04-26 00:00:00
Maop Reversal Flow Ind
No
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Cpm In Place Ind
Yes
Cpm Operating Ind
Yes
Cpm Functional Ind
Yes
Cpm Detection Ind
No
Cpm Conf Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
Material failure not associated with the controller or control room operations
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Equipment Failure
Cause Details
Defective Or Loose Tubing Or Fitting
Eq Failure Type
Defective Or Loose Tubing Or Fitting
Additional Vibration Ind
Yes
Additional Support Ind
Yes
Additional Defect Ind
Yes
Eqf Pump Equipment Ind
Yes
Eqf Defective Fitting Ind
Yes
Preparer Name
D***** B****
Preparer Title
Manager Pipeline Regulatory
Preparer Email
D***********@h*********.com
Preparer Telephone
9727955457
Prepared Date
2025-10-31 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
J*** P****
Authorizer Telephone
9183400556
Authorizer Title
Vice President Midstream Operations
Authorizer Email
J*********@h*********.com
Narrative
On august 1, 2025, at approximately 9:04 a.M. Cdt, technicians arrived at throckmorton station to perform scheduled pigging activities. Upon arrival, they discovered a leak originating from mainline pumping unit #2. Technicians immediately notified the qualified individual (qi), who in turn contacted the artesia control center. The pipeline was shut down by stopping all mainline pumping units and closing all associated motor operated valves (movs) on the system. While the shutdown was in progress, technicians observed product beginning to flow outside the station boundaries and onto the pipeline right-of-way. Using shovels, they quickly constructed an earthen berm to prevent further migration of product. Once the pipeline was fully isolated, the technicians blocked out both pumping units and placed collection buckets under the release point to capture residual flow. These efforts were slowed due to hazardous vapors, requiring the use of air monitoring equipment to continue safely with lockout/tagout procedures. Remediation activities began immediately, aided by a vacuum truck already onsite for the planned pigging operations. Subsequent inspection determined the failure originated from a 1/2-inch stainless steel tubing line on the suction side of pump unit #2, which had cracked approximately one inch from the tubing ferrule. The initially reported release volume of 155 barrels of gasoline was later corrected to 75 barrels of jet fuel. Free product was recovered, and contaminated soil that could be safely accessed was excavated and staged for offsite disposal. The failed tubing was sent to swagelok for metallurgical evaluation, which concluded the tubing failed due to fatigue, likely caused by flow-induced vibration and insufficient support near rotating equipment. The tubing met material hardness specifications (hrb 81) and showed no workmanship deficiencies. Swagelok�s findings were supported by a becht engineering review, which identified vibration and lack of support as the primary contributors to the failure. Following the investigation, the tubing was replaced and additional mechanical supports were installed along the run to improve stability and reduce vibration. In accordance with becht�s recommendations, two 0.125-inch orifices were installed along the straightest section of the tubing, spaced at least six inches apart and left unreamed to maintain sharp edges, to reduce flow velocity and mitigate flow-induced vibration during operation. These modifications were completed prior to returning unit #2 to service. On behalf of hf sinclair, trc has initiated coordination with the texas commission on environmental quality (tceq incident # 20252627) and is preparing to submit a self-implication notice. This submittal will outline the plan to chemically remediate remaining contaminated soils due to the complexity of excavating around in-service piping. The remediation process is expected to begin in november 2025, with confirmatory sampling planned for early 2026. This approach has been discussed with tceq and is not anticipated to be challenged.
| Report Received Date | 2025-08-27 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2025 |
| Report Number | 20250200 |
| Supplemental Number | 41535 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 32011 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Holly Energy Partners - Operating, L.p. |
| Operator Street Address | 2323 Victory Ave. Suite 1400 |
| Operator City Name | Dallas |
| Operator State Abbreviation | TX |
| Operator Postal Code | 75219 |
| Local Datetime | 2025-08-01 09:04:00 |
| Time Zone | Central |
| Daylight Savings Ind | Yes |
| Location Latitude | 33.254253 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -99.200362 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Refined And/or Petroleum Product (Non-Hvl) Which Is A Liquid At Ambient Conditions |
| Commodity Subtype | Diesel, Fuel Oil, Kerosene, Jet Fuel |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 75 |
| Recovered Bbls | 75 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Operator Employee |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2025-08-01 09:08:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pump/meter Station Equipment And Piping |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Status When Identified | Normal Operation, Includes Pauses Between Batches And During Maintenance |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | Yes |
| Shutdown Datetime | 2025-08-01 09:10:00 |
| Restart Datetime | 2025-08-01 14:13:00 |
| Communication State Fed Ind | No |
| On Site Datetime | 2025-08-01 09:08:00 |
| Confirmed Discovery Datetime | 2025-08-01 09:08:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2025-08-01 09:55:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1438559 NRC Report How to search |
| Additional Nrc Report Numbers | 1438797 |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Notify Qualified Indiv Ind | Yes |
| Qualified Indiv Notif Datetime | 2025-08-01 09:10:00 |
| Oil Spill Removal Org Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Big Spring To Wichita Falls 6/8 |
| Segment Name | Throckmorton Station To Archer Station 498 |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Tx |
| Onshore Postal Code | 76483 |
| Onshore City Name | Not Within A Municipality |
| Onshore County Name | Throckmorton |
| Designated Location | Milepost |
| Designated Name | 160.38 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Pipeline Right-Of-Way |
| Incident Area Type | Aboveground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Intrastate |
| Item Involved | Pump |
| Pump Type | Centrifugal |
| Pump Service Type | Mainline |
| Installation Year | Unknown |
| Manufactured Year | Unknown |
| Material Involved | Material Other Than Carbon Steel |
| Material Details | Stainless Steel Tubing |
| Release Type | Other |
| Release Type Details | Stainless Tubing Sheered, Likely Caused By Vibration |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | Yes |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | Yes |
| Soil Remed Ind | Yes |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Commodity Reached Hca | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 6900 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 5000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 15000 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 263424 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 290324 |
| Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght | 0 |
| Num Injured Treated By Emt | 0 |
| Num Resident Building Affctd | 0 |
| Num Business Building Affctd | 0 |
| Accident Psig | 519 |
| Mop Psig | 863 |
| Mop Cfr Section | Component Design Pressure �195.406(A)(2) View CFR 49 §192 |
| Maop Established Date | 2006-04-26 00:00:00 |
| Maop Reversal Flow Ind | No |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Cpm In Place Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Operating Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Functional Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Detection Ind | No |
| Cpm Conf Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | Material failure not associated with the controller or control room operations |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Equipment Failure |
| Cause Details | Defective Or Loose Tubing Or Fitting |
| Eq Failure Type | Defective Or Loose Tubing Or Fitting |
| Additional Vibration Ind | Yes |
| Additional Support Ind | Yes |
| Additional Defect Ind | Yes |
| Eqf Pump Equipment Ind | Yes |
| Eqf Defective Fitting Ind | Yes |
| Preparer Name | D***** B**** |
| Preparer Title | Manager Pipeline Regulatory |
| Preparer Email | D***********@h*********.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 9727955457 |
| Prepared Date | 2025-10-31 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | J*** P**** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 9183400556 |
| Authorizer Title | Vice President Midstream Operations |
| Authorizer Email | J*********@h*********.com |
| Narrative | On august 1, 2025, at approximately 9:04 a.M. Cdt, technicians arrived at throckmorton station to perform scheduled pigging activities. Upon arrival, they discovered a leak originating from mainline pumping unit #2. Technicians immediately notified the qualified individual (qi), who in turn contacted the artesia control center. The pipeline was shut down by stopping all mainline pumping units and closing all associated motor operated valves (movs) on the system. While the shutdown was in progress, technicians observed product beginning to flow outside the station boundaries and onto the pipeline right-of-way. Using shovels, they quickly constructed an earthen berm to prevent further migration of product. Once the pipeline was fully isolated, the technicians blocked out both pumping units and placed collection buckets under the release point to capture residual flow. These efforts were slowed due to hazardous vapors, requiring the use of air monitoring equipment to continue safely with lockout/tagout procedures. Remediation activities began immediately, aided by a vacuum truck already onsite for the planned pigging operations. Subsequent inspection determined the failure originated from a 1/2-inch stainless steel tubing line on the suction side of pump unit #2, which had cracked approximately one inch from the tubing ferrule. The initially reported release volume of 155 barrels of gasoline was later corrected to 75 barrels of jet fuel. Free product was recovered, and contaminated soil that could be safely accessed was excavated and staged for offsite disposal. The failed tubing was sent to swagelok for metallurgical evaluation, which concluded the tubing failed due to fatigue, likely caused by flow-induced vibration and insufficient support near rotating equipment. The tubing met material hardness specifications (hrb 81) and showed no workmanship deficiencies. Swagelok�s findings were supported by a becht engineering review, which identified vibration and lack of support as the primary contributors to the failure. Following the investigation, the tubing was replaced and additional mechanical supports were installed along the run to improve stability and reduce vibration. In accordance with becht�s recommendations, two 0.125-inch orifices were installed along the straightest section of the tubing, spaced at least six inches apart and left unreamed to maintain sharp edges, to reduce flow velocity and mitigate flow-induced vibration during operation. These modifications were completed prior to returning unit #2 to service. On behalf of hf sinclair, trc has initiated coordination with the texas commission on environmental quality (tceq incident # 20252627) and is preparing to submit a self-implication notice. This submittal will outline the plan to chemically remediate remaining contaminated soils due to the complexity of excavating around in-service piping. The remediation process is expected to begin in november 2025, with confirmatory sampling planned for early 2026. This approach has been discussed with tceq and is not anticipated to be challenged. |
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