Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2025-06-27 — TX
Operator
Capturepoint Llc
Cause
Material Failure Of Pipe Or Weld
Commodity
Co2 (Carbon Dioxide)
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$18,000
Incident datetime
2025-06-27 00:00 UTC
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
On 5/29/25, 1300 cdt, a local landowner visited the capturepoint office in perryton texas and informed jason pelton, a capturepoint employee, of a possible CO2 leak on his land. He told jason that he called the emergency contact number on the line markers and valve risers the day before on 5/28/25, 1500 cdt. Capturepoint employee austen pitts was informed shortly after jason and proceeded to location. The pipeline failure was confirmed by austen pitts on 5/29/25, 15:00 cdt. Austen contacted the landowner and discussed the plan to shut-in mlv1 and mlv2 to blowdown the pipeline and isolate the failure. No evacuations, road closures, injuries, fatalities or public notifications were necessary. Mlv1 and mlv2 were closed 5/29/25, 1630 cdt and austen pitts and drew price patrolled and monitored the pipeline blowdown until 5/29/25, 1815 cdt. Kirk love with capturepoint contacted the national response center (nrc) and informed them of the line failure on 5/29/25, 15:55 cdt. He was given nrc report #1432544. The texas railroad commission was also informed of the possible pipeline leak. After the pipeline was blown down and the failure point isolated, oq qualified contractors were contacted to begin investigating and repairing the pipeline. Metallurgical engineering services, inc. (mes), performed a failure analysis which stated: "based on the failure analysis conducted on the subject 6-inch nominal pipe, the root cause of the failure was identified as weld defects within the circumferential girth weld heat affected zone (haz), as a result of poor workmanship. The primary failure was located at the 12 o'clock position, adjacent to the downstream side of the weld cap. Poor weld alignment and high weld amperage resulted in inadequate fusion between the base and weld metals, which created a cold joint with insufficient metal fusion at this location." in summary, mes determined "...The primary root cause of the failure was identified as weld defects within the girth weld haz, specifically poor weld alignment and inadequate fusion. These defects led to preferential corrosion attack, exacerbated by the presence of chalcogens, resulting in the through hole failure. Additional contributing factors included incomplete fusion, cratering, and slag inclusions within the weld area. All relevant test outcomes support these findings, confirming that the failure originated from weld-related issues rather than base metal composition or mechanical properties."
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2025-06-27 00:00:00
Iyear
2025
Report Number
20250157
Supplemental Number
41237
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
39754
Name
Capturepoint Llc
Operator Street Address
1101 Central Expressway, South Suite 150
Operator City Name
Allen
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
75013
Time Zone
Central
Daylight Savings Ind
Yes
Location Latitude
36.17517
Location Longitude
-101.04497
Commodity Released Type
Co2 (Carbon Dioxide)
Unintentional Release Bbls
42
Intentional Release Bbls
565
Recovered Bbls
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Other
Accident Details
Landowner Reported
System Part Involved
Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
On Off Shore
Onshore
Status When Identified
Normal Operation, Includes Pauses Between Batches And During Maintenance
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Communication State Fed Ind
No
Nrc Rpt Num
1432544
Ignite Ind
No
Upstream Action Taken
Valve Closure
Upstream Valve Type Ind
Manual
Downstream Action Taken
Valve Closure
Downstream Valve Type Ind
Manual
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Borger To Farnsworth
Segment Name
Borger To Farnsworth (F2260)
Onshore State Abbreviation
Tx
Onshore Postal Code
79093
Onshore City Name
Waka
Onshore County Name
Ochiltree
Designated Location
Milepost
Designated Name
Mp1.5
Federal
No
Location Type
Pipeline Right-Of-Way
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Under Soil
Depth Of Cover
48
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
Item Involved
Weld, Including Heat-Affected Zone
Pipe Diameter
6
Pipe Wall Thickness
0.28
Pipe Smys
52000
Pipe Specification
Api 5l X52
Pipe Seam Type
Erw - High Frequency
Pipe Manufacturer
Unknown
Pipe Coating Type
Fusion Bonded Epoxy(Fbe)
Coating Applied Ind
No
Weld Subtype
Pipe Girth Weld
Different Girth Weld Ind
No
Installation Year
2011
Manufactured Year
Unknown
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Leak
Leak Type
Pinhole
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
No
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
Yes
Vegetation Remed Ind
Yes
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
No
Commodity Reached Hca
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
615
Est Cost Prop Damage
18000
Est Cost Emergency
1000
Est Cost Environmental
0
Est Cost Other
1000
Est Cost Other Details
Replace Farmer's Grass
Prpty
20615
Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght
0
Num Injured Treated By Emt
0
Num Resident Building Affctd
0
Num Business Building Affctd
0
Accident Psig
1100
Mop Psig
2160
Mop Cfr Section
Subpart E Pressure Test �195.406(A)(3)
Maop Established Date
2011-03-04 00:00:00
Maop Reversal Flow Ind
No
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Length Segment Isolated
15540
Internal Inspection Ind
No
Tight Mitered Ind
Yes
Operation Complications Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Cpm In Place Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
There were no alerts or alarms from the pressure or temperature transmitters tot the controllers.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Material Failure Of Pipe Or Weld
Cause Details
Design-, Construction-, Installation-, Or Fabrication-Related
Field Exam Ind
Yes
Metallurgical Ind
Yes
Failure Type
Design-, Construction-, Installation-, Or Fabrication-Related
Other Factor
Yes
Other Factor Details
Weld Defects Result Of Poor Workmanship
Additional Lack Fusion Ind
Yes
Pwf Addl Misalignment Ind
Yes
Pwf Additional Other Ind
Yes
Collected Data Ind
No
Has Hydrtst Conduc Before Ind
No
Direct Asmnt Conducted
No
Non Destructive Exam Ind
No
Extrnl Cor Galvanic Ind
Yes
Pwf Installation Ind
Yes
Preparer Name
H***** U*****
Preparer Title
Regulatory Consultant
Preparer Email
H************@e*********.com
Preparer Telephone
9364476100
Prepared Date
2025-08-08 00:00:00
Local Contact Name
P*** A*******
Local Contact Email
P********@c******.com
Local Contact Telephone
5012695215
Authorizer Name
H***** U*****
Authorizer Telephone
9187280133
Authorizer Title
Director
Authorizer Email
T*******@c**************.com
Narrative
On 5/29/25, 1300 cdt, a local landowner visited the capturepoint office in perryton texas and informed jason pelton, a capturepoint employee, of a possible CO2 leak on his land. He told jason that he called the emergency contact number on the line markers and valve risers the day before on 5/28/25, 1500 cdt. Capturepoint employee austen pitts was informed shortly after jason and proceeded to location. The pipeline failure was confirmed by austen pitts on 5/29/25, 15:00 cdt. Austen contacted the landowner and discussed the plan to shut-in mlv1 and mlv2 to blowdown the pipeline and isolate the failure. No evacuations, road closures, injuries, fatalities or public notifications were necessary. Mlv1 and mlv2 were closed 5/29/25, 1630 cdt and austen pitts and drew price patrolled and monitored the pipeline blowdown until 5/29/25, 1815 cdt. Kirk love with capturepoint contacted the national response center (nrc) and informed them of the line failure on 5/29/25, 15:55 cdt. He was given nrc report #1432544. The texas railroad commission was also informed of the possible pipeline leak. After the pipeline was blown down and the failure point isolated, oq qualified contractors were contacted to begin investigating and repairing the pipeline. Metallurgical engineering services, inc. (mes), performed a failure analysis which stated: "based on the failure analysis conducted on the subject 6-inch nominal pipe, the root cause of the failure was identified as weld defects within the circumferential girth weld heat affected zone (haz), as a result of poor workmanship. The primary failure was located at the 12 o'clock position, adjacent to the downstream side of the weld cap. Poor weld alignment and high weld amperage resulted in inadequate fusion between the base and weld metals, which created a cold joint with insufficient metal fusion at this location." in summary, mes determined "...The primary root cause of the failure was identified as weld defects within the girth weld haz, specifically poor weld alignment and inadequate fusion. These defects led to preferential corrosion attack, exacerbated by the presence of chalcogens, resulting in the through hole failure. Additional contributing factors included incomplete fusion, cratering, and slag inclusions within the weld area. All relevant test outcomes support these findings, confirming that the failure originated from weld-related issues rather than base metal composition or mechanical properties."
| Report Received Date | 2025-06-27 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2025 |
| Report Number | 20250157 |
| Supplemental Number | 41237 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 39754 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Capturepoint Llc |
| Operator Street Address | 1101 Central Expressway, South Suite 150 |
| Operator City Name | Allen |
| Operator State Abbreviation | TX |
| Operator Postal Code | 75013 |
| Time Zone | Central |
| Daylight Savings Ind | Yes |
| Location Latitude | 36.17517 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -101.04497 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Co2 (Carbon Dioxide) |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 42 |
| Intentional Release Bbls | 565 |
| Recovered Bbls | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Other |
| Accident Details | Landowner Reported |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Status When Identified | Normal Operation, Includes Pauses Between Batches And During Maintenance |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | Yes |
| Communication State Fed Ind | No |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1432544 NRC Report How to search |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Upstream Action Taken | Valve Closure |
| Upstream Valve Type Ind | Manual |
| Downstream Action Taken | Valve Closure |
| Downstream Valve Type Ind | Manual |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Borger To Farnsworth |
| Segment Name | Borger To Farnsworth (F2260) |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Tx |
| Onshore Postal Code | 79093 |
| Onshore City Name | Waka |
| Onshore County Name | Ochiltree |
| Designated Location | Milepost |
| Designated Name | Mp1.5 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Pipeline Right-Of-Way |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Under Soil |
| Depth Of Cover | 48 |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| Item Involved | Weld, Including Heat-Affected Zone |
| Pipe Diameter | 6 |
| Pipe Wall Thickness | 0.28 |
| Pipe Smys | 52000 |
| Pipe Specification | Api 5l X52 |
| Pipe Seam Type | Erw - High Frequency |
| Pipe Manufacturer | Unknown |
| Pipe Coating Type | Fusion Bonded Epoxy(Fbe) |
| Coating Applied Ind | No |
| Weld Subtype | Pipe Girth Weld |
| Different Girth Weld Ind | No |
| Installation Year | 2011 |
| Manufactured Year | Unknown |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Leak |
| Leak Type | Pinhole |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | No |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | Yes |
| Vegetation Remed Ind | Yes |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Commodity Reached Hca | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 615 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 18000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 1000 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 0 |
| Est Cost Other | 1000 |
| Est Cost Other Details | Replace Farmer's Grass |
| Prpty | 20615 |
| Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght | 0 |
| Num Injured Treated By Emt | 0 |
| Num Resident Building Affctd | 0 |
| Num Business Building Affctd | 0 |
| Accident Psig | 1100 |
| Mop Psig | 2160 |
| Mop Cfr Section | Subpart E Pressure Test �195.406(A)(3) View CFR 49 §192 |
| Maop Established Date | 2011-03-04 00:00:00 |
| Maop Reversal Flow Ind | No |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Length Segment Isolated | 15540 |
| Internal Inspection Ind | No |
| Tight Mitered Ind | Yes |
| Operation Complications Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Cpm In Place Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | There were no alerts or alarms from the pressure or temperature transmitters tot the controllers. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Material Failure Of Pipe Or Weld |
| Cause Details | Design-, Construction-, Installation-, Or Fabrication-Related |
| Field Exam Ind | Yes |
| Metallurgical Ind | Yes |
| Failure Type | Design-, Construction-, Installation-, Or Fabrication-Related |
| Other Factor | Yes |
| Other Factor Details | Weld Defects Result Of Poor Workmanship |
| Additional Lack Fusion Ind | Yes |
| Pwf Addl Misalignment Ind | Yes |
| Pwf Additional Other Ind | Yes |
| Collected Data Ind | No |
| Has Hydrtst Conduc Before Ind | No |
| Direct Asmnt Conducted | No |
| Non Destructive Exam Ind | No |
| Extrnl Cor Galvanic Ind | Yes |
| Pwf Installation Ind | Yes |
| Preparer Name | H***** U***** |
| Preparer Title | Regulatory Consultant |
| Preparer Email | H************@e*********.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 9364476100 |
| Prepared Date | 2025-08-08 00:00:00 |
| Local Contact Name | P*** A******* |
| Local Contact Email | P********@c******.com |
| Local Contact Telephone | 5012695215 |
| Authorizer Name | H***** U***** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 9187280133 |
| Authorizer Title | Director |
| Authorizer Email | T*******@c**************.com |
| Narrative | On 5/29/25, 1300 cdt, a local landowner visited the capturepoint office in perryton texas and informed jason pelton, a capturepoint employee, of a possible CO2 leak on his land. He told jason that he called the emergency contact number on the line markers and valve risers the day before on 5/28/25, 1500 cdt. Capturepoint employee austen pitts was informed shortly after jason and proceeded to location. The pipeline failure was confirmed by austen pitts on 5/29/25, 15:00 cdt. Austen contacted the landowner and discussed the plan to shut-in mlv1 and mlv2 to blowdown the pipeline and isolate the failure. No evacuations, road closures, injuries, fatalities or public notifications were necessary. Mlv1 and mlv2 were closed 5/29/25, 1630 cdt and austen pitts and drew price patrolled and monitored the pipeline blowdown until 5/29/25, 1815 cdt. Kirk love with capturepoint contacted the national response center (nrc) and informed them of the line failure on 5/29/25, 15:55 cdt. He was given nrc report #1432544. The texas railroad commission was also informed of the possible pipeline leak. After the pipeline was blown down and the failure point isolated, oq qualified contractors were contacted to begin investigating and repairing the pipeline. Metallurgical engineering services, inc. (mes), performed a failure analysis which stated: "based on the failure analysis conducted on the subject 6-inch nominal pipe, the root cause of the failure was identified as weld defects within the circumferential girth weld heat affected zone (haz), as a result of poor workmanship. The primary failure was located at the 12 o'clock position, adjacent to the downstream side of the weld cap. Poor weld alignment and high weld amperage resulted in inadequate fusion between the base and weld metals, which created a cold joint with insufficient metal fusion at this location." in summary, mes determined "...The primary root cause of the failure was identified as weld defects within the girth weld haz, specifically poor weld alignment and inadequate fusion. These defects led to preferential corrosion attack, exacerbated by the presence of chalcogens, resulting in the through hole failure. Additional contributing factors included incomplete fusion, cratering, and slag inclusions within the weld area. All relevant test outcomes support these findings, confirming that the failure originated from weld-related issues rather than base metal composition or mechanical properties." |
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