Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
GTG incident on 2025-06-18 — TX
Operator
Harvest Midstream Company
Cause
Other Incident Cause
Commodity
Natural Gas
Program
GTG
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$0
Incident datetime
2025-06-18 00:00 UTC
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
On may 19, 2025, harvest initiated a routine foam pigging operation on the pggs system at approximately 11:00 am as part of standard maintenance activities. The pig was launched without incident; however, pressure in the pg-02 segment began to rise unexpectedly later that afternoon. This segment is equipped with a 6-inch pressure relief valve (prv) and emergency shutdown valve (esdv-1), monitored by pressure transmitter pt-201. During the investigation, it was determined that the pig arrived significantly earlier than anticipated. The travel time had been projected using scada flow data. The pig was expected to take up to two days to reach its destination but completed the run within a few hours. This unanticipated arrival led to condensate accumulation in the line, which traveled into the actuator supply tubing of esdv-1, contributing to valve malfunction. At 5:14 pm, pt-201 registered a pressure of 526 psi. The houston control room detected the trend and contacted pipeline operator, who advised that the foam pig was likely still in transit. He informed the controller that the valve had pressure relief capability and instructed them to reset the valve if necessary and notify him if pressure exceeded 600 psi. As pressure continued to rise, pipeline operator initiated manual shut-in coordination with the hilcorp platform. At 5:54 pm, pressure reached 550 psi and esdv-1 received a close command, shutting the valve as designed. However, condensate accumulation in the regulator and actuator tubing subsequently prevented the valve from reopening. The control room issued multiple reset commands to esdv-1 via scada, but the valve remained in an 'error' state and failed to reopen. At 6:37 pm, pressure reached the maop of 606.2 psi, prompting the controller to escalate the situation to operations controls director, foreman, and pipeline operator. By 6:43 pm, scada engineer was contacted for support. He determined that the issue was not due to a scada malfunction but was likely caused by condensate in the regulator and actuator tubing, which prevented the valve from receiving sufficient actuation pressure. At 6:50 pm, pressure peaked at 620.9 psi, exceeding maop but remaining below 110%, and the prv activated to relieve pressure. The prv vented natural gas to atmosphere for approximately 22 minutes. At 6:57 pm, flow through pg-02 dropped to zero. At 7:00 pm, a manual close command was issued to esdv-1, and a permissive signal was received. Pipeline operators agreed to keep the valve closed and conduct a stand-up pressure test to confirm pipeline integrity. The test began at 7:18 pm, with pt-201 reading 594.5 psi. By 8:01 pm, pressure had stabilized at 594.0 psi. Although the line was deemed safe to restart, repeated attempts to reopen esdv-1 were unsuccessful. At 10:19 pm, pipeline operator and I&e technician decided to keep the system shut-in overnight. The root cause was identified as a liquid-filled regulator and actuator tubing, which prevented proper valve actuation. Plans were made to access the site the following morning and replace the affected components.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2025-06-18 00:00:00
Iyear
2025
Report Number
20250071
Supplemental Number
41047
Report Type
Original
Operator Id
30782
Name
Harvest Midstream Company
Operator Street Address
1111 Travis
Operator City Name
Houston
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
77002
Time Zone
Central
Daylight Savings Ind
Yes
Location Latitude
29.414059
Location Longitude
-90.443667
Nrc Rpt Num
1431586
Additional Nrc Report Numbers
1431771
Commodity Released Type
Natural Gas
Unintentional Release
6000
Intentional Release
0
Accompanying Liquid
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Status When Identified
Normal Operation, Includes Pauses During Maintenance
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Communication State Fed Ind
Yes
Party Initiated Communication
Operator
Ignite Ind
No
Upstream Oprtnl Cntrl Detail
No Valve Upstream.
Downstream Oprtnl Cntrl Detail
No Valve Upstream.
Num Pub Evacuated
0
On Off Shore
Onshore
Onshore State Abbreviation
La
Onshore Postal Code
70344
Onshore City Name
Not Within A Municipality
Onshore County Name
Terrebonne
Designated Location
Survey Station No.
Designated Name
713+45
Pipe Fac Name
Paradis Gas
Segment Name
Pg-2
Federal
No
Location Type
Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Aboveground
Incident Area Subtype
Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Intrastate
System Part Involved
Onshore Regulator/metering Station Equipment And Piping
Item Involved
Esd System, But Excluding Product Drain Lines And Tubing
Installation Year
Unknown
Manufactured Year
Unknown
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Other
Release Type Details
Relief Valve.
Class Location Type
Class 1 Location
Could Be Hca
No
Pir Radius
305
Heat Damage Ind
No
Non Heat Damage Ind
No
Did Occur In Mca Ind
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Unintentional Release
17760
Est Cost Intentional Release
0
Est Cost Prop Damage
0
Est Cost Emergency
0
Est Cost Other
0
Gas Cost In Mcf
2.96
Prpty
17760
Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght
0
Num Injured Treated By Emt
0
Num Resident Building Affctd
0
Num Business Building Affctd
0
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Accident Psig
606.2
Gas Flow In Pipe In Mcf
17520
Mop Psig
606
Mop Cfr Section
192.619(A)(1)
Maop Established Date
2023-04-24 00:00:00
Maop Reversal Flow Ind
No
Accident Pressure
Pressure Exceeded Maop, But Did Not Exceed The Applicable Allowance In 192.201
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Gas Required Odorized Ind
No
Pipeline Function
Type C Gathering
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
Yes
Scada Conf Ind
Yes
Accident Identifier
Scada-Based Information (Such As Alarm(S), Alert(S), Event(S), And/or Volume Or Pack Calculations)
Investigation Status
Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)
Invest No Controller Ind
Yes
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Other Incident Cause
Cause Details
Miscellaneous
Other Type
Miscellaneous
Misc Details
Condensate Build Up Increased The Pressure On The Line Up To The Point Of Esdv-1 Closure. Pressure Continued To Rise Due To Third-Party Production Requiring Time To Arrive On-Site For Manual Shut Down.
Eqf Control Releaf Ind
Yes
Preparer Name
J**** S****
Preparer Title
Compliance Specialist
Preparer Email
J**********@h***************.com
Preparer Telephone
8326384717
Local Contact Name
S**** D**
Local Contact Email
S********@h***************.com
Local Contact Telephone
3375780759
Authorizer Name
L***** F*****
Authorizer Title
Director Of Integrity
Authorizer Telephone
3462372138
Authorizer Email
L************@h***************.com
Narrative
On may 19, 2025, harvest initiated a routine foam pigging operation on the pggs system at approximately 11:00 am as part of standard maintenance activities. The pig was launched without incident; however, pressure in the pg-02 segment began to rise unexpectedly later that afternoon. This segment is equipped with a 6-inch pressure relief valve (prv) and emergency shutdown valve (esdv-1), monitored by pressure transmitter pt-201. During the investigation, it was determined that the pig arrived significantly earlier than anticipated. The travel time had been projected using scada flow data. The pig was expected to take up to two days to reach its destination but completed the run within a few hours. This unanticipated arrival led to condensate accumulation in the line, which traveled into the actuator supply tubing of esdv-1, contributing to valve malfunction. At 5:14 pm, pt-201 registered a pressure of 526 psi. The houston control room detected the trend and contacted pipeline operator, who advised that the foam pig was likely still in transit. He informed the controller that the valve had pressure relief capability and instructed them to reset the valve if necessary and notify him if pressure exceeded 600 psi. As pressure continued to rise, pipeline operator initiated manual shut-in coordination with the hilcorp platform. At 5:54 pm, pressure reached 550 psi and esdv-1 received a close command, shutting the valve as designed. However, condensate accumulation in the regulator and actuator tubing subsequently prevented the valve from reopening. The control room issued multiple reset commands to esdv-1 via scada, but the valve remained in an 'error' state and failed to reopen. At 6:37 pm, pressure reached the maop of 606.2 psi, prompting the controller to escalate the situation to operations controls director, foreman, and pipeline operator. By 6:43 pm, scada engineer was contacted for support. He determined that the issue was not due to a scada malfunction but was likely caused by condensate in the regulator and actuator tubing, which prevented the valve from receiving sufficient actuation pressure. At 6:50 pm, pressure peaked at 620.9 psi, exceeding maop but remaining below 110%, and the prv activated to relieve pressure. The prv vented natural gas to atmosphere for approximately 22 minutes. At 6:57 pm, flow through pg-02 dropped to zero. At 7:00 pm, a manual close command was issued to esdv-1, and a permissive signal was received. Pipeline operators agreed to keep the valve closed and conduct a stand-up pressure test to confirm pipeline integrity. The test began at 7:18 pm, with pt-201 reading 594.5 psi. By 8:01 pm, pressure had stabilized at 594.0 psi. Although the line was deemed safe to restart, repeated attempts to reopen esdv-1 were unsuccessful. At 10:19 pm, pipeline operator and I&e technician decided to keep the system shut-in overnight. The root cause was identified as a liquid-filled regulator and actuator tubing, which prevented proper valve actuation. Plans were made to access the site the following morning and replace the affected components.
| Report Received Date | 2025-06-18 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2025 |
| Report Number | 20250071 |
| Supplemental Number | 41047 |
| Report Type | Original |
| Operator Id | 30782 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Harvest Midstream Company |
| Operator Street Address | 1111 Travis |
| Operator City Name | Houston |
| Operator State Abbreviation | TX |
| Operator Postal Code | 77002 |
| Time Zone | Central |
| Daylight Savings Ind | Yes |
| Location Latitude | 29.414059 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -90.443667 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1431586 NRC Report How to search |
| Additional Nrc Report Numbers | 1431771 |
| Commodity Released Type | Natural Gas |
| Unintentional Release | 6000 |
| Intentional Release | 0 |
| Accompanying Liquid | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Status When Identified | Normal Operation, Includes Pauses During Maintenance |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | Yes |
| Communication State Fed Ind | Yes |
| Party Initiated Communication | Operator |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Upstream Oprtnl Cntrl Detail | No Valve Upstream. |
| Downstream Oprtnl Cntrl Detail | No Valve Upstream. |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | La |
| Onshore Postal Code | 70344 |
| Onshore City Name | Not Within A Municipality |
| Onshore County Name | Terrebonne |
| Designated Location | Survey Station No. |
| Designated Name | 713+45 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Paradis Gas |
| Segment Name | Pg-2 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Aboveground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Intrastate |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Regulator/metering Station Equipment And Piping |
| Item Involved | Esd System, But Excluding Product Drain Lines And Tubing |
| Installation Year | Unknown |
| Manufactured Year | Unknown |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Other |
| Release Type Details | Relief Valve. |
| Class Location Type | Class 1 Location |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Pir Radius | 305 |
| Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Non Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Did Occur In Mca Ind | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Unintentional Release | 17760 |
| Est Cost Intentional Release | 0 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 0 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 0 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Gas Cost In Mcf | 2.96 |
| Prpty | 17760 |
| Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght | 0 |
| Num Injured Treated By Emt | 0 |
| Num Resident Building Affctd | 0 |
| Num Business Building Affctd | 0 |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Accident Psig | 606.2 |
| Gas Flow In Pipe In Mcf | 17520 |
| Mop Psig | 606 |
| Mop Cfr Section | 192.619(A)(1) View CFR 49 §192 |
| Maop Established Date | 2023-04-24 00:00:00 |
| Maop Reversal Flow Ind | No |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Exceeded Maop, But Did Not Exceed The Applicable Allowance In 192.201 |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Gas Required Odorized Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | Type C Gathering |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | Yes |
| Scada Conf Ind | Yes |
| Accident Identifier | Scada-Based Information (Such As Alarm(S), Alert(S), Event(S), And/or Volume Or Pack Calculations) |
| Investigation Status | Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply) |
| Invest No Controller Ind | Yes |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Other Incident Cause |
| Cause Details | Miscellaneous |
| Other Type | Miscellaneous |
| Misc Details | Condensate Build Up Increased The Pressure On The Line Up To The Point Of Esdv-1 Closure. Pressure Continued To Rise Due To Third-Party Production Requiring Time To Arrive On-Site For Manual Shut Down. |
| Eqf Control Releaf Ind | Yes |
| Preparer Name | J**** S**** |
| Preparer Title | Compliance Specialist |
| Preparer Email | J**********@h***************.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 8326384717 |
| Local Contact Name | S**** D** |
| Local Contact Email | S********@h***************.com |
| Local Contact Telephone | 3375780759 |
| Authorizer Name | L***** F***** |
| Authorizer Title | Director Of Integrity |
| Authorizer Telephone | 3462372138 |
| Authorizer Email | L************@h***************.com |
| Narrative | On may 19, 2025, harvest initiated a routine foam pigging operation on the pggs system at approximately 11:00 am as part of standard maintenance activities. The pig was launched without incident; however, pressure in the pg-02 segment began to rise unexpectedly later that afternoon. This segment is equipped with a 6-inch pressure relief valve (prv) and emergency shutdown valve (esdv-1), monitored by pressure transmitter pt-201. During the investigation, it was determined that the pig arrived significantly earlier than anticipated. The travel time had been projected using scada flow data. The pig was expected to take up to two days to reach its destination but completed the run within a few hours. This unanticipated arrival led to condensate accumulation in the line, which traveled into the actuator supply tubing of esdv-1, contributing to valve malfunction. At 5:14 pm, pt-201 registered a pressure of 526 psi. The houston control room detected the trend and contacted pipeline operator, who advised that the foam pig was likely still in transit. He informed the controller that the valve had pressure relief capability and instructed them to reset the valve if necessary and notify him if pressure exceeded 600 psi. As pressure continued to rise, pipeline operator initiated manual shut-in coordination with the hilcorp platform. At 5:54 pm, pressure reached 550 psi and esdv-1 received a close command, shutting the valve as designed. However, condensate accumulation in the regulator and actuator tubing subsequently prevented the valve from reopening. The control room issued multiple reset commands to esdv-1 via scada, but the valve remained in an 'error' state and failed to reopen. At 6:37 pm, pressure reached the maop of 606.2 psi, prompting the controller to escalate the situation to operations controls director, foreman, and pipeline operator. By 6:43 pm, scada engineer was contacted for support. He determined that the issue was not due to a scada malfunction but was likely caused by condensate in the regulator and actuator tubing, which prevented the valve from receiving sufficient actuation pressure. At 6:50 pm, pressure peaked at 620.9 psi, exceeding maop but remaining below 110%, and the prv activated to relieve pressure. The prv vented natural gas to atmosphere for approximately 22 minutes. At 6:57 pm, flow through pg-02 dropped to zero. At 7:00 pm, a manual close command was issued to esdv-1, and a permissive signal was received. Pipeline operators agreed to keep the valve closed and conduct a stand-up pressure test to confirm pipeline integrity. The test began at 7:18 pm, with pt-201 reading 594.5 psi. By 8:01 pm, pressure had stabilized at 594.0 psi. Although the line was deemed safe to restart, repeated attempts to reopen esdv-1 were unsuccessful. At 10:19 pm, pipeline operator and I&e technician decided to keep the system shut-in overnight. The root cause was identified as a liquid-filled regulator and actuator tubing, which prevented proper valve actuation. Plans were made to access the site the following morning and replace the affected components. |
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