HL incident on 2024-12-18 — TX

Operator
Holly Energy Partners - Operating, L.p.
Cause
Corrosion Failure
Commodity
Refined And/or Petroleum Product (Non-Hvl) Which Is A Liquid At Ambient Conditions
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities 0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$693,000
Incident datetime
2024-12-18 00:00 UTC
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
At 11:40 cst on november 19, 2024, a pipeline technician with holly energy was notified by a line locator with another pipeline operator of a suspected leak near sweetwater, texas. The pipeline technician arrived on site at 12:00 cst, and seven minutes later the artesia control center initiated a pipeline shutdown. Field teams were deployed to secure the area. As part of the initial response, scada data was reviewed for pressure drops and flow anomalies, and a walkdown of adjacent right-of-ways was conducted to rule out other possible sources. No work activities were underway in the area, and there were no signs of recent ground disturbance near the release site. Upon confirmation of the leak at 14:15 cst, regulatory notifications were made. The national response center (nrc, report #1416839) was contacted at 15:01, followed by the texas railroad commission (rrc) at 15:10, both within the required timeframes. The texas commission on environmental quality (tceq) was notified later the same day at 16:44. Holly energy activated its oil spill removal organization (osro) at 14:30 cst. Local emergency response agencies were notified, though no assistance was ultimately required from local responders. Blackland services, our primary local contractor, mobilized vacuum trucks, an excavator, and a light plant for night operations. Hf sinclair�s emergency response trailer was also deployed from their tye terminal in abilene, stocked with tools, water boom, generators, absorbent pads, fire extinguishers, fencing, stops, and straw wattle. Once the osro arrived, additional support was provided by vacuum contractors, a third-party emergency response provider specializing in hazardous materials incidents. Ambipar supplemented the response with vacuum trucks, personnel, and trailers equipped with scbas, tyvek suits, and additional containment measures. Although no vapors of h2s were at risk, established response protocols effectively mitigated the hazard. Environmental contractors immediately began site containment and remediation activities. No injuries or safety-related incidents were reported during the initial response or throughout the repair and replacement activities. Emergency response activation remained in place from november 19 to december 3 (14 days). Failure occurred at mp 62 in a buried pipeline segment. Metallurgical testing confirmed the presence of external corrosion on the site of a pinhole leak. Soil analysis revealed elevated levels of chlorine and magnesium, which likely contributed to the corrosion. Coating evaluations post review showed inconsistent thicknesses across four cross-sections. According to the manufacturer specifications for denso-protal 7200, the recommended coating thickness for fbe repairs is 25�30 mils, with a minimum and maximum thicknesses between 20 and 70 mils. The 12 and 6 o�clock positions had the thinnest average coating thickness in the pipe sections, with a minimum coating thickness found on pipe section 3 at the 12 o�clock position reading 7.6 mils. While the maximum coating on that section was found to be 40.2. This segment was coated on-site during a 2023 replacement project, where expedited scheduling and the use of bare pipe resulted in limited qa/qc oversight. The lack of oversight, along with deviations from coating specifications and procedures, contributed to the release. In addition, the cathodic protection system showed signs of interference, likely from dc interaction with other pipelines in the shared corridor and possibly compounded by nearby ac power sources. Leak detection systems did not trigger during the event, likely due to the small release volume combined with metering inaccuracies. Several improvement opportunities were identified, including strengthening coating quality assurance processes, enhancing cathodic protection monitoring, and upgrading leak detection systems.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2024-12-18 00:00:00
Iyear
2024
Report Number
20240292
Supplemental Number
41305
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
Name
Holly Energy Partners - Operating, L.p.
Operator Street Address
2323 Victory Ave. Suite 1400
Operator City Name
Dallas
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
75219
Time Zone
Central
Daylight Savings Ind
No
Location Latitude
Location Longitude
Commodity Released Type
Refined And/or Petroleum Product (Non-Hvl) Which Is A Liquid At Ambient Conditions
Commodity Subtype
Gasoline (Non-Ethanol)
Unintentional Release Bbls
125
Recovered Bbls
120
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Notification From Public
System Part Involved
Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
On Off Shore
Onshore
Status When Identified
Normal Operation, Includes Pauses Between Batches And During Maintenance
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Communication State Fed Ind
Yes
Party Initiated Communication
Operator
Nrc Rpt Num
Additional Nrc Report Numbers
1417020
Ignite Ind
No
Upstream Action Taken
Valve Closure
Upstream Valve Type Ind
Remotely Controlled
Downstream Action Taken
Valve Closure
Downstream Valve Type Ind
Remotely Controlled
Notify Qualified Indiv Ind
Yes
Oil Spill Removal Org Ind
Yes
Osro Arrived On Site Dt
11/19/2024 18:30
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Big Spring To Hawley X6
Segment Name
Big Spring Refinery To Tye Traps 536
Onshore State Abbreviation
Tx
Onshore Postal Code
79556
Onshore City Name
Not Within A Municipality
Onshore County Name
Nolan County
Designated Location
Milepost
Designated Name
62
Federal
No
Location Type
Originated On Operator-Controlled Property, But Then Flowed Or Migrated Off The Property
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Under Soil
Depth Of Cover
44
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Intrastate
Item Involved
Pipe
Pipe Type
Pipe Body
Puddle Weld Ind
No
Pipe Diameter
6.625
Pipe Wall Thickness
0.25
Pipe Smys
70880
Pipe Specification
X52
Pipe Seam Type
Erw - High Frequency
Pipe Manufacturer
U.s. Steel
Pipe Coating Type
Epoxy Other Than Fbe
Coating Applied Ind
Yes
Installation Year
2023
Manufactured Year
2014
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Leak
Leak Type
Pinhole
Wildlife Impact Ind
Yes
Fish Aquatic Impact Ind
Yes
Soil Contamination
Yes
Long Term Assessment
Yes
Remediation Ind
Yes
Surface Water Remed Ind
Yes
Groundwater Remed Ind
Yes
Soil Remed Ind
Yes
Water Contam Ind
Yes
Surface Contam Ind
Yes
Amount Released
1
Rel Water Name
Localized Manmade Pond On Property
Could Be Hca
Yes
Commodity Reached Hca
Yes
Other Pop Ind
Yes
Other Pop Yes No
Yes
Est Cost Oper Paid
10000
Est Cost Gas Released
8750
Est Cost Prop Damage
693000
Est Cost Emergency
500000
Est Cost Environmental
750000
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
1961750
Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght
0
Num Injured Treated By Emt
0
Num Resident Building Affctd
0
Num Business Building Affctd
0
Accident Psig
207
Mop Psig
1120
Mop Cfr Section
Subpart E Pressure Test �195.406(A)(3)
Maop Established Date
2012-02-01 00:00:00
Maop Reversal Flow Ind
No
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Length Segment Isolated
15840
Internal Inspection Ind
Yes
Operation Complications Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Cpm In Place Ind
Yes
Cpm Operating Ind
Yes
Cpm Functional Ind
Yes
Cpm Detection Ind
No
Cpm Conf Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
Corrosion was the cause - the pipe was operated within parameters at all times
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Corrosion Failure
Cause Details
External Corrosion
Internal External
External Corrosion
Visual Exam Results
Localized Pitting
Galvanic Corrosion Ind
Yes
Stray Current Corrosion Ind
Yes
Stray Current Type
Direct Current
Stray Current Details
Dc Interference From Congestion Within Shared Pipeline Corridor
Field Exam Basis Ind
Yes
Underground Location
Yes
Under Cathodic Protection Ind
Yes
Cathodic Pro Start Year
2002
Shielding Evident
Yes
Cathodic Survey Type
Yes
Cp Annual Survey Ind
Yes
Close Interval Survey Ind
Yes
Other Cp Survey Ind
Yes
Cp Annual Survey Year
2024
Close Interval Survey Year
2024
Other Cp Survey Year
2024
Prior Damage
N/a Bare/ineffectively Coated Pipe
Collected Data Ind
Yes
Axial Magnetic Flx Lkg Ind
Yes
Axial Recent Year
2022
Axial Rcnt Propul Method
Free Swimming
Axial Rcnt Attuned Detect
Metal Loss
Axial Rcnt Atnd Dtct Metal
High Resolution
Axial Previous Year
2017
Axial Prev Propul Method
Free Swimming
Axial Prev Attuned Detect
Metal Loss
Axial Prev Atnd Dtct Metal
High Resolution
Has Hydrtst Conduc Before Ind
Yes
Hydrtst Most Rcnt Year
2023
Hydrtst Most Rcnt Pressure
1400
Direct Asmnt Conducted
No
Non Destructive Exam Ind
No
Extrnl Cor Stray Current Ind
Yes
Io Follow Procedure Ind
Yes
Preparer Name
D***** B****
Preparer Title
Manager Pipeline Regualtory
Preparer Email
D***********@h*********.com
Preparer Telephone
9727955457
Prepared Date
2025-08-27 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
J*** P****
Authorizer Telephone
9183400556
Authorizer Title
Vice President Midstream Operations
Authorizer Email
J*********@h*********.com
Narrative
At 11:40 cst on november 19, 2024, a pipeline technician with holly energy was notified by a line locator with another pipeline operator of a suspected leak near sweetwater, texas. The pipeline technician arrived on site at 12:00 cst, and seven minutes later the artesia control center initiated a pipeline shutdown. Field teams were deployed to secure the area. As part of the initial response, scada data was reviewed for pressure drops and flow anomalies, and a walkdown of adjacent right-of-ways was conducted to rule out other possible sources. No work activities were underway in the area, and there were no signs of recent ground disturbance near the release site. Upon confirmation of the leak at 14:15 cst, regulatory notifications were made. The national response center (nrc, report #1416839) was contacted at 15:01, followed by the texas railroad commission (rrc) at 15:10, both within the required timeframes. The texas commission on environmental quality (tceq) was notified later the same day at 16:44. Holly energy activated its oil spill removal organization (osro) at 14:30 cst. Local emergency response agencies were notified, though no assistance was ultimately required from local responders. Blackland services, our primary local contractor, mobilized vacuum trucks, an excavator, and a light plant for night operations. Hf sinclair�s emergency response trailer was also deployed from their tye terminal in abilene, stocked with tools, water boom, generators, absorbent pads, fire extinguishers, fencing, stops, and straw wattle. Once the osro arrived, additional support was provided by vacuum contractors, a third-party emergency response provider specializing in hazardous materials incidents. Ambipar supplemented the response with vacuum trucks, personnel, and trailers equipped with scbas, tyvek suits, and additional containment measures. Although no vapors of h2s were at risk, established response protocols effectively mitigated the hazard. Environmental contractors immediately began site containment and remediation activities. No injuries or safety-related incidents were reported during the initial response or throughout the repair and replacement activities. Emergency response activation remained in place from november 19 to december 3 (14 days). Failure occurred at mp 62 in a buried pipeline segment. Metallurgical testing confirmed the presence of external corrosion on the site of a pinhole leak. Soil analysis revealed elevated levels of chlorine and magnesium, which likely contributed to the corrosion. Coating evaluations post review showed inconsistent thicknesses across four cross-sections. According to the manufacturer specifications for denso-protal 7200, the recommended coating thickness for fbe repairs is 25�30 mils, with a minimum and maximum thicknesses between 20 and 70 mils. The 12 and 6 o�clock positions had the thinnest average coating thickness in the pipe sections, with a minimum coating thickness found on pipe section 3 at the 12 o�clock position reading 7.6 mils. While the maximum coating on that section was found to be 40.2. This segment was coated on-site during a 2023 replacement project, where expedited scheduling and the use of bare pipe resulted in limited qa/qc oversight. The lack of oversight, along with deviations from coating specifications and procedures, contributed to the release. In addition, the cathodic protection system showed signs of interference, likely from dc interaction with other pipelines in the shared corridor and possibly compounded by nearby ac power sources. Leak detection systems did not trigger during the event, likely due to the small release volume combined with metering inaccuracies. Several improvement opportunities were identified, including strengthening coating quality assurance processes, enhancing cathodic protection monitoring, and upgrading leak detection systems.
Report Received Date 2024-12-18 00:00:00
Iyear 2024
Report Number 20240292
Supplemental Number 41305
Report Type Supplemental Final
Operator Id 32011 PHMSA Enforcement
Name Holly Energy Partners - Operating, L.p.
Operator Street Address 2323 Victory Ave. Suite 1400
Operator City Name Dallas
Operator State Abbreviation TX
Operator Postal Code 75219
Time Zone Central
Daylight Savings Ind No
Location Latitude 32.444175 Google Maps OpenStreetMap
Location Longitude -100.39881 Google Maps OpenStreetMap
Commodity Released Type Refined And/or Petroleum Product (Non-Hvl) Which Is A Liquid At Ambient Conditions
Commodity Subtype Gasoline (Non-Ethanol)
Unintentional Release Bbls 125
Recovered Bbls 120
Fatality Ind No
Fatal 0
Injury Ind No
Injure 0
Accident Identifier Notification From Public
System Part Involved Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
On Off Shore Onshore
Status When Identified Normal Operation, Includes Pauses Between Batches And During Maintenance
Shutdown Due Accident Ind Yes
Communication State Fed Ind Yes
Party Initiated Communication Operator
Nrc Rpt Num 1416839 NRC Report How to search
Additional Nrc Report Numbers 1417020
Ignite Ind No
Upstream Action Taken Valve Closure
Upstream Valve Type Ind Remotely Controlled
Downstream Action Taken Valve Closure
Downstream Valve Type Ind Remotely Controlled
Notify Qualified Indiv Ind Yes
Oil Spill Removal Org Ind Yes
Osro Arrived On Site Dt 11/19/2024 18:30
Num Pub Evacuated 0
Pipe Fac Name Big Spring To Hawley X6
Segment Name Big Spring Refinery To Tye Traps 536
Onshore State Abbreviation Tx
Onshore Postal Code 79556
Onshore City Name Not Within A Municipality
Onshore County Name Nolan County
Designated Location Milepost
Designated Name 62
Federal No
Location Type Originated On Operator-Controlled Property, But Then Flowed Or Migrated Off The Property
Incident Area Type Underground
Incident Area Subtype Under Soil
Depth Of Cover 44
Crossing No
Pipe Facility Type Intrastate
Item Involved Pipe
Pipe Type Pipe Body
Puddle Weld Ind No
Pipe Diameter 6.625
Pipe Wall Thickness 0.25
Pipe Smys 70880
Pipe Specification X52
Pipe Seam Type Erw - High Frequency
Pipe Manufacturer U.s. Steel
Pipe Coating Type Epoxy Other Than Fbe
Coating Applied Ind Yes
Installation Year 2023
Manufactured Year 2014
Material Involved Carbon Steel
Release Type Leak
Leak Type Pinhole
Wildlife Impact Ind Yes
Fish Aquatic Impact Ind Yes
Soil Contamination Yes
Long Term Assessment Yes
Remediation Ind Yes
Surface Water Remed Ind Yes
Groundwater Remed Ind Yes
Soil Remed Ind Yes
Water Contam Ind Yes
Surface Contam Ind Yes
Amount Released 1
Rel Water Name Localized Manmade Pond On Property
Could Be Hca Yes
Commodity Reached Hca Yes
Other Pop Ind Yes
Other Pop Yes No Yes
Est Cost Oper Paid 10000
Est Cost Gas Released 8750
Est Cost Prop Damage 693000
Est Cost Emergency 500000
Est Cost Environmental 750000
Est Cost Other 0
Prpty 1961750
Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght 0
Num Injured Treated By Emt 0
Num Resident Building Affctd 0
Num Business Building Affctd 0
Accident Psig 207
Mop Psig 1120
Mop Cfr Section Subpart E Pressure Test �195.406(A)(3) View CFR 49 §192
Maop Established Date 2012-02-01 00:00:00
Maop Reversal Flow Ind No
Accident Pressure Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind No
Length Segment Isolated 15840
Internal Inspection Ind Yes
Operation Complications Ind No
Pipeline Function > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind Yes
Scada Operating Ind Yes
Scada Functional Ind Yes
Scada Detection Ind No
Scada Conf Ind No
Cpm In Place Ind Yes
Cpm Operating Ind Yes
Cpm Functional Ind Yes
Cpm Detection Ind No
Cpm Conf Ind No
Investigation Status No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details Corrosion was the cause - the pipe was operated within parameters at all times
Employee Drug Test Ind No
Contractor Drug Test Ind No
Cause Corrosion Failure
Cause Details External Corrosion
Internal External External Corrosion
Visual Exam Results Localized Pitting
Galvanic Corrosion Ind Yes
Stray Current Corrosion Ind Yes
Stray Current Type Direct Current
Stray Current Details Dc Interference From Congestion Within Shared Pipeline Corridor
Field Exam Basis Ind Yes
Underground Location Yes
Under Cathodic Protection Ind Yes
Cathodic Pro Start Year 2002
Shielding Evident Yes
Cathodic Survey Type Yes
Cp Annual Survey Ind Yes
Close Interval Survey Ind Yes
Other Cp Survey Ind Yes
Cp Annual Survey Year 2024
Close Interval Survey Year 2024
Other Cp Survey Year 2024
Prior Damage N/a Bare/ineffectively Coated Pipe
Collected Data Ind Yes
Axial Magnetic Flx Lkg Ind Yes
Axial Recent Year 2022
Axial Rcnt Propul Method Free Swimming
Axial Rcnt Attuned Detect Metal Loss
Axial Rcnt Atnd Dtct Metal High Resolution
Axial Previous Year 2017
Axial Prev Propul Method Free Swimming
Axial Prev Attuned Detect Metal Loss
Axial Prev Atnd Dtct Metal High Resolution
Has Hydrtst Conduc Before Ind Yes
Hydrtst Most Rcnt Year 2023
Hydrtst Most Rcnt Pressure 1400
Direct Asmnt Conducted No
Non Destructive Exam Ind No
Extrnl Cor Stray Current Ind Yes
Io Follow Procedure Ind Yes
Preparer Name D***** B****
Preparer Title Manager Pipeline Regualtory
Preparer Email D***********@h*********.com
Preparer Telephone 9727955457
Prepared Date 2025-08-27 00:00:00
Authorizer Name J*** P****
Authorizer Telephone 9183400556
Authorizer Title Vice President Midstream Operations
Authorizer Email J*********@h*********.com
Narrative At 11:40 cst on november 19, 2024, a pipeline technician with holly energy was notified by a line locator with another pipeline operator of a suspected leak near sweetwater, texas. The pipeline technician arrived on site at 12:00 cst, and seven minutes later the artesia control center initiated a pipeline shutdown. Field teams were deployed to secure the area. As part of the initial response, scada data was reviewed for pressure drops and flow anomalies, and a walkdown of adjacent right-of-ways was conducted to rule out other possible sources. No work activities were underway in the area, and there were no signs of recent ground disturbance near the release site. Upon confirmation of the leak at 14:15 cst, regulatory notifications were made. The national response center (nrc, report #1416839) was contacted at 15:01, followed by the texas railroad commission (rrc) at 15:10, both within the required timeframes. The texas commission on environmental quality (tceq) was notified later the same day at 16:44. Holly energy activated its oil spill removal organization (osro) at 14:30 cst. Local emergency response agencies were notified, though no assistance was ultimately required from local responders. Blackland services, our primary local contractor, mobilized vacuum trucks, an excavator, and a light plant for night operations. Hf sinclair�s emergency response trailer was also deployed from their tye terminal in abilene, stocked with tools, water boom, generators, absorbent pads, fire extinguishers, fencing, stops, and straw wattle. Once the osro arrived, additional support was provided by vacuum contractors, a third-party emergency response provider specializing in hazardous materials incidents. Ambipar supplemented the response with vacuum trucks, personnel, and trailers equipped with scbas, tyvek suits, and additional containment measures. Although no vapors of h2s were at risk, established response protocols effectively mitigated the hazard. Environmental contractors immediately began site containment and remediation activities. No injuries or safety-related incidents were reported during the initial response or throughout the repair and replacement activities. Emergency response activation remained in place from november 19 to december 3 (14 days). Failure occurred at mp 62 in a buried pipeline segment. Metallurgical testing confirmed the presence of external corrosion on the site of a pinhole leak. Soil analysis revealed elevated levels of chlorine and magnesium, which likely contributed to the corrosion. Coating evaluations post review showed inconsistent thicknesses across four cross-sections. According to the manufacturer specifications for denso-protal 7200, the recommended coating thickness for fbe repairs is 25�30 mils, with a minimum and maximum thicknesses between 20 and 70 mils. The 12 and 6 o�clock positions had the thinnest average coating thickness in the pipe sections, with a minimum coating thickness found on pipe section 3 at the 12 o�clock position reading 7.6 mils. While the maximum coating on that section was found to be 40.2. This segment was coated on-site during a 2023 replacement project, where expedited scheduling and the use of bare pipe resulted in limited qa/qc oversight. The lack of oversight, along with deviations from coating specifications and procedures, contributed to the release. In addition, the cathodic protection system showed signs of interference, likely from dc interaction with other pipelines in the shared corridor and possibly compounded by nearby ac power sources. Leak detection systems did not trigger during the event, likely due to the small release volume combined with metering inaccuracies. Several improvement opportunities were identified, including strengthening coating quality assurance processes, enhancing cathodic protection monitoring, and upgrading leak detection systems.

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