Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
GTG incident on 2024-11-01 — WI
Operator
Bluewater Gas Storage, Llc
Cause
Equipment Failure
Commodity
Natural Gas
Program
GTG
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$0
Incident datetime
2024-11-01 00:00 UTC
Report number
Location
WI
Narrative
Re: omo rd compressor station incident nrc incident report #1413461 & follow up #1413594 on october 5, 2024 at approximately 3:09 am, emergency shutdown (esd) vent valves (bdv 9010) and (bdv 9011) opened because of a loss of power gas pressure used to hold the esd valves closed. Pipeline isolation (sdv-9001) was also open, resulting in a gas release of ~5.2 mmscf to atmosphere. The loss of power gas was caused by of a combination of an isolation of the power gas header and a leaking regulator in the power gas system. On october 3, 2024, at 10:56 a.M., the fuel gas supply valve (sdv 9008) tripped / closed due to high pressure (>475 psig). The high pressure was caused by daytime heating and thermal expansion of the gas in the fuel gas system. The omo road compressor station was shutdown at the time, minimizing fuel gas use and causing fuel gas header pressure to fluctuate with ambient temperature. In addition to its primary function to supply fuel to the natural gas fired engines used to drive the gas compressors at the station, the fuel gas system also provides power gas to the power gas header. Typically, power gas pressure is high enough that the gas pressure overcomes the spring tension used to open the blowdown valves in the event of an esd. Following the overpressure condition, sdv 9008 was not reopened because the compressor station was idle and the need for fuel gas was minimal. With sdv 9008 closed and the power gas header isolated, a leaking regulator on bdv 9011 eventually bled off enough pressure from the power gas header to allow bdv 9010 and bdv 9011 to fail open as designed. The leaking regulator was identified following the release on october 5, 2024 and repaired on october 17, 2024. Corrective action: bluewater will implement corrective actions to preclude repetition of the incident, minimize the amount of vented gas, and improve reporting timeliness. 1. Update procedures to avoid the isolation of the power gas header: a. Option 1: sdv 9008 (fuel gas supply) will be open during normal and stand by operations b. Option 2: (tbd) vb-9071 changed to 'normally open' to provide an uninterrupted supply to the power gas header 2. Control logic at the site allowed for the pipeline valve (supply gas) to remain open when the vent valves bdv 9010 and bdv 9011 were open. A. Bluewater has updated logic at the facility, if a vent valve is in any position other than "closed" the pipeline valve feeding the facility (sdv 9001) will close. 3. Scada alarms to improve response time will be added. A. "valves out of sequence" notifying the operator that the vent valve and the pipeline valves are open or in travel. B. "low pipeline pressure" an adjustable alarm the operators can set for the current operating conditions on the pipelines. C. "low low pipeline pressure" a non-adjustable "high priority" alarm set at 650 psig. 4. Revise emergency procedures to include volumetric thresholds for reporting natural gas releases to federal and state agencies consistent with existing rules and regulations. 5. Training: additional/refresher training on reporting requirements I.E. Time to report, and thresholds for reporting. Bluewater completed the training for appropriate employees on october 15, 2024.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2024-11-01 00:00:00
Iyear
2024
Report Number
20240122
Supplemental Number
41199
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
32249
Name
Bluewater Gas Storage, Llc
Operator Street Address
231 W. Michigan St
Operator City Name
Milwaukee
Operator State Abbreviation
WI
Operator Postal Code
53203
Time Zone
Eastern
Daylight Savings Ind
No
Location Latitude
42.800475
Location Longitude
-82.862984
Nrc Rpt Num
1413461
Additional Nrc Report Numbers
1413594
Commodity Released Type
Natural Gas
Unintentional Release
5186
Intentional Release
1521
Accompanying Liquid
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Status When Identified
Normal Operation, Includes Pauses During Maintenance
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
No
Shutdown Explain
The Release Was Terminated At 5:56 Am By Closing The Compressor Station Inlet Va
Communication State Fed Ind
No
Ignite Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0
On Off Shore
Onshore
Onshore State Abbreviation
Mi
Onshore Postal Code
48096
Onshore City Name
Not Within A Municipality
Onshore County Name
Macomb Township
Designated Location
Not Applicable
Pipe Fac Name
Bluewater Gas Storage Omo Road Compressor Station
Segment Name
Omo Road Compressor Station
Federal
No
Location Type
Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Aboveground
Incident Area Subtype
Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
System Part Involved
Onshore Compressor Station Equipment And Piping
Item Involved
Esd System, But Excluding Product Drain Lines And Tubing
Installation Year
2022
Manufactured Year
2021
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Other
Release Type Details
The Esd Vent Valve Opened And Blew Down A Portion Of The Gas Within The Pipeline. The Cause Of The Valve Opening Was A Loss Of Power Gas.
Class Location Type
Class 2 Location
Could Be Hca
No
Pir Radius
455
Heat Damage Ind
No
Non Heat Damage Ind
No
Did Occur In Mca Ind
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Unintentional Release
12187
Est Cost Intentional Release
3574
Est Cost Prop Damage
0
Est Cost Emergency
5725
Est Cost Other
7500
Est Cost Other Details
Scada Changes New Alarm Training
Gas Cost In Mcf
2.35
Prpty
28986
Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght
0
Num Injured Treated By Emt
0
Num Resident Building Affctd
0
Num Business Building Affctd
0
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Accident Psig
850
Gas Flow In Pipe In Mcf
0
Mop Psig
1150
Mop Cfr Section
192.619(C)
Maop Established Date
2021-05-12 00:00:00
Maop Reversal Flow Ind
No
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Gas Required Odorized Ind
No
Pipeline Function
Transmission System
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
Yes
Scada Conf Ind
Yes
Accident Identifier
Scada-Based Information (Such As Alarm(S), Alert(S), Event(S), And/or Volume Or Pack Calculations)
Investigation Status
Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)
Invest No Controller Ind
Yes
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Equipment Failure
Cause Details
Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment
Eq Failure Type
Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment
Esd System Failure Ind
Yes
Other Control Relief Ind
Yes
Other Control Relief Details
A Leaking Regulator Valve Caused A Loss Of Power Gas Pressure Allowing The Esd Blowdown Valves To Open.
Eq Additional Other Ind
Yes
Eq Additional Other Details
A Leaking Regulator Valve Caused A Loss Of Power Gas Pressure Allowing The Esd B
Eqf Control Releaf Ind
Yes
Preparer Name
R*** R***
Preparer Title
Engineering Specialist
Preparer Email
R********@w**********.com
Preparer Telephone
517.278.3525
Local Contact Name
J****** W*******
Local Contact Email
J***************@w*************.com
Local Contact Telephone
810.642.9035
Authorizer Name
A***** H*********
Authorizer Title
Senior Vice President Gas Operations
Authorizer Telephone
414.221.4759
Authorizer Email
A****************@w*************.com
Narrative
Re: omo rd compressor station incident nrc incident report #1413461 & follow up #1413594 on october 5, 2024 at approximately 3:09 am, emergency shutdown (esd) vent valves (bdv 9010) and (bdv 9011) opened because of a loss of power gas pressure used to hold the esd valves closed. Pipeline isolation (sdv-9001) was also open, resulting in a gas release of ~5.2 mmscf to atmosphere. The loss of power gas was caused by of a combination of an isolation of the power gas header and a leaking regulator in the power gas system. On october 3, 2024, at 10:56 a.M., the fuel gas supply valve (sdv 9008) tripped / closed due to high pressure (>475 psig). The high pressure was caused by daytime heating and thermal expansion of the gas in the fuel gas system. The omo road compressor station was shutdown at the time, minimizing fuel gas use and causing fuel gas header pressure to fluctuate with ambient temperature. In addition to its primary function to supply fuel to the natural gas fired engines used to drive the gas compressors at the station, the fuel gas system also provides power gas to the power gas header. Typically, power gas pressure is high enough that the gas pressure overcomes the spring tension used to open the blowdown valves in the event of an esd. Following the overpressure condition, sdv 9008 was not reopened because the compressor station was idle and the need for fuel gas was minimal. With sdv 9008 closed and the power gas header isolated, a leaking regulator on bdv 9011 eventually bled off enough pressure from the power gas header to allow bdv 9010 and bdv 9011 to fail open as designed. The leaking regulator was identified following the release on october 5, 2024 and repaired on october 17, 2024. Corrective action: bluewater will implement corrective actions to preclude repetition of the incident, minimize the amount of vented gas, and improve reporting timeliness. 1. Update procedures to avoid the isolation of the power gas header: a. Option 1: sdv 9008 (fuel gas supply) will be open during normal and stand by operations b. Option 2: (tbd) vb-9071 changed to 'normally open' to provide an uninterrupted supply to the power gas header 2. Control logic at the site allowed for the pipeline valve (supply gas) to remain open when the vent valves bdv 9010 and bdv 9011 were open. A. Bluewater has updated logic at the facility, if a vent valve is in any position other than "closed" the pipeline valve feeding the facility (sdv 9001) will close. 3. Scada alarms to improve response time will be added. A. "valves out of sequence" notifying the operator that the vent valve and the pipeline valves are open or in travel. B. "low pipeline pressure" an adjustable alarm the operators can set for the current operating conditions on the pipelines. C. "low low pipeline pressure" a non-adjustable "high priority" alarm set at 650 psig. 4. Revise emergency procedures to include volumetric thresholds for reporting natural gas releases to federal and state agencies consistent with existing rules and regulations. 5. Training: additional/refresher training on reporting requirements I.E. Time to report, and thresholds for reporting. Bluewater completed the training for appropriate employees on october 15, 2024.
| Report Received Date | 2024-11-01 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2024 |
| Report Number | 20240122 |
| Supplemental Number | 41199 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 32249 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Bluewater Gas Storage, Llc |
| Operator Street Address | 231 W. Michigan St |
| Operator City Name | Milwaukee |
| Operator State Abbreviation | WI |
| Operator Postal Code | 53203 |
| Time Zone | Eastern |
| Daylight Savings Ind | No |
| Location Latitude | 42.800475 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -82.862984 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1413461 NRC Report How to search |
| Additional Nrc Report Numbers | 1413594 |
| Commodity Released Type | Natural Gas |
| Unintentional Release | 5186 |
| Intentional Release | 1521 |
| Accompanying Liquid | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Status When Identified | Normal Operation, Includes Pauses During Maintenance |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | No |
| Shutdown Explain | The Release Was Terminated At 5:56 Am By Closing The Compressor Station Inlet Va |
| Communication State Fed Ind | No |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Mi |
| Onshore Postal Code | 48096 |
| Onshore City Name | Not Within A Municipality |
| Onshore County Name | Macomb Township |
| Designated Location | Not Applicable |
| Pipe Fac Name | Bluewater Gas Storage Omo Road Compressor Station |
| Segment Name | Omo Road Compressor Station |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Aboveground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Compressor Station Equipment And Piping |
| Item Involved | Esd System, But Excluding Product Drain Lines And Tubing |
| Installation Year | 2022 |
| Manufactured Year | 2021 |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Other |
| Release Type Details | The Esd Vent Valve Opened And Blew Down A Portion Of The Gas Within The Pipeline. The Cause Of The Valve Opening Was A Loss Of Power Gas. |
| Class Location Type | Class 2 Location |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Pir Radius | 455 |
| Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Non Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Did Occur In Mca Ind | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Unintentional Release | 12187 |
| Est Cost Intentional Release | 3574 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 0 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 5725 |
| Est Cost Other | 7500 |
| Est Cost Other Details | Scada Changes New Alarm Training |
| Gas Cost In Mcf | 2.35 |
| Prpty | 28986 |
| Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght | 0 |
| Num Injured Treated By Emt | 0 |
| Num Resident Building Affctd | 0 |
| Num Business Building Affctd | 0 |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Accident Psig | 850 |
| Gas Flow In Pipe In Mcf | 0 |
| Mop Psig | 1150 |
| Mop Cfr Section | 192.619(C) View CFR 49 §192 |
| Maop Established Date | 2021-05-12 00:00:00 |
| Maop Reversal Flow Ind | No |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Gas Required Odorized Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | Transmission System |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | Yes |
| Scada Conf Ind | Yes |
| Accident Identifier | Scada-Based Information (Such As Alarm(S), Alert(S), Event(S), And/or Volume Or Pack Calculations) |
| Investigation Status | Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply) |
| Invest No Controller Ind | Yes |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Equipment Failure |
| Cause Details | Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment |
| Eq Failure Type | Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment |
| Esd System Failure Ind | Yes |
| Other Control Relief Ind | Yes |
| Other Control Relief Details | A Leaking Regulator Valve Caused A Loss Of Power Gas Pressure Allowing The Esd Blowdown Valves To Open. |
| Eq Additional Other Ind | Yes |
| Eq Additional Other Details | A Leaking Regulator Valve Caused A Loss Of Power Gas Pressure Allowing The Esd B |
| Eqf Control Releaf Ind | Yes |
| Preparer Name | R*** R*** |
| Preparer Title | Engineering Specialist |
| Preparer Email | R********@w**********.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 517.278.3525 |
| Local Contact Name | J****** W******* |
| Local Contact Email | J***************@w*************.com |
| Local Contact Telephone | 810.642.9035 |
| Authorizer Name | A***** H********* |
| Authorizer Title | Senior Vice President Gas Operations |
| Authorizer Telephone | 414.221.4759 |
| Authorizer Email | A****************@w*************.com |
| Narrative | Re: omo rd compressor station incident nrc incident report #1413461 & follow up #1413594 on october 5, 2024 at approximately 3:09 am, emergency shutdown (esd) vent valves (bdv 9010) and (bdv 9011) opened because of a loss of power gas pressure used to hold the esd valves closed. Pipeline isolation (sdv-9001) was also open, resulting in a gas release of ~5.2 mmscf to atmosphere. The loss of power gas was caused by of a combination of an isolation of the power gas header and a leaking regulator in the power gas system. On october 3, 2024, at 10:56 a.M., the fuel gas supply valve (sdv 9008) tripped / closed due to high pressure (>475 psig). The high pressure was caused by daytime heating and thermal expansion of the gas in the fuel gas system. The omo road compressor station was shutdown at the time, minimizing fuel gas use and causing fuel gas header pressure to fluctuate with ambient temperature. In addition to its primary function to supply fuel to the natural gas fired engines used to drive the gas compressors at the station, the fuel gas system also provides power gas to the power gas header. Typically, power gas pressure is high enough that the gas pressure overcomes the spring tension used to open the blowdown valves in the event of an esd. Following the overpressure condition, sdv 9008 was not reopened because the compressor station was idle and the need for fuel gas was minimal. With sdv 9008 closed and the power gas header isolated, a leaking regulator on bdv 9011 eventually bled off enough pressure from the power gas header to allow bdv 9010 and bdv 9011 to fail open as designed. The leaking regulator was identified following the release on october 5, 2024 and repaired on october 17, 2024. Corrective action: bluewater will implement corrective actions to preclude repetition of the incident, minimize the amount of vented gas, and improve reporting timeliness. 1. Update procedures to avoid the isolation of the power gas header: a. Option 1: sdv 9008 (fuel gas supply) will be open during normal and stand by operations b. Option 2: (tbd) vb-9071 changed to 'normally open' to provide an uninterrupted supply to the power gas header 2. Control logic at the site allowed for the pipeline valve (supply gas) to remain open when the vent valves bdv 9010 and bdv 9011 were open. A. Bluewater has updated logic at the facility, if a vent valve is in any position other than "closed" the pipeline valve feeding the facility (sdv 9001) will close. 3. Scada alarms to improve response time will be added. A. "valves out of sequence" notifying the operator that the vent valve and the pipeline valves are open or in travel. B. "low pipeline pressure" an adjustable alarm the operators can set for the current operating conditions on the pipelines. C. "low low pipeline pressure" a non-adjustable "high priority" alarm set at 650 psig. 4. Revise emergency procedures to include volumetric thresholds for reporting natural gas releases to federal and state agencies consistent with existing rules and regulations. 5. Training: additional/refresher training on reporting requirements I.E. Time to report, and thresholds for reporting. Bluewater completed the training for appropriate employees on october 15, 2024. |
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