Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
GTG incident on 2024-06-13 — TX
Operator
Columbia Gas Transmission, Llc
Cause
Equipment Failure
Commodity
Natural Gas
Program
GTG
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
2 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$8,500
Incident datetime
2024-06-13 00:00 UTC
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
On may 20, 2024, an incident occurred on pipeline sr- 538 in benton, ohio, during a scheduled maintenance project. As part of the project, four (4) tc energy technicians and two (2) third party contractors were working to install a skillet blind flange to isolate the affected pipeline segment. The crew observed a gas leak from a 6-inch valve at that time and decided to grease the valve to remediate the leak using a motorized grease gun. An ignition/flash fire ensued that injured two (2) of the tc energy technicians and both of the third-party contractors. The injured workers were immediately taken for medical evaluation and treatment. Tc energy completed an investigation to identify the factors that may have caused or contributed to the incident. The results of that investigation identified the following proposed recommendations: 1. Develop and publish an operating procedure, or update existing procedures, to outline the requirements for installing a skillet blind. 2. Conduct a control of work assessment for installing skillet blinds to produce a hazard controls diagram for review by personnel with the job safety analysis (jsa). 3. Implement improvements to personnel training materials to provide more emphasis on the adequate response to unexpected leaks. 4. Conduct risk assessment on the usage of csn solutions black widow 20v grease guns. 5. Update the jsa form to have operator confirm the specific personal protective equipment (ppe) needed for the task (e.G., flame-resistant clothing, etc.) 6. Update applicable procedures to require a hot work permit to be completed when installing a skillet blind downstream of a single point of isolation regardless of whether a gas leak occurs. 7. Complete ongoing effort to issue personal diffusive 4-gas monitor gas monitors to all tc energy field technicians and operations specialists. 8. Update jsa form to clarify that contractors must also sign the jsa if they are also involved in the task being covered. 9. Share additional details and learnings from the incident to the organization. 10. Update gas handling procedures to clarify the amount of time since the last valve inspection / servicing that would trigger additional inspection / servicing before completing a lockout tag out activity. Tc energy sent the valve associated with the incident to a laboratory for further analysis. The lab result confirmed the source of the gas leak was the valve. The following are the result of tests; 1-the seat tests conducted in general accordance with the 24th edition of API 6d, specification for pipeline and piping valves, showed that there was a detectable leak at the valve seat of the subject plug valve at pressures as low as 70 psi. 2-the shell tests conducted in general accordance with the 24th edition of API 6d showed that there was a detectable leak at the flanged connection between the rotating shaft of the plug and the shell of the valve at pressures as low as 800 psi.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2024-06-13 00:00:00
Iyear
2024
Report Number
20240081
Supplemental Number
41067
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
2616
Name
Columbia Gas Transmission, Llc
Operator Street Address
700 Louisiana St. Suite 700
Operator City Name
Houston
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
77002
Time Zone
Eastern
Daylight Savings Ind
Yes
Location Latitude
39.3742
Location Longitude
-82.64038
Nrc Rpt Num
1399501
Additional Nrc Report Numbers
1399652
Commodity Released Type
Natural Gas
Unintentional Release
115
Intentional Release
18.49
Accompanying Liquid
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
Yes
Num Emp Injuries
1
Num Contr Injuries
1
Num Er Injuries
0
Num Worker Injuries
0
Num Gp Injuries
0
Injure
2
Status When Identified
Post-Maintenance/repair
Communication State Fed Ind
Yes
Party Initiated Communication
Operator
Ignite Ind
Yes
How Extinguished
Operator/contractor
Gas Consumed By Fire In Mcf
3.96
Explode Ind
No
Upstream Action Taken
Operational Control
Upstream Oprtnl Cntrl Detail
The Upstream Valve Was Already Closed And Has Loto.
Downstream Action Taken
Operational Control
Downstream Oprtnl Cntrl Detail
The Downstream Valve Was Already Closed And Has Loto.
Num Pub Evacuated
0
On Off Shore
Onshore
Onshore State Abbreviation
Oh
Onshore Postal Code
43135
Onshore City Name
Not Within A Municipality
Onshore County Name
Hocking
Designated Location
Survey Station No.
Designated Name
84+28
Pipe Fac Name
Sr_636
Segment Name
Sr_636 And Sr-637 Valve Setting
Federal
No
Location Type
Pipeline Right-Of-Way
Incident Area Type
Aboveground
Incident Area Subtype
Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
System Part Involved
Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
Item Involved
Valve
Valve Type
Mainline
Valve Mainline Type
Plug
Valve Manufacturer
Nordstorm
Installation Year
1962
Manufactured Year
Unknown
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Leak
Leak Type
Other
Leak Type Other
Leak Through
Class Location Type
Class 1 Location
Could Be Hca
No
Pir Radius
238
Heat Damage Ind
No
Non Heat Damage Ind
No
Hca Fatalities Ind
No
Did Occur In Mca Ind
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Unintentional Release
155
Est Cost Intentional Release
25
Est Cost Prop Damage
8500
Est Cost Emergency
1000
Est Cost Other
30486
Est Cost Other Details
Total Medical Costs That Covered Company Personnel Injured As Of 7/18/24
Gas Cost In Mcf
1.35
Prpty
40166
Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght
2
Num Injured Treated By Emt
0
Num Resident Building Affctd
0
Num Business Building Affctd
0
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Accident Psig
0
Gas Flow In Pipe In Mcf
0
Mop Psig
803
Mop Cfr Section
192.619(C)
Maop Established Date
1969-10-06 00:00:00
Maop Reversal Flow Ind
Bi-Directional
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Gas Required Odorized Ind
No
Length Segment Isolated
9734
Internal Inspection Ind
No
Diameter Change Ind
Yes
Operation Complications Ind
No
Pipeline Function
Transmission In Storage Field
Scada In Place Ind
No
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
Investigation Status
No, the facility was not monitored by a controller(s) at the time of the incident
Employee Drug Test Ind
Yes
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Num Employees Tested
4
Num Employees Failed
0
Cause
Equipment Failure
Cause Details
Other Equipment Failure
Eq Failure Type
Other Equipment Failure
Eq Failure Details
Vlave Was Leaking During The Project.
Additional Valve Ind
Yes
Preparer Name
K***** R****** A*******
Preparer Email
K*************@t*******.com
Preparer Telephone
3045905956
Authorizer Name
C*** B*****
Authorizer Telephone
304 541 2170
Authorizer Email
C**********@t*******.com
Narrative
On may 20, 2024, an incident occurred on pipeline sr- 538 in benton, ohio, during a scheduled maintenance project. As part of the project, four (4) tc energy technicians and two (2) third party contractors were working to install a skillet blind flange to isolate the affected pipeline segment. The crew observed a gas leak from a 6-inch valve at that time and decided to grease the valve to remediate the leak using a motorized grease gun. An ignition/flash fire ensued that injured two (2) of the tc energy technicians and both of the third-party contractors. The injured workers were immediately taken for medical evaluation and treatment. Tc energy completed an investigation to identify the factors that may have caused or contributed to the incident. The results of that investigation identified the following proposed recommendations: 1. Develop and publish an operating procedure, or update existing procedures, to outline the requirements for installing a skillet blind. 2. Conduct a control of work assessment for installing skillet blinds to produce a hazard controls diagram for review by personnel with the job safety analysis (jsa). 3. Implement improvements to personnel training materials to provide more emphasis on the adequate response to unexpected leaks. 4. Conduct risk assessment on the usage of csn solutions black widow 20v grease guns. 5. Update the jsa form to have operator confirm the specific personal protective equipment (ppe) needed for the task (e.G., flame-resistant clothing, etc.) 6. Update applicable procedures to require a hot work permit to be completed when installing a skillet blind downstream of a single point of isolation regardless of whether a gas leak occurs. 7. Complete ongoing effort to issue personal diffusive 4-gas monitor gas monitors to all tc energy field technicians and operations specialists. 8. Update jsa form to clarify that contractors must also sign the jsa if they are also involved in the task being covered. 9. Share additional details and learnings from the incident to the organization. 10. Update gas handling procedures to clarify the amount of time since the last valve inspection / servicing that would trigger additional inspection / servicing before completing a lockout tag out activity. Tc energy sent the valve associated with the incident to a laboratory for further analysis. The lab result confirmed the source of the gas leak was the valve. The following are the result of tests; 1-the seat tests conducted in general accordance with the 24th edition of API 6d, specification for pipeline and piping valves, showed that there was a detectable leak at the valve seat of the subject plug valve at pressures as low as 70 psi. 2-the shell tests conducted in general accordance with the 24th edition of API 6d showed that there was a detectable leak at the flanged connection between the rotating shaft of the plug and the shell of the valve at pressures as low as 800 psi.
| Report Received Date | 2024-06-13 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2024 |
| Report Number | 20240081 |
| Supplemental Number | 41067 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 2616 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Columbia Gas Transmission, Llc |
| Operator Street Address | 700 Louisiana St. Suite 700 |
| Operator City Name | Houston |
| Operator State Abbreviation | TX |
| Operator Postal Code | 77002 |
| Time Zone | Eastern |
| Daylight Savings Ind | Yes |
| Location Latitude | 39.3742 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -82.64038 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1399501 NRC Report How to search |
| Additional Nrc Report Numbers | 1399652 |
| Commodity Released Type | Natural Gas |
| Unintentional Release | 115 |
| Intentional Release | 18.49 |
| Accompanying Liquid | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | Yes |
| Num Emp Injuries | 1 |
| Num Contr Injuries | 1 |
| Num Er Injuries | 0 |
| Num Worker Injuries | 0 |
| Num Gp Injuries | 0 |
| Injure | 2 |
| Status When Identified | Post-Maintenance/repair |
| Communication State Fed Ind | Yes |
| Party Initiated Communication | Operator |
| Ignite Ind | Yes |
| How Extinguished | Operator/contractor |
| Gas Consumed By Fire In Mcf | 3.96 |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Upstream Action Taken | Operational Control |
| Upstream Oprtnl Cntrl Detail | The Upstream Valve Was Already Closed And Has Loto. |
| Downstream Action Taken | Operational Control |
| Downstream Oprtnl Cntrl Detail | The Downstream Valve Was Already Closed And Has Loto. |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Oh |
| Onshore Postal Code | 43135 |
| Onshore City Name | Not Within A Municipality |
| Onshore County Name | Hocking |
| Designated Location | Survey Station No. |
| Designated Name | 84+28 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Sr_636 |
| Segment Name | Sr_636 And Sr-637 Valve Setting |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Pipeline Right-Of-Way |
| Incident Area Type | Aboveground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites |
| Item Involved | Valve |
| Valve Type | Mainline |
| Valve Mainline Type | Plug |
| Valve Manufacturer | Nordstorm |
| Installation Year | 1962 |
| Manufactured Year | Unknown |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Leak |
| Leak Type | Other |
| Leak Type Other | Leak Through |
| Class Location Type | Class 1 Location |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Pir Radius | 238 |
| Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Non Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Hca Fatalities Ind | No |
| Did Occur In Mca Ind | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Unintentional Release | 155 |
| Est Cost Intentional Release | 25 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 8500 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 1000 |
| Est Cost Other | 30486 |
| Est Cost Other Details | Total Medical Costs That Covered Company Personnel Injured As Of 7/18/24 |
| Gas Cost In Mcf | 1.35 |
| Prpty | 40166 |
| Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght | 2 |
| Num Injured Treated By Emt | 0 |
| Num Resident Building Affctd | 0 |
| Num Business Building Affctd | 0 |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Accident Psig | 0 |
| Gas Flow In Pipe In Mcf | 0 |
| Mop Psig | 803 |
| Mop Cfr Section | 192.619(C) View CFR 49 §192 |
| Maop Established Date | 1969-10-06 00:00:00 |
| Maop Reversal Flow Ind | Bi-Directional |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Gas Required Odorized Ind | No |
| Length Segment Isolated | 9734 |
| Internal Inspection Ind | No |
| Diameter Change Ind | Yes |
| Operation Complications Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | Transmission In Storage Field |
| Scada In Place Ind | No |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Operator Employee |
| Investigation Status | No, the facility was not monitored by a controller(s) at the time of the incident |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | Yes |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Num Employees Tested | 4 |
| Num Employees Failed | 0 |
| Cause | Equipment Failure |
| Cause Details | Other Equipment Failure |
| Eq Failure Type | Other Equipment Failure |
| Eq Failure Details | Vlave Was Leaking During The Project. |
| Additional Valve Ind | Yes |
| Preparer Name | K***** R****** A******* |
| Preparer Email | K*************@t*******.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 3045905956 |
| Authorizer Name | C*** B***** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 304 541 2170 |
| Authorizer Email | C**********@t*******.com |
| Narrative | On may 20, 2024, an incident occurred on pipeline sr- 538 in benton, ohio, during a scheduled maintenance project. As part of the project, four (4) tc energy technicians and two (2) third party contractors were working to install a skillet blind flange to isolate the affected pipeline segment. The crew observed a gas leak from a 6-inch valve at that time and decided to grease the valve to remediate the leak using a motorized grease gun. An ignition/flash fire ensued that injured two (2) of the tc energy technicians and both of the third-party contractors. The injured workers were immediately taken for medical evaluation and treatment. Tc energy completed an investigation to identify the factors that may have caused or contributed to the incident. The results of that investigation identified the following proposed recommendations: 1. Develop and publish an operating procedure, or update existing procedures, to outline the requirements for installing a skillet blind. 2. Conduct a control of work assessment for installing skillet blinds to produce a hazard controls diagram for review by personnel with the job safety analysis (jsa). 3. Implement improvements to personnel training materials to provide more emphasis on the adequate response to unexpected leaks. 4. Conduct risk assessment on the usage of csn solutions black widow 20v grease guns. 5. Update the jsa form to have operator confirm the specific personal protective equipment (ppe) needed for the task (e.G., flame-resistant clothing, etc.) 6. Update applicable procedures to require a hot work permit to be completed when installing a skillet blind downstream of a single point of isolation regardless of whether a gas leak occurs. 7. Complete ongoing effort to issue personal diffusive 4-gas monitor gas monitors to all tc energy field technicians and operations specialists. 8. Update jsa form to clarify that contractors must also sign the jsa if they are also involved in the task being covered. 9. Share additional details and learnings from the incident to the organization. 10. Update gas handling procedures to clarify the amount of time since the last valve inspection / servicing that would trigger additional inspection / servicing before completing a lockout tag out activity. Tc energy sent the valve associated with the incident to a laboratory for further analysis. The lab result confirmed the source of the gas leak was the valve. The following are the result of tests; 1-the seat tests conducted in general accordance with the 24th edition of API 6d, specification for pipeline and piping valves, showed that there was a detectable leak at the valve seat of the subject plug valve at pressures as low as 70 psi. 2-the shell tests conducted in general accordance with the 24th edition of API 6d showed that there was a detectable leak at the flanged connection between the rotating shaft of the plug and the shell of the valve at pressures as low as 800 psi. |
External Resources
PHMSA pipeline safety insights.
Product
Features
Company
All rights reserved. Copyright © by ClearPHMSA