Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
GTG incident on 2024-05-31 — OK
Operator
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company
Cause
Other Incident Cause
Commodity
Natural Gas
Program
GTG
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
1 injury
Property damage (nominal)
$10,000
Incident datetime
2024-05-31 00:00 UTC
Report number
Location
OK
Narrative
An accidental ignition occurred at station 60 on may 8, 2024, an interstate transmission compressor station operated by transcontinental pipe line company, llc (transco) near jackson, louisiana. At the time, station 60 was offline and isolated from operating pipelines for scheduled maintenance to replace internal valve components connecting the compressor units to the station's common suction and discharge headers. The incident happened at 6:32 am, just before scheduled maintenance work was to begin for that day. The facility's construction provided for single valve isolation between each pipeline and facility piping. Work plans anticipated leakage at these isolation points and incorporated an air purge plan to mitigate potential flammable environments within piping. The root cause investigation determined that the following causes directly led to the consequences of this incident: 1. Flammable material (natural gas) leaked into the station piping around the process isolation between the station and transmission pipelines; 2. The mitigative air flow did not maintain flammable gas concentration below the lel; 3. The mitigative air flow dried internal sludge deposits inside the station piping; 4. Suspected accumulation of pyrophoric iron sulfide in the internal sludge deposits of the station piping ignited upon exposure to oxygen; and 5. A person was present within the fire zone at the time of the accidental ignition. To prevent similar issues from recurring, williams is committed to following the recommendations derived from the root cause analysis. This includes providing comprehensive guidance and conducting refresher training for all personnel involved. By reinforcing the knowledge and skills necessary for safe operations, williams aims to ensure that personnel are equipped to recognize potential hazards and respond appropriately. Phmsa reviewed williams return to service plan and approved on june 18th, 2024. Williams station 60 returned to service on june 22nd at 9:55 am
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2024-05-31 00:00:00
Iyear
2024
Report Number
20240071
Supplemental Number
40826
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
19570
Name
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company
Operator Street Address
One Williams Center Md 43-4
Operator City Name
Tulsa
Operator State Abbreviation
OK
Operator Postal Code
74172
Time Zone
Central
Daylight Savings Ind
Yes
Location Latitude
30.74428316
Location Longitude
-91.26635241
Nrc Rpt Num
1398348
Additional Nrc Report Numbers
1398551
Commodity Released Type
Natural Gas
Unintentional Release
0
Intentional Release
0
Accompanying Liquid
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
Yes
Num Emp Injuries
0
Num Contr Injuries
1
Num Er Injuries
0
Num Worker Injuries
0
Num Gp Injuries
0
Injure
1
Status When Identified
Routine Shutdown
Communication State Fed Ind
Yes
Party Initiated Communication
Operator
Ignite Ind
Yes
How Extinguished
Other
How Extinguished Other Detail
Fire Consumed Flammable Material In Station Piping And Burned Quickly
Gas Consumed By Fire In Mcf
0
Explode Ind
Yes
Num Pub Evacuated
0
On Off Shore
Onshore
Onshore State Abbreviation
La
Onshore Postal Code
70748
Onshore City Name
Jackson
Onshore County Name
East Feliciana
Designated Location
Milepost
Designated Name
588.62
Pipe Fac Name
Station 60
Segment Name
Discharge And Suction Headers
Federal
No
Location Type
Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Aboveground
Incident Area Subtype
Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
System Part Involved
Onshore Compressor Station Equipment And Piping
Item Involved
Compressor
Installation Year
1950
Manufactured Year
1950
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Other
Release Type Details
Flash Fire Consumed The Flammable Gas Mixture Present Inside The Yard Piping And Was Released Through Suction And Discharge Headers
Class Location Type
Class 1 Location
Could Be Hca
No
Pir Radius
585
Heat Damage Ind
No
Non Heat Damage Ind
No
Hca Fatalities Ind
No
Did Occur In Mca Ind
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Unintentional Release
0
Est Cost Intentional Release
0
Est Cost Prop Damage
10000
Est Cost Emergency
0
Est Cost Other
210000
Est Cost Other Details
Nitrogen Contractors, And Integrity Engineer Contractors
Gas Cost In Mcf
0
Prpty
220000
Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght
0
Num Injured Treated By Emt
1
Num Resident Building Affctd
0
Num Business Building Affctd
0
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Accident Psig
0
Gas Flow In Pipe In Mcf
0
Mop Psig
800
Mop Cfr Section
192.619(A)(3)
Maop Established Date
1970-11-12 00:00:00
Maop Reversal Flow Ind
No
Accident Pressure
Pressure Exceeded The Applicable Allowance In 192.201
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Gas Required Odorized Ind
No
Pipeline Function
Transmission System
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
No
Scada Functional Ind
No
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
Compressor station 60 was offline for maintenance at the time of the event. Controllers were not involved in the incident as the station was offline and isolated for maintenance occurring onsite.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Other Incident Cause
Cause Details
Miscellaneous
Other Type
Miscellaneous
Misc Details
Natural Gas Leaked Around The Process Isolation Between The Station Piping And The Transmission Pipeline. The Mitigative Air Flow Did Not Maintain Flammable Gas Concentration In The Station Yard Piping Below The Lel. The Mitigative Air Flow Also Dried Out Sludge Deposits Inside The Station Yard Piping. Suspected Accumulation Of Iron Sulfide In The Sludge Deposits Auto-Ignited When Exposed To Oxygen. The Auto-Ignition Occurred In The Presence Of A Flammable Gas Concentration Above The Lel.
Preparer Name
E**** R********
Preparer Title
Regulatory Compliance Specialist Sr.
Preparer Email
E****************@w*******.com
Preparer Telephone
713-303-9956
Local Contact Name
J******* E*****
Local Contact Email
J**************@w*******.com
Local Contact Telephone
281-222-7693
Authorizer Name
J**** L****
Authorizer Title
Director Pipeline Safety And Asset Integrity
Authorizer Telephone
918-340-3572
Authorizer Email
J***********@w*******.com
Narrative
An accidental ignition occurred at station 60 on may 8, 2024, an interstate transmission compressor station operated by transcontinental pipe line company, llc (transco) near jackson, louisiana. At the time, station 60 was offline and isolated from operating pipelines for scheduled maintenance to replace internal valve components connecting the compressor units to the station's common suction and discharge headers. The incident happened at 6:32 am, just before scheduled maintenance work was to begin for that day. The facility's construction provided for single valve isolation between each pipeline and facility piping. Work plans anticipated leakage at these isolation points and incorporated an air purge plan to mitigate potential flammable environments within piping. The root cause investigation determined that the following causes directly led to the consequences of this incident: 1. Flammable material (natural gas) leaked into the station piping around the process isolation between the station and transmission pipelines; 2. The mitigative air flow did not maintain flammable gas concentration below the lel; 3. The mitigative air flow dried internal sludge deposits inside the station piping; 4. Suspected accumulation of pyrophoric iron sulfide in the internal sludge deposits of the station piping ignited upon exposure to oxygen; and 5. A person was present within the fire zone at the time of the accidental ignition. To prevent similar issues from recurring, williams is committed to following the recommendations derived from the root cause analysis. This includes providing comprehensive guidance and conducting refresher training for all personnel involved. By reinforcing the knowledge and skills necessary for safe operations, williams aims to ensure that personnel are equipped to recognize potential hazards and respond appropriately. Phmsa reviewed williams return to service plan and approved on june 18th, 2024. Williams station 60 returned to service on june 22nd at 9:55 am
| Report Received Date | 2024-05-31 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2024 |
| Report Number | 20240071 |
| Supplemental Number | 40826 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 19570 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company |
| Operator Street Address | One Williams Center Md 43-4 |
| Operator City Name | Tulsa |
| Operator State Abbreviation | OK |
| Operator Postal Code | 74172 |
| Time Zone | Central |
| Daylight Savings Ind | Yes |
| Location Latitude | 30.74428316 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -91.26635241 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1398348 NRC Report How to search |
| Additional Nrc Report Numbers | 1398551 |
| Commodity Released Type | Natural Gas |
| Unintentional Release | 0 |
| Intentional Release | 0 |
| Accompanying Liquid | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | Yes |
| Num Emp Injuries | 0 |
| Num Contr Injuries | 1 |
| Num Er Injuries | 0 |
| Num Worker Injuries | 0 |
| Num Gp Injuries | 0 |
| Injure | 1 |
| Status When Identified | Routine Shutdown |
| Communication State Fed Ind | Yes |
| Party Initiated Communication | Operator |
| Ignite Ind | Yes |
| How Extinguished | Other |
| How Extinguished Other Detail | Fire Consumed Flammable Material In Station Piping And Burned Quickly |
| Gas Consumed By Fire In Mcf | 0 |
| Explode Ind | Yes |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | La |
| Onshore Postal Code | 70748 |
| Onshore City Name | Jackson |
| Onshore County Name | East Feliciana |
| Designated Location | Milepost |
| Designated Name | 588.62 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Station 60 |
| Segment Name | Discharge And Suction Headers |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Aboveground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Compressor Station Equipment And Piping |
| Item Involved | Compressor |
| Installation Year | 1950 |
| Manufactured Year | 1950 |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Other |
| Release Type Details | Flash Fire Consumed The Flammable Gas Mixture Present Inside The Yard Piping And Was Released Through Suction And Discharge Headers |
| Class Location Type | Class 1 Location |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Pir Radius | 585 |
| Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Non Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Hca Fatalities Ind | No |
| Did Occur In Mca Ind | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Unintentional Release | 0 |
| Est Cost Intentional Release | 0 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 10000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 0 |
| Est Cost Other | 210000 |
| Est Cost Other Details | Nitrogen Contractors, And Integrity Engineer Contractors |
| Gas Cost In Mcf | 0 |
| Prpty | 220000 |
| Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght | 0 |
| Num Injured Treated By Emt | 1 |
| Num Resident Building Affctd | 0 |
| Num Business Building Affctd | 0 |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Accident Psig | 0 |
| Gas Flow In Pipe In Mcf | 0 |
| Mop Psig | 800 |
| Mop Cfr Section | 192.619(A)(3) View CFR 49 §192 |
| Maop Established Date | 1970-11-12 00:00:00 |
| Maop Reversal Flow Ind | No |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Exceeded The Applicable Allowance In 192.201 |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Gas Required Odorized Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | Transmission System |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | No |
| Scada Functional Ind | No |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Operator Employee |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | Compressor station 60 was offline for maintenance at the time of the event. Controllers were not involved in the incident as the station was offline and isolated for maintenance occurring onsite. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Other Incident Cause |
| Cause Details | Miscellaneous |
| Other Type | Miscellaneous |
| Misc Details | Natural Gas Leaked Around The Process Isolation Between The Station Piping And The Transmission Pipeline. The Mitigative Air Flow Did Not Maintain Flammable Gas Concentration In The Station Yard Piping Below The Lel. The Mitigative Air Flow Also Dried Out Sludge Deposits Inside The Station Yard Piping. Suspected Accumulation Of Iron Sulfide In The Sludge Deposits Auto-Ignited When Exposed To Oxygen. The Auto-Ignition Occurred In The Presence Of A Flammable Gas Concentration Above The Lel. |
| Preparer Name | E**** R******** |
| Preparer Title | Regulatory Compliance Specialist Sr. |
| Preparer Email | E****************@w*******.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 713-303-9956 |
| Local Contact Name | J******* E***** |
| Local Contact Email | J**************@w*******.com |
| Local Contact Telephone | 281-222-7693 |
| Authorizer Name | J**** L**** |
| Authorizer Title | Director Pipeline Safety And Asset Integrity |
| Authorizer Telephone | 918-340-3572 |
| Authorizer Email | J***********@w*******.com |
| Narrative | An accidental ignition occurred at station 60 on may 8, 2024, an interstate transmission compressor station operated by transcontinental pipe line company, llc (transco) near jackson, louisiana. At the time, station 60 was offline and isolated from operating pipelines for scheduled maintenance to replace internal valve components connecting the compressor units to the station's common suction and discharge headers. The incident happened at 6:32 am, just before scheduled maintenance work was to begin for that day. The facility's construction provided for single valve isolation between each pipeline and facility piping. Work plans anticipated leakage at these isolation points and incorporated an air purge plan to mitigate potential flammable environments within piping. The root cause investigation determined that the following causes directly led to the consequences of this incident: 1. Flammable material (natural gas) leaked into the station piping around the process isolation between the station and transmission pipelines; 2. The mitigative air flow did not maintain flammable gas concentration below the lel; 3. The mitigative air flow dried internal sludge deposits inside the station piping; 4. Suspected accumulation of pyrophoric iron sulfide in the internal sludge deposits of the station piping ignited upon exposure to oxygen; and 5. A person was present within the fire zone at the time of the accidental ignition. To prevent similar issues from recurring, williams is committed to following the recommendations derived from the root cause analysis. This includes providing comprehensive guidance and conducting refresher training for all personnel involved. By reinforcing the knowledge and skills necessary for safe operations, williams aims to ensure that personnel are equipped to recognize potential hazards and respond appropriately. Phmsa reviewed williams return to service plan and approved on june 18th, 2024. Williams station 60 returned to service on june 22nd at 9:55 am |
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