Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
GTG incident on 2024-02-20 — WV
Operator
Eastern Gas Transmission And Storage, Inc.
Cause
Equipment Failure
Commodity
Natural Gas
Program
GTG
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$500,000
Incident datetime
2024-02-20 00:00 UTC
Report number
Location
WV
Narrative
Operations management received initial notification of this incident via a call from another operator on 1/25/24 at approximately 18:06 reporting that there was a fire at big isaac compressor station (cs) (ga-1081). Gas control received secondary notification of this incident from 911 at approximately 18:10 reporting that a fire department was in the process of responding to big isaac cs. At this point in time, the extent and severity of the fire at big isaac cs was not known. Big isaac cs receives natural gas from h-21912 (production pipeline owned and operated by hope gas), compresses it using a single engine unit (ajax model #dpc-360le installed in 1999 with 360 hp), and discharges it into tl-413 (gathering pipeline owned and operated by egts with a maop of 500 psig). Gas control notified operations management of the situation at approximately 18:15. Operations management dispatched personnel to big isaac cs at approximately 18:20. Gas control lost communications with big isaac cs at approximately 17:19. Operations personnel arrived at big isaac cs at approximately 19:24, assessed the situation, began utilizing fire extinguishers to extinguish the fire on the engine unit, and implemented a plan to safely isolate the fire. Operations personnel manually closed valve 1081-a at approximately 19:26. Valve 1081-a is located where the discharge of big isaac cs connects to tl-413 which is downstream of the fire. Operations personnel manually closed valve 1081-b at approximately 19:27. Valve 1081-b is located where the suction of big isaac cs connects to h-21912 which is upstream of the fire. The closure of valves 1081-a and 1081-b completed the isolation of the fire. The fire was extinguished at approximately 19:36. The responding fire department departed the facility at approximately 20:20. The responding operations personnel secured the facility and departed the facility at approximately 23:20. No evacuations were necessary, no injuries were sustained, and there were no environmental impacts as a result of the incident. Based on review of the scada discharge pressure and flow histories, it is believed that the fire on the engine unit initially ignited at approximately 17:19 at which point in time big isaac cs was in normal operation with a discharge pressure of 197 psig and a discharge flow rate of 832 mscfd. Upon examination of the engine unit following the incident, it is believed that the fire initiated in the low stage distance piece and was sustained by the flow of natural gas. The crosshead pin and bushing seized causing increased friction on the slide assembly. The additional friction increased the temperature on the components to the flashpoint of the oil (459 deg f). The crosshead running position was altered by melting babbitt causing the compressor piston rod to rub the pressure and wiper packing cases. Excessive rubbing of the compressor piston rod generated excessive heat inside a gaseous environment which allowed combustion to occur. The internal fire melted the plexiglass cover on the crosshead distance piece housing which allowed additional oxygen to enter the distance piece and sustained the combustion. The resulting damage to the engine unit and the associated frame, skid, protective structure, control panel, compressor bottle, fuel line valve, and conduit was extensive. Initial telephonic notification was made to the national response center on 1/25/24 at 19:28. The national response center assigned incident report #1389962 to the initial notification of the incident. A follow up telephonic notification was made to the national response center on 1/27/24 at 09:04 to confirm the initial telephonic notification. The national response center assigned incident report #1389962 to the follow up telephonic notification. The decision was made to abandon big isaac cs as an engine unit at law cs is capable of moving the natural gas that was moved by the engine unit at big isaac cs.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2024-02-20 00:00:00
Iyear
2024
Report Number
20240021
Supplemental Number
41078
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
2714
Name
Eastern Gas Transmission And Storage, Inc.
Operator Street Address
925 White Oaks Boulevard
Operator City Name
Bridgeport
Operator State Abbreviation
WV
Operator Postal Code
26330
Time Zone
Eastern
Daylight Savings Ind
No
Location Latitude
39.2462778
Location Longitude
-80.5558528
Nrc Rpt Num
1389962
Additional Nrc Report Numbers
1390072
Commodity Released Type
Natural Gas
Unintentional Release
2.9
Intentional Release
2.6
Accompanying Liquid
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Status When Identified
Normal Operation, Includes Pauses During Maintenance
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Still Shutdown Ind
Yes
Communication State Fed Ind
Yes
Party Initiated Communication
Local/state/federal Emergency Responder
Ignite Ind
Yes
How Extinguished
Operator/contractor
Gas Consumed By Fire In Mcf
2.9
Explode Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0
On Off Shore
Onshore
Onshore State Abbreviation
Wv
Onshore Postal Code
26426
Onshore City Name
Not Within A Municipality
Onshore County Name
Harrison
Designated Location
Not Applicable
Pipe Fac Name
Big Isaac Compressor Station
Federal
No
Location Type
Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Aboveground
Incident Area Subtype
Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
System Part Involved
Onshore Compressor Station Equipment And Piping
Item Involved
Compressor
Installation Year
1999
Manufactured Year
Unknown
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Leak
Leak Type
Seal Or Packing
Class Location Type
Class 1 Location
Could Be Hca
No
Pir Radius
366
Heat Damage Ind
No
Non Heat Damage Ind
No
Did Occur In Mca Ind
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Unintentional Release
7
Est Cost Intentional Release
6
Est Cost Prop Damage
500000
Est Cost Emergency
1000
Est Cost Other
0
Gas Cost In Mcf
2.47
Prpty
501013
Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght
0
Num Injured Treated By Emt
0
Num Resident Building Affctd
0
Num Business Building Affctd
0
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Accident Psig
196
Gas Flow In Pipe In Mcf
830
Mop Psig
500
Mop Cfr Section
192.619(A)(2)
Maop Established Date
1974-10-31 00:00:00
Maop Reversal Flow Ind
No
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Gas Required Odorized Ind
No
Pipeline Function
Type C Gathering
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Accident Identifier
Notification From Public
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
The controller(s) actions or control room issues were not a cause of or a contributing factor to the incident.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Equipment Failure
Cause Details
Compressor Or Compressor-Related Equipment
Eq Failure Type
Compressor Or Compressor-Related Equipment
Other Compressor Ind
Seal Failure
Additional Improper Mntnce Ind
Yes
Preparer Name
D***** S****
Preparer Title
Pipeline Integrity Engineer
Preparer Email
D***********@b*****.com
Preparer Telephone
3042666062
Local Contact Name
J**** D*******
Local Contact Email
J*************@b*****.com
Local Contact Telephone
3042037410
Authorizer Name
K*** W******
Authorizer Title
Manager - Pipeline Integrity
Authorizer Telephone
3048412365
Authorizer Email
K***********@b*****.com
Narrative
Operations management received initial notification of this incident via a call from another operator on 1/25/24 at approximately 18:06 reporting that there was a fire at big isaac compressor station (cs) (ga-1081). Gas control received secondary notification of this incident from 911 at approximately 18:10 reporting that a fire department was in the process of responding to big isaac cs. At this point in time, the extent and severity of the fire at big isaac cs was not known. Big isaac cs receives natural gas from h-21912 (production pipeline owned and operated by hope gas), compresses it using a single engine unit (ajax model #dpc-360le installed in 1999 with 360 hp), and discharges it into tl-413 (gathering pipeline owned and operated by egts with a maop of 500 psig). Gas control notified operations management of the situation at approximately 18:15. Operations management dispatched personnel to big isaac cs at approximately 18:20. Gas control lost communications with big isaac cs at approximately 17:19. Operations personnel arrived at big isaac cs at approximately 19:24, assessed the situation, began utilizing fire extinguishers to extinguish the fire on the engine unit, and implemented a plan to safely isolate the fire. Operations personnel manually closed valve 1081-a at approximately 19:26. Valve 1081-a is located where the discharge of big isaac cs connects to tl-413 which is downstream of the fire. Operations personnel manually closed valve 1081-b at approximately 19:27. Valve 1081-b is located where the suction of big isaac cs connects to h-21912 which is upstream of the fire. The closure of valves 1081-a and 1081-b completed the isolation of the fire. The fire was extinguished at approximately 19:36. The responding fire department departed the facility at approximately 20:20. The responding operations personnel secured the facility and departed the facility at approximately 23:20. No evacuations were necessary, no injuries were sustained, and there were no environmental impacts as a result of the incident. Based on review of the scada discharge pressure and flow histories, it is believed that the fire on the engine unit initially ignited at approximately 17:19 at which point in time big isaac cs was in normal operation with a discharge pressure of 197 psig and a discharge flow rate of 832 mscfd. Upon examination of the engine unit following the incident, it is believed that the fire initiated in the low stage distance piece and was sustained by the flow of natural gas. The crosshead pin and bushing seized causing increased friction on the slide assembly. The additional friction increased the temperature on the components to the flashpoint of the oil (459 deg f). The crosshead running position was altered by melting babbitt causing the compressor piston rod to rub the pressure and wiper packing cases. Excessive rubbing of the compressor piston rod generated excessive heat inside a gaseous environment which allowed combustion to occur. The internal fire melted the plexiglass cover on the crosshead distance piece housing which allowed additional oxygen to enter the distance piece and sustained the combustion. The resulting damage to the engine unit and the associated frame, skid, protective structure, control panel, compressor bottle, fuel line valve, and conduit was extensive. Initial telephonic notification was made to the national response center on 1/25/24 at 19:28. The national response center assigned incident report #1389962 to the initial notification of the incident. A follow up telephonic notification was made to the national response center on 1/27/24 at 09:04 to confirm the initial telephonic notification. The national response center assigned incident report #1389962 to the follow up telephonic notification. The decision was made to abandon big isaac cs as an engine unit at law cs is capable of moving the natural gas that was moved by the engine unit at big isaac cs.
| Report Received Date | 2024-02-20 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2024 |
| Report Number | 20240021 |
| Supplemental Number | 41078 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 2714 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Eastern Gas Transmission And Storage, Inc. |
| Operator Street Address | 925 White Oaks Boulevard |
| Operator City Name | Bridgeport |
| Operator State Abbreviation | WV |
| Operator Postal Code | 26330 |
| Time Zone | Eastern |
| Daylight Savings Ind | No |
| Location Latitude | 39.2462778 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -80.5558528 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1389962 NRC Report How to search |
| Additional Nrc Report Numbers | 1390072 |
| Commodity Released Type | Natural Gas |
| Unintentional Release | 2.9 |
| Intentional Release | 2.6 |
| Accompanying Liquid | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Status When Identified | Normal Operation, Includes Pauses During Maintenance |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | Yes |
| Still Shutdown Ind | Yes |
| Communication State Fed Ind | Yes |
| Party Initiated Communication | Local/state/federal Emergency Responder |
| Ignite Ind | Yes |
| How Extinguished | Operator/contractor |
| Gas Consumed By Fire In Mcf | 2.9 |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Wv |
| Onshore Postal Code | 26426 |
| Onshore City Name | Not Within A Municipality |
| Onshore County Name | Harrison |
| Designated Location | Not Applicable |
| Pipe Fac Name | Big Isaac Compressor Station |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Aboveground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Compressor Station Equipment And Piping |
| Item Involved | Compressor |
| Installation Year | 1999 |
| Manufactured Year | Unknown |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Leak |
| Leak Type | Seal Or Packing |
| Class Location Type | Class 1 Location |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Pir Radius | 366 |
| Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Non Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Did Occur In Mca Ind | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Unintentional Release | 7 |
| Est Cost Intentional Release | 6 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 500000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 1000 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Gas Cost In Mcf | 2.47 |
| Prpty | 501013 |
| Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght | 0 |
| Num Injured Treated By Emt | 0 |
| Num Resident Building Affctd | 0 |
| Num Business Building Affctd | 0 |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Accident Psig | 196 |
| Gas Flow In Pipe In Mcf | 830 |
| Mop Psig | 500 |
| Mop Cfr Section | 192.619(A)(2) View CFR 49 §192 |
| Maop Established Date | 1974-10-31 00:00:00 |
| Maop Reversal Flow Ind | No |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Gas Required Odorized Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | Type C Gathering |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Accident Identifier | Notification From Public |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | The controller(s) actions or control room issues were not a cause of or a contributing factor to the incident. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Equipment Failure |
| Cause Details | Compressor Or Compressor-Related Equipment |
| Eq Failure Type | Compressor Or Compressor-Related Equipment |
| Other Compressor Ind | Seal Failure |
| Additional Improper Mntnce Ind | Yes |
| Preparer Name | D***** S**** |
| Preparer Title | Pipeline Integrity Engineer |
| Preparer Email | D***********@b*****.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 3042666062 |
| Local Contact Name | J**** D******* |
| Local Contact Email | J*************@b*****.com |
| Local Contact Telephone | 3042037410 |
| Authorizer Name | K*** W****** |
| Authorizer Title | Manager - Pipeline Integrity |
| Authorizer Telephone | 3048412365 |
| Authorizer Email | K***********@b*****.com |
| Narrative | Operations management received initial notification of this incident via a call from another operator on 1/25/24 at approximately 18:06 reporting that there was a fire at big isaac compressor station (cs) (ga-1081). Gas control received secondary notification of this incident from 911 at approximately 18:10 reporting that a fire department was in the process of responding to big isaac cs. At this point in time, the extent and severity of the fire at big isaac cs was not known. Big isaac cs receives natural gas from h-21912 (production pipeline owned and operated by hope gas), compresses it using a single engine unit (ajax model #dpc-360le installed in 1999 with 360 hp), and discharges it into tl-413 (gathering pipeline owned and operated by egts with a maop of 500 psig). Gas control notified operations management of the situation at approximately 18:15. Operations management dispatched personnel to big isaac cs at approximately 18:20. Gas control lost communications with big isaac cs at approximately 17:19. Operations personnel arrived at big isaac cs at approximately 19:24, assessed the situation, began utilizing fire extinguishers to extinguish the fire on the engine unit, and implemented a plan to safely isolate the fire. Operations personnel manually closed valve 1081-a at approximately 19:26. Valve 1081-a is located where the discharge of big isaac cs connects to tl-413 which is downstream of the fire. Operations personnel manually closed valve 1081-b at approximately 19:27. Valve 1081-b is located where the suction of big isaac cs connects to h-21912 which is upstream of the fire. The closure of valves 1081-a and 1081-b completed the isolation of the fire. The fire was extinguished at approximately 19:36. The responding fire department departed the facility at approximately 20:20. The responding operations personnel secured the facility and departed the facility at approximately 23:20. No evacuations were necessary, no injuries were sustained, and there were no environmental impacts as a result of the incident. Based on review of the scada discharge pressure and flow histories, it is believed that the fire on the engine unit initially ignited at approximately 17:19 at which point in time big isaac cs was in normal operation with a discharge pressure of 197 psig and a discharge flow rate of 832 mscfd. Upon examination of the engine unit following the incident, it is believed that the fire initiated in the low stage distance piece and was sustained by the flow of natural gas. The crosshead pin and bushing seized causing increased friction on the slide assembly. The additional friction increased the temperature on the components to the flashpoint of the oil (459 deg f). The crosshead running position was altered by melting babbitt causing the compressor piston rod to rub the pressure and wiper packing cases. Excessive rubbing of the compressor piston rod generated excessive heat inside a gaseous environment which allowed combustion to occur. The internal fire melted the plexiglass cover on the crosshead distance piece housing which allowed additional oxygen to enter the distance piece and sustained the combustion. The resulting damage to the engine unit and the associated frame, skid, protective structure, control panel, compressor bottle, fuel line valve, and conduit was extensive. Initial telephonic notification was made to the national response center on 1/25/24 at 19:28. The national response center assigned incident report #1389962 to the initial notification of the incident. A follow up telephonic notification was made to the national response center on 1/27/24 at 09:04 to confirm the initial telephonic notification. The national response center assigned incident report #1389962 to the follow up telephonic notification. The decision was made to abandon big isaac cs as an engine unit at law cs is capable of moving the natural gas that was moved by the engine unit at big isaac cs. |
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