Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2023-06-21 — TX
Operator
Energy Transfer Company
Cause
Corrosion Failure
Commodity
Crude Oil
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$25,000
Incident datetime
2023-06-21 00:00 UTC
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
On 5/6/2023 at approximately 14:44 while pumping the recently commissioned bear creek cvr delivery, a release at eola station occurred. At approximately 21:35 the release was discovered at eola station by operating personnel. The line was shut down and spill response crews were dispatched. Approximately 1500 barrels of crude oil was released. All free product was recovered, and contaminated soil was removed. The failure occurred on previously unknown 10-inch dead leg piping situated between the mainline diameter transition traps of the 10-inch to 12-inch segments. On 5/7/2023, permanent repairs were completed, and the line was restarted. The failed piping was cut out and sent to 3rd party laboratory for analysis. The laboratory analysis determined that the failure was caused by internal corrosion that progressed until the remaining wall thickness could no longer support the pressure within the pipe resulting in the rupture failure. The corrosion deposits indicated that the internal corrosion progressed in an environment containing carbonic acid forming within the presence of CO2 and water which was exacerbated by sediment filling the low end of the pipe. The release was exacerbated due to control center uncertainty regarding whether a valve closure at the delivery facility at approximately 14:39 was caused either by a loss of communications due to a power failure at the delivery facility or due to pressure setpoint. This uncertainty led controllers to believe a line balance issue was due to power failure/communication loss and not a release. Surge protection was no longer open downstream which allowed a higher-than-normal pressure but not exceeding mop to be experienced at eola station and open path logic did not trigger an immediate shutdown. The rupture alarms following startup appeared to the controller to be explainable and were not properly escalated for additional investigation. While field crews at the delivery point continued to trouble shoot the issues and communicate with the control center the line continued to be operated intermittently until 21:35 with the belief that the line was re-packing after the power failure, communications loss, and delivery valve closure. To prevent a recurrence open path logic and revised alarm set points were implemented on this delivery configuration. Additionally, controller adherence to procedures, shutdown authority and engagement with management was reviewed with all liquid controllers.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2023-06-21 00:00:00
Iyear
2023
Report Number
20230135
Supplemental Number
38980
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
32099
Name
Energy Transfer Company
Operator Street Address
1300 Main Street
Operator City Name
Houston
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
77002
Time Zone
Central
Daylight Savings Ind
Yes
Location Latitude
34.566202
Location Longitude
-97.446486
Commodity Released Type
Crude Oil
Unintentional Release Bbls
1500
Recovered Bbls
1500
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
System Part Involved
Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
On Off Shore
Onshore
Status When Identified
Normal Operation, Includes Pauses Between Batches And During Maintenance
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Communication State Fed Ind
Yes
Party Initiated Communication
Operator
Nrc Rpt Num
1366561
Additional Nrc Report Numbers
1366721
Ignite Ind
No
Upstream Action Taken
Valve Closure
Upstream Valve Type Ind
Remotely Controlled
Downstream Action Taken
Valve Closure
Downstream Valve Type Ind
Remotely Controlled
Notify Qualified Indiv Ind
Yes
Oil Spill Removal Org Ind
Yes
Osro Arrived On Site Dt
5/7/2023 0:30
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Eola Station
Segment Name
25001 10-Inch
Onshore State Abbreviation
Ok
Onshore Postal Code
73057
Onshore City Name
Not Within A Municipality
Onshore County Name
Garvin
Designated Location
Milepost
Designated Name
0
Federal
No
Location Type
Originated On Operator-Controlled Property, But Then Flowed Or Migrated Off The Property
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Under Soil
Depth Of Cover
60
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Intrastate
Item Involved
Pipe
Pipe Type
Pipe Body
Puddle Weld Ind
No
Pipe Diameter
10
Pipe Wall Thickness
0.25
Pipe Smys
52000
Pipe Specification
X-52
Pipe Seam Type
Erw - Low Frequency
Pipe Manufacturer
Unknown
Pipe Coating Type
Coal Tar
Coating Applied Ind
Unknown
Installation Year
Unknown
Manufactured Year
Unknown
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Rupture
Rupture Orient
Longitudinal
Rupture Width
0.5
Rupture Length
8
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
Yes
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
Yes
Soil Remed Ind
Yes
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
Yes
Commodity Reached Hca
Yes
Other Pop Ind
Yes
Other Pop Yes No
Yes
Est Cost Oper Paid
75000
Est Cost Gas Released
0
Est Cost Prop Damage
25000
Est Cost Emergency
175000
Est Cost Environmental
75000
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
350000
Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght
0
Num Injured Treated By Emt
0
Num Resident Building Affctd
0
Num Business Building Affctd
0
Accident Psig
950
Mop Psig
1044
Mop Cfr Section
Subpart E Pressure Test �195.406(A)(3)
Maop Established Date
2004-01-01 00:00:00
Maop Reversal Flow Ind
No
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Length Segment Isolated
90
Internal Inspection Ind
No
Other Inspection Ind
Yes
Internal Inspection Details
Facility Piping Between Mainline Diameter Transition And Traps
Operation Complications Ind
Yes
Other Complications Ind
Yes
Inspect Comp Details
Facility Piping Between Traps
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
Yes
Scada Conf Ind
Yes
Cpm In Place Ind
Yes
Cpm Operating Ind
Yes
Cpm Functional Ind
Yes
Cpm Detection Ind
Yes
Cpm Conf Ind
Yes
Investigation Status
Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)
Invest Schedule Ind
Yes
Invest Incorrect Action Ind
Yes
Invest Maint Ind
Yes
Employee Drug Test Ind
Yes
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Num Employees Tested
2
Num Employees Failed
0
Cause
Corrosion Failure
Cause Details
Internal Corrosion
Internal External
Internal Corrosion
Int Visual Exam Results
General Corrosion
Int Water Acid Ind
Yes
Int Metallurgical Basis Ind
Yes
Int Low Point Pipe Loc Ind
Yes
Int Dead Leg Loc Ind
Yes
Corrosion Inhibitors
No
Corrosion Lining
No
Cleaning Dewatering
Not Applicable - Not Mainline Pipe
Corrosion Coupons
Not Applicable - Not Mainline Pipe
Collected Data Ind
No
Has Hydrtst Conduc Before Ind
No
Direct Asmnt Conducted
No
Non Destructive Exam Ind
No
Io Follow Procedure Ind
Yes
Preparer Name
T*** N*******
Preparer Title
Director - Dot Compliance
Preparer Email
T************@e*************.com
Preparer Telephone
713-989-7126
Prepared Date
2023-12-19 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
T*** N*******
Authorizer Telephone
713-989-7126
Authorizer Title
Director - Dot Compliance
Authorizer Email
T************@e*************.com
Narrative
On 5/6/2023 at approximately 14:44 while pumping the recently commissioned bear creek cvr delivery, a release at eola station occurred. At approximately 21:35 the release was discovered at eola station by operating personnel. The line was shut down and spill response crews were dispatched. Approximately 1500 barrels of crude oil was released. All free product was recovered, and contaminated soil was removed. The failure occurred on previously unknown 10-inch dead leg piping situated between the mainline diameter transition traps of the 10-inch to 12-inch segments. On 5/7/2023, permanent repairs were completed, and the line was restarted. The failed piping was cut out and sent to 3rd party laboratory for analysis. The laboratory analysis determined that the failure was caused by internal corrosion that progressed until the remaining wall thickness could no longer support the pressure within the pipe resulting in the rupture failure. The corrosion deposits indicated that the internal corrosion progressed in an environment containing carbonic acid forming within the presence of CO2 and water which was exacerbated by sediment filling the low end of the pipe. The release was exacerbated due to control center uncertainty regarding whether a valve closure at the delivery facility at approximately 14:39 was caused either by a loss of communications due to a power failure at the delivery facility or due to pressure setpoint. This uncertainty led controllers to believe a line balance issue was due to power failure/communication loss and not a release. Surge protection was no longer open downstream which allowed a higher-than-normal pressure but not exceeding mop to be experienced at eola station and open path logic did not trigger an immediate shutdown. The rupture alarms following startup appeared to the controller to be explainable and were not properly escalated for additional investigation. While field crews at the delivery point continued to trouble shoot the issues and communicate with the control center the line continued to be operated intermittently until 21:35 with the belief that the line was re-packing after the power failure, communications loss, and delivery valve closure. To prevent a recurrence open path logic and revised alarm set points were implemented on this delivery configuration. Additionally, controller adherence to procedures, shutdown authority and engagement with management was reviewed with all liquid controllers.
| Report Received Date | 2023-06-21 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2023 |
| Report Number | 20230135 |
| Supplemental Number | 38980 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 32099 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Energy Transfer Company |
| Operator Street Address | 1300 Main Street |
| Operator City Name | Houston |
| Operator State Abbreviation | TX |
| Operator Postal Code | 77002 |
| Time Zone | Central |
| Daylight Savings Ind | Yes |
| Location Latitude | 34.566202 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -97.446486 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Crude Oil |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 1500 |
| Recovered Bbls | 1500 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Operator Employee |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Status When Identified | Normal Operation, Includes Pauses Between Batches And During Maintenance |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | Yes |
| Communication State Fed Ind | Yes |
| Party Initiated Communication | Operator |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1366561 NRC Report How to search |
| Additional Nrc Report Numbers | 1366721 |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Upstream Action Taken | Valve Closure |
| Upstream Valve Type Ind | Remotely Controlled |
| Downstream Action Taken | Valve Closure |
| Downstream Valve Type Ind | Remotely Controlled |
| Notify Qualified Indiv Ind | Yes |
| Oil Spill Removal Org Ind | Yes |
| Osro Arrived On Site Dt | 5/7/2023 0:30 |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Eola Station |
| Segment Name | 25001 10-Inch |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Ok |
| Onshore Postal Code | 73057 |
| Onshore City Name | Not Within A Municipality |
| Onshore County Name | Garvin |
| Designated Location | Milepost |
| Designated Name | 0 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Originated On Operator-Controlled Property, But Then Flowed Or Migrated Off The Property |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Under Soil |
| Depth Of Cover | 60 |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Intrastate |
| Item Involved | Pipe |
| Pipe Type | Pipe Body |
| Puddle Weld Ind | No |
| Pipe Diameter | 10 |
| Pipe Wall Thickness | 0.25 |
| Pipe Smys | 52000 |
| Pipe Specification | X-52 |
| Pipe Seam Type | Erw - Low Frequency |
| Pipe Manufacturer | Unknown |
| Pipe Coating Type | Coal Tar |
| Coating Applied Ind | Unknown |
| Installation Year | Unknown |
| Manufactured Year | Unknown |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Rupture |
| Rupture Orient | Longitudinal |
| Rupture Width | 0.5 |
| Rupture Length | 8 |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | Yes |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | Yes |
| Soil Remed Ind | Yes |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | Yes |
| Commodity Reached Hca | Yes |
| Other Pop Ind | Yes |
| Other Pop Yes No | Yes |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 75000 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 0 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 25000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 175000 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 75000 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 350000 |
| Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght | 0 |
| Num Injured Treated By Emt | 0 |
| Num Resident Building Affctd | 0 |
| Num Business Building Affctd | 0 |
| Accident Psig | 950 |
| Mop Psig | 1044 |
| Mop Cfr Section | Subpart E Pressure Test �195.406(A)(3) View CFR 49 §192 |
| Maop Established Date | 2004-01-01 00:00:00 |
| Maop Reversal Flow Ind | No |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Length Segment Isolated | 90 |
| Internal Inspection Ind | No |
| Other Inspection Ind | Yes |
| Internal Inspection Details | Facility Piping Between Mainline Diameter Transition And Traps |
| Operation Complications Ind | Yes |
| Other Complications Ind | Yes |
| Inspect Comp Details | Facility Piping Between Traps |
| Pipeline Function | > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | Yes |
| Scada Conf Ind | Yes |
| Cpm In Place Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Operating Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Functional Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Detection Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Conf Ind | Yes |
| Investigation Status | Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply) |
| Invest Schedule Ind | Yes |
| Invest Incorrect Action Ind | Yes |
| Invest Maint Ind | Yes |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | Yes |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Num Employees Tested | 2 |
| Num Employees Failed | 0 |
| Cause | Corrosion Failure |
| Cause Details | Internal Corrosion |
| Internal External | Internal Corrosion |
| Int Visual Exam Results | General Corrosion |
| Int Water Acid Ind | Yes |
| Int Metallurgical Basis Ind | Yes |
| Int Low Point Pipe Loc Ind | Yes |
| Int Dead Leg Loc Ind | Yes |
| Corrosion Inhibitors | No |
| Corrosion Lining | No |
| Cleaning Dewatering | Not Applicable - Not Mainline Pipe |
| Corrosion Coupons | Not Applicable - Not Mainline Pipe |
| Collected Data Ind | No |
| Has Hydrtst Conduc Before Ind | No |
| Direct Asmnt Conducted | No |
| Non Destructive Exam Ind | No |
| Io Follow Procedure Ind | Yes |
| Preparer Name | T*** N******* |
| Preparer Title | Director - Dot Compliance |
| Preparer Email | T************@e*************.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 713-989-7126 |
| Prepared Date | 2023-12-19 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | T*** N******* |
| Authorizer Telephone | 713-989-7126 |
| Authorizer Title | Director - Dot Compliance |
| Authorizer Email | T************@e*************.com |
| Narrative | On 5/6/2023 at approximately 14:44 while pumping the recently commissioned bear creek cvr delivery, a release at eola station occurred. At approximately 21:35 the release was discovered at eola station by operating personnel. The line was shut down and spill response crews were dispatched. Approximately 1500 barrels of crude oil was released. All free product was recovered, and contaminated soil was removed. The failure occurred on previously unknown 10-inch dead leg piping situated between the mainline diameter transition traps of the 10-inch to 12-inch segments. On 5/7/2023, permanent repairs were completed, and the line was restarted. The failed piping was cut out and sent to 3rd party laboratory for analysis. The laboratory analysis determined that the failure was caused by internal corrosion that progressed until the remaining wall thickness could no longer support the pressure within the pipe resulting in the rupture failure. The corrosion deposits indicated that the internal corrosion progressed in an environment containing carbonic acid forming within the presence of CO2 and water which was exacerbated by sediment filling the low end of the pipe. The release was exacerbated due to control center uncertainty regarding whether a valve closure at the delivery facility at approximately 14:39 was caused either by a loss of communications due to a power failure at the delivery facility or due to pressure setpoint. This uncertainty led controllers to believe a line balance issue was due to power failure/communication loss and not a release. Surge protection was no longer open downstream which allowed a higher-than-normal pressure but not exceeding mop to be experienced at eola station and open path logic did not trigger an immediate shutdown. The rupture alarms following startup appeared to the controller to be explainable and were not properly escalated for additional investigation. While field crews at the delivery point continued to trouble shoot the issues and communicate with the control center the line continued to be operated intermittently until 21:35 with the belief that the line was re-packing after the power failure, communications loss, and delivery valve closure. To prevent a recurrence open path logic and revised alarm set points were implemented on this delivery configuration. Additionally, controller adherence to procedures, shutdown authority and engagement with management was reviewed with all liquid controllers. |
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