GTG incident on 2023-11-03 — TX

Operator
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company
Cause
Equipment Failure
Commodity
Natural Gas
Program
GTG
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities 0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$3,500
Incident datetime
2023-11-03 00:00 UTC
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
On october 5, 2023 at 06:58 (est), station 267 in hopkinton, ma experienced an esd event. The initial notification was received via scada alarms. Gas control personnel notified tgp operations personnel who were in route to the station for daily activities. Tgp operations personnel arrived onsite at 07:11 (est). The hopkinton fire department had been notified by a third-party and arrived onsite at 07:18 (est). Once tgp operations personnel arrived onsite, they observed that station 267 was venting, but the compressor station was not fully isolated from the mainline. During a station walkthrough by operations personnel, it was discovered that the compressor station side gate valves were partially open. Thus gas from the mainline was venting through the station. At 7:38 (est), tgp operations personnel closed the compressor station blowoff valves to stop venting of the gas. At 3:00 (est), station 267 was confirmed to be isolated from the mainline. Since this event, station 267 has remained isolated. Following the internal investigation, it was determined that a power fault in the area resulted in the failure of the station plc. The plc failure activated the building protection system, triggering the esd. Due to the esd command, the compressor station vent valves were opened to blow down the units. However, the compressor side gate valves failed to properly close and isolate the station. The gas loss due to this event was calculated to be 8664 mcf. In order to prevent reoccurrence, new plcs have been ordered and will be installed. Additionally, all of the compressor station side gate valves have been evaluated to ensure correct functionality. As an added precaution, operations has developed a procedure for isolating the station from the mainline during extended periods when the station is not in demand. The action items above are intended to reduce the potential for reoccurrence of this event.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2023-11-03 00:00:00
Iyear
2023
Report Number
20230101
Supplemental Number
38745
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
Name
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company
Operator Street Address
1001 Louisiana St
Operator City Name
Houston
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
77002
Time Zone
Eastern
Daylight Savings Ind
Yes
Location Latitude
Location Longitude
-71.51523967
Nrc Rpt Num
Additional Nrc Report Numbers
1381037
Commodity Released Type
Natural Gas
Unintentional Release
8664
Intentional Release
0
Accompanying Liquid
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Status When Identified
Idle
Communication State Fed Ind
Yes
Party Initiated Communication
Local/state/federal Emergency Responder
Ignite Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0
On Off Shore
Onshore
Onshore State Abbreviation
Ma
Onshore Postal Code
01748
Onshore City Name
Hopkinton
Onshore County Name
Middlesex
Designated Location
Not Applicable
Pipe Fac Name
Station 267
Segment Name
Station 267
Federal
No
Location Type
Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Aboveground
Incident Area Subtype
Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
System Part Involved
Onshore Compressor Station Equipment And Piping
Item Involved
Compressor
Installation Year
1969
Manufactured Year
Unknown
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Other
Release Type Details
Unexpected Malfunction Of Esd At Compressor Station, Vented Natural Gas
Class Location Type
Class 3 Location
Could Be Hca
Yes
Determination Method
Method2
Pir Radius
494
Heat Damage Ind
No
Non Heat Damage Ind
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Unintentional Release
26252
Est Cost Intentional Release
0
Est Cost Prop Damage
3500
Est Cost Emergency
0
Est Cost Other
0
Gas Cost In Mcf
3.03
Prpty
29752
Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght
0
Num Injured Treated By Emt
0
Num Resident Building Affctd
0
Num Business Building Affctd
0
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Accident Psig
630
Gas Flow In Pipe In Mcf
211912
Mop Psig
750
Mop Cfr Section
192.619(A)(1)
Maop Established Date
1970-07-01 00:00:00
Maop Reversal Flow Ind
No
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Gas Required Odorized Ind
Yes
Gas Odorized Ind
Yes
Pipeline Function
Transmission System
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
Yes
Scada Conf Ind
No
Accident Identifier
Scada-Based Information (Such As Alarm(S), Alert(S), Event(S), And/or Volume Or Pack Calculations)
Investigation Status
Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)
Invest Schedule Ind
Yes
Invest No Control Room Ind
Yes
Invest No Controller Ind
Yes
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Equipment Failure
Cause Details
Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment
Eq Failure Type
Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment
Block Valve Ind
Yes
Power Failure Ind
Yes
Esd System Failure Ind
Yes
Additional Electricity Ind
Yes
Preparer Name
B***** C******
Preparer Title
Pipeline Engineer
Preparer Email
B*************@k***********.com
Preparer Telephone
7134205629
Authorizer Name
J**** H********
Authorizer Title
Director - Engineering
Authorizer Telephone
7133699443
Authorizer Email
J**************@k***********.com
Narrative
On october 5, 2023 at 06:58 (est), station 267 in hopkinton, ma experienced an esd event. The initial notification was received via scada alarms. Gas control personnel notified tgp operations personnel who were in route to the station for daily activities. Tgp operations personnel arrived onsite at 07:11 (est). The hopkinton fire department had been notified by a third-party and arrived onsite at 07:18 (est). Once tgp operations personnel arrived onsite, they observed that station 267 was venting, but the compressor station was not fully isolated from the mainline. During a station walkthrough by operations personnel, it was discovered that the compressor station side gate valves were partially open. Thus gas from the mainline was venting through the station. At 7:38 (est), tgp operations personnel closed the compressor station blowoff valves to stop venting of the gas. At 3:00 (est), station 267 was confirmed to be isolated from the mainline. Since this event, station 267 has remained isolated. Following the internal investigation, it was determined that a power fault in the area resulted in the failure of the station plc. The plc failure activated the building protection system, triggering the esd. Due to the esd command, the compressor station vent valves were opened to blow down the units. However, the compressor side gate valves failed to properly close and isolate the station. The gas loss due to this event was calculated to be 8664 mcf. In order to prevent reoccurrence, new plcs have been ordered and will be installed. Additionally, all of the compressor station side gate valves have been evaluated to ensure correct functionality. As an added precaution, operations has developed a procedure for isolating the station from the mainline during extended periods when the station is not in demand. The action items above are intended to reduce the potential for reoccurrence of this event.
Report Received Date 2023-11-03 00:00:00
Iyear 2023
Report Number 20230101
Supplemental Number 38745
Report Type Supplemental Final
Operator Id 19160 PHMSA Enforcement
Name Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company
Operator Street Address 1001 Louisiana St
Operator City Name Houston
Operator State Abbreviation TX
Operator Postal Code 77002
Time Zone Eastern
Daylight Savings Ind Yes
Location Latitude 42.24650353 Google Maps OpenStreetMap
Location Longitude -71.51523967 Google Maps OpenStreetMap
Nrc Rpt Num 1380937 NRC Report How to search
Additional Nrc Report Numbers 1381037
Commodity Released Type Natural Gas
Unintentional Release 8664
Intentional Release 0
Accompanying Liquid 0
Fatality Ind No
Fatal 0
Injury Ind No
Injure 0
Status When Identified Idle
Communication State Fed Ind Yes
Party Initiated Communication Local/state/federal Emergency Responder
Ignite Ind No
Num Pub Evacuated 0
On Off Shore Onshore
Onshore State Abbreviation Ma
Onshore Postal Code 01748
Onshore City Name Hopkinton
Onshore County Name Middlesex
Designated Location Not Applicable
Pipe Fac Name Station 267
Segment Name Station 267
Federal No
Location Type Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type Aboveground
Incident Area Subtype Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance
Crossing No
Pipe Facility Type Interstate
System Part Involved Onshore Compressor Station Equipment And Piping
Item Involved Compressor
Installation Year 1969
Manufactured Year Unknown
Material Involved Carbon Steel
Release Type Other
Release Type Details Unexpected Malfunction Of Esd At Compressor Station, Vented Natural Gas
Class Location Type Class 3 Location
Could Be Hca Yes
Determination Method Method2
Pir Radius 494
Heat Damage Ind No
Non Heat Damage Ind No
Est Cost Oper Paid 0
Est Cost Unintentional Release 26252
Est Cost Intentional Release 0
Est Cost Prop Damage 3500
Est Cost Emergency 0
Est Cost Other 0
Gas Cost In Mcf 3.03
Prpty 29752
Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght 0
Num Injured Treated By Emt 0
Num Resident Building Affctd 0
Num Business Building Affctd 0
Wildlife Impact Ind No
Accident Psig 630
Gas Flow In Pipe In Mcf 211912
Mop Psig 750
Mop Cfr Section 192.619(A)(1) View CFR 49 §192
Maop Established Date 1970-07-01 00:00:00
Maop Reversal Flow Ind No
Accident Pressure Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop
Pressure Restriction Ind No
Gas Required Odorized Ind Yes
Gas Odorized Ind Yes
Pipeline Function Transmission System
Scada In Place Ind Yes
Scada Operating Ind Yes
Scada Functional Ind Yes
Scada Detection Ind Yes
Scada Conf Ind No
Accident Identifier Scada-Based Information (Such As Alarm(S), Alert(S), Event(S), And/or Volume Or Pack Calculations)
Investigation Status Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)
Invest Schedule Ind Yes
Invest No Control Room Ind Yes
Invest No Controller Ind Yes
Employee Drug Test Ind No
Contractor Drug Test Ind No
Cause Equipment Failure
Cause Details Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment
Eq Failure Type Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment
Block Valve Ind Yes
Power Failure Ind Yes
Esd System Failure Ind Yes
Additional Electricity Ind Yes
Preparer Name B***** C******
Preparer Title Pipeline Engineer
Preparer Email B*************@k***********.com
Preparer Telephone 7134205629
Authorizer Name J**** H********
Authorizer Title Director - Engineering
Authorizer Telephone 7133699443
Authorizer Email J**************@k***********.com
Narrative On october 5, 2023 at 06:58 (est), station 267 in hopkinton, ma experienced an esd event. The initial notification was received via scada alarms. Gas control personnel notified tgp operations personnel who were in route to the station for daily activities. Tgp operations personnel arrived onsite at 07:11 (est). The hopkinton fire department had been notified by a third-party and arrived onsite at 07:18 (est). Once tgp operations personnel arrived onsite, they observed that station 267 was venting, but the compressor station was not fully isolated from the mainline. During a station walkthrough by operations personnel, it was discovered that the compressor station side gate valves were partially open. Thus gas from the mainline was venting through the station. At 7:38 (est), tgp operations personnel closed the compressor station blowoff valves to stop venting of the gas. At 3:00 (est), station 267 was confirmed to be isolated from the mainline. Since this event, station 267 has remained isolated. Following the internal investigation, it was determined that a power fault in the area resulted in the failure of the station plc. The plc failure activated the building protection system, triggering the esd. Due to the esd command, the compressor station vent valves were opened to blow down the units. However, the compressor side gate valves failed to properly close and isolate the station. The gas loss due to this event was calculated to be 8664 mcf. In order to prevent reoccurrence, new plcs have been ordered and will be installed. Additionally, all of the compressor station side gate valves have been evaluated to ensure correct functionality. As an added precaution, operations has developed a procedure for isolating the station from the mainline during extended periods when the station is not in demand. The action items above are intended to reduce the potential for reoccurrence of this event.

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