Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
GD incident on 2023-08-15 — MO
Operator
Springfield, City Utilities Of
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Commodity
Natural Gas
Program
GD
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$250,000
Incident datetime
2023-08-15 00:00 UTC
Report number
Location
MO, GREENE
Narrative
A natural gas construction crew was performing maintenance on a distribution line behind 5012 s charleston avenue. At that location, a flanged cross fitting connected sections of gas pipeline via valves to the north, west, and south in an exposed valve cluster pit. In preparation for maintenance, the valves to each of the north, west, and south pipelines were closed. Gas remained in the north and west pipeline but had already been purged from the south pipeline. Crews removed the flanged cross fitting and the valve to the south. Though the valve to the north was exposed, it was attached to a section of pipe connected to the upstream pipeline by a compression coupling that was underground and not visible to the crew. Shortly after the crew removed the flanged cross fitting, they heard a sound they recognized to be a gas leak, so they began to evacuate the area and contacted emergency services. Within approximately 5 minutes, the blowing gas ignited. Gas was then shut off from the incident site and the flames were extinguished. Eventually it was discovered that the north valve and section of pipe it was attached to had pulled out of the compression coupling connecting it with the rest of the north pipeline.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2023-08-15 00:00:00
Iyear
2023.0
Report Number
20230042.0
Supplemental Number
40059.0
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
18584
Name
Springfield, City Utilities Of
Operator Street Address
301 E. Central
Operator City Name
Springfield
Operator State Abbreviation
MO
Operator Postal Code
65802.0
Time Zone
Central
Daylight Savings Ind
Yes
Location Street Address
5012 S. Charleston
Location City Name
Springfield
Location County Name
Greene
Location State Abbreviation
MO
Location Postal Code
65804.0
Location Latitude
37.122861
Location Longitude
-93.263209
Flow Cont Key Crit Ind
Yes
Flow Cont Main Valve Ind
Yes
Flow Cont Meter Reg Ind
Yes
Nrc Rpt Num
1373341.0
Additional Nrc Report Numbers
1373504.0
Commodity Released Type
Natural Gas
Unintentional Release
1210.0
Intentional Release
0.0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Ignite Ind
Yes
How Extinguished
Allowed To Burn Out
Gas Consumed By Fire In Mcf
1087
Explode Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
4.0
Communication State Fed Ind
Yes
Party Initiated Communication
Operator
Federal
No
Location Type
Utility Right-Of-Way / Easement
Incident Area Type
Transition Area
Incident Area Subtype
Other
Incident Area Details
Unexposed Fitting Near Exposed Valve
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Municipally Owned
System Part Involved
Main
Installation Year
1968.0
Pipe Diameter
12.0
Pipe Specification
Api 5l
Pipe Manufacturer
Unknown
Material Involved
Steel
Steel Seam Type
Longitudinal Erw - Unknown Frequency
Wt Steel
0.25
Release Type
Leak
Leak Type
Connection Failure
Class Location Type
Class 3 Location
Est Cost Oper Paid
100000.0
Est Cost Prop Damage
250000.0
Est Cost Emergency
10000.0
Est Cost Other
0.0
Gas Cost In Mcf
6.86
Est Cost Unintentional Release
8301.0
Est Cost Intentional Release
0.0
Prpty
368301.0
Commercial Affected
0.0
Industrial Affected
0.0
Residences Affected
4.0
Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght
4.0
Num Injured Treated By Emt
0.0
Num Resident Building Affctd
4.0
Num Business Building Affctd
0.0
Accident Psig
134.0
Normal Psig
148.0
Mop Psig
200.0
Mop Cfr Section
192.619(A)(3)
Maop Established Date
1987-07-20 00:00:00
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop
Gas Odorized System Type
Injection Pump
Gas Odorized Lvl Not Msrd Ind
Yes
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
No aspect of the control room operations were a contributing factor to the incident and there were no actions that the controller could have taken that would have changed the outcome of the incident.
Employee Drug Test Ind
Yes
Num Employees Tested
7
Num Employees Failed
0
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Cause Details
Other Incorrect Operation
Operation Type
Other Incorrect Operation
Operation Details
City Utilities Personnel Failed To Locate And Review The As-Built Drawing Of The Cross-Fitting Location, Which Showed The Presence Of A Dresser Coupling Near The Fitting.
Related No Proc Ind
Yes
Category Type
Other Maintenance
Operator Qualification Ind
No
Preparer Name
J**** A*******
Preparer Title
Natural Gas Code Compliance Engineer
Preparer Email
J*************@c************.net
Preparer Telephone
4177662756
Local Contact Name
J**** A*******
Local Contact Email
J*************@c************.net
Local Contact Telephone
4177662756
Authorizer Name
D**** M*****
Authorizer Title
Director - Supply And Delivery
Authorizer Telephone
417-831-8462
Authorizer Email
D***********@c************.net
Narrative
A natural gas construction crew was performing maintenance on a distribution line behind 5012 s charleston avenue. At that location, a flanged cross fitting connected sections of gas pipeline via valves to the north, west, and south in an exposed valve cluster pit. In preparation for maintenance, the valves to each of the north, west, and south pipelines were closed. Gas remained in the north and west pipeline but had already been purged from the south pipeline. Crews removed the flanged cross fitting and the valve to the south. Though the valve to the north was exposed, it was attached to a section of pipe connected to the upstream pipeline by a compression coupling that was underground and not visible to the crew. Shortly after the crew removed the flanged cross fitting, they heard a sound they recognized to be a gas leak, so they began to evacuate the area and contacted emergency services. Within approximately 5 minutes, the blowing gas ignited. Gas was then shut off from the incident site and the flames were extinguished. Eventually it was discovered that the north valve and section of pipe it was attached to had pulled out of the compression coupling connecting it with the rest of the north pipeline.
| Report Received Date | 2023-08-15 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2023.0 |
| Report Number | 20230042.0 |
| Supplemental Number | 40059.0 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 18584 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Springfield, City Utilities Of |
| Operator Street Address | 301 E. Central |
| Operator City Name | Springfield |
| Operator State Abbreviation | MO |
| Operator Postal Code | 65802.0 |
| Time Zone | Central |
| Daylight Savings Ind | Yes |
| Location Street Address | 5012 S. Charleston |
| Location City Name | Springfield |
| Location County Name | Greene |
| Location State Abbreviation | MO |
| Location Postal Code | 65804.0 |
| Location Latitude | 37.122861 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -93.263209 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Flow Cont Key Crit Ind | Yes |
| Flow Cont Main Valve Ind | Yes |
| Flow Cont Meter Reg Ind | Yes |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1373341.0 NRC Report How to search |
| Additional Nrc Report Numbers | 1373504.0 |
| Commodity Released Type | Natural Gas |
| Unintentional Release | 1210.0 |
| Intentional Release | 0.0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Ignite Ind | Yes |
| How Extinguished | Allowed To Burn Out |
| Gas Consumed By Fire In Mcf | 1087 |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 4.0 |
| Communication State Fed Ind | Yes |
| Party Initiated Communication | Operator |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Utility Right-Of-Way / Easement |
| Incident Area Type | Transition Area |
| Incident Area Subtype | Other |
| Incident Area Details | Unexposed Fitting Near Exposed Valve |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Municipally Owned |
| System Part Involved | Main |
| Installation Year | 1968.0 |
| Pipe Diameter | 12.0 |
| Pipe Specification | Api 5l |
| Pipe Manufacturer | Unknown |
| Material Involved | Steel |
| Steel Seam Type | Longitudinal Erw - Unknown Frequency |
| Wt Steel | 0.25 |
| Release Type | Leak |
| Leak Type | Connection Failure |
| Class Location Type | Class 3 Location |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 100000.0 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 250000.0 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 10000.0 |
| Est Cost Other | 0.0 |
| Gas Cost In Mcf | 6.86 |
| Est Cost Unintentional Release | 8301.0 |
| Est Cost Intentional Release | 0.0 |
| Prpty | 368301.0 |
| Commercial Affected | 0.0 |
| Industrial Affected | 0.0 |
| Residences Affected | 4.0 |
| Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght | 4.0 |
| Num Injured Treated By Emt | 0.0 |
| Num Resident Building Affctd | 4.0 |
| Num Business Building Affctd | 0.0 |
| Accident Psig | 134.0 |
| Normal Psig | 148.0 |
| Mop Psig | 200.0 |
| Mop Cfr Section | 192.619(A)(3) View CFR 49 §192 |
| Maop Established Date | 1987-07-20 00:00:00 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop |
| Gas Odorized System Type | Injection Pump |
| Gas Odorized Lvl Not Msrd Ind | Yes |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Operator Employee |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | No aspect of the control room operations were a contributing factor to the incident and there were no actions that the controller could have taken that would have changed the outcome of the incident. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | Yes |
| Num Employees Tested | 7 |
| Num Employees Failed | 0 |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Incorrect Operation |
| Cause Details | Other Incorrect Operation |
| Operation Type | Other Incorrect Operation |
| Operation Details | City Utilities Personnel Failed To Locate And Review The As-Built Drawing Of The Cross-Fitting Location, Which Showed The Presence Of A Dresser Coupling Near The Fitting. |
| Related No Proc Ind | Yes |
| Category Type | Other Maintenance |
| Operator Qualification Ind | No |
| Preparer Name | J**** A******* |
| Preparer Title | Natural Gas Code Compliance Engineer |
| Preparer Email | J*************@c************.net |
| Preparer Telephone | 4177662756 |
| Local Contact Name | J**** A******* |
| Local Contact Email | J*************@c************.net |
| Local Contact Telephone | 4177662756 |
| Authorizer Name | D**** M***** |
| Authorizer Title | Director - Supply And Delivery |
| Authorizer Telephone | 417-831-8462 |
| Authorizer Email | D***********@c************.net |
| Narrative | A natural gas construction crew was performing maintenance on a distribution line behind 5012 s charleston avenue. At that location, a flanged cross fitting connected sections of gas pipeline via valves to the north, west, and south in an exposed valve cluster pit. In preparation for maintenance, the valves to each of the north, west, and south pipelines were closed. Gas remained in the north and west pipeline but had already been purged from the south pipeline. Crews removed the flanged cross fitting and the valve to the south. Though the valve to the north was exposed, it was attached to a section of pipe connected to the upstream pipeline by a compression coupling that was underground and not visible to the crew. Shortly after the crew removed the flanged cross fitting, they heard a sound they recognized to be a gas leak, so they began to evacuate the area and contacted emergency services. Within approximately 5 minutes, the blowing gas ignited. Gas was then shut off from the incident site and the flames were extinguished. Eventually it was discovered that the north valve and section of pipe it was attached to had pulled out of the compression coupling connecting it with the rest of the north pipeline. |
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