Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
GTG incident on 2022-09-08 — TX
Operator
High Point Gas Transmission, Llc
Cause
Other Incident Cause
Commodity
Natural Gas
Program
GTG
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$1,300,000
Incident datetime
2022-09-08 16:12
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
Due to character limits, see original report 20220107 for incident description. *update 10/31/22* the lab company (stress engineering) that the samples were sent to is currently preforming metallurgical analysis on both samples that third coast sent. The chief incident investigator that third coast contracted to investigate the lake lery incident is still conducting the investigation and interviewing witnesses. Meetings with third coast, the investigator and the US coast guard has produced a marine casualty investigation by the coast guard. Repairs to the 20' are under way and are near completion including backfilling the hole that was created. To prevent this from occurring in the future the pipeline will buried, hole back filled and 2 levels of articulating concrete mates will be placed on top along this section of pipe. *update 01/05/23* the 20' gate 6 to toca line has been dewatered, cut, air gapped, and capped from any pressure source and placed under a nitrogen blanket. *update 02/7/23* stress engineering (ses) performed several examinations of the pipe samples sent for analysis including laser scanning, visual examination, scanning electron microscopy (sem), energy dispersive x-ray spectroscopy (eds), x-ray diffraction (xrd), chemical analysis, mechanical testing and metallographic examination. The two transverse fractures on the two pipe segments (north and south) originated at the 6 o'clock position. The two helical, circumferential fractures likely occurred following a longitudinal rupture along the bottom of the 13-feet length pipe segment(s) that was/were displaced and never recovered. Pitting corrosion was found on the inside surface of the two pipe segments analyzed by ses. The pits were found to be as deep as 50% of the wall thickness in the north section. The inside surface scale contained iron carbonate and iron sulfide, while the deposits from the pits contained iron carbonate and iron oxide ' which are typical oilfield corrosion products from acid gases. The tensile properties met the requirements for grade x52 steel per API 5lx (1953) specifications. The microstructure of the pipe base material was typical of grade x52 carbon steel. Without the missing pipe segment(s) and the ability to examine it/them, ses cannot conclusively determine the cause of the rupture, nor can it rule out certain possible causes. Multiple attempts were conducted using a combination of divers and hydrographic/magnetometer up to 1 mile from release point; locating/marking and investigating by diver heavy metal debris targets. The 13-foot piece was never found and recovered.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2022-10-07 00:00:00
Iyear
2022
Report Number
20220107
Supplemental Number
37864
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
38902
Name
High Point Gas Transmission, Llc
Operator Street Address
Third Coast Midstream, Llc Po Box 1227
Operator City Name
Houston
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
77251
Local Datetime
2022-09-08 16:12:00
Time Zone
Central
Daylight Savings Ind
Yes
Location Latitude
29.7919139
Location Longitude
-89.8052972
Nrc Rpt Num
1346790
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2022-09-08 16:48:00
Additional Nrc Report Numbers
1346927
Commodity Released Type
Natural Gas
Unintentional Release
35000
Intentional Release
0
Accompanying Liquid
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Status When Identified
Normal Operation, Includes Pauses During Maintenance
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
No
Shutdown Explain
Pipeline Was Already Down Due To Business Needs
Ignite Ind
Yes
Ignite Datetime
2022-09-08 16:12:00
How Extinguished
Allowed To Burn Out
Gas Consumed By Fire In Mcf
35000
Explode Ind
No
Upstream Action Taken
Valve Closure
Upstream Valve Close Datetime
2022-09-08 10:00:00
Downstream Action Taken
Valve Closure
Downstream Vlv Close Datetime
2022-09-08 17:15:00
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Incident Identified Datetime
2022-09-08 16:12:00
On Site Datetime
2022-09-08 17:00:00
On Off Shore
Onshore
Onshore State Abbreviation
La
Onshore Postal Code
70040
Onshore City Name
St Bernard
Onshore County Name
Plaquemines
Designated Location
Milepost
Designated Name
51.18
Pipe Fac Name
Main Pass To Franklin 20"
Segment Name
Gate 6 To Toca 20"
Federal
No
Location Type
Pipeline Right-Of-Way
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Under Soil
Other Underground Facilities
No
Crossing
Yes
Water Crossing Ind
Yes
Water Type
Uncased
Water Name
Lake Lery
Water Depth
6
Water Subtype
Below Water, Pipe Buried Below Bottom (Not In Bored/drilled Crossing)
Crossing 100 Feet
Yes
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
System Part Involved
Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
Item Involved
Pipe
Pipe Type
Pipe Body
Pipe Diameter
20
Puddle Weld Ind
No
Pipe Wall Thickness
0.344
Pipe Smys
52000
Pipe Specification
X-52
Pipe Seam Type
Flash Welded
Pipe Manufacturer
A.o. Smith
Pipe Coating Type
Other
Pipe Coating Details
Concrete
Coating Applied Ind
No
Installation Year
1953
Manufactured Year
1953
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Rupture
Rupture Orient
Longitudinal
Rupture Length
156
Rupture Width
1
Class Location Type
Class 1 Location
Could Be Hca
No
Pir Radius
447
Heat Damage Ind
No
Non Heat Damage Ind
No
Did Occur In Mca Ind
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Unintentional Release
279650
Est Cost Intentional Release
0
Est Cost Prop Damage
1300000
Est Cost Emergency
341000
Est Cost Other
0
Gas Cost In Mcf
7.99
Prpty
1920650
Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght
0
Num Injured Treated By Emt
0
Num Resident Building Affctd
0
Num Business Building Affctd
0
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Accident Psig
1051
Gas Flow In Pipe In Mcf
0
Mop Psig
1072
Mop Cfr Section
Other
Mop Cfr Section Details
Prior To Code
Maop Established Date
1959-10-01 00:00:00
Maop Reversal Flow Ind
No
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Gas Required Odorized Ind
No
Upstream Valve Type Ind
Manual
Downstream Valve Type Ind
Manual
Length Segment Isolated
89760
Internal Inspection Ind
Yes
Operation Complications Ind
No
Pipeline Function
Transmission System
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
Yes
Scada Conf Ind
Yes
Accident Identifier
Notification From Emergency Responder
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
A review of the accident determined that there were no control room actions that contributed to the event.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Other Incident Cause
Cause Details
Unknown
Other Type
Unknown
Unknown Subtype
Investigation Complete, Cause Of Incident Unknown
Incident Unknown Comments
Due To Missing 13-Foot Piece Of Pipe, Cause Of The Rupture Cannot Be Determined.
Preparer Name
N****** P********
Preparer Title
Manager Pipeline Regulatory Compliance
Preparer Email
N*********@t**********.com
Preparer Telephone
3462413368
Authorizer Name
N****** P********
Authorizer Title
Manager Pipeline Regulatory Compliance
Authorizer Telephone
3462413368
Authorizer Email
N*********@t**********.com
Narrative
Due to character limits, see original report 20220107 for incident description. *update 10/31/22* the lab company (stress engineering) that the samples were sent to is currently preforming metallurgical analysis on both samples that third coast sent. The chief incident investigator that third coast contracted to investigate the lake lery incident is still conducting the investigation and interviewing witnesses. Meetings with third coast, the investigator and the US coast guard has produced a marine casualty investigation by the coast guard. Repairs to the 20' are under way and are near completion including backfilling the hole that was created. To prevent this from occurring in the future the pipeline will buried, hole back filled and 2 levels of articulating concrete mates will be placed on top along this section of pipe. *update 01/05/23* the 20' gate 6 to toca line has been dewatered, cut, air gapped, and capped from any pressure source and placed under a nitrogen blanket. *update 02/7/23* stress engineering (ses) performed several examinations of the pipe samples sent for analysis including laser scanning, visual examination, scanning electron microscopy (sem), energy dispersive x-ray spectroscopy (eds), x-ray diffraction (xrd), chemical analysis, mechanical testing and metallographic examination. The two transverse fractures on the two pipe segments (north and south) originated at the 6 o'clock position. The two helical, circumferential fractures likely occurred following a longitudinal rupture along the bottom of the 13-feet length pipe segment(s) that was/were displaced and never recovered. Pitting corrosion was found on the inside surface of the two pipe segments analyzed by ses. The pits were found to be as deep as 50% of the wall thickness in the north section. The inside surface scale contained iron carbonate and iron sulfide, while the deposits from the pits contained iron carbonate and iron oxide ' which are typical oilfield corrosion products from acid gases. The tensile properties met the requirements for grade x52 steel per API 5lx (1953) specifications. The microstructure of the pipe base material was typical of grade x52 carbon steel. Without the missing pipe segment(s) and the ability to examine it/them, ses cannot conclusively determine the cause of the rupture, nor can it rule out certain possible causes. Multiple attempts were conducted using a combination of divers and hydrographic/magnetometer up to 1 mile from release point; locating/marking and investigating by diver heavy metal debris targets. The 13-foot piece was never found and recovered.
| Report Received Date | 2022-10-07 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2022 |
| Report Number | 20220107 |
| Supplemental Number | 37864 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 38902 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | High Point Gas Transmission, Llc |
| Operator Street Address | Third Coast Midstream, Llc Po Box 1227 |
| Operator City Name | Houston |
| Operator State Abbreviation | TX |
| Operator Postal Code | 77251 |
| Local Datetime | 2022-09-08 16:12:00 |
| Time Zone | Central |
| Daylight Savings Ind | Yes |
| Location Latitude | 29.7919139 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -89.8052972 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1346790 NRC Report How to search |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2022-09-08 16:48:00 |
| Additional Nrc Report Numbers | 1346927 |
| Commodity Released Type | Natural Gas |
| Unintentional Release | 35000 |
| Intentional Release | 0 |
| Accompanying Liquid | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Status When Identified | Normal Operation, Includes Pauses During Maintenance |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | No |
| Shutdown Explain | Pipeline Was Already Down Due To Business Needs |
| Ignite Ind | Yes |
| Ignite Datetime | 2022-09-08 16:12:00 |
| How Extinguished | Allowed To Burn Out |
| Gas Consumed By Fire In Mcf | 35000 |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Upstream Action Taken | Valve Closure |
| Upstream Valve Close Datetime | 2022-09-08 10:00:00 |
| Downstream Action Taken | Valve Closure |
| Downstream Vlv Close Datetime | 2022-09-08 17:15:00 |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2022-09-08 16:12:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2022-09-08 17:00:00 |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | La |
| Onshore Postal Code | 70040 |
| Onshore City Name | St Bernard |
| Onshore County Name | Plaquemines |
| Designated Location | Milepost |
| Designated Name | 51.18 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Main Pass To Franklin 20" |
| Segment Name | Gate 6 To Toca 20" |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Pipeline Right-Of-Way |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Under Soil |
| Other Underground Facilities | No |
| Crossing | Yes |
| Water Crossing Ind | Yes |
| Water Type | Uncased |
| Water Name | Lake Lery |
| Water Depth | 6 |
| Water Subtype | Below Water, Pipe Buried Below Bottom (Not In Bored/drilled Crossing) |
| Crossing 100 Feet | Yes |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites |
| Item Involved | Pipe |
| Pipe Type | Pipe Body |
| Pipe Diameter | 20 |
| Puddle Weld Ind | No |
| Pipe Wall Thickness | 0.344 |
| Pipe Smys | 52000 |
| Pipe Specification | X-52 |
| Pipe Seam Type | Flash Welded |
| Pipe Manufacturer | A.o. Smith |
| Pipe Coating Type | Other |
| Pipe Coating Details | Concrete |
| Coating Applied Ind | No |
| Installation Year | 1953 |
| Manufactured Year | 1953 |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Rupture |
| Rupture Orient | Longitudinal |
| Rupture Length | 156 |
| Rupture Width | 1 |
| Class Location Type | Class 1 Location |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Pir Radius | 447 |
| Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Non Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Did Occur In Mca Ind | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Unintentional Release | 279650 |
| Est Cost Intentional Release | 0 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 1300000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 341000 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Gas Cost In Mcf | 7.99 |
| Prpty | 1920650 |
| Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght | 0 |
| Num Injured Treated By Emt | 0 |
| Num Resident Building Affctd | 0 |
| Num Business Building Affctd | 0 |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Accident Psig | 1051 |
| Gas Flow In Pipe In Mcf | 0 |
| Mop Psig | 1072 |
| Mop Cfr Section | Other View CFR 49 §192 |
| Mop Cfr Section Details | Prior To Code |
| Maop Established Date | 1959-10-01 00:00:00 |
| Maop Reversal Flow Ind | No |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Gas Required Odorized Ind | No |
| Upstream Valve Type Ind | Manual |
| Downstream Valve Type Ind | Manual |
| Length Segment Isolated | 89760 |
| Internal Inspection Ind | Yes |
| Operation Complications Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | Transmission System |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | Yes |
| Scada Conf Ind | Yes |
| Accident Identifier | Notification From Emergency Responder |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | A review of the accident determined that there were no control room actions that contributed to the event. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Other Incident Cause |
| Cause Details | Unknown |
| Other Type | Unknown |
| Unknown Subtype | Investigation Complete, Cause Of Incident Unknown |
| Incident Unknown Comments | Due To Missing 13-Foot Piece Of Pipe, Cause Of The Rupture Cannot Be Determined. |
| Preparer Name | N****** P******** |
| Preparer Title | Manager Pipeline Regulatory Compliance |
| Preparer Email | N*********@t**********.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 3462413368 |
| Authorizer Name | N****** P******** |
| Authorizer Title | Manager Pipeline Regulatory Compliance |
| Authorizer Telephone | 3462413368 |
| Authorizer Email | N*********@t**********.com |
| Narrative | Due to character limits, see original report 20220107 for incident description. *update 10/31/22* the lab company (stress engineering) that the samples were sent to is currently preforming metallurgical analysis on both samples that third coast sent. The chief incident investigator that third coast contracted to investigate the lake lery incident is still conducting the investigation and interviewing witnesses. Meetings with third coast, the investigator and the US coast guard has produced a marine casualty investigation by the coast guard. Repairs to the 20' are under way and are near completion including backfilling the hole that was created. To prevent this from occurring in the future the pipeline will buried, hole back filled and 2 levels of articulating concrete mates will be placed on top along this section of pipe. *update 01/05/23* the 20' gate 6 to toca line has been dewatered, cut, air gapped, and capped from any pressure source and placed under a nitrogen blanket. *update 02/7/23* stress engineering (ses) performed several examinations of the pipe samples sent for analysis including laser scanning, visual examination, scanning electron microscopy (sem), energy dispersive x-ray spectroscopy (eds), x-ray diffraction (xrd), chemical analysis, mechanical testing and metallographic examination. The two transverse fractures on the two pipe segments (north and south) originated at the 6 o'clock position. The two helical, circumferential fractures likely occurred following a longitudinal rupture along the bottom of the 13-feet length pipe segment(s) that was/were displaced and never recovered. Pitting corrosion was found on the inside surface of the two pipe segments analyzed by ses. The pits were found to be as deep as 50% of the wall thickness in the north section. The inside surface scale contained iron carbonate and iron sulfide, while the deposits from the pits contained iron carbonate and iron oxide ' which are typical oilfield corrosion products from acid gases. The tensile properties met the requirements for grade x52 steel per API 5lx (1953) specifications. The microstructure of the pipe base material was typical of grade x52 carbon steel. Without the missing pipe segment(s) and the ability to examine it/them, ses cannot conclusively determine the cause of the rupture, nor can it rule out certain possible causes. Multiple attempts were conducted using a combination of divers and hydrographic/magnetometer up to 1 mile from release point; locating/marking and investigating by diver heavy metal debris targets. The 13-foot piece was never found and recovered. |
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