Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2020-06-14 — TX
Operator
Fieldwood Energy, Llc
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Commodity
Crude Oil
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$50,000
Incident datetime
2020-06-14 08:00
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
According to the operators on shift that day, at approximately 17:00 on the evening of 06/14/20, during the routine transfer operation mentioned above, the levels in tank 5 exceeded the level of the flange of the fire suppression system and continuously leaked until approximately 02:00 on 06/15/20. The cause was originally determined two (2) discs of the foam chambers ruptured allowing oil to start leaking out of the annular air holes on the piping just below the chamber. However during repair operations it was discovered the plates did not rupture but instead were found to be incorrectly installed. The foam chambers installed at the facility are installed for the fire protection of the fixed roof tank and have been in place prior to the 2005 integrity test on file. They are installed on the side wall of vertical storage tanks above the maximum product storage level. The chambers are designed to apply an expanded foam blanket over the surface of a flammable liquid fire within the tank. The annular holes on the piping below the chamber are designed to allow air to mix with the foam solution to create the foam before it enters the tank. During the investigation of this incident fieldwood discovered that the overfill of the tank #5 was due to operator error and poor calculations. The operator believed he had room for an additional 4200 bbls however during his calculating of tank fill he allegedly failed to take into consideration of the flange level of the fire suppression system. When the safety devices alerted of potential overfill he placed the devices in bypass believing his calculations were accurate. To place the safety device in bypass the high alarms at the facility are air actuated alarms that can be heard from any location on the facility. When the alarm is triggered it must be acknowledged and silenced by facility personnel from one of two terminals (located within the office & mcc building). For corrective action fieldwood did the following: offshore production foremen/operation lead have increased their presence on the grand isle tank battery. They spend one full day a week on location to evaluate personnel and walk the grounds. Daily calls will be made along with an email of all activities am/pm will be sent to the production foreman and production superintendent. Weekly checklist along with pinc's will be done and discussed on daily call. Fieldwood hse personnel will increase site visits to this facility and accompany the pic to the gitb yard for a walk around evaluation. Both contract operators involved with this incident were relieved of their duties with fieldwood. Fieldwood added an additional operator going from 2 to 3 personnel. All operations groups underwent refresher training for who to report any concerns or incidents within the organization. Fieldwood will increase surprise mimic spill drills to verify all personnel on location are prepared and understand what is expected and how to respond.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2020-09-04 00:00:00
Iyear
2020
Report Number
20200245
Supplemental Number
34823
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
39068
Name
Fieldwood Energy, Llc
Operator Street Address
2000 W. Sam Houston Pkwy South 1200
Operator City Name
Houston
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
77042
Local Datetime
2020-08-06 15:24:00
Location Latitude
29.25617816
Location Longitude
-89.96341906
Commodity Released Type
Crude Oil
Unintentional Release Bbls
458
Recovered Bbls
458
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
Incident Identified Datetime
2020-06-14 08:00:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Breakout Tank Or Storage Vessel, Including Attached Appurtenances
On Off Shore
Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
No
Shutdown Explain
Product Was Diverted To Other Tanks Within The Facility.
On Site Datetime
2020-06-14 08:00:00
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2020-08-06 15:24:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1283894
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Grand Isle Tank Battery
Segment Name
Gitb
Onshore State Abbreviation
La
Onshore Postal Code
70358
Onshore City Name
Grand Isle
Onshore County Name
Jefferson
Designated Location
Milepost/valve Station
Designated Name
Tank Battery
Federal
No
Location Type
Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Tank, Including Attached Appurtenances
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
Item Involved
Tank/vessel
Tank Vessel Subtype
Other
Tank Vessel Details
Fire Suppresion System
Tank Type
Atmospheric
Installation Year
Unknown
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Overfill Or Overflow
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
Yes
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
Yes
Soil Remed Ind
Yes
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
Yes
Commodity Reached Hca
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
15000
Est Cost Prop Damage
50000
Est Cost Emergency
600000
Est Cost Environmental
500000
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
1165000
Accident Psig
20
Mop Psig
25
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Pipeline Function
=< 20% Smys Regulated Gathering
Scada In Place Ind
No
Cpm In Place Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
Fieldwood does not have a control room associated with this facility.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Cause Details
Tank, Vessel, Or Sump/separator Allowed Or Caused To Overfill Or Overflow
Operation Type
Tank, Vessel, Or Sump/separator Allowed Or Caused To Overfill Or Overflow
Overflow Other Ind
Incorrect Reference Data/calculation
Related Failure Follow Ind
Yes
Category Type
Normal Operating Conditions
Operator Qualification Ind
Yes
Qualified Individuals
Yes, They Were Qualified For The Task(S)
Preparer Name
T***** H******
Preparer Title
Compliance Coordinator
Preparer Email
T*************@f*****.com
Preparer Telephone
337-354-8015
Prepared Date
2021-02-08 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
T***** H******
Authorizer Telephone
337-354-8015
Authorizer Title
Compliance Coordinator
Authorizer Email
T*************@f*****.com
Narrative
According to the operators on shift that day, at approximately 17:00 on the evening of 06/14/20, during the routine transfer operation mentioned above, the levels in tank 5 exceeded the level of the flange of the fire suppression system and continuously leaked until approximately 02:00 on 06/15/20. The cause was originally determined two (2) discs of the foam chambers ruptured allowing oil to start leaking out of the annular air holes on the piping just below the chamber. However during repair operations it was discovered the plates did not rupture but instead were found to be incorrectly installed. The foam chambers installed at the facility are installed for the fire protection of the fixed roof tank and have been in place prior to the 2005 integrity test on file. They are installed on the side wall of vertical storage tanks above the maximum product storage level. The chambers are designed to apply an expanded foam blanket over the surface of a flammable liquid fire within the tank. The annular holes on the piping below the chamber are designed to allow air to mix with the foam solution to create the foam before it enters the tank. During the investigation of this incident fieldwood discovered that the overfill of the tank #5 was due to operator error and poor calculations. The operator believed he had room for an additional 4200 bbls however during his calculating of tank fill he allegedly failed to take into consideration of the flange level of the fire suppression system. When the safety devices alerted of potential overfill he placed the devices in bypass believing his calculations were accurate. To place the safety device in bypass the high alarms at the facility are air actuated alarms that can be heard from any location on the facility. When the alarm is triggered it must be acknowledged and silenced by facility personnel from one of two terminals (located within the office & mcc building). For corrective action fieldwood did the following: offshore production foremen/operation lead have increased their presence on the grand isle tank battery. They spend one full day a week on location to evaluate personnel and walk the grounds. Daily calls will be made along with an email of all activities am/pm will be sent to the production foreman and production superintendent. Weekly checklist along with pinc's will be done and discussed on daily call. Fieldwood hse personnel will increase site visits to this facility and accompany the pic to the gitb yard for a walk around evaluation. Both contract operators involved with this incident were relieved of their duties with fieldwood. Fieldwood added an additional operator going from 2 to 3 personnel. All operations groups underwent refresher training for who to report any concerns or incidents within the organization. Fieldwood will increase surprise mimic spill drills to verify all personnel on location are prepared and understand what is expected and how to respond.
| Report Received Date | 2020-09-04 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2020 |
| Report Number | 20200245 |
| Supplemental Number | 34823 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 39068 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Fieldwood Energy, Llc |
| Operator Street Address | 2000 W. Sam Houston Pkwy South 1200 |
| Operator City Name | Houston |
| Operator State Abbreviation | TX |
| Operator Postal Code | 77042 |
| Local Datetime | 2020-08-06 15:24:00 |
| Location Latitude | 29.25617816 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -89.96341906 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Crude Oil |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 458 |
| Recovered Bbls | 458 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Operator Employee |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2020-06-14 08:00:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Breakout Tank Or Storage Vessel, Including Attached Appurtenances |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | No |
| Shutdown Explain | Product Was Diverted To Other Tanks Within The Facility. |
| On Site Datetime | 2020-06-14 08:00:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2020-08-06 15:24:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1283894 NRC Report How to search |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Grand Isle Tank Battery |
| Segment Name | Gitb |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | La |
| Onshore Postal Code | 70358 |
| Onshore City Name | Grand Isle |
| Onshore County Name | Jefferson |
| Designated Location | Milepost/valve Station |
| Designated Name | Tank Battery |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Tank, Including Attached Appurtenances |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| Item Involved | Tank/vessel |
| Tank Vessel Subtype | Other |
| Tank Vessel Details | Fire Suppresion System |
| Tank Type | Atmospheric |
| Installation Year | Unknown |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Overfill Or Overflow |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | Yes |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | Yes |
| Soil Remed Ind | Yes |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | Yes |
| Commodity Reached Hca | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 15000 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 50000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 600000 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 500000 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 1165000 |
| Accident Psig | 20 |
| Mop Psig | 25 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | =< 20% Smys Regulated Gathering |
| Scada In Place Ind | No |
| Cpm In Place Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | Fieldwood does not have a control room associated with this facility. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Incorrect Operation |
| Cause Details | Tank, Vessel, Or Sump/separator Allowed Or Caused To Overfill Or Overflow |
| Operation Type | Tank, Vessel, Or Sump/separator Allowed Or Caused To Overfill Or Overflow |
| Overflow Other Ind | Incorrect Reference Data/calculation |
| Related Failure Follow Ind | Yes |
| Category Type | Normal Operating Conditions |
| Operator Qualification Ind | Yes |
| Qualified Individuals | Yes, They Were Qualified For The Task(S) |
| Preparer Name | T***** H****** |
| Preparer Title | Compliance Coordinator |
| Preparer Email | T*************@f*****.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 337-354-8015 |
| Prepared Date | 2021-02-08 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | T***** H****** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 337-354-8015 |
| Authorizer Title | Compliance Coordinator |
| Authorizer Email | T*************@f*****.com |
| Narrative | According to the operators on shift that day, at approximately 17:00 on the evening of 06/14/20, during the routine transfer operation mentioned above, the levels in tank 5 exceeded the level of the flange of the fire suppression system and continuously leaked until approximately 02:00 on 06/15/20. The cause was originally determined two (2) discs of the foam chambers ruptured allowing oil to start leaking out of the annular air holes on the piping just below the chamber. However during repair operations it was discovered the plates did not rupture but instead were found to be incorrectly installed. The foam chambers installed at the facility are installed for the fire protection of the fixed roof tank and have been in place prior to the 2005 integrity test on file. They are installed on the side wall of vertical storage tanks above the maximum product storage level. The chambers are designed to apply an expanded foam blanket over the surface of a flammable liquid fire within the tank. The annular holes on the piping below the chamber are designed to allow air to mix with the foam solution to create the foam before it enters the tank. During the investigation of this incident fieldwood discovered that the overfill of the tank #5 was due to operator error and poor calculations. The operator believed he had room for an additional 4200 bbls however during his calculating of tank fill he allegedly failed to take into consideration of the flange level of the fire suppression system. When the safety devices alerted of potential overfill he placed the devices in bypass believing his calculations were accurate. To place the safety device in bypass the high alarms at the facility are air actuated alarms that can be heard from any location on the facility. When the alarm is triggered it must be acknowledged and silenced by facility personnel from one of two terminals (located within the office & mcc building). For corrective action fieldwood did the following: offshore production foremen/operation lead have increased their presence on the grand isle tank battery. They spend one full day a week on location to evaluate personnel and walk the grounds. Daily calls will be made along with an email of all activities am/pm will be sent to the production foreman and production superintendent. Weekly checklist along with pinc's will be done and discussed on daily call. Fieldwood hse personnel will increase site visits to this facility and accompany the pic to the gitb yard for a walk around evaluation. Both contract operators involved with this incident were relieved of their duties with fieldwood. Fieldwood added an additional operator going from 2 to 3 personnel. All operations groups underwent refresher training for who to report any concerns or incidents within the organization. Fieldwood will increase surprise mimic spill drills to verify all personnel on location are prepared and understand what is expected and how to respond. |
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