Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2020-04-28 — OK
Operator
Oneok Ngl Pipeline, Llc
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Commodity
Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$0
Incident datetime
2020-04-28 17:00
Report number
Location
OK
Narrative
On 4/28/2020 an incipient fire occurred while a contractor was completing the final tie-in weld at oneok's eastland ii pump station. The incipient fire occurred as the welder was approximately half-way through his root pass and self-extinguished. The pipeline was isolated by mainline block-valves upstream and downstream of the location and stopples had been set on either side of the work site. A mud plug vapor barrier was installed before performing the final tie-in weld. To make the final tie-in weld the mainline pipe was cut to ensure proper fit. Once the final cut was made a worker moved the mud plug farther into the pipe to enable the welder to make his weld. The mud plug was visually inspected and atmospheric testing downstream of the mud plug was conducted with no hydrocarbons detected. As the welder was in the process of making his weld the incipient fire developed and self-extinguished. Oneok's investigation identified that previous to oneok becoming the operator of this asset in 2015, the previous operator/employer did employ mud plugs as vapor barriers which was carried forward by the employees involved. At the time of the incident, oneok did not have a qualification or procedure for the utilization/installation of mud plugs as vapor barriers. Oneok is working to develop a mud plug vapor barrier procedure and qualifications should the use of a mud plug be required in the future. Oneok is also conducting refresher training on reporting requirements to the field employees to make sure they are aware of the PHMSA and nrc reporting requirements. Oneok's anti-drug and alcohol misuse prevention plan includes the following statements regarding post-accident testing. Anti-drug program: as soon as possible but no later than 32 hours after an accident, the company will drug test each surviving covered employee whose performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. Alcohol misuse prevention plan: as soon as possible, the company will alcohol test each surviving covered employee whose performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. The company may decide not to test under this paragraph but such a decision will be based on specific information that the covered employee's performance had no role in the cause(s) or severity of the accident. The reportability of this incident was not identified within that timeframe, thus any testing that would have normally occurred did not take place. Nrc report 1276472 was made on 5/01/20 and the follow up nrc report 1276608 was made on 5/04/20. Report updated 6/08/20 per PHMSA request.-n jones report updated 2/18/2022-n jones corrected part a, question 5-accident location, part b, question 1-pipeline name, part d, question 6-hca information part e, question 2-mop of pipeline and part e, question 9-scada & question-10 leak detection. Part a, question 5 - original gps coordinates used for the accident were incorrect. Originally reported gps: (32.4883300, -98.88111000) are for the eastland I pump station accident occurred at gps location: 32.489106, -98.873557 which is on the oneok 10" pipeline (index #21365) part b, question 1- changed pipeline/facility name from eastland I pump station to oneok #1-10" pipeline. Part d, question 6- changed hca information to "no" location on original report was eastland 1 pump station which is hca location. Accident occurred outside of hca at oneok #1-10" pipeline. Part e, question 2- changed mop to 890 which is the mop of the existing 10" pipeline. Part e, questions 9 & 10- pipeline does have scada and cpm leak detection. Both were in operation at time of accident but isolated from the section where the accident occurred.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2020-05-28 00:00:00
Iyear
2020
Report Number
20200149
Supplemental Number
36366
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
32109
Name
Oneok Ngl Pipeline, Llc
Operator Street Address
100 West Fifth Street
Operator City Name
Tulsa
Operator State Abbreviation
OK
Operator Postal Code
74103
Local Datetime
2020-04-28 17:00:00
Location Latitude
32.489106
Location Longitude
-98.873557
Commodity Released Type
Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions
Commodity Subtype
Lpg (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) / Ngl (Natural Gas Liquid)
Unintentional Release Bbls
0.1
Intentional Release Bbls
0
Recovered Bbls
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
Incident Identified Datetime
2020-04-28 17:00:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Pump/meter Station Equipment And Piping
On Off Shore
Onshore
On Site Datetime
2020-04-28 17:00:00
Confirmed Discovery Datetime
2020-04-28 17:00:00
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2020-05-01 11:22:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1276472
Ignite Ind
Yes
Ignite Datetime
2020-04-28 17:00:00
How Extinguished
Other
How Extinguished Other Detail
Fire Immediately Self-Extinguished
Consumed By Fire In Barrels
0.1
Explode Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Oneok West Texas Lpg #1 10" Pipeline
Segment Name
Oneok Index #21365
Onshore State Abbreviation
Tx
Onshore Postal Code
76448
Onshore City Name
Not Within Municipality
Onshore County Name
Eastland
Designated Location
Survey Station No.
Designated Name
745+00
Federal
No
Location Type
Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Exposed Due To Excavation
Depth Of Cover
48
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
Item Involved
Weld, Including Heat-Affected Zone
Weld Subtype
Other Butt Weld
Installation Year
2020
Manufactured Year
2018
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Other
Release Type Details
Incipient Fire Occurred At Weld And Self-Extinguished, During Welding Of Pipe During Tie-In Work Related To New Construction
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
No
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
No
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
No
Commodity Reached Hca
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
1
Est Cost Prop Damage
0
Est Cost Emergency
0
Est Cost Environmental
0
Est Cost Other
250
Est Cost Other Details
Investigation Costs
Prpty
251
Accident Psig
0
Mop Psig
890
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
No
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Cpm In Place Ind
Yes
Cpm Operating Ind
Yes
Cpm Functional Ind
No
Cpm Detection Ind
No
Cpm Conf Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the facility was not monitored by a controller(s) at the time of the accident
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Cause Details
Other Incorrect Operation
Operation Type
Other Incorrect Operation
Operation Details
Hydrocarbons Were Present And Not Identified During Tie-In Weld Activities Resulting In An Incipient Fire That Self Extinguished.
Related Inadequate Proc Ind
Yes
Category Type
Construction
Operator Qualification Ind
Yes
Qualified Individuals
Yes, They Were Qualified For The Task(S)
Preparer Name
N*** J****
Preparer Title
Requlatory Compliance Manager
Preparer Email
N*********@o****.com
Preparer Telephone
580-395-6304
Preparer Fax
580-395-2933
Prepared Date
2022-02-20 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
N*** J****
Authorizer Telephone
580-395-6304
Authorizer Title
Regulatory Compliance Manager
Authorizer Email
N*********@o****.com
Narrative
On 4/28/2020 an incipient fire occurred while a contractor was completing the final tie-in weld at oneok's eastland ii pump station. The incipient fire occurred as the welder was approximately half-way through his root pass and self-extinguished. The pipeline was isolated by mainline block-valves upstream and downstream of the location and stopples had been set on either side of the work site. A mud plug vapor barrier was installed before performing the final tie-in weld. To make the final tie-in weld the mainline pipe was cut to ensure proper fit. Once the final cut was made a worker moved the mud plug farther into the pipe to enable the welder to make his weld. The mud plug was visually inspected and atmospheric testing downstream of the mud plug was conducted with no hydrocarbons detected. As the welder was in the process of making his weld the incipient fire developed and self-extinguished. Oneok's investigation identified that previous to oneok becoming the operator of this asset in 2015, the previous operator/employer did employ mud plugs as vapor barriers which was carried forward by the employees involved. At the time of the incident, oneok did not have a qualification or procedure for the utilization/installation of mud plugs as vapor barriers. Oneok is working to develop a mud plug vapor barrier procedure and qualifications should the use of a mud plug be required in the future. Oneok is also conducting refresher training on reporting requirements to the field employees to make sure they are aware of the PHMSA and nrc reporting requirements. Oneok's anti-drug and alcohol misuse prevention plan includes the following statements regarding post-accident testing. Anti-drug program: as soon as possible but no later than 32 hours after an accident, the company will drug test each surviving covered employee whose performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. Alcohol misuse prevention plan: as soon as possible, the company will alcohol test each surviving covered employee whose performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. The company may decide not to test under this paragraph but such a decision will be based on specific information that the covered employee's performance had no role in the cause(s) or severity of the accident. The reportability of this incident was not identified within that timeframe, thus any testing that would have normally occurred did not take place. Nrc report 1276472 was made on 5/01/20 and the follow up nrc report 1276608 was made on 5/04/20. Report updated 6/08/20 per PHMSA request.-n jones report updated 2/18/2022-n jones corrected part a, question 5-accident location, part b, question 1-pipeline name, part d, question 6-hca information part e, question 2-mop of pipeline and part e, question 9-scada & question-10 leak detection. Part a, question 5 - original gps coordinates used for the accident were incorrect. Originally reported gps: (32.4883300, -98.88111000) are for the eastland I pump station accident occurred at gps location: 32.489106, -98.873557 which is on the oneok 10" pipeline (index #21365) part b, question 1- changed pipeline/facility name from eastland I pump station to oneok #1-10" pipeline. Part d, question 6- changed hca information to "no" location on original report was eastland 1 pump station which is hca location. Accident occurred outside of hca at oneok #1-10" pipeline. Part e, question 2- changed mop to 890 which is the mop of the existing 10" pipeline. Part e, questions 9 & 10- pipeline does have scada and cpm leak detection. Both were in operation at time of accident but isolated from the section where the accident occurred.
| Report Received Date | 2020-05-28 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2020 |
| Report Number | 20200149 |
| Supplemental Number | 36366 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 32109 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Oneok Ngl Pipeline, Llc |
| Operator Street Address | 100 West Fifth Street |
| Operator City Name | Tulsa |
| Operator State Abbreviation | OK |
| Operator Postal Code | 74103 |
| Local Datetime | 2020-04-28 17:00:00 |
| Location Latitude | 32.489106 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -98.873557 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions |
| Commodity Subtype | Lpg (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) / Ngl (Natural Gas Liquid) |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 0.1 |
| Intentional Release Bbls | 0 |
| Recovered Bbls | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Operator Employee |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2020-04-28 17:00:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pump/meter Station Equipment And Piping |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| On Site Datetime | 2020-04-28 17:00:00 |
| Confirmed Discovery Datetime | 2020-04-28 17:00:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2020-05-01 11:22:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1276472 NRC Report How to search |
| Ignite Ind | Yes |
| Ignite Datetime | 2020-04-28 17:00:00 |
| How Extinguished | Other |
| How Extinguished Other Detail | Fire Immediately Self-Extinguished |
| Consumed By Fire In Barrels | 0.1 |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Oneok West Texas Lpg #1 10" Pipeline |
| Segment Name | Oneok Index #21365 |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Tx |
| Onshore Postal Code | 76448 |
| Onshore City Name | Not Within Municipality |
| Onshore County Name | Eastland |
| Designated Location | Survey Station No. |
| Designated Name | 745+00 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Exposed Due To Excavation |
| Depth Of Cover | 48 |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| Item Involved | Weld, Including Heat-Affected Zone |
| Weld Subtype | Other Butt Weld |
| Installation Year | 2020 |
| Manufactured Year | 2018 |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Other |
| Release Type Details | Incipient Fire Occurred At Weld And Self-Extinguished, During Welding Of Pipe During Tie-In Work Related To New Construction |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | No |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | No |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Commodity Reached Hca | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 1 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 0 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 0 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 0 |
| Est Cost Other | 250 |
| Est Cost Other Details | Investigation Costs |
| Prpty | 251 |
| Accident Psig | 0 |
| Mop Psig | 890 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | No |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Cpm In Place Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Operating Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Functional Ind | No |
| Cpm Detection Ind | No |
| Cpm Conf Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | No, the facility was not monitored by a controller(s) at the time of the accident |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Incorrect Operation |
| Cause Details | Other Incorrect Operation |
| Operation Type | Other Incorrect Operation |
| Operation Details | Hydrocarbons Were Present And Not Identified During Tie-In Weld Activities Resulting In An Incipient Fire That Self Extinguished. |
| Related Inadequate Proc Ind | Yes |
| Category Type | Construction |
| Operator Qualification Ind | Yes |
| Qualified Individuals | Yes, They Were Qualified For The Task(S) |
| Preparer Name | N*** J**** |
| Preparer Title | Requlatory Compliance Manager |
| Preparer Email | N*********@o****.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 580-395-6304 |
| Preparer Fax | 580-395-2933 |
| Prepared Date | 2022-02-20 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | N*** J**** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 580-395-6304 |
| Authorizer Title | Regulatory Compliance Manager |
| Authorizer Email | N*********@o****.com |
| Narrative | On 4/28/2020 an incipient fire occurred while a contractor was completing the final tie-in weld at oneok's eastland ii pump station. The incipient fire occurred as the welder was approximately half-way through his root pass and self-extinguished. The pipeline was isolated by mainline block-valves upstream and downstream of the location and stopples had been set on either side of the work site. A mud plug vapor barrier was installed before performing the final tie-in weld. To make the final tie-in weld the mainline pipe was cut to ensure proper fit. Once the final cut was made a worker moved the mud plug farther into the pipe to enable the welder to make his weld. The mud plug was visually inspected and atmospheric testing downstream of the mud plug was conducted with no hydrocarbons detected. As the welder was in the process of making his weld the incipient fire developed and self-extinguished. Oneok's investigation identified that previous to oneok becoming the operator of this asset in 2015, the previous operator/employer did employ mud plugs as vapor barriers which was carried forward by the employees involved. At the time of the incident, oneok did not have a qualification or procedure for the utilization/installation of mud plugs as vapor barriers. Oneok is working to develop a mud plug vapor barrier procedure and qualifications should the use of a mud plug be required in the future. Oneok is also conducting refresher training on reporting requirements to the field employees to make sure they are aware of the PHMSA and nrc reporting requirements. Oneok's anti-drug and alcohol misuse prevention plan includes the following statements regarding post-accident testing. Anti-drug program: as soon as possible but no later than 32 hours after an accident, the company will drug test each surviving covered employee whose performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. Alcohol misuse prevention plan: as soon as possible, the company will alcohol test each surviving covered employee whose performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. The company may decide not to test under this paragraph but such a decision will be based on specific information that the covered employee's performance had no role in the cause(s) or severity of the accident. The reportability of this incident was not identified within that timeframe, thus any testing that would have normally occurred did not take place. Nrc report 1276472 was made on 5/01/20 and the follow up nrc report 1276608 was made on 5/04/20. Report updated 6/08/20 per PHMSA request.-n jones report updated 2/18/2022-n jones corrected part a, question 5-accident location, part b, question 1-pipeline name, part d, question 6-hca information part e, question 2-mop of pipeline and part e, question 9-scada & question-10 leak detection. Part a, question 5 - original gps coordinates used for the accident were incorrect. Originally reported gps: (32.4883300, -98.88111000) are for the eastland I pump station accident occurred at gps location: 32.489106, -98.873557 which is on the oneok 10" pipeline (index #21365) part b, question 1- changed pipeline/facility name from eastland I pump station to oneok #1-10" pipeline. Part d, question 6- changed hca information to "no" location on original report was eastland 1 pump station which is hca location. Accident occurred outside of hca at oneok #1-10" pipeline. Part e, question 2- changed mop to 890 which is the mop of the existing 10" pipeline. Part e, questions 9 & 10- pipeline does have scada and cpm leak detection. Both were in operation at time of accident but isolated from the section where the accident occurred. |
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