Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
GD incident on 2020-11-07 — TX
Operator
Atmos Energy Corporation - Mid-Tex
Cause
Pipe, Weld, Or Joint Failure
Commodity
Natural Gas
Program
GD
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
1 injury
Property damage (nominal)
$81,500
Incident datetime
2020-11-07 09:20
Report number
Location
TX, DALLAS
Narrative
On friday, november 6, 2020, at approximately 2:30 p.M., a third-party contractor cut the natural gas service line to highland park high school when performing a saw cut in westchester drive. Atmos energy crews responded by making the area safe, evacuating the high school, and then began the process of restoring service to the high school. The main line in the area consisted of 4" steel pipe. However, the repair required the installation of a poly transition fitting from the steel main to the 3" steel service line as well as the installation of a poly valve. A bell hole was dug at the location of the damage and where the main to service line connection was being replaced. On the morning of saturday, november 7, repairs had been completed on the segment of main up to the closed poly valve and was active with natural gas. Atmos energy employees were preparing to perform additional work that was required for the service line when natural gas suddenly escaped and ignited at approximately 9:20 a.M. Two employees were injured and were taken to the hospital. One employee was treated and released, and the other was admitted to the hospital at 11:17 am. The probable cause of this incident was the failure and release of the 4" electrofusion coupling that occurred within the north bell hole. The joint failure was sudden and occurred after the coupling was installed and placed in service. The joint failure and separation of the coupling occurred within the same excavated bell hole that the resulting injured crew members were working downstream performing final system tie-ins. The most likely source of ignition occurred from the energized fitting being fused (4" ef coupling) on the outlet side of the valve. None of these activities provided evidence of a direct cause of failure. Since the materials involved in the failure were destroyed in the resulting fire, laboratory testing cannot be conducted on the failed fitting to further evaluate root cause. However, testing was conducted on other elements in investigation of the root cause such as the electrofusion processor unit, the downstream valve, and prior fusions performed by the same qualified employee.
Detailed record list
Occurred At
2020-11-07 09:20:00
Year
2020
Report Received Date
2020-12-07 00:00:00
Iyear
2020.0
Report Number
20200124.0
Supplemental Number
35400.0
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
31348
Name
Atmos Energy Corporation - Mid-Tex
Operator Street Address
5430 Lbj Freeway Suite 1800
Operator City Name
Dallas
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
75240
Local Datetime
2020-11-07 09:20:00
Time Zone
Central
Daylight Savings Ind
Yes
Location Street Address
6700 Westchester Drive
Location City Name
Dallas
Location County Name
Dallas
Location State Abbreviation
TX
Location Postal Code
75205
Location Latitude
32.84759
Location Longitude
-96.80673
Flow Cont Stopple Fitng Ind
Yes
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2020-11-07 11:10:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1291639
Additional Nrc Report Numbers
1291734
Commodity Released Type
Natural Gas
Unintentional Release
207.0
Intentional Release
0.0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
Yes
Num Emp Injuries
1
Num Contr Injuries
0
Num Er Injuries
0
Num Worker Injuries
0
Num Gp Injuries
0
Injure
1
Ignite Ind
Yes
Ignite Datetime
2020-11-07 09:20:00
How Extinguished
Operator/contractor
Gas Consumed By Fire In Mcf
207
Explode Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0.0
Incident Identified Datetime
2020-11-07 09:20:00
Communication State Fed Ind
Yes
Party Initiated Communication
Operator
Initial Responder Com Datetime
2020-11-07 09:21:00
On Site Datetime
2020-11-07 09:20:00
Federal
No
Location Type
Utility Right-Of-Way / Easement
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Exposed Due To Excavation
Depth Of Cover
19.0
Other Underground Facilities
No
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Investor Owned
System Part Involved
Main
Installation Year
2020.0
Pipe Diameter
4.0
Pipe Specification
D2513
Pipe Manufacturer
Performance Pipe
Material Involved
Plastic
Plastic Type
Polyethylene (Pe)
Plastic Sdr
11
Material Pe Pipe Code
3408
Release Type
Leak
Leak Type
Connection Failure
Class Location Type
Class 3 Location
Est Cost Oper Paid
0.0
Est Cost Prop Damage
81500.0
Est Cost Emergency
4742.0
Est Cost Other
0.0
Gas Cost In Mcf
5.9903
Est Cost Unintentional Release
1240.0
Est Cost Intentional Release
0.0
Prpty
87482.0
Commercial Affected
0.0
Industrial Affected
0.0
Residences Affected
0.0
Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght
1.0
Num Injured Treated By Emt
0.0
Num Resident Building Affctd
0.0
Num Business Building Affctd
0.0
Accident Psig
23.0
Normal Psig
23.0
Mop Psig
55.0
Mop Cfr Section
192.619(A)(2)
Maop Established Date
2020-11-06 00:00:00
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop
Gas Odorized System Type
Odorized By Others
Gas Odorized Level
6
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
The pipeline is monitored by the scada system. There was no alert or alarm. System was operating normally at the time of the incident.
Employee Drug Test Ind
Yes
Num Employees Tested
6
Num Employees Failed
0
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Pipe, Weld, Or Joint Failure
Cause Details
Fusion Joint
Pwjf Failure Type
Fusion Joint
Plastic Joint Subtype
Socket, Electrofusion
Fpw Installed Year
2020
Fpw First Plastic Type
Polyethylene (Pe)
Fpw Second Plastic Type
Polyethylene (Pe)
Additional Other Ind
Yes
Additional Factor Details
Unknown, Refer To Narrative.
Result Material Ind
Yes
Result Material Subtype
Other
Result Material Details
Electrofusion Joint Failure
Hydrotest Conducted Ind
No
Preparer Name
P****** M******
Preparer Title
Operations Manager
Preparer Email
P***************@a**********.com
Preparer Telephone
903-249-7709
Authorizer Name
M**** S*****
Authorizer Title
Vice President - Technical Services
Authorizer Telephone
214-206-2033
Authorizer Email
M***********@a**********.com
Narrative
On friday, november 6, 2020, at approximately 2:30 p.M., a third-party contractor cut the natural gas service line to highland park high school when performing a saw cut in westchester drive. Atmos energy crews responded by making the area safe, evacuating the high school, and then began the process of restoring service to the high school. The main line in the area consisted of 4" steel pipe. However, the repair required the installation of a poly transition fitting from the steel main to the 3" steel service line as well as the installation of a poly valve. A bell hole was dug at the location of the damage and where the main to service line connection was being replaced. On the morning of saturday, november 7, repairs had been completed on the segment of main up to the closed poly valve and was active with natural gas. Atmos energy employees were preparing to perform additional work that was required for the service line when natural gas suddenly escaped and ignited at approximately 9:20 a.M. Two employees were injured and were taken to the hospital. One employee was treated and released, and the other was admitted to the hospital at 11:17 am. The probable cause of this incident was the failure and release of the 4" electrofusion coupling that occurred within the north bell hole. The joint failure was sudden and occurred after the coupling was installed and placed in service. The joint failure and separation of the coupling occurred within the same excavated bell hole that the resulting injured crew members were working downstream performing final system tie-ins. The most likely source of ignition occurred from the energized fitting being fused (4" ef coupling) on the outlet side of the valve. None of these activities provided evidence of a direct cause of failure. Since the materials involved in the failure were destroyed in the resulting fire, laboratory testing cannot be conducted on the failed fitting to further evaluate root cause. However, testing was conducted on other elements in investigation of the root cause such as the electrofusion processor unit, the downstream valve, and prior fusions performed by the same qualified employee.
| Occurred At | 2020-11-07 09:20:00 |
|---|---|
| Year | 2020 |
| Report Received Date | 2020-12-07 00:00:00 |
| Iyear | 2020.0 |
| Report Number | 20200124.0 |
| Supplemental Number | 35400.0 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 31348 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Atmos Energy Corporation - Mid-Tex |
| Operator Street Address | 5430 Lbj Freeway Suite 1800 |
| Operator City Name | Dallas |
| Operator State Abbreviation | TX |
| Operator Postal Code | 75240 |
| Local Datetime | 2020-11-07 09:20:00 |
| Time Zone | Central |
| Daylight Savings Ind | Yes |
| Location Street Address | 6700 Westchester Drive |
| Location City Name | Dallas |
| Location County Name | Dallas |
| Location State Abbreviation | TX |
| Location Postal Code | 75205 |
| Location Latitude | 32.84759 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -96.80673 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Flow Cont Stopple Fitng Ind | Yes |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2020-11-07 11:10:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1291639 NRC Report How to search |
| Additional Nrc Report Numbers | 1291734 |
| Commodity Released Type | Natural Gas |
| Unintentional Release | 207.0 |
| Intentional Release | 0.0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | Yes |
| Num Emp Injuries | 1 |
| Num Contr Injuries | 0 |
| Num Er Injuries | 0 |
| Num Worker Injuries | 0 |
| Num Gp Injuries | 0 |
| Injure | 1 |
| Ignite Ind | Yes |
| Ignite Datetime | 2020-11-07 09:20:00 |
| How Extinguished | Operator/contractor |
| Gas Consumed By Fire In Mcf | 207 |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0.0 |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2020-11-07 09:20:00 |
| Communication State Fed Ind | Yes |
| Party Initiated Communication | Operator |
| Initial Responder Com Datetime | 2020-11-07 09:21:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2020-11-07 09:20:00 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Utility Right-Of-Way / Easement |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Exposed Due To Excavation |
| Depth Of Cover | 19.0 |
| Other Underground Facilities | No |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Investor Owned |
| System Part Involved | Main |
| Installation Year | 2020.0 |
| Pipe Diameter | 4.0 |
| Pipe Specification | D2513 |
| Pipe Manufacturer | Performance Pipe |
| Material Involved | Plastic |
| Plastic Type | Polyethylene (Pe) |
| Plastic Sdr | 11 |
| Material Pe Pipe Code | 3408 |
| Release Type | Leak |
| Leak Type | Connection Failure |
| Class Location Type | Class 3 Location |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0.0 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 81500.0 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 4742.0 |
| Est Cost Other | 0.0 |
| Gas Cost In Mcf | 5.9903 |
| Est Cost Unintentional Release | 1240.0 |
| Est Cost Intentional Release | 0.0 |
| Prpty | 87482.0 |
| Commercial Affected | 0.0 |
| Industrial Affected | 0.0 |
| Residences Affected | 0.0 |
| Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght | 1.0 |
| Num Injured Treated By Emt | 0.0 |
| Num Resident Building Affctd | 0.0 |
| Num Business Building Affctd | 0.0 |
| Accident Psig | 23.0 |
| Normal Psig | 23.0 |
| Mop Psig | 55.0 |
| Mop Cfr Section | 192.619(A)(2) View CFR 49 §192 |
| Maop Established Date | 2020-11-06 00:00:00 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop |
| Gas Odorized System Type | Odorized By Others |
| Gas Odorized Level | 6 |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Operator Employee |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | The pipeline is monitored by the scada system. There was no alert or alarm. System was operating normally at the time of the incident. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | Yes |
| Num Employees Tested | 6 |
| Num Employees Failed | 0 |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Pipe, Weld, Or Joint Failure |
| Cause Details | Fusion Joint |
| Pwjf Failure Type | Fusion Joint |
| Plastic Joint Subtype | Socket, Electrofusion |
| Fpw Installed Year | 2020 |
| Fpw First Plastic Type | Polyethylene (Pe) |
| Fpw Second Plastic Type | Polyethylene (Pe) |
| Additional Other Ind | Yes |
| Additional Factor Details | Unknown, Refer To Narrative. |
| Result Material Ind | Yes |
| Result Material Subtype | Other |
| Result Material Details | Electrofusion Joint Failure |
| Hydrotest Conducted Ind | No |
| Preparer Name | P****** M****** |
| Preparer Title | Operations Manager |
| Preparer Email | P***************@a**********.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 903-249-7709 |
| Authorizer Name | M**** S***** |
| Authorizer Title | Vice President - Technical Services |
| Authorizer Telephone | 214-206-2033 |
| Authorizer Email | M***********@a**********.com |
| Narrative | On friday, november 6, 2020, at approximately 2:30 p.M., a third-party contractor cut the natural gas service line to highland park high school when performing a saw cut in westchester drive. Atmos energy crews responded by making the area safe, evacuating the high school, and then began the process of restoring service to the high school. The main line in the area consisted of 4" steel pipe. However, the repair required the installation of a poly transition fitting from the steel main to the 3" steel service line as well as the installation of a poly valve. A bell hole was dug at the location of the damage and where the main to service line connection was being replaced. On the morning of saturday, november 7, repairs had been completed on the segment of main up to the closed poly valve and was active with natural gas. Atmos energy employees were preparing to perform additional work that was required for the service line when natural gas suddenly escaped and ignited at approximately 9:20 a.M. Two employees were injured and were taken to the hospital. One employee was treated and released, and the other was admitted to the hospital at 11:17 am. The probable cause of this incident was the failure and release of the 4" electrofusion coupling that occurred within the north bell hole. The joint failure was sudden and occurred after the coupling was installed and placed in service. The joint failure and separation of the coupling occurred within the same excavated bell hole that the resulting injured crew members were working downstream performing final system tie-ins. The most likely source of ignition occurred from the energized fitting being fused (4" ef coupling) on the outlet side of the valve. None of these activities provided evidence of a direct cause of failure. Since the materials involved in the failure were destroyed in the resulting fire, laboratory testing cannot be conducted on the failed fitting to further evaluate root cause. However, testing was conducted on other elements in investigation of the root cause such as the electrofusion processor unit, the downstream valve, and prior fusions performed by the same qualified employee. |
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