Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
GD incident on 2020-10-08 — IL
Operator
Northern Illinois Gas Co
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Commodity
Natural Gas
Program
GD
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$648,742
Incident datetime
2020-10-08 01:15
Report number
Location
IL, LIVINGSTON
Narrative
Earlier in the evening and prior to the incident, the gas controller observed at hh alarm on the send out pressure for the regulating station. The controller made appropriate and prompt notification to local personnel responsible for the operation/maintenance of the regulating station. Operating personnel responded and verified that the station was passing gas and the pipeline pressure downstream of the station had exceeded the system maop. The crew attempted to reduce the pipeline pressure by intentionally venting gas to atmosphere at the station. During the venting process, ignition occurred, resulting in a fire at the station. The station regulating equipment and other station associated equipment was destroyed in the fire. The station was isolated to stop the flow of gas and the fire was extinguished. The station impacted equipment was re-built and the station was put back into service.
Detailed record list
Occurred At
2020-10-08 01:15:00
Year
2020
Report Received Date
2020-11-06 00:00:00
Iyear
2020.0
Report Number
20200113.0
Supplemental Number
34931.0
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
13710
Name
Northern Illinois Gas Co
Operator Street Address
P.o. Box 190, Rt 59 & I-88
Operator City Name
Aurora
Operator State Abbreviation
IL
Operator Postal Code
60507
Local Datetime
2020-10-08 01:15:00
Time Zone
Central
Daylight Savings Ind
No
Location Street Address
Ancona Rd (N 300 E Rd) And E 2900 N Rd
Location City Name
Ancona
Location County Name
Livingston
Location State Abbreviation
IL
Location Postal Code
61311
Location Latitude
41.04610177
Location Longitude
-88.87215095
Flow Cont Key Crit Ind
Yes
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2020-10-08 01:55:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1289261
Additional Nrc Report Numbers
1289395
Commodity Released Type
Natural Gas
Unintentional Release
1312.3
Intentional Release
2.58
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Ignite Ind
Yes
Ignite Datetime
2020-10-08 01:15:00
How Extinguished
Operator/contractor
Gas Consumed By Fire In Mcf
1312.3
Explode Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0.0
Incident Identified Datetime
2020-10-08 01:15:00
Communication State Fed Ind
Yes
Party Initiated Communication
Operator
Initial Responder Com Datetime
2020-10-08 01:20:00
On Site Datetime
2020-10-08 01:15:00
Federal
No
Location Type
Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Aboveground
Incident Area Subtype
Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance (E.g. Value Or Regulator Station, Outdoor Meter Set)
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Investor Owned
System Part Involved
District Regulator/metering Station
Installation Year
1987.0
Material Involved
Other
Material Details
Various Materials In The Regulator Runs
Release Type
Other
Release Type Details
Intentional Gas Release As Response To Over Pressure Condition Prior To The Incident
Class Location Type
Class 1 Location
Est Cost Oper Paid
0.0
Est Cost Prop Damage
648742.0
Est Cost Emergency
2500.0
Est Cost Other
0.0
Gas Cost In Mcf
1.5842
Est Cost Unintentional Release
2079.0
Est Cost Intentional Release
4.0
Prpty
653325.0
Commercial Affected
0.0
Industrial Affected
0.0
Residences Affected
0.0
Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght
0.0
Num Injured Treated By Emt
0.0
Num Resident Building Affctd
0.0
Num Business Building Affctd
0.0
Accident Psig
332.0
Normal Psig
300.0
Mop Psig
300.0
Mop Cfr Section
192.619(A)(2)
Maop Established Date
2010-07-06 00:00:00
Accident Pressure
Pressure Exceeded The Applicable Allowance In 192.201
Gas Odorized System Type
Wick
Gas Odorized Lvl Not Msrd Ind
Yes
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
Yes
Scada Conf Ind
No
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
Earlier in the evening and prior to the incident, the gas controller observed at hh alarm on the send out pressure for the regulating station. The controller made appropriate and prompt notification to local personnel responsible for the operation/maintenance of the regulating station. During the response to the aoc, ignition occurred. The actions of the controller did not play a part in the cause of the incident.
Employee Drug Test Ind
Yes
Num Employees Tested
4
Num Employees Failed
0
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Cause Details
Other Incorrect Operation
Operation Type
Other Incorrect Operation
Operation Details
Failure To Follow Venting Procedures.
Related Failure Follow Ind
Yes
Category Type
Non-Routine Operating Conditions (Abnormal Operations Or Emergencies)
Operator Qualification Ind
Yes
Qualified Individuals
Yes, They Were Qualified For The Task(S)
Io Follow Procedure Ind
Yes
Preparer Name
L****** Q******
Preparer Title
Dir. Compliance And Qa
Preparer Email
L******@s*********.com
Preparer Telephone
6305142036
Local Contact Name
L****** Q******
Local Contact Email
L******@s*********.com
Local Contact Telephone
6305142036
Authorizer Name
L****** Q******
Authorizer Title
Dir. Compliance And Qa
Authorizer Telephone
6305142036
Authorizer Email
L******@s*********.com
Narrative
Earlier in the evening and prior to the incident, the gas controller observed at hh alarm on the send out pressure for the regulating station. The controller made appropriate and prompt notification to local personnel responsible for the operation/maintenance of the regulating station. Operating personnel responded and verified that the station was passing gas and the pipeline pressure downstream of the station had exceeded the system maop. The crew attempted to reduce the pipeline pressure by intentionally venting gas to atmosphere at the station. During the venting process, ignition occurred, resulting in a fire at the station. The station regulating equipment and other station associated equipment was destroyed in the fire. The station was isolated to stop the flow of gas and the fire was extinguished. The station impacted equipment was re-built and the station was put back into service.
| Occurred At | 2020-10-08 01:15:00 |
|---|---|
| Year | 2020 |
| Report Received Date | 2020-11-06 00:00:00 |
| Iyear | 2020.0 |
| Report Number | 20200113.0 |
| Supplemental Number | 34931.0 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 13710 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Northern Illinois Gas Co |
| Operator Street Address | P.o. Box 190, Rt 59 & I-88 |
| Operator City Name | Aurora |
| Operator State Abbreviation | IL |
| Operator Postal Code | 60507 |
| Local Datetime | 2020-10-08 01:15:00 |
| Time Zone | Central |
| Daylight Savings Ind | No |
| Location Street Address | Ancona Rd (N 300 E Rd) And E 2900 N Rd |
| Location City Name | Ancona |
| Location County Name | Livingston |
| Location State Abbreviation | IL |
| Location Postal Code | 61311 |
| Location Latitude | 41.04610177 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -88.87215095 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Flow Cont Key Crit Ind | Yes |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2020-10-08 01:55:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1289261 NRC Report How to search |
| Additional Nrc Report Numbers | 1289395 |
| Commodity Released Type | Natural Gas |
| Unintentional Release | 1312.3 |
| Intentional Release | 2.58 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Ignite Ind | Yes |
| Ignite Datetime | 2020-10-08 01:15:00 |
| How Extinguished | Operator/contractor |
| Gas Consumed By Fire In Mcf | 1312.3 |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0.0 |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2020-10-08 01:15:00 |
| Communication State Fed Ind | Yes |
| Party Initiated Communication | Operator |
| Initial Responder Com Datetime | 2020-10-08 01:20:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2020-10-08 01:15:00 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Aboveground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance (E.g. Value Or Regulator Station, Outdoor Meter Set) |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Investor Owned |
| System Part Involved | District Regulator/metering Station |
| Installation Year | 1987.0 |
| Material Involved | Other |
| Material Details | Various Materials In The Regulator Runs |
| Release Type | Other |
| Release Type Details | Intentional Gas Release As Response To Over Pressure Condition Prior To The Incident |
| Class Location Type | Class 1 Location |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0.0 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 648742.0 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 2500.0 |
| Est Cost Other | 0.0 |
| Gas Cost In Mcf | 1.5842 |
| Est Cost Unintentional Release | 2079.0 |
| Est Cost Intentional Release | 4.0 |
| Prpty | 653325.0 |
| Commercial Affected | 0.0 |
| Industrial Affected | 0.0 |
| Residences Affected | 0.0 |
| Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght | 0.0 |
| Num Injured Treated By Emt | 0.0 |
| Num Resident Building Affctd | 0.0 |
| Num Business Building Affctd | 0.0 |
| Accident Psig | 332.0 |
| Normal Psig | 300.0 |
| Mop Psig | 300.0 |
| Mop Cfr Section | 192.619(A)(2) View CFR 49 §192 |
| Maop Established Date | 2010-07-06 00:00:00 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Exceeded The Applicable Allowance In 192.201 |
| Gas Odorized System Type | Wick |
| Gas Odorized Lvl Not Msrd Ind | Yes |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | Yes |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Operator Employee |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | Earlier in the evening and prior to the incident, the gas controller observed at hh alarm on the send out pressure for the regulating station. The controller made appropriate and prompt notification to local personnel responsible for the operation/maintenance of the regulating station. During the response to the aoc, ignition occurred. The actions of the controller did not play a part in the cause of the incident. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | Yes |
| Num Employees Tested | 4 |
| Num Employees Failed | 0 |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Incorrect Operation |
| Cause Details | Other Incorrect Operation |
| Operation Type | Other Incorrect Operation |
| Operation Details | Failure To Follow Venting Procedures. |
| Related Failure Follow Ind | Yes |
| Category Type | Non-Routine Operating Conditions (Abnormal Operations Or Emergencies) |
| Operator Qualification Ind | Yes |
| Qualified Individuals | Yes, They Were Qualified For The Task(S) |
| Io Follow Procedure Ind | Yes |
| Preparer Name | L****** Q****** |
| Preparer Title | Dir. Compliance And Qa |
| Preparer Email | L******@s*********.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 6305142036 |
| Local Contact Name | L****** Q****** |
| Local Contact Email | L******@s*********.com |
| Local Contact Telephone | 6305142036 |
| Authorizer Name | L****** Q****** |
| Authorizer Title | Dir. Compliance And Qa |
| Authorizer Telephone | 6305142036 |
| Authorizer Email | L******@s*********.com |
| Narrative | Earlier in the evening and prior to the incident, the gas controller observed at hh alarm on the send out pressure for the regulating station. The controller made appropriate and prompt notification to local personnel responsible for the operation/maintenance of the regulating station. Operating personnel responded and verified that the station was passing gas and the pipeline pressure downstream of the station had exceeded the system maop. The crew attempted to reduce the pipeline pressure by intentionally venting gas to atmosphere at the station. During the venting process, ignition occurred, resulting in a fire at the station. The station regulating equipment and other station associated equipment was destroyed in the fire. The station was isolated to stop the flow of gas and the fire was extinguished. The station impacted equipment was re-built and the station was put back into service. |
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