Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2019-09-14 — TX
Operator
Osage Pipe Line Company, Llc
Cause
Corrosion Failure
Commodity
Crude Oil
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$400,000
Incident datetime
2019-09-14 06:13
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
**update** 08/28/2020 on september 13, 2019, enbridge south tank farm personnel responded to an unintended movement alarm on enbridge tank 3010. Once enbridge personnel arrived on location, they discovered crude oil in containment, inside the berm of tank 3011. Enbridge checked the tank level on tank 3011, which was unchanged. Enbridge then blocked the relief line to tank 3010 and opened up the line to tank 3013. The level on tank 3010 stabilized after the relief line was closed. Enbridge made initial notifications to the nrc. Clean-up began immediately, with enbridge handling initial efforts. On september 14, 2019 at 13:21, holly energy partners (hep) and enbridge determined that the leak originated at a corrosion failure on a relief line. Hep took over clean-up efforts on september 14 and notified the national response center (nrc) at 13:47. Hep filed a written f 7000.1 accident report on october 14, 2019. Hep has completed a metallurgical analysis of the failed pipe segment and has resolved jurisdictional and ownership uncertainties. At the time of the release, hep did not believe that it owned the relief line. Hep then investigated the documentation related to its 2015 acquisition of the nearby osage pipeline for more information. While our review did not conclusively demonstrate that the relief line conveyed in that acquisition, hep has decided to resolve the uncertainty by taking responsibility for the relief line. Hep also evaluated the jurisdictional status of the relief line and has determined that the line provides surge relief to an osage pipeline header that receives oil from third party, part 195 regulated pipelines. Hep's third party metallurgical contractor evaluated two pipe samples from the relief line. The contractor observed internal corrosion pitting, characterized its morphology, and concluded that microbial induced corrosion (mic) was a contributing factor for the internal corrosion. Hep has evaluated available information about the relief line and determined that it was a dead leg, that contained crude oil without regular flow. It is likely that this low-flow environment contributed to the mic that led to the failure. Considering these findings, hep has taken a number of steps to improve safety of the relief line and reduce the likelihood of future failures, including: replaced a substantial portion of the relief line with internally-coated steel pipe. The internal coating (sherwin williams nova-plate 360) is a ptfe base that lines the entire pipe. Internal sleeves were used at field joints, and were protected during welding with backing strips, and were bonded to the interior of the line. Hep has installed and is monitoring one corrosion coupon on the relief line. Developed a line flushing and chemical injection procedure for the relief line. The purpose of the procedure is to periodically sweep the line of stagnant crude and inject corrosion inhibitor as necessary. Installed a check valve immediately downstream from the enbridge relief tank (tank 3010), to prevent back-flow from the tank.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2019-10-14 00:00:00
Iyear
2019
Report Number
20190309
Supplemental Number
34605
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
14391
Name
Osage Pipe Line Company, Llc
Operator Street Address
2323 Victory Ave. Suite 1400
Operator City Name
Dallas
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
75219
Local Datetime
2019-09-14 06:13:00
Location Latitude
35.935612
Location Longitude
-96.749949
Commodity Released Type
Crude Oil
Unintentional Release Bbls
1200
Recovered Bbls
1200
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Other
Accident Details
Enbridge Local Operating Personnel
Incident Identified Datetime
2019-09-14 06:13:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Terminal/tank Farm Equipment And Piping
On Off Shore
Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
No
Shutdown Explain
Hep Was No Longer Pumping From The Enbridge Tank Farm When The Leak Was Discover
On Site Datetime
2019-09-14 10:30:00
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2019-09-14 13:47:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1258233
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Enbridge Cushing South Terminal
Segment Name
Enbridge Cushing South Terminal Tank 3011
Onshore State Abbreviation
Ok
Onshore Postal Code
74023
Onshore City Name
Cushing
Onshore County Name
Lincoln
Designated Location
Milepost/valve Station
Designated Name
Enbridge Cush
Federal
No
Location Type
Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Under Soil
Depth Of Cover
36
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
Item Involved
Pipe
Pipe Type
Pipe Body
Pipe Diameter
12
Pipe Wall Thickness
0.375
Pipe Smys
42000
Pipe Specification
X42
Pipe Seam Type
Erw � Unknown Frequency
Pipe Manufacturer
American Steel
Pipe Coating Type
Fusion Bonded Epoxy(Fbe)
Installation Year
2011
Manufactured Year
2011
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Leak
Leak Type
Other
Leak Type Other
Hole
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
Yes
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
Yes
Soil Remed Ind
Yes
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
No
Commodity Reached Hca
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
0
Est Cost Prop Damage
400000
Est Cost Emergency
400000
Est Cost Environmental
400000
Est Cost Other
300000
Est Cost Other Details
Additional Costs Relating To Clean-Up
Prpty
1500000
Accident Psig
247
Mop Psig
285
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Pipeline Function
< 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
No
Cpm In Place Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the facility was not monitored by a controller(s) at the time of the accident
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Corrosion Failure
Cause Details
Internal Corrosion
Internal External
Internal Corrosion
Int Visual Exam Results
Localized Pitting
Int Microbiological Ind
Yes
Int Metallurgical Basis Ind
Yes
Int Low Point Pipe Loc Ind
Yes
Corrosion Inhibitors
No
Corrosion Lining
No
Cleaning Dewatering
Not Applicable - Not Mainline Pipe
Corrosion Coupons
Not Applicable - Not Mainline Pipe
Collected Data Ind
No
Has Hydrtst Conduc Before Ind
Yes
Hydrtst Most Rcnt Year
2020
Hydrtst Most Rcnt Pressure
425
Direct Asmnt Conducted
No
Non Destructive Exam Ind
Yes
Exm Handl Ultrasonic Rcnt Year
2019
Exm Handl Ultrasonic Rcnt Ind
Yes
Preparer Name
C****** C***
Preparer Title
Manager Pipeline Regulatory
Preparer Email
C***********@h**********.com
Preparer Telephone
2148713574
Prepared Date
2020-12-10 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
C****** C***
Authorizer Telephone
2148713574
Authorizer Title
Manager Pipeline Regulatory
Authorizer Email
C***********@h**********.com
Narrative
**update** 08/28/2020 on september 13, 2019, enbridge south tank farm personnel responded to an unintended movement alarm on enbridge tank 3010. Once enbridge personnel arrived on location, they discovered crude oil in containment, inside the berm of tank 3011. Enbridge checked the tank level on tank 3011, which was unchanged. Enbridge then blocked the relief line to tank 3010 and opened up the line to tank 3013. The level on tank 3010 stabilized after the relief line was closed. Enbridge made initial notifications to the nrc. Clean-up began immediately, with enbridge handling initial efforts. On september 14, 2019 at 13:21, holly energy partners (hep) and enbridge determined that the leak originated at a corrosion failure on a relief line. Hep took over clean-up efforts on september 14 and notified the national response center (nrc) at 13:47. Hep filed a written f 7000.1 accident report on october 14, 2019. Hep has completed a metallurgical analysis of the failed pipe segment and has resolved jurisdictional and ownership uncertainties. At the time of the release, hep did not believe that it owned the relief line. Hep then investigated the documentation related to its 2015 acquisition of the nearby osage pipeline for more information. While our review did not conclusively demonstrate that the relief line conveyed in that acquisition, hep has decided to resolve the uncertainty by taking responsibility for the relief line. Hep also evaluated the jurisdictional status of the relief line and has determined that the line provides surge relief to an osage pipeline header that receives oil from third party, part 195 regulated pipelines. Hep's third party metallurgical contractor evaluated two pipe samples from the relief line. The contractor observed internal corrosion pitting, characterized its morphology, and concluded that microbial induced corrosion (mic) was a contributing factor for the internal corrosion. Hep has evaluated available information about the relief line and determined that it was a dead leg, that contained crude oil without regular flow. It is likely that this low-flow environment contributed to the mic that led to the failure. Considering these findings, hep has taken a number of steps to improve safety of the relief line and reduce the likelihood of future failures, including: replaced a substantial portion of the relief line with internally-coated steel pipe. The internal coating (sherwin williams nova-plate 360) is a ptfe base that lines the entire pipe. Internal sleeves were used at field joints, and were protected during welding with backing strips, and were bonded to the interior of the line. Hep has installed and is monitoring one corrosion coupon on the relief line. Developed a line flushing and chemical injection procedure for the relief line. The purpose of the procedure is to periodically sweep the line of stagnant crude and inject corrosion inhibitor as necessary. Installed a check valve immediately downstream from the enbridge relief tank (tank 3010), to prevent back-flow from the tank.
| Report Received Date | 2019-10-14 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2019 |
| Report Number | 20190309 |
| Supplemental Number | 34605 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 14391 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Osage Pipe Line Company, Llc |
| Operator Street Address | 2323 Victory Ave. Suite 1400 |
| Operator City Name | Dallas |
| Operator State Abbreviation | TX |
| Operator Postal Code | 75219 |
| Local Datetime | 2019-09-14 06:13:00 |
| Location Latitude | 35.935612 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -96.749949 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Crude Oil |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 1200 |
| Recovered Bbls | 1200 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Other |
| Accident Details | Enbridge Local Operating Personnel |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2019-09-14 06:13:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Terminal/tank Farm Equipment And Piping |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | No |
| Shutdown Explain | Hep Was No Longer Pumping From The Enbridge Tank Farm When The Leak Was Discover |
| On Site Datetime | 2019-09-14 10:30:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2019-09-14 13:47:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1258233 NRC Report How to search |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Enbridge Cushing South Terminal |
| Segment Name | Enbridge Cushing South Terminal Tank 3011 |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Ok |
| Onshore Postal Code | 74023 |
| Onshore City Name | Cushing |
| Onshore County Name | Lincoln |
| Designated Location | Milepost/valve Station |
| Designated Name | Enbridge Cush |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Under Soil |
| Depth Of Cover | 36 |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| Item Involved | Pipe |
| Pipe Type | Pipe Body |
| Pipe Diameter | 12 |
| Pipe Wall Thickness | 0.375 |
| Pipe Smys | 42000 |
| Pipe Specification | X42 |
| Pipe Seam Type | Erw � Unknown Frequency |
| Pipe Manufacturer | American Steel |
| Pipe Coating Type | Fusion Bonded Epoxy(Fbe) |
| Installation Year | 2011 |
| Manufactured Year | 2011 |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Leak |
| Leak Type | Other |
| Leak Type Other | Hole |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | Yes |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | Yes |
| Soil Remed Ind | Yes |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Commodity Reached Hca | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 0 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 400000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 400000 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 400000 |
| Est Cost Other | 300000 |
| Est Cost Other Details | Additional Costs Relating To Clean-Up |
| Prpty | 1500000 |
| Accident Psig | 247 |
| Mop Psig | 285 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | < 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | No |
| Cpm In Place Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | No, the facility was not monitored by a controller(s) at the time of the accident |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Corrosion Failure |
| Cause Details | Internal Corrosion |
| Internal External | Internal Corrosion |
| Int Visual Exam Results | Localized Pitting |
| Int Microbiological Ind | Yes |
| Int Metallurgical Basis Ind | Yes |
| Int Low Point Pipe Loc Ind | Yes |
| Corrosion Inhibitors | No |
| Corrosion Lining | No |
| Cleaning Dewatering | Not Applicable - Not Mainline Pipe |
| Corrosion Coupons | Not Applicable - Not Mainline Pipe |
| Collected Data Ind | No |
| Has Hydrtst Conduc Before Ind | Yes |
| Hydrtst Most Rcnt Year | 2020 |
| Hydrtst Most Rcnt Pressure | 425 |
| Direct Asmnt Conducted | No |
| Non Destructive Exam Ind | Yes |
| Exm Handl Ultrasonic Rcnt Year | 2019 |
| Exm Handl Ultrasonic Rcnt Ind | Yes |
| Preparer Name | C****** C*** |
| Preparer Title | Manager Pipeline Regulatory |
| Preparer Email | C***********@h**********.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 2148713574 |
| Prepared Date | 2020-12-10 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | C****** C*** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 2148713574 |
| Authorizer Title | Manager Pipeline Regulatory |
| Authorizer Email | C***********@h**********.com |
| Narrative | **update** 08/28/2020 on september 13, 2019, enbridge south tank farm personnel responded to an unintended movement alarm on enbridge tank 3010. Once enbridge personnel arrived on location, they discovered crude oil in containment, inside the berm of tank 3011. Enbridge checked the tank level on tank 3011, which was unchanged. Enbridge then blocked the relief line to tank 3010 and opened up the line to tank 3013. The level on tank 3010 stabilized after the relief line was closed. Enbridge made initial notifications to the nrc. Clean-up began immediately, with enbridge handling initial efforts. On september 14, 2019 at 13:21, holly energy partners (hep) and enbridge determined that the leak originated at a corrosion failure on a relief line. Hep took over clean-up efforts on september 14 and notified the national response center (nrc) at 13:47. Hep filed a written f 7000.1 accident report on october 14, 2019. Hep has completed a metallurgical analysis of the failed pipe segment and has resolved jurisdictional and ownership uncertainties. At the time of the release, hep did not believe that it owned the relief line. Hep then investigated the documentation related to its 2015 acquisition of the nearby osage pipeline for more information. While our review did not conclusively demonstrate that the relief line conveyed in that acquisition, hep has decided to resolve the uncertainty by taking responsibility for the relief line. Hep also evaluated the jurisdictional status of the relief line and has determined that the line provides surge relief to an osage pipeline header that receives oil from third party, part 195 regulated pipelines. Hep's third party metallurgical contractor evaluated two pipe samples from the relief line. The contractor observed internal corrosion pitting, characterized its morphology, and concluded that microbial induced corrosion (mic) was a contributing factor for the internal corrosion. Hep has evaluated available information about the relief line and determined that it was a dead leg, that contained crude oil without regular flow. It is likely that this low-flow environment contributed to the mic that led to the failure. Considering these findings, hep has taken a number of steps to improve safety of the relief line and reduce the likelihood of future failures, including: replaced a substantial portion of the relief line with internally-coated steel pipe. The internal coating (sherwin williams nova-plate 360) is a ptfe base that lines the entire pipe. Internal sleeves were used at field joints, and were protected during welding with backing strips, and were bonded to the interior of the line. Hep has installed and is monitoring one corrosion coupon on the relief line. Developed a line flushing and chemical injection procedure for the relief line. The purpose of the procedure is to periodically sweep the line of stagnant crude and inject corrosion inhibitor as necessary. Installed a check valve immediately downstream from the enbridge relief tank (tank 3010), to prevent back-flow from the tank. |
External Resources
PHMSA pipeline safety insights.
Product
Features
Company
All rights reserved. Copyright © by ClearPHMSA