Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2019-08-06 — MI
Operator
Wolverine Pipeline Co
Cause
Equipment Failure
Commodity
Refined And/or Petroleum Product (Non-Hvl) Which Is A Liquid At Ambient Conditions
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$200
Incident datetime
2019-08-06 06:27
Report number
Location
MI
Narrative
Wolverine pipe line company (wplco) damage prevention specialist (dps), while performing a station walk-around, discovered a leak on valve #34 a little before 6:30 am (cst) confined to the property of our joliet pump station. As soon as he discovered the leak he called the operations control center (occ) and had them shut down the jo-ka 18" pipeline and reduce pressure to as low as possible. At the time of the discovery the dps noticed a steady drip of gasoline coming from the 1" body drain valve. Hammond crew went to the site and determined the extent of the impacted area by digging up the stone/soil and drumming it up. Cleanup conducted the same day, valve replaced and returned to service. The safety health & environmental department determined volume to be 14.5 gallons based on release dimensions. First look at the 1" balon valve showed the leak at the split of the body on the valve as this is a two-piece valve. Valve has been sent to the manufacturer to determine cause of failure. The defective valve was sent to balon corporation for testing and analysis. The valve leaked at the adapter on test. The body o-ring was damaged, and the seats and thrust washer were extruded. The valve was subject to failure from a thermal over pressure event. The thermal expansion occurred downstream of the ball, between the ball and a cap that had been installed on the valve. This particular balon valve has a pressure rating of 3000 psi, which could only have been exceeded by trapped thermal pressure within the fitting itself. Mainline scada pressure data confirms that there were no over pressure events at the leak location. A balon engineer concluded possible "over pressure other than freezing." this is most likely the result of an inadvertent opening of the valve, followed by a closing of the valve, which would have trapped liquid downstream of the valve between the cap and ball. As a result of this event wolverine pipe line company is implementing solutions to prevent this type of incident from happening at other similarly configured valve sites.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2019-08-29 00:00:00
Iyear
2019
Report Number
20190274
Supplemental Number
33186
Report Type
Supplemental
Operator Id
22830
Name
Wolverine Pipeline Co
Operator Street Address
8075 Creekside Dr., Ste. 210
Operator City Name
Portage
Operator State Abbreviation
MI
Operator Postal Code
49024-6303
Local Datetime
2019-08-06 06:27:00
Location Latitude
41.420326
Location Longitude
-88.173178
Commodity Released Type
Refined And/or Petroleum Product (Non-Hvl) Which Is A Liquid At Ambient Conditions
Commodity Subtype
Gasoline (Non-Ethanol)
Unintentional Release Bbls
0.35
Recovered Bbls
0.35
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
Incident Identified Datetime
2019-08-06 06:27:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Pump/meter Station Equipment And Piping
On Off Shore
Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Shutdown Datetime
2019-08-06 06:27:00
Restart Datetime
2019-08-06 15:44:00
On Site Datetime
2019-08-06 06:27:00
Nrc Rpt Num
Nrc Notification Not Required
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Joliet Station
Segment Name
Joliet - Kennedy Avenue 18"
Onshore State Abbreviation
Il
Onshore Postal Code
60436
Onshore City Name
Elwood
Onshore County Name
Will
Designated Location
Milepost/valve Station
Designated Name
Valve Station
Federal
No
Location Type
Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Aboveground
Incident Area Subtype
Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
Item Involved
Valve
Valve Type
Auxiliary Or Other Valve
Installation Year
2014
Material Involved
Material Other Than Carbon Steel
Material Details
Stainless Steel
Release Type
Other
Release Type Details
Drain Valve On Mainline Valve Failed
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
Yes
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
Yes
Soil Remed Ind
Yes
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
Yes
Commodity Reached Hca
Yes
High Pop Ind
Yes
High Pop Yes No
Yes
Other Pop Ind
Yes
Other Pop Yes No
Yes
Usa Ecological Ind
Yes
Usa Ecological Yes No
Yes
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
42
Est Cost Prop Damage
200
Est Cost Emergency
2500
Est Cost Environmental
2880
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
5622
Accident Psig
440
Mop Psig
1431
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Cpm In Place Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
Equipment failure unrelated to controller's actions. The valve has been sent to manufacturer for failure analysis.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Equipment Failure
Cause Details
Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment
Eq Failure Type
Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment
Other Control Relief Ind
Yes
Other Control Relief Details
Drain Valve On Mainline Valve
Additional Overpressure Ind
Yes
Additional Thermal Ind
Yes
Eq Additional Other Ind
Yes
Eq Additional Other Details
Valve Sent To Manufacturer For Evaluation
Preparer Name
C******** K**********
Preparer Title
Safety And Regulatory Analyst
Preparer Email
C********************@w****.com
Preparer Telephone
269-323-2491
Preparer Fax
269-323-9359
Prepared Date
2020-01-14 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
M****** D****
Authorizer Telephone
269-323-2491
Authorizer Title
Vice President And Manager
Authorizer Email
M************@w****.com
Narrative
Wolverine pipe line company (wplco) damage prevention specialist (dps), while performing a station walk-around, discovered a leak on valve #34 a little before 6:30 am (cst) confined to the property of our joliet pump station. As soon as he discovered the leak he called the operations control center (occ) and had them shut down the jo-ka 18" pipeline and reduce pressure to as low as possible. At the time of the discovery the dps noticed a steady drip of gasoline coming from the 1" body drain valve. Hammond crew went to the site and determined the extent of the impacted area by digging up the stone/soil and drumming it up. Cleanup conducted the same day, valve replaced and returned to service. The safety health & environmental department determined volume to be 14.5 gallons based on release dimensions. First look at the 1" balon valve showed the leak at the split of the body on the valve as this is a two-piece valve. Valve has been sent to the manufacturer to determine cause of failure. The defective valve was sent to balon corporation for testing and analysis. The valve leaked at the adapter on test. The body o-ring was damaged, and the seats and thrust washer were extruded. The valve was subject to failure from a thermal over pressure event. The thermal expansion occurred downstream of the ball, between the ball and a cap that had been installed on the valve. This particular balon valve has a pressure rating of 3000 psi, which could only have been exceeded by trapped thermal pressure within the fitting itself. Mainline scada pressure data confirms that there were no over pressure events at the leak location. A balon engineer concluded possible "over pressure other than freezing." this is most likely the result of an inadvertent opening of the valve, followed by a closing of the valve, which would have trapped liquid downstream of the valve between the cap and ball. As a result of this event wolverine pipe line company is implementing solutions to prevent this type of incident from happening at other similarly configured valve sites.
| Report Received Date | 2019-08-29 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2019 |
| Report Number | 20190274 |
| Supplemental Number | 33186 |
| Report Type | Supplemental |
| Operator Id | 22830 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Wolverine Pipeline Co |
| Operator Street Address | 8075 Creekside Dr., Ste. 210 |
| Operator City Name | Portage |
| Operator State Abbreviation | MI |
| Operator Postal Code | 49024-6303 |
| Local Datetime | 2019-08-06 06:27:00 |
| Location Latitude | 41.420326 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -88.173178 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Refined And/or Petroleum Product (Non-Hvl) Which Is A Liquid At Ambient Conditions |
| Commodity Subtype | Gasoline (Non-Ethanol) |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 0.35 |
| Recovered Bbls | 0.35 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Operator Employee |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2019-08-06 06:27:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pump/meter Station Equipment And Piping |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | Yes |
| Shutdown Datetime | 2019-08-06 06:27:00 |
| Restart Datetime | 2019-08-06 15:44:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2019-08-06 06:27:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | Nrc Notification Not Required NRC Report How to search |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Joliet Station |
| Segment Name | Joliet - Kennedy Avenue 18" |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Il |
| Onshore Postal Code | 60436 |
| Onshore City Name | Elwood |
| Onshore County Name | Will |
| Designated Location | Milepost/valve Station |
| Designated Name | Valve Station |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Aboveground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| Item Involved | Valve |
| Valve Type | Auxiliary Or Other Valve |
| Installation Year | 2014 |
| Material Involved | Material Other Than Carbon Steel |
| Material Details | Stainless Steel |
| Release Type | Other |
| Release Type Details | Drain Valve On Mainline Valve Failed |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | Yes |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | Yes |
| Soil Remed Ind | Yes |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | Yes |
| Commodity Reached Hca | Yes |
| High Pop Ind | Yes |
| High Pop Yes No | Yes |
| Other Pop Ind | Yes |
| Other Pop Yes No | Yes |
| Usa Ecological Ind | Yes |
| Usa Ecological Yes No | Yes |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 42 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 200 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 2500 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 2880 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 5622 |
| Accident Psig | 440 |
| Mop Psig | 1431 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Cpm In Place Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | Equipment failure unrelated to controller's actions. The valve has been sent to manufacturer for failure analysis. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Equipment Failure |
| Cause Details | Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment |
| Eq Failure Type | Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment |
| Other Control Relief Ind | Yes |
| Other Control Relief Details | Drain Valve On Mainline Valve |
| Additional Overpressure Ind | Yes |
| Additional Thermal Ind | Yes |
| Eq Additional Other Ind | Yes |
| Eq Additional Other Details | Valve Sent To Manufacturer For Evaluation |
| Preparer Name | C******** K********** |
| Preparer Title | Safety And Regulatory Analyst |
| Preparer Email | C********************@w****.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 269-323-2491 |
| Preparer Fax | 269-323-9359 |
| Prepared Date | 2020-01-14 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | M****** D**** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 269-323-2491 |
| Authorizer Title | Vice President And Manager |
| Authorizer Email | M************@w****.com |
| Narrative | Wolverine pipe line company (wplco) damage prevention specialist (dps), while performing a station walk-around, discovered a leak on valve #34 a little before 6:30 am (cst) confined to the property of our joliet pump station. As soon as he discovered the leak he called the operations control center (occ) and had them shut down the jo-ka 18" pipeline and reduce pressure to as low as possible. At the time of the discovery the dps noticed a steady drip of gasoline coming from the 1" body drain valve. Hammond crew went to the site and determined the extent of the impacted area by digging up the stone/soil and drumming it up. Cleanup conducted the same day, valve replaced and returned to service. The safety health & environmental department determined volume to be 14.5 gallons based on release dimensions. First look at the 1" balon valve showed the leak at the split of the body on the valve as this is a two-piece valve. Valve has been sent to the manufacturer to determine cause of failure. The defective valve was sent to balon corporation for testing and analysis. The valve leaked at the adapter on test. The body o-ring was damaged, and the seats and thrust washer were extruded. The valve was subject to failure from a thermal over pressure event. The thermal expansion occurred downstream of the ball, between the ball and a cap that had been installed on the valve. This particular balon valve has a pressure rating of 3000 psi, which could only have been exceeded by trapped thermal pressure within the fitting itself. Mainline scada pressure data confirms that there were no over pressure events at the leak location. A balon engineer concluded possible "over pressure other than freezing." this is most likely the result of an inadvertent opening of the valve, followed by a closing of the valve, which would have trapped liquid downstream of the valve between the cap and ball. As a result of this event wolverine pipe line company is implementing solutions to prevent this type of incident from happening at other similarly configured valve sites. |
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