Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2019-07-18 — TX
Operator
Epic Consolidated Operations, Llc
Cause
Material Failure Of Pipe Or Weld
Commodity
Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$5,000
Incident datetime
2019-07-18 12:56
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
An epic pipeline technician found a leak on a separator at the valve site. The technician called it in to the control room and the separator was isolated from the pipeline system. After the site was made safe it was determined that the release came from a failed flange on a 2-inch drain line. It was determined that the drain line was not needed in the configuration of the separator and blinds were placed on the separator drain outlets to prevent a similar failure. There are no other separator's operated by epic in any of their other pipeline systems. The reconfiguration will mitigate any future re-occurrence of this type of failure. 10/17/2019 update: the failed weld, pipe, and flange samples were sent to a third party laboratory for a metallurgical analysis to be performed on the samples. It was confirmed the weld failed due to underbead cracking, or delayed hydrogen cracking, by metallurgical analysis. The weld failed in the heat affected zone on the flange side of the weld.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2019-08-12 00:00:00
Iyear
2019
Report Number
20190251
Supplemental Number
33193
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
39785
Name
Epic Consolidated Operations, Llc
Operator Street Address
18615 Tuscany Stone, Suite 300
Operator City Name
San Antonio
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
78258
Local Datetime
2019-07-18 12:56:00
Location Latitude
31.3618
Location Longitude
-101.7773
Commodity Released Type
Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions
Commodity Subtype
Lpg (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) / Ngl (Natural Gas Liquid)
Unintentional Release Bbls
125
Intentional Release Bbls
0
Recovered Bbls
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
Incident Identified Datetime
2019-07-18 12:56:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
On Off Shore
Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
No
Shutdown Explain
The Pipeline Was In A Static State At Time Of Release.
On Site Datetime
2019-07-18 12:54:00
Nrc Rpt Num
Nrc Notification Not Required
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Upstream Valve Type Ind
Remotely Controlled
Downstream Valve Type Ind
Remotely Controlled
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Bennedum To Dcp
Segment Name
Bennedum To Dcp
Onshore State Abbreviation
Tx
Onshore Postal Code
79778
Onshore City Name
Not Within A Municipality
Onshore County Name
Upton
Designated Location
Milepost/valve Station
Designated Name
Dcp Valve
Federal
No
Location Type
Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Aboveground
Incident Area Subtype
Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Intrastate
Item Involved
Weld, Including Heat-Affected Zone
Weld Subtype
Other Butt Weld
Installation Year
2019
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Rupture
Rupture Orient
Circumferential
Rupture Width
2
Rupture Length
2
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
No
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
No
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
No
Commodity Reached Hca
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
5000
Est Cost Prop Damage
5000
Est Cost Emergency
0
Est Cost Environmental
0
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
10000
Accident Psig
1056
Mop Psig
1440
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Length Segment Isolated
Unknown
Internal Inspection Ind
Yes
Operation Complications Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
No
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
Yes
Cpm In Place Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
Controller was not a contributing factor in the rupture.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Material Failure Of Pipe Or Weld
Cause Details
Design-, Construction-, Installation-, Or Fabrication-Related
Metallurgical Ind
Yes
Failure Type
Design-, Construction-, Installation-, Or Fabrication-Related
Other Factor
Yes
Other Factor Details
Delayed Hydrogen Cracking
Additional Crack Ind
Yes
Collected Data Ind
No
Has Hydrtst Conduc Before Ind
Yes
Hydrtst Most Rcnt Year
2019
Hydrtst Most Rcnt Pressure
1950
Direct Asmnt Conducted
No
Non Destructive Exam Ind
No
Preparer Name
C**** W*******
Preparer Title
Sr. Pipeline Compliance Professional
Preparer Email
C*************@f*************.net
Preparer Telephone
8067596499
Prepared Date
2020-01-16 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
D***** V** D****
Authorizer Telephone
2109202255
Authorizer Title
Director Of Operations
Authorizer Email
D**************@e******.com
Narrative
An epic pipeline technician found a leak on a separator at the valve site. The technician called it in to the control room and the separator was isolated from the pipeline system. After the site was made safe it was determined that the release came from a failed flange on a 2-inch drain line. It was determined that the drain line was not needed in the configuration of the separator and blinds were placed on the separator drain outlets to prevent a similar failure. There are no other separator's operated by epic in any of their other pipeline systems. The reconfiguration will mitigate any future re-occurrence of this type of failure. 10/17/2019 update: the failed weld, pipe, and flange samples were sent to a third party laboratory for a metallurgical analysis to be performed on the samples. It was confirmed the weld failed due to underbead cracking, or delayed hydrogen cracking, by metallurgical analysis. The weld failed in the heat affected zone on the flange side of the weld.
| Report Received Date | 2019-08-12 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2019 |
| Report Number | 20190251 |
| Supplemental Number | 33193 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 39785 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Epic Consolidated Operations, Llc |
| Operator Street Address | 18615 Tuscany Stone, Suite 300 |
| Operator City Name | San Antonio |
| Operator State Abbreviation | TX |
| Operator Postal Code | 78258 |
| Local Datetime | 2019-07-18 12:56:00 |
| Location Latitude | 31.3618 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -101.7773 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions |
| Commodity Subtype | Lpg (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) / Ngl (Natural Gas Liquid) |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 125 |
| Intentional Release Bbls | 0 |
| Recovered Bbls | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Operator Employee |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2019-07-18 12:56:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | No |
| Shutdown Explain | The Pipeline Was In A Static State At Time Of Release. |
| On Site Datetime | 2019-07-18 12:54:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | Nrc Notification Not Required NRC Report How to search |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Upstream Valve Type Ind | Remotely Controlled |
| Downstream Valve Type Ind | Remotely Controlled |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Bennedum To Dcp |
| Segment Name | Bennedum To Dcp |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Tx |
| Onshore Postal Code | 79778 |
| Onshore City Name | Not Within A Municipality |
| Onshore County Name | Upton |
| Designated Location | Milepost/valve Station |
| Designated Name | Dcp Valve |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Aboveground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Intrastate |
| Item Involved | Weld, Including Heat-Affected Zone |
| Weld Subtype | Other Butt Weld |
| Installation Year | 2019 |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Rupture |
| Rupture Orient | Circumferential |
| Rupture Width | 2 |
| Rupture Length | 2 |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | No |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | No |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Commodity Reached Hca | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 5000 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 5000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 0 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 0 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 10000 |
| Accident Psig | 1056 |
| Mop Psig | 1440 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Length Segment Isolated | Unknown |
| Internal Inspection Ind | Yes |
| Operation Complications Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | No |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | Yes |
| Cpm In Place Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | Controller was not a contributing factor in the rupture. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Material Failure Of Pipe Or Weld |
| Cause Details | Design-, Construction-, Installation-, Or Fabrication-Related |
| Metallurgical Ind | Yes |
| Failure Type | Design-, Construction-, Installation-, Or Fabrication-Related |
| Other Factor | Yes |
| Other Factor Details | Delayed Hydrogen Cracking |
| Additional Crack Ind | Yes |
| Collected Data Ind | No |
| Has Hydrtst Conduc Before Ind | Yes |
| Hydrtst Most Rcnt Year | 2019 |
| Hydrtst Most Rcnt Pressure | 1950 |
| Direct Asmnt Conducted | No |
| Non Destructive Exam Ind | No |
| Preparer Name | C**** W******* |
| Preparer Title | Sr. Pipeline Compliance Professional |
| Preparer Email | C*************@f*************.net |
| Preparer Telephone | 8067596499 |
| Prepared Date | 2020-01-16 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | D***** V** D**** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 2109202255 |
| Authorizer Title | Director Of Operations |
| Authorizer Email | D**************@e******.com |
| Narrative | An epic pipeline technician found a leak on a separator at the valve site. The technician called it in to the control room and the separator was isolated from the pipeline system. After the site was made safe it was determined that the release came from a failed flange on a 2-inch drain line. It was determined that the drain line was not needed in the configuration of the separator and blinds were placed on the separator drain outlets to prevent a similar failure. There are no other separator's operated by epic in any of their other pipeline systems. The reconfiguration will mitigate any future re-occurrence of this type of failure. 10/17/2019 update: the failed weld, pipe, and flange samples were sent to a third party laboratory for a metallurgical analysis to be performed on the samples. It was confirmed the weld failed due to underbead cracking, or delayed hydrogen cracking, by metallurgical analysis. The weld failed in the heat affected zone on the flange side of the weld. |
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