Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
GD incident on 2019-01-07 — NC
Operator
Public Service Co Of North Carolina
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Commodity
Natural Gas
Program
GD
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$132,444
Incident datetime
2019-01-07 18:00
Report number
Location
NC, BUNCOMBE
Narrative
Update to final report: revised part a, 5.5f lat. And long. Values to reflect a more accurate location of incident. Revised part c, 5 to reflect of hole size of 0.4 inch instead of 375.00 inches. The actual size was 0.375 inch but system only allows one decimal place. Updated cost information in part d. Replaced symbols in narrative that cause print errors. Additional actions: provided human factors investigation report to ncuc on 2/22/2019 via email. Provided follow-up training documentation to ncuc on 2/22/2019 via email. Provided operator qualification and procedure information to ncuc on 2/22/2019 via email. Original project plan on 1/7/19, a psnc energy contractor was retiring a 350 psig 4 in. Lateral (m-320) off on our 8 in. Transmission line (t-04) in asheville. The specific location of the work was near the intersection of swannanoa river and fairview roads. This work was the final step to retiring a bridge attachment on fairview road. This project included rerouting some sections and de-rating part of the 350 psig system to a standard distribution system pressure of 60 psig. This section of m-320 used to feed some regulator stations that are now retired. The original project plan was to excavate and retire the 4 in. Lateral section using a 4 in. Td williamson (tdw) stop-off fitting and repave this area by 11 pm that night. Summary of what happened when the pipe was exposed at about 11:00 am it was discovered the pipe was 6 in. So 6 in. Fittings of identical pressure specifications were rounded up. A tdw thread-o-ring (tor which is basically a 2in. Fitting used in the tapping operation) and the 6 in. Stop-off fitting were welded on the pipe. The tor was tapped at about 6 pm by our tapping contractor, when it was discovered that the 6 in. Pipe was actually casing pipe over the 4 in. Pipe. The pilot bit penetrated the 4 in. Line creating a 3/8 in. Hole that sent gas in both directions down the casing. The tapping contractor technician and the pipeline contractor support personnel evacuated the hole. Psnc energy had an inspector on site and additional psnc energy personnel were brought in to monitor both ends of the casings for gas migration. Gaseous atmosphere was about 25-30 ft. Radius from the bell hole containing the tor. The project design specified the remaining lateral stub to be as short as possible so there was no room to install another stop-off fitting. This made the repair/shut-off plan more complex. The section of transmission line containing the lateral connection was going to have to be isolated to stop the leak. This is a single feed system so a bypass was required. Psnc energy was able to round up two tdw 3-way tees (which are designed to facilitate both stop-off and bypass) from another job. Transmission contract crews were brought in to weld on the fittings and to weld up and install a 120 ft. 8 in. Bypass. Two remote bell holes were dug to install the fittings on t-04. The shutdown process of installing fittings and bypass, testing and purging the bypass, stopping off the damaged section, and transferring the flow to the bypass lasted from approximately 8:00 pm on 1/7/19 until 11:10 am on 1/8/19. Replacing the damaged lateral containing the section of t-04 with pre-tested pipe and placing the pipeline back in service took until 11:10 am on 1/8/19. Backfilling and road repair lasted through the evening. Other information of note the emergency response and repair processes required the shut-down of swannanoa river roads. The entire stoppage of the leak and repair were worked outside of the hazardous gaseous environment. Psnc worked with local news to put out traffic advisories. Psnc energy's in house inspector was drug tested since his actions contributed to the incident. The ncuc had pipeline safety officers on the scene. Scana gas services facilitated a human factor investigation of the incident. The hfi report is incomplete as of 1/29/19.
Detailed record list
Occurred At
2019-01-07 18:00:00
Year
2019
Report Received Date
2019-01-30 00:00:00
Iyear
2019.0
Report Number
20190010.0
Supplemental Number
31966.0
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
15938
Name
Public Service Co Of North Carolina
Operator Street Address
800 Gaston Road
Operator City Name
Gastonia
Operator State Abbreviation
NC
Operator Postal Code
28056
Local Datetime
2019-01-07 18:00:00
Location Street Address
Swannanoa River Rd & Fairview Rd.
Location City Name
Asheville
Location County Name
Buncombe
Location State Abbreviation
NC
Location Postal Code
28806
Location Latitude
35.574758
Location Longitude
-82.502529
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2019-01-07 20:28:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1234779
Commodity Released Type
Natural Gas
Unintentional Release
504.0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0.0
Incident Identified Datetime
2019-01-07 18:00:00
On Site Datetime
2019-01-07 18:00:00
Federal
No
Location Type
Public Property
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Exposed Due To Excavation
Depth Of Cover
48.0
Crossing
Yes
Road Crossing Ind
Yes
Road Type
Cased
Pipe Facility Type
Investor Owned
System Part Involved
Main
Installation Year
1959.0
Pipe Diameter
4.0
Pipe Specification
Api 5l
Pipe Manufacturer
Unknown
Material Involved
Steel
Steel Seam Type
Other
Steel Seam Type Details
Unknown
Wt Steel
0.188
Release Type
Mechanical Puncture
Puncture Axial
0.4
Puncture Circum
0.4
Class Location Type
Class 3 Location
Est Cost Oper Paid
0.0
Est Cost Prop Damage
132444.0
Est Cost Emergency
7200.0
Est Cost Other
0.0
Est Cost Unintentional Release
2175.0
Prpty
141819.0
Commercial Affected
0.0
Industrial Affected
0.0
Residences Affected
0.0
Accident Psig
350.0
Normal Psig
350.0
Mop Psig
375.0
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
The leak amount was too small to show up and or trigger any alarms.
Employee Drug Test Ind
Yes
Num Employees Tested
1
Num Employees Failed
0
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Cause Details
Damage By Operator Or Operator's Contractor Not Related To Excavation And Not Due To Motorized Vehicle/equipment Damage
Operation Type
Damage By Operator Or Operator's Contractor Not Related To Excavation And Not Due To Motorized Vehicle/equipment Damage
Related Failure Follow Ind
Yes
Category Type
Decommissioning
Operator Qualification Ind
Yes
Qualified Individuals
Yes, They Were Qualified For The Task(S)
Preparer Name
M*** H*****
Preparer Title
Operations Manager
Preparer Email
R******@s****.com
Preparer Telephone
828-670-3567
Authorizer Name
S**** S*******
Authorizer Title
General Manager-Operations
Authorizer Telephone
704-810-3230
Authorizer Email
M********@s****.com
Narrative
Update to final report: revised part a, 5.5f lat. And long. Values to reflect a more accurate location of incident. Revised part c, 5 to reflect of hole size of 0.4 inch instead of 375.00 inches. The actual size was 0.375 inch but system only allows one decimal place. Updated cost information in part d. Replaced symbols in narrative that cause print errors. Additional actions: provided human factors investigation report to ncuc on 2/22/2019 via email. Provided follow-up training documentation to ncuc on 2/22/2019 via email. Provided operator qualification and procedure information to ncuc on 2/22/2019 via email. Original project plan on 1/7/19, a psnc energy contractor was retiring a 350 psig 4 in. Lateral (m-320) off on our 8 in. Transmission line (t-04) in asheville. The specific location of the work was near the intersection of swannanoa river and fairview roads. This work was the final step to retiring a bridge attachment on fairview road. This project included rerouting some sections and de-rating part of the 350 psig system to a standard distribution system pressure of 60 psig. This section of m-320 used to feed some regulator stations that are now retired. The original project plan was to excavate and retire the 4 in. Lateral section using a 4 in. Td williamson (tdw) stop-off fitting and repave this area by 11 pm that night. Summary of what happened when the pipe was exposed at about 11:00 am it was discovered the pipe was 6 in. So 6 in. Fittings of identical pressure specifications were rounded up. A tdw thread-o-ring (tor which is basically a 2in. Fitting used in the tapping operation) and the 6 in. Stop-off fitting were welded on the pipe. The tor was tapped at about 6 pm by our tapping contractor, when it was discovered that the 6 in. Pipe was actually casing pipe over the 4 in. Pipe. The pilot bit penetrated the 4 in. Line creating a 3/8 in. Hole that sent gas in both directions down the casing. The tapping contractor technician and the pipeline contractor support personnel evacuated the hole. Psnc energy had an inspector on site and additional psnc energy personnel were brought in to monitor both ends of the casings for gas migration. Gaseous atmosphere was about 25-30 ft. Radius from the bell hole containing the tor. The project design specified the remaining lateral stub to be as short as possible so there was no room to install another stop-off fitting. This made the repair/shut-off plan more complex. The section of transmission line containing the lateral connection was going to have to be isolated to stop the leak. This is a single feed system so a bypass was required. Psnc energy was able to round up two tdw 3-way tees (which are designed to facilitate both stop-off and bypass) from another job. Transmission contract crews were brought in to weld on the fittings and to weld up and install a 120 ft. 8 in. Bypass. Two remote bell holes were dug to install the fittings on t-04. The shutdown process of installing fittings and bypass, testing and purging the bypass, stopping off the damaged section, and transferring the flow to the bypass lasted from approximately 8:00 pm on 1/7/19 until 11:10 am on 1/8/19. Replacing the damaged lateral containing the section of t-04 with pre-tested pipe and placing the pipeline back in service took until 11:10 am on 1/8/19. Backfilling and road repair lasted through the evening. Other information of note the emergency response and repair processes required the shut-down of swannanoa river roads. The entire stoppage of the leak and repair were worked outside of the hazardous gaseous environment. Psnc worked with local news to put out traffic advisories. Psnc energy's in house inspector was drug tested since his actions contributed to the incident. The ncuc had pipeline safety officers on the scene. Scana gas services facilitated a human factor investigation of the incident. The hfi report is incomplete as of 1/29/19.
| Occurred At | 2019-01-07 18:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Year | 2019 |
| Report Received Date | 2019-01-30 00:00:00 |
| Iyear | 2019.0 |
| Report Number | 20190010.0 |
| Supplemental Number | 31966.0 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 15938 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Public Service Co Of North Carolina |
| Operator Street Address | 800 Gaston Road |
| Operator City Name | Gastonia |
| Operator State Abbreviation | NC |
| Operator Postal Code | 28056 |
| Local Datetime | 2019-01-07 18:00:00 |
| Location Street Address | Swannanoa River Rd & Fairview Rd. |
| Location City Name | Asheville |
| Location County Name | Buncombe |
| Location State Abbreviation | NC |
| Location Postal Code | 28806 |
| Location Latitude | 35.574758 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -82.502529 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2019-01-07 20:28:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1234779 NRC Report How to search |
| Commodity Released Type | Natural Gas |
| Unintentional Release | 504.0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0.0 |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2019-01-07 18:00:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2019-01-07 18:00:00 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Public Property |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Exposed Due To Excavation |
| Depth Of Cover | 48.0 |
| Crossing | Yes |
| Road Crossing Ind | Yes |
| Road Type | Cased |
| Pipe Facility Type | Investor Owned |
| System Part Involved | Main |
| Installation Year | 1959.0 |
| Pipe Diameter | 4.0 |
| Pipe Specification | Api 5l |
| Pipe Manufacturer | Unknown |
| Material Involved | Steel |
| Steel Seam Type | Other |
| Steel Seam Type Details | Unknown |
| Wt Steel | 0.188 |
| Release Type | Mechanical Puncture |
| Puncture Axial | 0.4 |
| Puncture Circum | 0.4 |
| Class Location Type | Class 3 Location |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0.0 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 132444.0 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 7200.0 |
| Est Cost Other | 0.0 |
| Est Cost Unintentional Release | 2175.0 |
| Prpty | 141819.0 |
| Commercial Affected | 0.0 |
| Industrial Affected | 0.0 |
| Residences Affected | 0.0 |
| Accident Psig | 350.0 |
| Normal Psig | 350.0 |
| Mop Psig | 375.0 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Operator Employee |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | The leak amount was too small to show up and or trigger any alarms. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | Yes |
| Num Employees Tested | 1 |
| Num Employees Failed | 0 |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Incorrect Operation |
| Cause Details | Damage By Operator Or Operator's Contractor Not Related To Excavation And Not Due To Motorized Vehicle/equipment Damage |
| Operation Type | Damage By Operator Or Operator's Contractor Not Related To Excavation And Not Due To Motorized Vehicle/equipment Damage |
| Related Failure Follow Ind | Yes |
| Category Type | Decommissioning |
| Operator Qualification Ind | Yes |
| Qualified Individuals | Yes, They Were Qualified For The Task(S) |
| Preparer Name | M*** H***** |
| Preparer Title | Operations Manager |
| Preparer Email | R******@s****.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 828-670-3567 |
| Authorizer Name | S**** S******* |
| Authorizer Title | General Manager-Operations |
| Authorizer Telephone | 704-810-3230 |
| Authorizer Email | M********@s****.com |
| Narrative | Update to final report: revised part a, 5.5f lat. And long. Values to reflect a more accurate location of incident. Revised part c, 5 to reflect of hole size of 0.4 inch instead of 375.00 inches. The actual size was 0.375 inch but system only allows one decimal place. Updated cost information in part d. Replaced symbols in narrative that cause print errors. Additional actions: provided human factors investigation report to ncuc on 2/22/2019 via email. Provided follow-up training documentation to ncuc on 2/22/2019 via email. Provided operator qualification and procedure information to ncuc on 2/22/2019 via email. Original project plan on 1/7/19, a psnc energy contractor was retiring a 350 psig 4 in. Lateral (m-320) off on our 8 in. Transmission line (t-04) in asheville. The specific location of the work was near the intersection of swannanoa river and fairview roads. This work was the final step to retiring a bridge attachment on fairview road. This project included rerouting some sections and de-rating part of the 350 psig system to a standard distribution system pressure of 60 psig. This section of m-320 used to feed some regulator stations that are now retired. The original project plan was to excavate and retire the 4 in. Lateral section using a 4 in. Td williamson (tdw) stop-off fitting and repave this area by 11 pm that night. Summary of what happened when the pipe was exposed at about 11:00 am it was discovered the pipe was 6 in. So 6 in. Fittings of identical pressure specifications were rounded up. A tdw thread-o-ring (tor which is basically a 2in. Fitting used in the tapping operation) and the 6 in. Stop-off fitting were welded on the pipe. The tor was tapped at about 6 pm by our tapping contractor, when it was discovered that the 6 in. Pipe was actually casing pipe over the 4 in. Pipe. The pilot bit penetrated the 4 in. Line creating a 3/8 in. Hole that sent gas in both directions down the casing. The tapping contractor technician and the pipeline contractor support personnel evacuated the hole. Psnc energy had an inspector on site and additional psnc energy personnel were brought in to monitor both ends of the casings for gas migration. Gaseous atmosphere was about 25-30 ft. Radius from the bell hole containing the tor. The project design specified the remaining lateral stub to be as short as possible so there was no room to install another stop-off fitting. This made the repair/shut-off plan more complex. The section of transmission line containing the lateral connection was going to have to be isolated to stop the leak. This is a single feed system so a bypass was required. Psnc energy was able to round up two tdw 3-way tees (which are designed to facilitate both stop-off and bypass) from another job. Transmission contract crews were brought in to weld on the fittings and to weld up and install a 120 ft. 8 in. Bypass. Two remote bell holes were dug to install the fittings on t-04. The shutdown process of installing fittings and bypass, testing and purging the bypass, stopping off the damaged section, and transferring the flow to the bypass lasted from approximately 8:00 pm on 1/7/19 until 11:10 am on 1/8/19. Replacing the damaged lateral containing the section of t-04 with pre-tested pipe and placing the pipeline back in service took until 11:10 am on 1/8/19. Backfilling and road repair lasted through the evening. Other information of note the emergency response and repair processes required the shut-down of swannanoa river roads. The entire stoppage of the leak and repair were worked outside of the hazardous gaseous environment. Psnc worked with local news to put out traffic advisories. Psnc energy's in house inspector was drug tested since his actions contributed to the incident. The ncuc had pipeline safety officers on the scene. Scana gas services facilitated a human factor investigation of the incident. The hfi report is incomplete as of 1/29/19. |
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