Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2018-11-10 — TX
Operator
Dcp Midstream
Cause
Excavation Issue
Commodity
Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
2 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$2,000,000
Incident datetime
2018-11-10 14:18
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
Dcp contract line locator guadalupe valdes provided positive response to the third party excavator on 10/31/18 (ticket # 1880394139) indicating that the pipeline had been marked and flagged, provided specific instructions in the positive response stating that dcp must be on site within 30 feet of the ngl pipeline, mr. Valdez provided his contact mobile cell number in the positive response to the third party excavator, and added that if there were any questions to call him at that number. The positive response was emailed to the third party excavator. The third party excavator did not contact mr. Valdez when they were excavating / working within 30 feet of the pipeline and the flags. The line was marked with flags and permanent markers, the flags and permanent markers for this pipeline were visible. The third party excavator ignored these markings and continued excavation activities, and struck the dcp midstream pipeline. Requested supplementary information follows. Regarding ignition of the escaping natural gas liquids, the chain trencher machine operated by the third party excavator company was in operation and came into contact with the dcp midstream pipeline. Contrary to the one call positive response instructions, the third party excavator did not contact dcp personnel when the excavator was operating machinery within thirty feet of the dcp pipeline, so no dcp personnel were present when the chain trencher machine contacted the dcp pipeline, compromised the pipe wall and ignition of the escaping natural gas liquids occurred. The ignition source would appear to be either a spark from the excavation chain trencher machine mechanically being in contact with the metal dcp pipeline, or the engine from the excavator chain trencher machine coming into contact with escaping natural gas liquids. Injuries were to the two third party excavator company machine operators, the only persons present at this location when the excavator company's machinery struck the dcp midstream pipeline. The fire from the escaping natural gas liquids, escaping through a cut in/puncture of the pipeline, could not be safely stopped by fire professionals so it was allowed to continue until the hydrocarbon liquids source was spent and the fire self-extinguished. The estimated volume of natural gas liquids product released was adjusted (increased) after the initial report because the lost volume from the 11/10/18 incident was later assessed using a different approach compared to the initial estimate, specifically using a more refined calculation relying on actual measured system loss and gain metrics for the pipeline in relation to the time period around the incident (vs. An initial estimate relying on engineering calculations using relevant pipeline parameters, I.E., line fill between main line valves). The railroad commission of texas, oversight and safety division, pipeline safety program, inspected the incident site and investigated the 11/10/18 incident. In an april 9, 2019, pipeline safety evaluation letter to dcp midstream, the rrc pipeline safety program concluded that dcp emergency procedures, one-call procedures, line marking procedures, and operator qualifications for the line marking task were acceptable, that the dcp pipeline had been marked with flags, that the positive response to the excavator company on the one call ticket (tx. 811 ticket no. 1880394139) indicated temporary line markers were in place and also included affirmative instructions that if and when excavation activities are within 30 feet of the dcp pipeline then dcp be contacted so that a dcp representative can and should be present, and that there was no evidence of the third party excavator company contacting dcp when they were trenching within 30 feet of the dcp pipeline on nov. 10, 2018. The railroad commission determined that with respect to the 11/10/18 incident and dcp midstream's activities, it found no alleged violations by dcp midstream.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2018-12-10 00:00:00
Iyear
2018
Report Number
20180382
Supplemental Number
32252
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
31130
Name
Dcp Midstream
Operator Street Address
2331 Citywest Blvd. Hq-08-S812-02
Operator City Name
Houston
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
77042
Local Datetime
2018-11-10 14:18:00
Location Latitude
30.3515556
Location Longitude
-100.5817917
Commodity Released Type
Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions
Commodity Subtype
Lpg (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) / Ngl (Natural Gas Liquid)
Unintentional Release Bbls
48400
Intentional Release Bbls
0
Recovered Bbls
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
Yes
Num Emp Injuries
0
Num Contr Injuries
0
Num Er Injuries
0
Num Worker Injuries
2
Num Gp Injuries
0
Injure
2
Accident Identifier
Cpm Leak Detection System Or Scada-Based Information (Such As Alarm(S), Alert(S), Event(S), And/or Volume Calculations)
Incident Identified Datetime
2018-11-10 14:18:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
On Off Shore
Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Shutdown Datetime
2018-11-10 14:18:00
Restart Datetime
2018-11-15 02:00:00
On Site Datetime
2018-11-10 15:20:00
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2018-11-10 17:50:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1230061
Ignite Ind
Yes
Explode Ind
No
Upstream Valve Type Ind
Automatic
Downstream Valve Type Ind
Automatic
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Sahi-1
Segment Name
Sand Hills Mainline
Onshore State Abbreviation
Tx
Onshore Postal Code
76950
Onshore City Name
Not Within A Municipality
Onshore County Name
Sutton
Designated Location
Milepost/valve Station
Designated Name
Mlv-11
Federal
No
Location Type
Pipeline Right-Of-Way
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Under Soil
Depth Of Cover
60
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Intrastate
Item Involved
Pipe
Pipe Type
Pipe Body
Pipe Diameter
20
Pipe Wall Thickness
0.406
Pipe Smys
60000
Pipe Specification
X60
Pipe Seam Type
Erw - High Frequency
Pipe Manufacturer
Stupp Corporation
Pipe Coating Type
Fusion Bonded Epoxy(Fbe)
Installation Year
2013
Manufactured Year
Unknown
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Mechanical Puncture
Puncture Axial
20
Puncture Circum
20
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
Yes
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
Yes
Soil Remed Ind
Yes
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
No
Commodity Reached Hca
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
300000
Est Cost Gas Released
1300000
Est Cost Prop Damage
2000000
Est Cost Emergency
500000
Est Cost Environmental
100000
Est Cost Other
11000000
Est Cost Other Details
8.f Includes Bus. Interr./lost Rev. Costs. 8a To 8.f Are Estimates; May Be Supp.
Prpty
15200000
Accident Psig
1044
Mop Psig
1440
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Length Segment Isolated
58436
Internal Inspection Ind
Yes
Operation Complications Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
Yes
Scada Conf Ind
Yes
Cpm In Place Ind
Yes
Cpm Operating Ind
Yes
Cpm Functional Ind
Yes
Cpm Detection Ind
Yes
Cpm Conf Ind
Yes
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
Pipeline was damaged by 3rd party excavation activities.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Excavation Damage
Cause Details
Excavation Damage By Third Party
Ex Party Type
Excavation Damage By Third Party
Prior Notification Ind
No
Notify Cga Dirt
No
Private Row Ind
Yes
Private Subtype
Private Landowner
Pipeline Easement Row Ind
Yes
Excavator Type
Contractor
Excavator Equipment
Trencher
Work Performed
Liquid Pipeline
One Call Notified Ind
Yes
One Call Ticket Num
1880394139
One Call Center Name
Texas 811
Locator Type
Contract Locator
Visible Marks
Yes
Service Interruption
Yes
Service Interruption Hours
108
Root Cause Category
Excavation Issue
Root Cause Type
Excavator Failed To Maintain Clearance After Verifying Marks
Preparer Name
K**** N****
Preparer Title
Sr. Pipeline Compliance Specialist
Preparer Email
K******@d***********.com
Preparer Telephone
979-242-6976
Prepared Date
2019-06-07 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
J*** P*******
Authorizer Telephone
405-605-3859
Authorizer Title
Manager Pipeline Compliance
Authorizer Email
J*********@d***********.com
Narrative
Dcp contract line locator guadalupe valdes provided positive response to the third party excavator on 10/31/18 (ticket # 1880394139) indicating that the pipeline had been marked and flagged, provided specific instructions in the positive response stating that dcp must be on site within 30 feet of the ngl pipeline, mr. Valdez provided his contact mobile cell number in the positive response to the third party excavator, and added that if there were any questions to call him at that number. The positive response was emailed to the third party excavator. The third party excavator did not contact mr. Valdez when they were excavating / working within 30 feet of the pipeline and the flags. The line was marked with flags and permanent markers, the flags and permanent markers for this pipeline were visible. The third party excavator ignored these markings and continued excavation activities, and struck the dcp midstream pipeline. Requested supplementary information follows. Regarding ignition of the escaping natural gas liquids, the chain trencher machine operated by the third party excavator company was in operation and came into contact with the dcp midstream pipeline. Contrary to the one call positive response instructions, the third party excavator did not contact dcp personnel when the excavator was operating machinery within thirty feet of the dcp pipeline, so no dcp personnel were present when the chain trencher machine contacted the dcp pipeline, compromised the pipe wall and ignition of the escaping natural gas liquids occurred. The ignition source would appear to be either a spark from the excavation chain trencher machine mechanically being in contact with the metal dcp pipeline, or the engine from the excavator chain trencher machine coming into contact with escaping natural gas liquids. Injuries were to the two third party excavator company machine operators, the only persons present at this location when the excavator company's machinery struck the dcp midstream pipeline. The fire from the escaping natural gas liquids, escaping through a cut in/puncture of the pipeline, could not be safely stopped by fire professionals so it was allowed to continue until the hydrocarbon liquids source was spent and the fire self-extinguished. The estimated volume of natural gas liquids product released was adjusted (increased) after the initial report because the lost volume from the 11/10/18 incident was later assessed using a different approach compared to the initial estimate, specifically using a more refined calculation relying on actual measured system loss and gain metrics for the pipeline in relation to the time period around the incident (vs. An initial estimate relying on engineering calculations using relevant pipeline parameters, I.E., line fill between main line valves). The railroad commission of texas, oversight and safety division, pipeline safety program, inspected the incident site and investigated the 11/10/18 incident. In an april 9, 2019, pipeline safety evaluation letter to dcp midstream, the rrc pipeline safety program concluded that dcp emergency procedures, one-call procedures, line marking procedures, and operator qualifications for the line marking task were acceptable, that the dcp pipeline had been marked with flags, that the positive response to the excavator company on the one call ticket (tx. 811 ticket no. 1880394139) indicated temporary line markers were in place and also included affirmative instructions that if and when excavation activities are within 30 feet of the dcp pipeline then dcp be contacted so that a dcp representative can and should be present, and that there was no evidence of the third party excavator company contacting dcp when they were trenching within 30 feet of the dcp pipeline on nov. 10, 2018. The railroad commission determined that with respect to the 11/10/18 incident and dcp midstream's activities, it found no alleged violations by dcp midstream.
| Report Received Date | 2018-12-10 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2018 |
| Report Number | 20180382 |
| Supplemental Number | 32252 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 31130 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Dcp Midstream |
| Operator Street Address | 2331 Citywest Blvd. Hq-08-S812-02 |
| Operator City Name | Houston |
| Operator State Abbreviation | TX |
| Operator Postal Code | 77042 |
| Local Datetime | 2018-11-10 14:18:00 |
| Location Latitude | 30.3515556 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -100.5817917 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions |
| Commodity Subtype | Lpg (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) / Ngl (Natural Gas Liquid) |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 48400 |
| Intentional Release Bbls | 0 |
| Recovered Bbls | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | Yes |
| Num Emp Injuries | 0 |
| Num Contr Injuries | 0 |
| Num Er Injuries | 0 |
| Num Worker Injuries | 2 |
| Num Gp Injuries | 0 |
| Injure | 2 |
| Accident Identifier | Cpm Leak Detection System Or Scada-Based Information (Such As Alarm(S), Alert(S), Event(S), And/or Volume Calculations) |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2018-11-10 14:18:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | Yes |
| Shutdown Datetime | 2018-11-10 14:18:00 |
| Restart Datetime | 2018-11-15 02:00:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2018-11-10 15:20:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2018-11-10 17:50:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1230061 NRC Report How to search |
| Ignite Ind | Yes |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Upstream Valve Type Ind | Automatic |
| Downstream Valve Type Ind | Automatic |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Sahi-1 |
| Segment Name | Sand Hills Mainline |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Tx |
| Onshore Postal Code | 76950 |
| Onshore City Name | Not Within A Municipality |
| Onshore County Name | Sutton |
| Designated Location | Milepost/valve Station |
| Designated Name | Mlv-11 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Pipeline Right-Of-Way |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Under Soil |
| Depth Of Cover | 60 |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Intrastate |
| Item Involved | Pipe |
| Pipe Type | Pipe Body |
| Pipe Diameter | 20 |
| Pipe Wall Thickness | 0.406 |
| Pipe Smys | 60000 |
| Pipe Specification | X60 |
| Pipe Seam Type | Erw - High Frequency |
| Pipe Manufacturer | Stupp Corporation |
| Pipe Coating Type | Fusion Bonded Epoxy(Fbe) |
| Installation Year | 2013 |
| Manufactured Year | Unknown |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Mechanical Puncture |
| Puncture Axial | 20 |
| Puncture Circum | 20 |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | Yes |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | Yes |
| Soil Remed Ind | Yes |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Commodity Reached Hca | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 300000 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 1300000 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 2000000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 500000 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 100000 |
| Est Cost Other | 11000000 |
| Est Cost Other Details | 8.f Includes Bus. Interr./lost Rev. Costs. 8a To 8.f Are Estimates; May Be Supp. |
| Prpty | 15200000 |
| Accident Psig | 1044 |
| Mop Psig | 1440 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Length Segment Isolated | 58436 |
| Internal Inspection Ind | Yes |
| Operation Complications Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | Yes |
| Scada Conf Ind | Yes |
| Cpm In Place Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Operating Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Functional Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Detection Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Conf Ind | Yes |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | Pipeline was damaged by 3rd party excavation activities. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Excavation Damage |
| Cause Details | Excavation Damage By Third Party |
| Ex Party Type | Excavation Damage By Third Party |
| Prior Notification Ind | No |
| Notify Cga Dirt | No |
| Private Row Ind | Yes |
| Private Subtype | Private Landowner |
| Pipeline Easement Row Ind | Yes |
| Excavator Type | Contractor |
| Excavator Equipment | Trencher |
| Work Performed | Liquid Pipeline |
| One Call Notified Ind | Yes |
| One Call Ticket Num | 1880394139 |
| One Call Center Name | Texas 811 |
| Locator Type | Contract Locator |
| Visible Marks | Yes |
| Service Interruption | Yes |
| Service Interruption Hours | 108 |
| Root Cause Category | Excavation Issue |
| Root Cause Type | Excavator Failed To Maintain Clearance After Verifying Marks |
| Preparer Name | K**** N**** |
| Preparer Title | Sr. Pipeline Compliance Specialist |
| Preparer Email | K******@d***********.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 979-242-6976 |
| Prepared Date | 2019-06-07 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | J*** P******* |
| Authorizer Telephone | 405-605-3859 |
| Authorizer Title | Manager Pipeline Compliance |
| Authorizer Email | J*********@d***********.com |
| Narrative | Dcp contract line locator guadalupe valdes provided positive response to the third party excavator on 10/31/18 (ticket # 1880394139) indicating that the pipeline had been marked and flagged, provided specific instructions in the positive response stating that dcp must be on site within 30 feet of the ngl pipeline, mr. Valdez provided his contact mobile cell number in the positive response to the third party excavator, and added that if there were any questions to call him at that number. The positive response was emailed to the third party excavator. The third party excavator did not contact mr. Valdez when they were excavating / working within 30 feet of the pipeline and the flags. The line was marked with flags and permanent markers, the flags and permanent markers for this pipeline were visible. The third party excavator ignored these markings and continued excavation activities, and struck the dcp midstream pipeline. Requested supplementary information follows. Regarding ignition of the escaping natural gas liquids, the chain trencher machine operated by the third party excavator company was in operation and came into contact with the dcp midstream pipeline. Contrary to the one call positive response instructions, the third party excavator did not contact dcp personnel when the excavator was operating machinery within thirty feet of the dcp pipeline, so no dcp personnel were present when the chain trencher machine contacted the dcp pipeline, compromised the pipe wall and ignition of the escaping natural gas liquids occurred. The ignition source would appear to be either a spark from the excavation chain trencher machine mechanically being in contact with the metal dcp pipeline, or the engine from the excavator chain trencher machine coming into contact with escaping natural gas liquids. Injuries were to the two third party excavator company machine operators, the only persons present at this location when the excavator company's machinery struck the dcp midstream pipeline. The fire from the escaping natural gas liquids, escaping through a cut in/puncture of the pipeline, could not be safely stopped by fire professionals so it was allowed to continue until the hydrocarbon liquids source was spent and the fire self-extinguished. The estimated volume of natural gas liquids product released was adjusted (increased) after the initial report because the lost volume from the 11/10/18 incident was later assessed using a different approach compared to the initial estimate, specifically using a more refined calculation relying on actual measured system loss and gain metrics for the pipeline in relation to the time period around the incident (vs. An initial estimate relying on engineering calculations using relevant pipeline parameters, I.E., line fill between main line valves). The railroad commission of texas, oversight and safety division, pipeline safety program, inspected the incident site and investigated the 11/10/18 incident. In an april 9, 2019, pipeline safety evaluation letter to dcp midstream, the rrc pipeline safety program concluded that dcp emergency procedures, one-call procedures, line marking procedures, and operator qualifications for the line marking task were acceptable, that the dcp pipeline had been marked with flags, that the positive response to the excavator company on the one call ticket (tx. 811 ticket no. 1880394139) indicated temporary line markers were in place and also included affirmative instructions that if and when excavation activities are within 30 feet of the dcp pipeline then dcp be contacted so that a dcp representative can and should be present, and that there was no evidence of the third party excavator company contacting dcp when they were trenching within 30 feet of the dcp pipeline on nov. 10, 2018. The railroad commission determined that with respect to the 11/10/18 incident and dcp midstream's activities, it found no alleged violations by dcp midstream. |
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