Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2018-11-09 — TX
Operator
Denbury Gulf Coast Pipelines, Llc
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Commodity
Co2 (Carbon Dioxide)
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$161,095
Incident datetime
2018-11-09 17:15
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
On 11/9/2018 at 17:15, two denbury employees overseeing the reloading of the delta pipeline witnessed a rupture of a CO2 pipeline within the perimeter of a denbury controlled valve location. The pipeline foreman onsite immediately notified the appropriate pipeline personnel to include the denbury control center (dcc). The dcc closed and isolated the two pipelines feeding the delta pipeline by remotely shutting two isolation valves upstream from the failure location. The two isolation valves were closed at 17:20 and 17:22, respectively. The area immediately surrounding the failure location was secured. At 18:10 personnel were dispersed downwind of the failure location and throughout the area to monitor the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. The release did not result in explosion, fire, death, personal injury, significant public property damage, or pollution of any water body, and was confined to company controlled property apart from dispersion of a vapor cloud. It was determined to be a significant event at 21:38 and an nrc telephonic report was initiated at 22:28 on 11/9/2018 (incident report #1230011). A controlled blowdown at the failure site occurred throughout the night to prepare for investigation, excavation, and repair. On 11/10/2018 at 07:30 denbury personnel accessed the failure location to assess the situation. At 07:40 two isolation valves were shut at the failure location to stop all flow between the failure location and the source pipeline. An excavation crew was contacted, and excavation began at 14:00. Due to weather/rain conditions, excavation continued 11/11/2018 and 11/12/2018. A 48-hour nrc telephonic report update was initiated at 06:52 on 11/12/2018 (incident report #1230120). The failure location was fully excavated on 11/13/2018. An engineering contractor performed a field evaluation at the failure location and the failed pipe was removed from the existing pipeline and sent to a lab for further testing to determine cause. On 11/14/2018 four welds west of the failure location were non-destructively tested to assure integrity. In addition, the location was prepared for the fitment of new, pre-tested replacement pipe. Site preparation and pipe fitment continued 11/15/2018. On 11/16/2018 the replacement pipe was installed and welded in place. On 11/17/2018 excavation took place to expose two additional welds east of the failure location. These two existing welds and the two repair welds were non-destructively tested and accepted. On 11/18/2018 at 08:40 refill of the delta pipeline began and on 11/20/2018 at 21:15 the delta pipeline returned to service without incident. On march 19, 2019 denbury received a final lab report stating the release was the result of large thermal differential stresses being exerted on the pipeline from CO2 loading at two different locations. The report indicated there was no evidence of anomalies in the mechanical properties or chemical composition of the ruptured weld pipe. Denbury is reviewing recommendations to ensure this failure will not happen in future pipeline loading which may include: performing a pre-loading engineering assessment to evaluate thermal stresses and restrained pipeline, perform stress analysis to verify thermal stress loading effects, procedure change to avoid loading from two separate locations, perform loading by throttling to control temperature levels, pre-heat CO2 prior to loading, or use of nitrogen in pre-loading.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2018-12-06 00:00:00
Iyear
2018
Report Number
20180379
Supplemental Number
31918
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
32545
Name
Denbury Gulf Coast Pipelines, Llc
Operator Street Address
5851 Legacy Circle Suite 1200
Operator City Name
Plano
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
75024
Local Datetime
2018-11-09 17:15:00
Location Latitude
32.54988
Location Longitude
-90.0315
Commodity Released Type
Co2 (Carbon Dioxide)
Unintentional Release Bbls
281.1
Intentional Release Bbls
12561
Recovered Bbls
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
Incident Identified Datetime
2018-11-09 17:15:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
On Off Shore
Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
No
Shutdown Explain
At The Time Of Failure The Pipeline Was Being Reloaded And Not Operational
On Site Datetime
2018-11-09 17:15:00
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2018-11-09 22:28:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1230011
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Upstream Valve Type Ind
Remotely Controlled
Downstream Valve Type Ind
Remotely Controlled
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Delta
Segment Name
Delta
Onshore State Abbreviation
Ms
Onshore Postal Code
39046
Onshore City Name
Not Within A Municipality
Onshore County Name
Madison
Designated Location
Milepost/valve Station
Designated Name
Old Canton Vs
Federal
No
Location Type
Originated On Operator-Controlled Property, But Then Flowed Or Migrated Off The Property
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Under Soil
Depth Of Cover
96
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
Item Involved
Weld, Including Heat-Affected Zone
Pipe Diameter
24
Pipe Wall Thickness
0.5
Pipe Smys
80000
Pipe Specification
Api 5l
Pipe Seam Type
Erw - High Frequency
Pipe Manufacturer
Stupp Corporation
Pipe Coating Type
Field Applied Epoxy
Weld Subtype
Pipe Girth Weld
Installation Year
2011
Manufactured Year
2009
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Rupture
Rupture Orient
Circumferential
Rupture Width
0.5
Rupture Length
75
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
No
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
No
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
No
Commodity Reached Hca
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
524
Est Cost Prop Damage
161095
Est Cost Emergency
18532
Est Cost Environmental
0
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
180151
Accident Psig
65
Mop Psig
1797
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Length Segment Isolated
43560
Internal Inspection Ind
Yes
Operation Complications Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Cpm In Place Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
The pipeline segment was out of service and in the process of being filled at the time of failure due to previous/non-related maintenance activities and was under local operations control.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Cause Details
Other Incorrect Operation
Operation Type
Other Incorrect Operation
Operation Details
Inadequate Procedure That Resulted In Large Thermal Differential Stresses Being Exerted On The Pipeline. The Strain On The Pipeline Segment Between The Two Loading Points Created A Thermal Differential Stress Which Caused The Pipeline To Contract Between The Two Restrained Buried Tees.
Related Inadequate Proc Ind
Yes
Category Type
Other Maintenance
Operator Qualification Ind
Yes
Qualified Individuals
Yes, They Were Qualified For The Task(S)
Preparer Name
C*** D******
Preparer Title
Regulatory Compliance Specialist
Preparer Email
C***********@d******.com
Preparer Telephone
9726732734
Prepared Date
2019-04-08 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
J*** F**********
Authorizer Telephone
9726732648
Authorizer Title
Svp - Operations Services
Authorizer Email
J***************@d******.com
Narrative
On 11/9/2018 at 17:15, two denbury employees overseeing the reloading of the delta pipeline witnessed a rupture of a CO2 pipeline within the perimeter of a denbury controlled valve location. The pipeline foreman onsite immediately notified the appropriate pipeline personnel to include the denbury control center (dcc). The dcc closed and isolated the two pipelines feeding the delta pipeline by remotely shutting two isolation valves upstream from the failure location. The two isolation valves were closed at 17:20 and 17:22, respectively. The area immediately surrounding the failure location was secured. At 18:10 personnel were dispersed downwind of the failure location and throughout the area to monitor the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. The release did not result in explosion, fire, death, personal injury, significant public property damage, or pollution of any water body, and was confined to company controlled property apart from dispersion of a vapor cloud. It was determined to be a significant event at 21:38 and an nrc telephonic report was initiated at 22:28 on 11/9/2018 (incident report #1230011). A controlled blowdown at the failure site occurred throughout the night to prepare for investigation, excavation, and repair. On 11/10/2018 at 07:30 denbury personnel accessed the failure location to assess the situation. At 07:40 two isolation valves were shut at the failure location to stop all flow between the failure location and the source pipeline. An excavation crew was contacted, and excavation began at 14:00. Due to weather/rain conditions, excavation continued 11/11/2018 and 11/12/2018. A 48-hour nrc telephonic report update was initiated at 06:52 on 11/12/2018 (incident report #1230120). The failure location was fully excavated on 11/13/2018. An engineering contractor performed a field evaluation at the failure location and the failed pipe was removed from the existing pipeline and sent to a lab for further testing to determine cause. On 11/14/2018 four welds west of the failure location were non-destructively tested to assure integrity. In addition, the location was prepared for the fitment of new, pre-tested replacement pipe. Site preparation and pipe fitment continued 11/15/2018. On 11/16/2018 the replacement pipe was installed and welded in place. On 11/17/2018 excavation took place to expose two additional welds east of the failure location. These two existing welds and the two repair welds were non-destructively tested and accepted. On 11/18/2018 at 08:40 refill of the delta pipeline began and on 11/20/2018 at 21:15 the delta pipeline returned to service without incident. On march 19, 2019 denbury received a final lab report stating the release was the result of large thermal differential stresses being exerted on the pipeline from CO2 loading at two different locations. The report indicated there was no evidence of anomalies in the mechanical properties or chemical composition of the ruptured weld pipe. Denbury is reviewing recommendations to ensure this failure will not happen in future pipeline loading which may include: performing a pre-loading engineering assessment to evaluate thermal stresses and restrained pipeline, perform stress analysis to verify thermal stress loading effects, procedure change to avoid loading from two separate locations, perform loading by throttling to control temperature levels, pre-heat CO2 prior to loading, or use of nitrogen in pre-loading.
| Report Received Date | 2018-12-06 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2018 |
| Report Number | 20180379 |
| Supplemental Number | 31918 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 32545 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Denbury Gulf Coast Pipelines, Llc |
| Operator Street Address | 5851 Legacy Circle Suite 1200 |
| Operator City Name | Plano |
| Operator State Abbreviation | TX |
| Operator Postal Code | 75024 |
| Local Datetime | 2018-11-09 17:15:00 |
| Location Latitude | 32.54988 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -90.0315 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Co2 (Carbon Dioxide) |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 281.1 |
| Intentional Release Bbls | 12561 |
| Recovered Bbls | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Operator Employee |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2018-11-09 17:15:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | No |
| Shutdown Explain | At The Time Of Failure The Pipeline Was Being Reloaded And Not Operational |
| On Site Datetime | 2018-11-09 17:15:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2018-11-09 22:28:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1230011 NRC Report How to search |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Upstream Valve Type Ind | Remotely Controlled |
| Downstream Valve Type Ind | Remotely Controlled |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Delta |
| Segment Name | Delta |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Ms |
| Onshore Postal Code | 39046 |
| Onshore City Name | Not Within A Municipality |
| Onshore County Name | Madison |
| Designated Location | Milepost/valve Station |
| Designated Name | Old Canton Vs |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Originated On Operator-Controlled Property, But Then Flowed Or Migrated Off The Property |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Under Soil |
| Depth Of Cover | 96 |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| Item Involved | Weld, Including Heat-Affected Zone |
| Pipe Diameter | 24 |
| Pipe Wall Thickness | 0.5 |
| Pipe Smys | 80000 |
| Pipe Specification | Api 5l |
| Pipe Seam Type | Erw - High Frequency |
| Pipe Manufacturer | Stupp Corporation |
| Pipe Coating Type | Field Applied Epoxy |
| Weld Subtype | Pipe Girth Weld |
| Installation Year | 2011 |
| Manufactured Year | 2009 |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Rupture |
| Rupture Orient | Circumferential |
| Rupture Width | 0.5 |
| Rupture Length | 75 |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | No |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | No |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Commodity Reached Hca | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 524 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 161095 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 18532 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 0 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 180151 |
| Accident Psig | 65 |
| Mop Psig | 1797 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Length Segment Isolated | 43560 |
| Internal Inspection Ind | Yes |
| Operation Complications Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Cpm In Place Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | The pipeline segment was out of service and in the process of being filled at the time of failure due to previous/non-related maintenance activities and was under local operations control. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Incorrect Operation |
| Cause Details | Other Incorrect Operation |
| Operation Type | Other Incorrect Operation |
| Operation Details | Inadequate Procedure That Resulted In Large Thermal Differential Stresses Being Exerted On The Pipeline. The Strain On The Pipeline Segment Between The Two Loading Points Created A Thermal Differential Stress Which Caused The Pipeline To Contract Between The Two Restrained Buried Tees. |
| Related Inadequate Proc Ind | Yes |
| Category Type | Other Maintenance |
| Operator Qualification Ind | Yes |
| Qualified Individuals | Yes, They Were Qualified For The Task(S) |
| Preparer Name | C*** D****** |
| Preparer Title | Regulatory Compliance Specialist |
| Preparer Email | C***********@d******.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 9726732734 |
| Prepared Date | 2019-04-08 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | J*** F********** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 9726732648 |
| Authorizer Title | Svp - Operations Services |
| Authorizer Email | J***************@d******.com |
| Narrative | On 11/9/2018 at 17:15, two denbury employees overseeing the reloading of the delta pipeline witnessed a rupture of a CO2 pipeline within the perimeter of a denbury controlled valve location. The pipeline foreman onsite immediately notified the appropriate pipeline personnel to include the denbury control center (dcc). The dcc closed and isolated the two pipelines feeding the delta pipeline by remotely shutting two isolation valves upstream from the failure location. The two isolation valves were closed at 17:20 and 17:22, respectively. The area immediately surrounding the failure location was secured. At 18:10 personnel were dispersed downwind of the failure location and throughout the area to monitor the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. The release did not result in explosion, fire, death, personal injury, significant public property damage, or pollution of any water body, and was confined to company controlled property apart from dispersion of a vapor cloud. It was determined to be a significant event at 21:38 and an nrc telephonic report was initiated at 22:28 on 11/9/2018 (incident report #1230011). A controlled blowdown at the failure site occurred throughout the night to prepare for investigation, excavation, and repair. On 11/10/2018 at 07:30 denbury personnel accessed the failure location to assess the situation. At 07:40 two isolation valves were shut at the failure location to stop all flow between the failure location and the source pipeline. An excavation crew was contacted, and excavation began at 14:00. Due to weather/rain conditions, excavation continued 11/11/2018 and 11/12/2018. A 48-hour nrc telephonic report update was initiated at 06:52 on 11/12/2018 (incident report #1230120). The failure location was fully excavated on 11/13/2018. An engineering contractor performed a field evaluation at the failure location and the failed pipe was removed from the existing pipeline and sent to a lab for further testing to determine cause. On 11/14/2018 four welds west of the failure location were non-destructively tested to assure integrity. In addition, the location was prepared for the fitment of new, pre-tested replacement pipe. Site preparation and pipe fitment continued 11/15/2018. On 11/16/2018 the replacement pipe was installed and welded in place. On 11/17/2018 excavation took place to expose two additional welds east of the failure location. These two existing welds and the two repair welds were non-destructively tested and accepted. On 11/18/2018 at 08:40 refill of the delta pipeline began and on 11/20/2018 at 21:15 the delta pipeline returned to service without incident. On march 19, 2019 denbury received a final lab report stating the release was the result of large thermal differential stresses being exerted on the pipeline from CO2 loading at two different locations. The report indicated there was no evidence of anomalies in the mechanical properties or chemical composition of the ruptured weld pipe. Denbury is reviewing recommendations to ensure this failure will not happen in future pipeline loading which may include: performing a pre-loading engineering assessment to evaluate thermal stresses and restrained pipeline, perform stress analysis to verify thermal stress loading effects, procedure change to avoid loading from two separate locations, perform loading by throttling to control temperature levels, pre-heat CO2 prior to loading, or use of nitrogen in pre-loading. |
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