Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2018-10-11 — TX
Operator
Phillips 66 Pipeline Llc
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Commodity
Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$65,000
Incident datetime
2018-10-11 11:10
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
On october 11, 2018, an anomaly repair crew was in the process of installing a full wrap sleeve on mx-20 (at eng station 476+77) as a repair for an internal metal loss ili tool run feature. At approximately 11:10 am, a weld burn through occurred during in-service welding (at ~6 oclock position) while in the process of installing the first butter pass/temper bead on a circumferential weld for the sleeve. A small fire ensued that was immediately extinguished by the two fire-watches on site. No injuries occurred and the line was immediately shut down, isolated and efforts initiated to reduce pressure on the pipeline segment. The pipeline segment was isolated and purged and the affected area of pipe was removed and replaced with new pipe. The pipeline was then returned to service at 8:00 am on monday, october 15, 2018. The primary cause of this incident is related to a thin wall internal corrosion area on the bottom of the pipe at the location of the sleeve circumferential weld that was not identified during the ut testing of the area prior to welding. The pipe wall thickness in this area was too thin to support in-service welding and so the weld penetrated the pipe wall. An epoch 650 dual element probe was used to perform the pipe wall thickness testing prior to welding of the circumferential welds for the sleeve. With this type of ut instrument, and under certain circumstances of pipe wall thickness and corrosion geometry, it is possible to get a false indication of pipe wall thickness that is a multiple of the actual remaining wall thickness. In this case, the ndt technician received a false thickness ut reading which was believed to be adequate for in-service welding. P66 is currently evaluating improvements to ut procedures and processes to reduce the likelihood of getting false thickness indications in similar situations. Based on these evaluations, appropriate changes to ut procedures will be implemented. This report was updated / modified per comments received from PHMSA accident investigation division and is submitted as a final report.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2018-11-08 00:00:00
Iyear
2018
Report Number
20180343
Supplemental Number
31209
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
31684
Name
Phillips 66 Pipeline Llc
Operator Street Address
2331 Citywest Blvd
Operator City Name
Houston
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
77042
Local Datetime
2018-10-11 11:10:00
Location Latitude
32.1014
Location Longitude
-102.70702
Commodity Released Type
Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions
Commodity Subtype
Lpg (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) / Ngl (Natural Gas Liquid)
Unintentional Release Bbls
0.07
Intentional Release Bbls
1200
Recovered Bbls
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Contractor Working For The Operator
Incident Identified Datetime
2018-10-11 11:10:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
On Off Shore
Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Shutdown Datetime
2018-10-11 11:15:00
Restart Datetime
2018-10-15 08:00:00
On Site Datetime
2018-10-11 11:10:00
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2018-10-11 12:06:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1227211
Ignite Ind
Yes
Explode Ind
No
Upstream Valve Type Ind
Manual
Downstream Valve Type Ind
Manual
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Mx-20
Segment Name
Gaines To Goldsmith
Onshore State Abbreviation
Tx
Onshore Postal Code
79714
Onshore City Name
Not Within A Municipality
Onshore County Name
Andrews
Designated Location
Survey Station No.
Designated Name
476+77
Federal
No
Location Type
Pipeline Right-Of-Way
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Exposed Due To Excavation
Depth Of Cover
18
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
Item Involved
Pipe
Pipe Type
Pipe Body
Pipe Diameter
8
Pipe Wall Thickness
0.188
Pipe Smys
45000
Pipe Specification
Api-5l
Pipe Seam Type
Erw - Low Frequency
Pipe Manufacturer
Unknown
Pipe Coating Type
Coal Tar
Weld Subtype
Other
Installation Year
1944
Manufactured Year
Unknown
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Leak
Leak Type
Pinhole
Leak Type Other
Weld Blow Through Pinhole
Rupture Details
Located At The 6 O'clock Position
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
No
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
No
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
No
Commodity Reached Hca
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
84000
Est Cost Prop Damage
65000
Est Cost Emergency
0
Est Cost Environmental
0
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
149000
Accident Psig
650
Mop Psig
1005
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Length Segment Isolated
42240
Internal Inspection Ind
Yes
Operation Complications Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Cpm In Place Ind
Yes
Cpm Operating Ind
Yes
Cpm Functional Ind
Yes
Cpm Detection Ind
No
Cpm Conf Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
Leak caused by weld blow through on the line. Controller actions could not have contributed to the incident
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
Yes
Num Contractors Tested
2
Num Contractors Failed
0
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Cause Details
Other Incorrect Operation
Operation Type
Other Incorrect Operation
Operation Details
Accidental Ignition During Maintenance Welding Operation
Related Other Ind
Yes
Operation Related Details
Inadequate Ut Thickness Testing
Category Type
Routine Maintenance
Operator Qualification Ind
Yes
Qualified Individuals
Yes, They Were Qualified For The Task(S)
Preparer Name
C**** F*****
Preparer Title
Dot Coordinator
Preparer Email
C*************@p**.com
Preparer Telephone
303-862-1189
Prepared Date
2018-11-20 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
T*** F****
Authorizer Telephone
8327651632
Authorizer Title
Director Dot Compliance
Authorizer Email
M***********@p**.com
Narrative
On october 11, 2018, an anomaly repair crew was in the process of installing a full wrap sleeve on mx-20 (at eng station 476+77) as a repair for an internal metal loss ili tool run feature. At approximately 11:10 am, a weld burn through occurred during in-service welding (at ~6 oclock position) while in the process of installing the first butter pass/temper bead on a circumferential weld for the sleeve. A small fire ensued that was immediately extinguished by the two fire-watches on site. No injuries occurred and the line was immediately shut down, isolated and efforts initiated to reduce pressure on the pipeline segment. The pipeline segment was isolated and purged and the affected area of pipe was removed and replaced with new pipe. The pipeline was then returned to service at 8:00 am on monday, october 15, 2018. The primary cause of this incident is related to a thin wall internal corrosion area on the bottom of the pipe at the location of the sleeve circumferential weld that was not identified during the ut testing of the area prior to welding. The pipe wall thickness in this area was too thin to support in-service welding and so the weld penetrated the pipe wall. An epoch 650 dual element probe was used to perform the pipe wall thickness testing prior to welding of the circumferential welds for the sleeve. With this type of ut instrument, and under certain circumstances of pipe wall thickness and corrosion geometry, it is possible to get a false indication of pipe wall thickness that is a multiple of the actual remaining wall thickness. In this case, the ndt technician received a false thickness ut reading which was believed to be adequate for in-service welding. P66 is currently evaluating improvements to ut procedures and processes to reduce the likelihood of getting false thickness indications in similar situations. Based on these evaluations, appropriate changes to ut procedures will be implemented. This report was updated / modified per comments received from PHMSA accident investigation division and is submitted as a final report.
| Report Received Date | 2018-11-08 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2018 |
| Report Number | 20180343 |
| Supplemental Number | 31209 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 31684 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Phillips 66 Pipeline Llc |
| Operator Street Address | 2331 Citywest Blvd |
| Operator City Name | Houston |
| Operator State Abbreviation | TX |
| Operator Postal Code | 77042 |
| Local Datetime | 2018-10-11 11:10:00 |
| Location Latitude | 32.1014 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -102.70702 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions |
| Commodity Subtype | Lpg (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) / Ngl (Natural Gas Liquid) |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 0.07 |
| Intentional Release Bbls | 1200 |
| Recovered Bbls | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Contractor Working For The Operator |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2018-10-11 11:10:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | Yes |
| Shutdown Datetime | 2018-10-11 11:15:00 |
| Restart Datetime | 2018-10-15 08:00:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2018-10-11 11:10:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2018-10-11 12:06:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1227211 NRC Report How to search |
| Ignite Ind | Yes |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Upstream Valve Type Ind | Manual |
| Downstream Valve Type Ind | Manual |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Mx-20 |
| Segment Name | Gaines To Goldsmith |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Tx |
| Onshore Postal Code | 79714 |
| Onshore City Name | Not Within A Municipality |
| Onshore County Name | Andrews |
| Designated Location | Survey Station No. |
| Designated Name | 476+77 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Pipeline Right-Of-Way |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Exposed Due To Excavation |
| Depth Of Cover | 18 |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| Item Involved | Pipe |
| Pipe Type | Pipe Body |
| Pipe Diameter | 8 |
| Pipe Wall Thickness | 0.188 |
| Pipe Smys | 45000 |
| Pipe Specification | Api-5l |
| Pipe Seam Type | Erw - Low Frequency |
| Pipe Manufacturer | Unknown |
| Pipe Coating Type | Coal Tar |
| Weld Subtype | Other |
| Installation Year | 1944 |
| Manufactured Year | Unknown |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Leak |
| Leak Type | Pinhole |
| Leak Type Other | Weld Blow Through Pinhole |
| Rupture Details | Located At The 6 O'clock Position |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | No |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | No |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Commodity Reached Hca | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 84000 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 65000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 0 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 0 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 149000 |
| Accident Psig | 650 |
| Mop Psig | 1005 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Length Segment Isolated | 42240 |
| Internal Inspection Ind | Yes |
| Operation Complications Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Cpm In Place Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Operating Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Functional Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Detection Ind | No |
| Cpm Conf Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | Leak caused by weld blow through on the line. Controller actions could not have contributed to the incident |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | Yes |
| Num Contractors Tested | 2 |
| Num Contractors Failed | 0 |
| Cause | Incorrect Operation |
| Cause Details | Other Incorrect Operation |
| Operation Type | Other Incorrect Operation |
| Operation Details | Accidental Ignition During Maintenance Welding Operation |
| Related Other Ind | Yes |
| Operation Related Details | Inadequate Ut Thickness Testing |
| Category Type | Routine Maintenance |
| Operator Qualification Ind | Yes |
| Qualified Individuals | Yes, They Were Qualified For The Task(S) |
| Preparer Name | C**** F***** |
| Preparer Title | Dot Coordinator |
| Preparer Email | C*************@p**.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 303-862-1189 |
| Prepared Date | 2018-11-20 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | T*** F**** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 8327651632 |
| Authorizer Title | Director Dot Compliance |
| Authorizer Email | M***********@p**.com |
| Narrative | On october 11, 2018, an anomaly repair crew was in the process of installing a full wrap sleeve on mx-20 (at eng station 476+77) as a repair for an internal metal loss ili tool run feature. At approximately 11:10 am, a weld burn through occurred during in-service welding (at ~6 oclock position) while in the process of installing the first butter pass/temper bead on a circumferential weld for the sleeve. A small fire ensued that was immediately extinguished by the two fire-watches on site. No injuries occurred and the line was immediately shut down, isolated and efforts initiated to reduce pressure on the pipeline segment. The pipeline segment was isolated and purged and the affected area of pipe was removed and replaced with new pipe. The pipeline was then returned to service at 8:00 am on monday, october 15, 2018. The primary cause of this incident is related to a thin wall internal corrosion area on the bottom of the pipe at the location of the sleeve circumferential weld that was not identified during the ut testing of the area prior to welding. The pipe wall thickness in this area was too thin to support in-service welding and so the weld penetrated the pipe wall. An epoch 650 dual element probe was used to perform the pipe wall thickness testing prior to welding of the circumferential welds for the sleeve. With this type of ut instrument, and under certain circumstances of pipe wall thickness and corrosion geometry, it is possible to get a false indication of pipe wall thickness that is a multiple of the actual remaining wall thickness. In this case, the ndt technician received a false thickness ut reading which was believed to be adequate for in-service welding. P66 is currently evaluating improvements to ut procedures and processes to reduce the likelihood of getting false thickness indications in similar situations. Based on these evaluations, appropriate changes to ut procedures will be implemented. This report was updated / modified per comments received from PHMSA accident investigation division and is submitted as a final report. |
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