Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2018-07-18 — TX
Operator
Coffeyville Resources Crude Transportation, Llc
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Commodity
Crude Oil
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$1,000
Incident datetime
2018-07-18 10:12
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
On july 18th at approximately 10:12 am, 24 barrels of crude oil was released onto coffeyville resources crude transportation, llc (crct) property after a gasket failed at a 16' pipeline flange. The gasket ruptured while crct operations personnel and the remote operations control (roc), a third party operation company, were conducting point checks on the automated valves at the coffeyville east tank farm (etf) facility. During the start of the point check process the roc received a copy of the facility p&id's which identified valves using a different nomenclature from what most crct operations personnel use at the etf. Roc personnel asked for approval to operate valve v-201f which is known as 22a-1 fill valve by crct operations personnel. This valve is located on a manifold system containing three valves with each valve specific to filling one of three facility crude oil storage tanks. When crct personnel acknowledged approval for the roc to point check valve v-201f, the roc was not aware this was the active valve filling tank 22a-1 and crct personnel did not recognize the request as the 22a-1 fill valve. As the valve began to travel to the closed position, crct operations personnel realized this was the incorrect valve and requested the roc to reverse the valve travel to prevent shutting in the pipeline. The roc could not reverse the travel until it completely cycled to the closed position. This valve closure resulted in a pressure increase at the manifold containing valve v-201f. The increase in pressure resulted in a pump shut down, however the gasket ruptured on the piping manifold releasing crude oil. Crct personnel and the refinery emergency response team were immediately notified to begin clean-up activities. Agency notifications were made within a timely manner with an estimated release volume and updated the following day with a revised spill amount. The initial investigation determined a communication issue between crct operations personnel and the roc using different nomenclature. The pressures experienced locally at the manifold were within tolerances for the gasket. Failure of the gasket was likely due to either a latent material defect or incorrect installation. Crct has conducted a formal root cause failure analysis which can be provided upon request.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2018-08-16 00:00:00
Iyear
2018
Report Number
20180243
Supplemental Number
31024
Report Type
Supplemental
Operator Id
5081
Name
Coffeyville Resources Crude Transportation, Llc
Operator Street Address
2277 Plaza Drive Suite 500
Operator City Name
Sugar Land
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
77479
Local Datetime
2018-07-18 10:12:00
Location Latitude
37.060849
Location Longitude
-95.576661
Commodity Released Type
Crude Oil
Unintentional Release Bbls
24
Recovered Bbls
24
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
Incident Identified Datetime
2018-07-18 10:12:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Terminal/tank Farm Equipment And Piping
On Off Shore
Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Shutdown Datetime
2018-07-18 10:14:00
Restart Datetime
2018-07-18 14:36:00
On Site Datetime
2018-07-18 10:12:00
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2018-07-18 10:50:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1218733
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
East Tank Farm (Etf)
Segment Name
Broome To Etf 16"
Onshore State Abbreviation
Ks
Onshore Postal Code
67337
Onshore City Name
Coffeyville
Onshore County Name
Montgomery
Designated Location
Milepost/valve Station
Designated Name
18.6
Federal
No
Location Type
Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Aboveground
Incident Area Subtype
Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
Item Involved
Flange Assembly
Installation Year
2013
Material Involved
Material Other Than Carbon Steel
Material Details
Gasket
Release Type
Leak
Leak Type
Connection Failure
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
Yes
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
Yes
Soil Remed Ind
Yes
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
Yes
Commodity Reached Hca
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
1704
Est Cost Prop Damage
1000
Est Cost Emergency
5616
Est Cost Environmental
1680
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
10000
Accident Psig
303
Mop Psig
300
Accident Pressure
Pressure Exceeded Mop, But Did Not Exceed 110% Of Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
Yes
Scada Conf Ind
Yes
Cpm In Place Ind
Yes
Cpm Operating Ind
Yes
Cpm Functional Ind
Yes
Cpm Detection Ind
No
Cpm Conf Ind
No
Investigation Status
Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)
Invest Incorrect Action Ind
Yes
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Cause Details
Valve Left Or Placed In Wrong Position, But Not Resulting In A Tank, Vessel, Or Sump/separator Overflow Or Facility Overpressure
Operation Type
Valve Left Or Placed In Wrong Position, But Not Resulting In A Tank, Vessel, Or Sump/separator Overflow Or Facility Overpressure
Related Other Ind
Yes
Operation Related Details
See Narrative Description
Category Type
Commissioning
Operator Qualification Ind
Yes
Qualified Individuals
Yes, They Were Qualified For The Task(S)
Preparer Name
M*** C******
Preparer Title
Sr. Environmental Engineer
Preparer Email
M********@c********.com
Preparer Telephone
918-766-4691
Preparer Fax
918-333-4173
Prepared Date
2018-10-05 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
M*** C******
Authorizer Telephone
918-766-4691
Authorizer Title
Sr. Environmental Engineer
Authorizer Email
M********@c********.com
Narrative
On july 18th at approximately 10:12 am, 24 barrels of crude oil was released onto coffeyville resources crude transportation, llc (crct) property after a gasket failed at a 16' pipeline flange. The gasket ruptured while crct operations personnel and the remote operations control (roc), a third party operation company, were conducting point checks on the automated valves at the coffeyville east tank farm (etf) facility. During the start of the point check process the roc received a copy of the facility p&id's which identified valves using a different nomenclature from what most crct operations personnel use at the etf. Roc personnel asked for approval to operate valve v-201f which is known as 22a-1 fill valve by crct operations personnel. This valve is located on a manifold system containing three valves with each valve specific to filling one of three facility crude oil storage tanks. When crct personnel acknowledged approval for the roc to point check valve v-201f, the roc was not aware this was the active valve filling tank 22a-1 and crct personnel did not recognize the request as the 22a-1 fill valve. As the valve began to travel to the closed position, crct operations personnel realized this was the incorrect valve and requested the roc to reverse the valve travel to prevent shutting in the pipeline. The roc could not reverse the travel until it completely cycled to the closed position. This valve closure resulted in a pressure increase at the manifold containing valve v-201f. The increase in pressure resulted in a pump shut down, however the gasket ruptured on the piping manifold releasing crude oil. Crct personnel and the refinery emergency response team were immediately notified to begin clean-up activities. Agency notifications were made within a timely manner with an estimated release volume and updated the following day with a revised spill amount. The initial investigation determined a communication issue between crct operations personnel and the roc using different nomenclature. The pressures experienced locally at the manifold were within tolerances for the gasket. Failure of the gasket was likely due to either a latent material defect or incorrect installation. Crct has conducted a formal root cause failure analysis which can be provided upon request.
| Report Received Date | 2018-08-16 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2018 |
| Report Number | 20180243 |
| Supplemental Number | 31024 |
| Report Type | Supplemental |
| Operator Id | 5081 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Coffeyville Resources Crude Transportation, Llc |
| Operator Street Address | 2277 Plaza Drive Suite 500 |
| Operator City Name | Sugar Land |
| Operator State Abbreviation | TX |
| Operator Postal Code | 77479 |
| Local Datetime | 2018-07-18 10:12:00 |
| Location Latitude | 37.060849 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -95.576661 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Crude Oil |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 24 |
| Recovered Bbls | 24 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Operator Employee |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2018-07-18 10:12:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Terminal/tank Farm Equipment And Piping |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | Yes |
| Shutdown Datetime | 2018-07-18 10:14:00 |
| Restart Datetime | 2018-07-18 14:36:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2018-07-18 10:12:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2018-07-18 10:50:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1218733 NRC Report How to search |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | East Tank Farm (Etf) |
| Segment Name | Broome To Etf 16" |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Ks |
| Onshore Postal Code | 67337 |
| Onshore City Name | Coffeyville |
| Onshore County Name | Montgomery |
| Designated Location | Milepost/valve Station |
| Designated Name | 18.6 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Aboveground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| Item Involved | Flange Assembly |
| Installation Year | 2013 |
| Material Involved | Material Other Than Carbon Steel |
| Material Details | Gasket |
| Release Type | Leak |
| Leak Type | Connection Failure |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | Yes |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | Yes |
| Soil Remed Ind | Yes |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | Yes |
| Commodity Reached Hca | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 1704 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 1000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 5616 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 1680 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 10000 |
| Accident Psig | 303 |
| Mop Psig | 300 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Exceeded Mop, But Did Not Exceed 110% Of Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | Yes |
| Scada Conf Ind | Yes |
| Cpm In Place Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Operating Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Functional Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Detection Ind | No |
| Cpm Conf Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply) |
| Invest Incorrect Action Ind | Yes |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Incorrect Operation |
| Cause Details | Valve Left Or Placed In Wrong Position, But Not Resulting In A Tank, Vessel, Or Sump/separator Overflow Or Facility Overpressure |
| Operation Type | Valve Left Or Placed In Wrong Position, But Not Resulting In A Tank, Vessel, Or Sump/separator Overflow Or Facility Overpressure |
| Related Other Ind | Yes |
| Operation Related Details | See Narrative Description |
| Category Type | Commissioning |
| Operator Qualification Ind | Yes |
| Qualified Individuals | Yes, They Were Qualified For The Task(S) |
| Preparer Name | M*** C****** |
| Preparer Title | Sr. Environmental Engineer |
| Preparer Email | M********@c********.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 918-766-4691 |
| Preparer Fax | 918-333-4173 |
| Prepared Date | 2018-10-05 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | M*** C****** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 918-766-4691 |
| Authorizer Title | Sr. Environmental Engineer |
| Authorizer Email | M********@c********.com |
| Narrative | On july 18th at approximately 10:12 am, 24 barrels of crude oil was released onto coffeyville resources crude transportation, llc (crct) property after a gasket failed at a 16' pipeline flange. The gasket ruptured while crct operations personnel and the remote operations control (roc), a third party operation company, were conducting point checks on the automated valves at the coffeyville east tank farm (etf) facility. During the start of the point check process the roc received a copy of the facility p&id's which identified valves using a different nomenclature from what most crct operations personnel use at the etf. Roc personnel asked for approval to operate valve v-201f which is known as 22a-1 fill valve by crct operations personnel. This valve is located on a manifold system containing three valves with each valve specific to filling one of three facility crude oil storage tanks. When crct personnel acknowledged approval for the roc to point check valve v-201f, the roc was not aware this was the active valve filling tank 22a-1 and crct personnel did not recognize the request as the 22a-1 fill valve. As the valve began to travel to the closed position, crct operations personnel realized this was the incorrect valve and requested the roc to reverse the valve travel to prevent shutting in the pipeline. The roc could not reverse the travel until it completely cycled to the closed position. This valve closure resulted in a pressure increase at the manifold containing valve v-201f. The increase in pressure resulted in a pump shut down, however the gasket ruptured on the piping manifold releasing crude oil. Crct personnel and the refinery emergency response team were immediately notified to begin clean-up activities. Agency notifications were made within a timely manner with an estimated release volume and updated the following day with a revised spill amount. The initial investigation determined a communication issue between crct operations personnel and the roc using different nomenclature. The pressures experienced locally at the manifold were within tolerances for the gasket. Failure of the gasket was likely due to either a latent material defect or incorrect installation. Crct has conducted a formal root cause failure analysis which can be provided upon request. |
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