Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
GTG incident on 2018-03-23 — NY
Operator
Consolidated Edison Co Of New York
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Commodity
—
Program
GTG
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$0
Incident datetime
2018-03-23 02:27
Report number
Location
NY
Narrative
On march 23, 2018, a main valve inspection was performed that included a full remote closure inspection of remotely operated valve (rov) 62190, located immediately downstream of the transco (pipeline) 134th street city gate station in manhattan. This inspection was performed by con edison gas operations pressure control personnel with assistance from interstate transmission pipeline company personnel, who were also on site. Prior to the inspection, the city gate station was flowing at 13,000 dekatherms per hour at an outlet pressure of 287 psig into con edison's transmission system. At 01:51, all personnel were on site and ready to begin the inspection activities, at which time con edison's gas control group began coordinating the shutdown of the city gate station with the pipeline's gas control group. At 02:05, con edison's gas control group confirmed with pipeline on-site personnel that the city gate station was fully shutdown, which had been accomplished by closure of the station meter runs manual outlet valves. At 02:08, after being notified that the gate station was fully shutdown, con edison pressure control personnel began performing the manual operation portion of the rov inspection, which was completed at 02:09. Con edison pressure control personnel then began performing the remote operation portion of the rov inspection. At 02:10, the station outlet pressure fell below 250 psig. At 02:17, the remote operation portion of the inspection was completed, thereby concluding all tasks associated with the planned rov inspection. At 02:21, an on-site pipeline technician requested that con edison gas control close rov 62190 due to activation of the station's under-pressure protection, equipment designed to maintain a minimum pressure in the downstream piping, which had engaged when the station outlet pressure fell below 250 psig. The pipeline technician's plan was to incrementally open the meter run #1 isolation valve to raise the downstream pressure above 250 psig, which would cause the under-pressure protection to disengage and the regulator runs to close automatically. Con edison gas control would then be notified to re-open rov 62190. At 02:22, con edison gas control closed rov 62190. At 02:23, con edison gas control notified the pipeline technician that the rov was closing. The pipeline technician responded indicating that, once the rov was closed, he would proceed to open the manual isolation valve a small amount to increase the downstream pressure. At 02:26, con edison gas control received a "high-high" pressure alarm at the gate station, and at 02:27, the pipeline technician notified con edison gas control that rov 62190 could be re-opened. At 02:28, con edison gas control began slowly opening rov 62190 in 10% increments, which cleared the "high-high" pressure alarm at 02:29. Con edison gas control determined post incident that the maximum allowable operating pressure (maop) of the con edison owned segment of transmission pipeline immediately upstream of the rov had been exceeded for approximately 2 minutes, during which the pressure peaked at 478 psig at 02:28. Internal notifications were made at 03:22, and con edison notified the new york public service commission and the national response center at 03:52. To prevent future re-occurrence of a similar event, internal company operating specifications are being revised to require gas engineering oversight in the form of written work procedures for rov's located on the outlet of city gates as well as the elimination of full operation testing to better align with regulatory requirements.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2018-04-20 00:00:00
Iyear
2018
Report Number
20180044
Supplemental Number
31459
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
2704
Name
Consolidated Edison Co Of New York
Operator Street Address
4 Irving Place
Operator City Name
New York
Operator State Abbreviation
NY
Operator Postal Code
10003
Local Datetime
2018-03-23 02:27:00
Location Latitude
40.822217
Location Longitude
-73.958953
Nrc Rpt Num
1207487
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2018-03-23 03:52:00
Unintentional Release
0
Intentional Release
0
Accompanying Liquid
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
No
Shutdown Explain
Shutdown Not Req., Pressure Reduced To Normal Using Existing Transmission Sysem.
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Incident Identified Datetime
2018-03-23 02:27:00
On Site Datetime
2018-03-23 02:27:00
On Off Shore
Onshore
Onshore State Abbreviation
Ny
Onshore Postal Code
10031
Onshore City Name
New York City
Onshore County Name
New York
Designated Location
Milepost
Designated Name
Rov 62190
Pipe Fac Name
Con Edison
Segment Name
M1 - Upstream Of Rov 62190
Federal
No
Location Type
Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Transition Area
Incident Area Subtype
Soil/air Interface
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Intrastate
System Part Involved
Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
Item Involved
Pipe
Pipe Type
Pipe Body
Pipe Diameter
30
Pipe Wall Thickness
0.5
Pipe Smys
52000
Pipe Specification
Api 5l / Grade X52/x60
Pipe Seam Type
Other
Pipe Seam Details
30" Segment Saw, 26" Segment Dsaw
Pipe Manufacturer
Mittal/arcelor Mittal
Pipe Coating Type
Other
Pipe Coating Details
Pritech And Raven 405 Epoxy
Installation Year
2013
Manufactured Year
2013
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Other
Release Type Details
Pressure Exceeded Segment Maop
Class Location Type
Class 4 Location
Could Be Hca
Yes
Determination Method
Method1
Pir Radius
387
Heat Damage Ind
No
Non Heat Damage Ind
No
Hca Fatalities Ind
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Unintentional Release
0
Est Cost Intentional Release
0
Est Cost Prop Damage
0
Est Cost Emergency
0
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
0
Accident Psig
478
Mop Psig
350
Mop Cfr Section
192.619(A)(1)
Accident Pressure
Pressure Exceeded The Applicable Allowance In 192.201
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Upstream Valve Type Ind
Automatic
Downstream Valve Type Ind
Remotely Controlled
Length Segment Isolated
87
Internal Inspection Ind
No
Diameter Change Ind
Yes
Unsuitable Mainline Ind
Yes
Tight Mitered Ind
Yes
Operation Complications Ind
Yes
Other Complications Ind
Yes
Inspect Comp Details
No Launchers Available
Pipeline Function
Transmission System
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
Yes
Scada Conf Ind
Yes
Accident Identifier
Scada-Based Information (Such As Alarm(S), Alert(S), Event(S), And/or Volume Or Pack Calculations)
Investigation Status
Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)
Invest Schedule Ind
Yes
Invest No Control Room Ind
Yes
Invest No Controller Ind
Yes
Invest Incorrect Procedure Ind
Yes
Invest Maint Ind
Yes
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Cause Details
Pipeline Or Equipment Overpressured
Operation Type
Pipeline Or Equipment Overpressured
Related Inadequate Proc Ind
Yes
Related No Proc Ind
Yes
Category Type
Non-Routine Operating Conditions (Abnormal Operations Or Emergencies)
Operator Qualification Ind
Yes
Qualified Individuals
Yes, They Were Qualified For The Task(S)
Preparer Name
V***** D******
Preparer Title
Department Manager
Preparer Email
D*******@c****.com
Preparer Telephone
718 7942873
Authorizer Name
A****** L***
Authorizer Title
Chief Engineer
Authorizer Telephone
718 8391759
Authorizer Email
L****@c****.com
Narrative
On march 23, 2018, a main valve inspection was performed that included a full remote closure inspection of remotely operated valve (rov) 62190, located immediately downstream of the transco (pipeline) 134th street city gate station in manhattan. This inspection was performed by con edison gas operations pressure control personnel with assistance from interstate transmission pipeline company personnel, who were also on site. Prior to the inspection, the city gate station was flowing at 13,000 dekatherms per hour at an outlet pressure of 287 psig into con edison's transmission system. At 01:51, all personnel were on site and ready to begin the inspection activities, at which time con edison's gas control group began coordinating the shutdown of the city gate station with the pipeline's gas control group. At 02:05, con edison's gas control group confirmed with pipeline on-site personnel that the city gate station was fully shutdown, which had been accomplished by closure of the station meter runs manual outlet valves. At 02:08, after being notified that the gate station was fully shutdown, con edison pressure control personnel began performing the manual operation portion of the rov inspection, which was completed at 02:09. Con edison pressure control personnel then began performing the remote operation portion of the rov inspection. At 02:10, the station outlet pressure fell below 250 psig. At 02:17, the remote operation portion of the inspection was completed, thereby concluding all tasks associated with the planned rov inspection. At 02:21, an on-site pipeline technician requested that con edison gas control close rov 62190 due to activation of the station's under-pressure protection, equipment designed to maintain a minimum pressure in the downstream piping, which had engaged when the station outlet pressure fell below 250 psig. The pipeline technician's plan was to incrementally open the meter run #1 isolation valve to raise the downstream pressure above 250 psig, which would cause the under-pressure protection to disengage and the regulator runs to close automatically. Con edison gas control would then be notified to re-open rov 62190. At 02:22, con edison gas control closed rov 62190. At 02:23, con edison gas control notified the pipeline technician that the rov was closing. The pipeline technician responded indicating that, once the rov was closed, he would proceed to open the manual isolation valve a small amount to increase the downstream pressure. At 02:26, con edison gas control received a "high-high" pressure alarm at the gate station, and at 02:27, the pipeline technician notified con edison gas control that rov 62190 could be re-opened. At 02:28, con edison gas control began slowly opening rov 62190 in 10% increments, which cleared the "high-high" pressure alarm at 02:29. Con edison gas control determined post incident that the maximum allowable operating pressure (maop) of the con edison owned segment of transmission pipeline immediately upstream of the rov had been exceeded for approximately 2 minutes, during which the pressure peaked at 478 psig at 02:28. Internal notifications were made at 03:22, and con edison notified the new york public service commission and the national response center at 03:52. To prevent future re-occurrence of a similar event, internal company operating specifications are being revised to require gas engineering oversight in the form of written work procedures for rov's located on the outlet of city gates as well as the elimination of full operation testing to better align with regulatory requirements.
| Report Received Date | 2018-04-20 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2018 |
| Report Number | 20180044 |
| Supplemental Number | 31459 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 2704 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Consolidated Edison Co Of New York |
| Operator Street Address | 4 Irving Place |
| Operator City Name | New York |
| Operator State Abbreviation | NY |
| Operator Postal Code | 10003 |
| Local Datetime | 2018-03-23 02:27:00 |
| Location Latitude | 40.822217 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -73.958953 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1207487 NRC Report How to search |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2018-03-23 03:52:00 |
| Unintentional Release | 0 |
| Intentional Release | 0 |
| Accompanying Liquid | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | No |
| Shutdown Explain | Shutdown Not Req., Pressure Reduced To Normal Using Existing Transmission Sysem. |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2018-03-23 02:27:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2018-03-23 02:27:00 |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Ny |
| Onshore Postal Code | 10031 |
| Onshore City Name | New York City |
| Onshore County Name | New York |
| Designated Location | Milepost |
| Designated Name | Rov 62190 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Con Edison |
| Segment Name | M1 - Upstream Of Rov 62190 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Transition Area |
| Incident Area Subtype | Soil/air Interface |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Intrastate |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites |
| Item Involved | Pipe |
| Pipe Type | Pipe Body |
| Pipe Diameter | 30 |
| Pipe Wall Thickness | 0.5 |
| Pipe Smys | 52000 |
| Pipe Specification | Api 5l / Grade X52/x60 |
| Pipe Seam Type | Other |
| Pipe Seam Details | 30" Segment Saw, 26" Segment Dsaw |
| Pipe Manufacturer | Mittal/arcelor Mittal |
| Pipe Coating Type | Other |
| Pipe Coating Details | Pritech And Raven 405 Epoxy |
| Installation Year | 2013 |
| Manufactured Year | 2013 |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Other |
| Release Type Details | Pressure Exceeded Segment Maop |
| Class Location Type | Class 4 Location |
| Could Be Hca | Yes |
| Determination Method | Method1 |
| Pir Radius | 387 |
| Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Non Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Hca Fatalities Ind | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Unintentional Release | 0 |
| Est Cost Intentional Release | 0 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 0 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 0 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 0 |
| Accident Psig | 478 |
| Mop Psig | 350 |
| Mop Cfr Section | 192.619(A)(1) View CFR 49 §192 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Exceeded The Applicable Allowance In 192.201 |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Upstream Valve Type Ind | Automatic |
| Downstream Valve Type Ind | Remotely Controlled |
| Length Segment Isolated | 87 |
| Internal Inspection Ind | No |
| Diameter Change Ind | Yes |
| Unsuitable Mainline Ind | Yes |
| Tight Mitered Ind | Yes |
| Operation Complications Ind | Yes |
| Other Complications Ind | Yes |
| Inspect Comp Details | No Launchers Available |
| Pipeline Function | Transmission System |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | Yes |
| Scada Conf Ind | Yes |
| Accident Identifier | Scada-Based Information (Such As Alarm(S), Alert(S), Event(S), And/or Volume Or Pack Calculations) |
| Investigation Status | Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply) |
| Invest Schedule Ind | Yes |
| Invest No Control Room Ind | Yes |
| Invest No Controller Ind | Yes |
| Invest Incorrect Procedure Ind | Yes |
| Invest Maint Ind | Yes |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Incorrect Operation |
| Cause Details | Pipeline Or Equipment Overpressured |
| Operation Type | Pipeline Or Equipment Overpressured |
| Related Inadequate Proc Ind | Yes |
| Related No Proc Ind | Yes |
| Category Type | Non-Routine Operating Conditions (Abnormal Operations Or Emergencies) |
| Operator Qualification Ind | Yes |
| Qualified Individuals | Yes, They Were Qualified For The Task(S) |
| Preparer Name | V***** D****** |
| Preparer Title | Department Manager |
| Preparer Email | D*******@c****.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 718 7942873 |
| Authorizer Name | A****** L*** |
| Authorizer Title | Chief Engineer |
| Authorizer Telephone | 718 8391759 |
| Authorizer Email | L****@c****.com |
| Narrative | On march 23, 2018, a main valve inspection was performed that included a full remote closure inspection of remotely operated valve (rov) 62190, located immediately downstream of the transco (pipeline) 134th street city gate station in manhattan. This inspection was performed by con edison gas operations pressure control personnel with assistance from interstate transmission pipeline company personnel, who were also on site. Prior to the inspection, the city gate station was flowing at 13,000 dekatherms per hour at an outlet pressure of 287 psig into con edison's transmission system. At 01:51, all personnel were on site and ready to begin the inspection activities, at which time con edison's gas control group began coordinating the shutdown of the city gate station with the pipeline's gas control group. At 02:05, con edison's gas control group confirmed with pipeline on-site personnel that the city gate station was fully shutdown, which had been accomplished by closure of the station meter runs manual outlet valves. At 02:08, after being notified that the gate station was fully shutdown, con edison pressure control personnel began performing the manual operation portion of the rov inspection, which was completed at 02:09. Con edison pressure control personnel then began performing the remote operation portion of the rov inspection. At 02:10, the station outlet pressure fell below 250 psig. At 02:17, the remote operation portion of the inspection was completed, thereby concluding all tasks associated with the planned rov inspection. At 02:21, an on-site pipeline technician requested that con edison gas control close rov 62190 due to activation of the station's under-pressure protection, equipment designed to maintain a minimum pressure in the downstream piping, which had engaged when the station outlet pressure fell below 250 psig. The pipeline technician's plan was to incrementally open the meter run #1 isolation valve to raise the downstream pressure above 250 psig, which would cause the under-pressure protection to disengage and the regulator runs to close automatically. Con edison gas control would then be notified to re-open rov 62190. At 02:22, con edison gas control closed rov 62190. At 02:23, con edison gas control notified the pipeline technician that the rov was closing. The pipeline technician responded indicating that, once the rov was closed, he would proceed to open the manual isolation valve a small amount to increase the downstream pressure. At 02:26, con edison gas control received a "high-high" pressure alarm at the gate station, and at 02:27, the pipeline technician notified con edison gas control that rov 62190 could be re-opened. At 02:28, con edison gas control began slowly opening rov 62190 in 10% increments, which cleared the "high-high" pressure alarm at 02:29. Con edison gas control determined post incident that the maximum allowable operating pressure (maop) of the con edison owned segment of transmission pipeline immediately upstream of the rov had been exceeded for approximately 2 minutes, during which the pressure peaked at 478 psig at 02:28. Internal notifications were made at 03:22, and con edison notified the new york public service commission and the national response center at 03:52. To prevent future re-occurrence of a similar event, internal company operating specifications are being revised to require gas engineering oversight in the form of written work procedures for rov's located on the outlet of city gates as well as the elimination of full operation testing to better align with regulatory requirements. |
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