Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2017-09-28 — TX
Operator
Ascend Performance Materials Texas Inc
Cause
Corrosion Failure
Commodity
Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$4,600,000
Incident datetime
2017-09-28 06:17
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
Continuation: ascend engaged a pipeline integrity management services company with expertise in direct assessments, cathodic protection, corrosion engineering, and metallurgical analysis to help investigate the root cause of the subsurface pipeline leak. Ascend also utilized a leading materials testing laboratory to perform metallographic and fractographic examinations and chemical analyses of the pipeline segment. The segment was inspected in the field, excised for off-site examination at the materials testing laboratory, and thoroughly analyzed at the lab. Additional post-incident field work, including a close-interval survey, was also conducted in support of the root cause analysis. Based on the various field and laboratory analyses, the root cause of the subsurface pipeline leak was determined to be accelerated, localized, stray direct current-induced corrosion caused by cathodic protection (cp) system interference (cp interference) on the pipeline. The pipeline has a cp system designed to protect the pipeline from corrosion; however, a nearby, private third-party (non-DOT / rrc jurisdiction) installation was found to have been constructed in the area and that included a cp system for its own protection. A missing / broken connection was found on the third-party cp system. The connection failure resulted in excess cathodic potential for the connected portion of the third-party installation, and the excess cp interfered with the pipeline cp system.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2017-10-27 00:00:00
Iyear
2017
Report Number
20170351
Supplemental Number
30216
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
31517
Name
Ascend Performance Materials Texas Inc
Operator Street Address
1010 Travis Street Suite 900
Operator City Name
Houston
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
77002
Local Datetime
2017-09-28 06:17:00
Location Latitude
29.06948
Location Longitude
-95.33939
Commodity Released Type
Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions
Commodity Subtype
Anhydrous Ammonia
Unintentional Release Bbls
1369.7
Intentional Release Bbls
54.36
Recovered Bbls
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Other
Accident Details
Notified By Ineos (Landowner)
Incident Identified Datetime
2017-09-28 06:17:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
On Off Shore
Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Shutdown Datetime
2017-09-28 08:25:00
Restart Datetime
2017-10-21 00:26:00
On Site Datetime
2017-09-28 07:03:00
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2017-09-28 09:24:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1191738
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Upstream Valve Type Ind
Remotely Controlled
Downstream Valve Type Ind
Manual
Num Pub Evacuated
7
Pipe Fac Name
Ascend Ammonia (Oyster Creek) Pipeline
Segment Name
Vs13 To Vs14
Onshore State Abbreviation
Tx
Onshore Postal Code
77541
Onshore City Name
Not Within A Municipality
Onshore County Name
Brazoria
Designated Location
Survey Station No.
Designated Name
269220
Federal
No
Location Type
Pipeline Right-Of-Way
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Under Soil
Depth Of Cover
88
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Intrastate
Item Involved
Pipe
Pipe Type
Pipe Body
Pipe Diameter
10
Pipe Wall Thickness
0.25
Pipe Smys
42000
Pipe Specification
Api-5l X42
Pipe Seam Type
Erw - High Frequency
Pipe Manufacturer
Us Steel
Pipe Coating Type
Coal Tar
Installation Year
1976
Manufactured Year
1974
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Leak
Leak Type
Pinhole
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
Yes
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
Yes
Soil Remed Ind
Yes
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
Yes
Commodity Reached Hca
Yes
Other Pop Ind
Yes
Other Pop Yes No
Yes
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
120000
Est Cost Prop Damage
4600000
Est Cost Emergency
6500000
Est Cost Environmental
4080000
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
15300000
Accident Psig
240
Mop Psig
390
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Length Segment Isolated
15326
Internal Inspection Ind
No
Other Restrictions Ind
Yes
Other Inspection Ind
Yes
Internal Inspection Details
Two Historical Ili Attempts, By The Previous Owner, Failed For Unknown Reasons. Approx. 800-Ft. Of Pipeline Was Inspected In Late-2017 From Vs13 To Vs13a In Conjunction With The Ongoing Leak Investigation, By Use Of A Tethered Mfl-Type Ili Tool, Prior To Returning The Segment To Normal Service.
Operation Complications Ind
Yes
Low Flow Ind
Yes
Pipeline Function
< 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Cpm In Place Ind
Yes
Cpm Operating Ind
Yes
Cpm Functional Ind
Yes
Cpm Detection Ind
No
Cpm Conf Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
Leak was very small pinhole, and was judged non-detectable via the cpm system measurements.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Corrosion Failure
Cause Details
External Corrosion
Internal External
External Corrosion
Visual Exam Results
Localized Pitting
Stray Current Corrosion Ind
Yes
Field Exam Basis Ind
Yes
Other Basis Ind
Yes
Corrosion Basis Details
Ascends Review Of Failure Lab Photos
Underground Location
Yes
Under Cathodic Protection Ind
Yes
Cathodic Pro Start Year
1976
Shielding Evident
No
Cathodic Survey Type
Yes
Cp Annual Survey Ind
Yes
Close Interval Survey Ind
Yes
Other Cp Survey Ind
Yes
Cp Annual Survey Year
2016
Close Interval Survey Year
2015
Other Cp Survey Year
2015
Prior Damage
No
Collected Data Ind
Yes
Axial Magnetic Flx Lkg Ind
Yes
Axial Recent Year
2017
Has Hydrtst Conduc Before Ind
Yes
Hydrtst Most Rcnt Year
2004
Hydrtst Most Rcnt Pressure
500
Direct Asmnt Conducted
Yes, But The Point Of The Accident Was Not Identified As A Dig Site
Direct Asmnt Pnt Not Idntf Yr
2015
Non Destructive Exam Ind
No
Preparer Name
M*** H*****
Preparer Title
Materials And Corrosion Engineer
Preparer Email
M******@a**************.com
Preparer Telephone
281-228-4595
Prepared Date
2018-04-19 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
J***** M*****
Authorizer Telephone
281-228-4464
Authorizer Title
Operations Manager Distribution Manager
Authorizer Email
J*****@a**************.com
Narrative
Continuation: ascend engaged a pipeline integrity management services company with expertise in direct assessments, cathodic protection, corrosion engineering, and metallurgical analysis to help investigate the root cause of the subsurface pipeline leak. Ascend also utilized a leading materials testing laboratory to perform metallographic and fractographic examinations and chemical analyses of the pipeline segment. The segment was inspected in the field, excised for off-site examination at the materials testing laboratory, and thoroughly analyzed at the lab. Additional post-incident field work, including a close-interval survey, was also conducted in support of the root cause analysis. Based on the various field and laboratory analyses, the root cause of the subsurface pipeline leak was determined to be accelerated, localized, stray direct current-induced corrosion caused by cathodic protection (cp) system interference (cp interference) on the pipeline. The pipeline has a cp system designed to protect the pipeline from corrosion; however, a nearby, private third-party (non-DOT / rrc jurisdiction) installation was found to have been constructed in the area and that included a cp system for its own protection. A missing / broken connection was found on the third-party cp system. The connection failure resulted in excess cathodic potential for the connected portion of the third-party installation, and the excess cp interfered with the pipeline cp system.
| Report Received Date | 2017-10-27 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2017 |
| Report Number | 20170351 |
| Supplemental Number | 30216 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 31517 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Ascend Performance Materials Texas Inc |
| Operator Street Address | 1010 Travis Street Suite 900 |
| Operator City Name | Houston |
| Operator State Abbreviation | TX |
| Operator Postal Code | 77002 |
| Local Datetime | 2017-09-28 06:17:00 |
| Location Latitude | 29.06948 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -95.33939 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions |
| Commodity Subtype | Anhydrous Ammonia |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 1369.7 |
| Intentional Release Bbls | 54.36 |
| Recovered Bbls | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Other |
| Accident Details | Notified By Ineos (Landowner) |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2017-09-28 06:17:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | Yes |
| Shutdown Datetime | 2017-09-28 08:25:00 |
| Restart Datetime | 2017-10-21 00:26:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2017-09-28 07:03:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2017-09-28 09:24:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1191738 NRC Report How to search |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Upstream Valve Type Ind | Remotely Controlled |
| Downstream Valve Type Ind | Manual |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 7 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Ascend Ammonia (Oyster Creek) Pipeline |
| Segment Name | Vs13 To Vs14 |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Tx |
| Onshore Postal Code | 77541 |
| Onshore City Name | Not Within A Municipality |
| Onshore County Name | Brazoria |
| Designated Location | Survey Station No. |
| Designated Name | 269220 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Pipeline Right-Of-Way |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Under Soil |
| Depth Of Cover | 88 |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Intrastate |
| Item Involved | Pipe |
| Pipe Type | Pipe Body |
| Pipe Diameter | 10 |
| Pipe Wall Thickness | 0.25 |
| Pipe Smys | 42000 |
| Pipe Specification | Api-5l X42 |
| Pipe Seam Type | Erw - High Frequency |
| Pipe Manufacturer | Us Steel |
| Pipe Coating Type | Coal Tar |
| Installation Year | 1976 |
| Manufactured Year | 1974 |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Leak |
| Leak Type | Pinhole |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | Yes |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | Yes |
| Soil Remed Ind | Yes |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | Yes |
| Commodity Reached Hca | Yes |
| Other Pop Ind | Yes |
| Other Pop Yes No | Yes |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 120000 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 4600000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 6500000 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 4080000 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 15300000 |
| Accident Psig | 240 |
| Mop Psig | 390 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Length Segment Isolated | 15326 |
| Internal Inspection Ind | No |
| Other Restrictions Ind | Yes |
| Other Inspection Ind | Yes |
| Internal Inspection Details | Two Historical Ili Attempts, By The Previous Owner, Failed For Unknown Reasons. Approx. 800-Ft. Of Pipeline Was Inspected In Late-2017 From Vs13 To Vs13a In Conjunction With The Ongoing Leak Investigation, By Use Of A Tethered Mfl-Type Ili Tool, Prior To Returning The Segment To Normal Service. |
| Operation Complications Ind | Yes |
| Low Flow Ind | Yes |
| Pipeline Function | < 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Cpm In Place Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Operating Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Functional Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Detection Ind | No |
| Cpm Conf Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | Leak was very small pinhole, and was judged non-detectable via the cpm system measurements. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Corrosion Failure |
| Cause Details | External Corrosion |
| Internal External | External Corrosion |
| Visual Exam Results | Localized Pitting |
| Stray Current Corrosion Ind | Yes |
| Field Exam Basis Ind | Yes |
| Other Basis Ind | Yes |
| Corrosion Basis Details | Ascends Review Of Failure Lab Photos |
| Underground Location | Yes |
| Under Cathodic Protection Ind | Yes |
| Cathodic Pro Start Year | 1976 |
| Shielding Evident | No |
| Cathodic Survey Type | Yes |
| Cp Annual Survey Ind | Yes |
| Close Interval Survey Ind | Yes |
| Other Cp Survey Ind | Yes |
| Cp Annual Survey Year | 2016 |
| Close Interval Survey Year | 2015 |
| Other Cp Survey Year | 2015 |
| Prior Damage | No |
| Collected Data Ind | Yes |
| Axial Magnetic Flx Lkg Ind | Yes |
| Axial Recent Year | 2017 |
| Has Hydrtst Conduc Before Ind | Yes |
| Hydrtst Most Rcnt Year | 2004 |
| Hydrtst Most Rcnt Pressure | 500 |
| Direct Asmnt Conducted | Yes, But The Point Of The Accident Was Not Identified As A Dig Site |
| Direct Asmnt Pnt Not Idntf Yr | 2015 |
| Non Destructive Exam Ind | No |
| Preparer Name | M*** H***** |
| Preparer Title | Materials And Corrosion Engineer |
| Preparer Email | M******@a**************.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 281-228-4595 |
| Prepared Date | 2018-04-19 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | J***** M***** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 281-228-4464 |
| Authorizer Title | Operations Manager Distribution Manager |
| Authorizer Email | J*****@a**************.com |
| Narrative | Continuation: ascend engaged a pipeline integrity management services company with expertise in direct assessments, cathodic protection, corrosion engineering, and metallurgical analysis to help investigate the root cause of the subsurface pipeline leak. Ascend also utilized a leading materials testing laboratory to perform metallographic and fractographic examinations and chemical analyses of the pipeline segment. The segment was inspected in the field, excised for off-site examination at the materials testing laboratory, and thoroughly analyzed at the lab. Additional post-incident field work, including a close-interval survey, was also conducted in support of the root cause analysis. Based on the various field and laboratory analyses, the root cause of the subsurface pipeline leak was determined to be accelerated, localized, stray direct current-induced corrosion caused by cathodic protection (cp) system interference (cp interference) on the pipeline. The pipeline has a cp system designed to protect the pipeline from corrosion; however, a nearby, private third-party (non-DOT / rrc jurisdiction) installation was found to have been constructed in the area and that included a cp system for its own protection. A missing / broken connection was found on the third-party cp system. The connection failure resulted in excess cathodic potential for the connected portion of the third-party installation, and the excess cp interfered with the pipeline cp system. |
External Resources
PHMSA pipeline safety insights.
Product
Features
Company
All rights reserved. Copyright © by ClearPHMSA