Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
GD incident on 2016-09-27 — NY
Operator
Consolidated Edison Co Of New York
Cause
Other Incident Cause
Commodity
Natural Gas
Program
GD
Damage and Injuries
1 fatality
1 injury
Property damage (nominal)
$651
Incident datetime
2016-09-27 07:32
Report number
Location
NY, BRONX
Narrative
On september 27, 2016, at 06:36, con edison's gas emergency response center (gerc) received a report from its customer operations call center that a member of the public had called in a strong outside gas odor on tibbett avenue between west 234th and west 236th streets in the bronx. At 06:37, a dispatcher with the fire department of the city of new york (fdny) called con edison's gerc and reported that the fdny was on location for an outside gas odor in the area of a private house located at 300 west 234th street. Con edison's gerc dispatched a leak survey mechanic to the location at 06:39. At 06:45, the fdny reported evacuating the private house at 300 west 234th street because of the gas odor. A multiple resource response event (code murre) was then initiated by con edison and additional personnel - a supervisor and mechanic from con edison's gas distribution services (gds) department - were dispatched to the location by the gerc. The gerc then called the fdny to provide information concerning the location of the curb valve, at which time the fdny reported that it had already closed the curb valve on the gas service line supplying 300 west 234th street. A field operations planner with con edison's gas emergency response group (erg) was dispatched at 07:05. At 07:08, the fdny reported that it had requested assistance from the new york city police department (nypd) because of a possible drug lab at the location. Con edison's leak survey mechanic arrived at 07:14. He entered the basement of 304 west 234th street and, using a gas measurement instrument, detected no gas-in-air in the area of the gas service point of entry. The leak survey mechanic then entered the basement of 300 west 234th street and, using a gas measurement instrument, detected no gas-in-air in the area of the gas service point of entry. The gds mechanic and gds supervisor arrived at 07:26 and 07:28, respectively. Together with the leak survey mechanic, they entered the basement of 300 west 234th street to investigate and verify shutdown of the gas service. When the con edison erg field operations planner arrived at 07:31, he joined the other con edison responders in the basement of the building. Moments later, at 07:32, the gds supervisor and erg field operations planner reported that an explosion occurred on the second floor of the building and that all con edison employees were accounted for. Two of the four con edison employees in the basement at the time of the explosion sustained minor injuries. All four con edison employees were transported to montefiore medical center for evaluation. The area is supplied by a 4-inch high-pressure polyethylene (hppe) gas main, with a 1-inch hppe branch service supplying 300 and 304 west 234th street. Four main valves were closed to isolate gas supply to the area, which interrupted gas service to nine residential customers. A recent leak survey of the area, conducted a week prior to this incident on september 20, 2016, found no leaks. Odorant levels and distribution system pressure supplying the area were checked after the incident and found to be within acceptable ranges. Multiple media outlets were on location. A fdny battalion chief was struck and killed by debris propelled by the explosion. Other injuries were reported. The nypd isolated the area as a crime scene. Multiple municipal agencies were on location. Nysdps, nycdep, and usdot were notified. Nysdps suresh thomas was notified and responded to location. The fire marshal investigation concluded that the explosion was caused by an accidental ignition of natural gas trapped in the second-floor bedrooms. Investigators found that the tenants in control of the house had sealed second-floor bedroom windows with foam boards to conceal a marijuana grow operation. Although the gas leak was isolated with service turned off, the foam boards on the second floor prevented emergency responders from venting accumulated gas, which subsequently exploded.
Detailed record list
Occurred At
2016-09-27 07:32:00
Year
2016
Report Received Date
2016-10-25 00:00:00
Iyear
2016.0
Report Number
20160107.0
Supplemental Number
39288.0
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
2704
Name
Consolidated Edison Co Of New York
Operator Street Address
4 Irving Place
Operator City Name
New York
Operator State Abbreviation
NY
Operator Postal Code
10003
Local Datetime
2016-09-27 07:32:00
Time Zone
Eastern
Daylight Savings Ind
Yes
Location Street Address
300 West 234 Street
Location City Name
New York
Location County Name
Bronx
Location State Abbreviation
NY
Location Postal Code
10463-3703
Location Latitude
40.883197
Location Longitude
-73.905976
Flow Cont Main Valve Ind
Yes
Flow Cont Service Valve Ind
Yes
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2016-09-27 07:46:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1160072
Commodity Released Type
Natural Gas
Unintentional Release
1.0
Intentional Release
0.0
Fatality Ind
Yes
Num Emp Fatalities
0
Num Contr Fatalities
0
Num Er Fatalities
1
Num Worker Fatalities
0
Num Gp Fatalities
0
Fatal
1
Injury Ind
Yes
Num Emp Injuries
0
Num Contr Injuries
0
Num Er Injuries
1
Num Worker Injuries
0
Num Gp Injuries
0
Injure
1
Ignite Ind
Yes
Ignite Datetime
2016-09-27 07:32:00
How Extinguished
Local/state/federal Emergency Responder
Gas Consumed By Fire In Mcf
1
Explode Ind
Yes
Num Pub Evacuated
30.0
Incident Identified Datetime
2016-09-27 07:32:00
Communication State Fed Ind
Yes
Party Initiated Communication
Operator
Initial Responder Com Datetime
2016-09-27 07:46:00
On Site Datetime
2016-09-27 07:14:00
Confirmed Discovery Datetime
2016-09-27 07:32:00
Federal
No
Location Type
Private Property
Incident Area Type
Aboveground
Incident Area Subtype
Inside A Building
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Privately Owned
System Part Involved
Other
System Part Details
Investigated By Nypd/other Law Enforcement Agencies
Material Involved
Unknown
Release Type
Other
Release Type Details
Investigated By Nypd And Other Law Enforcement Agencies
Class Location Type
Class 4 Location
Est Cost Oper Paid
1000000.0
Est Cost Prop Damage
651.0
Est Cost Emergency
14868.0
Est Cost Other
0.0
Gas Cost In Mcf
4.0
Est Cost Unintentional Release
4.0
Est Cost Intentional Release
0.0
Prpty
1015523.0
Commercial Affected
0.0
Industrial Affected
0.0
Residences Affected
9.0
Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght
4.0
Num Injured Treated By Emt
31.0
Num Resident Building Affctd
9.0
Num Business Building Affctd
0.0
Accident Psig
58.0
Normal Psig
58.0
Mop Psig
91.0
Mop Cfr Section
192.619(A)(1)
Maop Established Date
2015-03-26 00:00:00
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop
Gas Odorized System Type
Odorized By Others
Gas Odorized Level
5
Scada In Place Ind
No
Accident Identifier
Notification From Public
Investigation Status
No, the facility was not monitored by a controller(s) at the time of the incident
Employee Drug Test Ind
Yes
Num Employees Tested
7
Num Employees Failed
0
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Other Incident Cause
Cause Details
Miscellaneous
Other Type
Miscellaneous
Misc Details
The Fire Marshal Investigation Concluded That The Explosion Was Caused By An Accidental Ignition Of Natural Gas Trapped In The Second-Floor Bedrooms. Investigators Found That The Tenants In Control Of The House Had Sealed Second-Floor Bedroom Windows With Foam Boards To Conceal A Marijuana Grow Operation. Although The Gas Leak Was Isolated With Service Turned Off, The Foam Boards On The Second Floor Prevented Emergency Responders From Venting Accumulated Gas, Which Subsequently Exploded.
Preparer Name
K**** F****
Preparer Title
Operations Manager - Gas Emergency Response Center
Preparer Email
F*****@c****.com
Preparer Telephone
(718) 319-2310
Preparer Fax
(718) 904-4607
Authorizer Name
N******* H*****
Authorizer Title
Department Manager - Gas Emergency Response Center
Authorizer Telephone
(718) 319-2310
Authorizer Email
H******@c****.com
Narrative
On september 27, 2016, at 06:36, con edison's gas emergency response center (gerc) received a report from its customer operations call center that a member of the public had called in a strong outside gas odor on tibbett avenue between west 234th and west 236th streets in the bronx. At 06:37, a dispatcher with the fire department of the city of new york (fdny) called con edison's gerc and reported that the fdny was on location for an outside gas odor in the area of a private house located at 300 west 234th street. Con edison's gerc dispatched a leak survey mechanic to the location at 06:39. At 06:45, the fdny reported evacuating the private house at 300 west 234th street because of the gas odor. A multiple resource response event (code murre) was then initiated by con edison and additional personnel - a supervisor and mechanic from con edison's gas distribution services (gds) department - were dispatched to the location by the gerc. The gerc then called the fdny to provide information concerning the location of the curb valve, at which time the fdny reported that it had already closed the curb valve on the gas service line supplying 300 west 234th street. A field operations planner with con edison's gas emergency response group (erg) was dispatched at 07:05. At 07:08, the fdny reported that it had requested assistance from the new york city police department (nypd) because of a possible drug lab at the location. Con edison's leak survey mechanic arrived at 07:14. He entered the basement of 304 west 234th street and, using a gas measurement instrument, detected no gas-in-air in the area of the gas service point of entry. The leak survey mechanic then entered the basement of 300 west 234th street and, using a gas measurement instrument, detected no gas-in-air in the area of the gas service point of entry. The gds mechanic and gds supervisor arrived at 07:26 and 07:28, respectively. Together with the leak survey mechanic, they entered the basement of 300 west 234th street to investigate and verify shutdown of the gas service. When the con edison erg field operations planner arrived at 07:31, he joined the other con edison responders in the basement of the building. Moments later, at 07:32, the gds supervisor and erg field operations planner reported that an explosion occurred on the second floor of the building and that all con edison employees were accounted for. Two of the four con edison employees in the basement at the time of the explosion sustained minor injuries. All four con edison employees were transported to montefiore medical center for evaluation. The area is supplied by a 4-inch high-pressure polyethylene (hppe) gas main, with a 1-inch hppe branch service supplying 300 and 304 west 234th street. Four main valves were closed to isolate gas supply to the area, which interrupted gas service to nine residential customers. A recent leak survey of the area, conducted a week prior to this incident on september 20, 2016, found no leaks. Odorant levels and distribution system pressure supplying the area were checked after the incident and found to be within acceptable ranges. Multiple media outlets were on location. A fdny battalion chief was struck and killed by debris propelled by the explosion. Other injuries were reported. The nypd isolated the area as a crime scene. Multiple municipal agencies were on location. Nysdps, nycdep, and usdot were notified. Nysdps suresh thomas was notified and responded to location. The fire marshal investigation concluded that the explosion was caused by an accidental ignition of natural gas trapped in the second-floor bedrooms. Investigators found that the tenants in control of the house had sealed second-floor bedroom windows with foam boards to conceal a marijuana grow operation. Although the gas leak was isolated with service turned off, the foam boards on the second floor prevented emergency responders from venting accumulated gas, which subsequently exploded.
| Occurred At | 2016-09-27 07:32:00 |
|---|---|
| Year | 2016 |
| Report Received Date | 2016-10-25 00:00:00 |
| Iyear | 2016.0 |
| Report Number | 20160107.0 |
| Supplemental Number | 39288.0 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 2704 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Consolidated Edison Co Of New York |
| Operator Street Address | 4 Irving Place |
| Operator City Name | New York |
| Operator State Abbreviation | NY |
| Operator Postal Code | 10003 |
| Local Datetime | 2016-09-27 07:32:00 |
| Time Zone | Eastern |
| Daylight Savings Ind | Yes |
| Location Street Address | 300 West 234 Street |
| Location City Name | New York |
| Location County Name | Bronx |
| Location State Abbreviation | NY |
| Location Postal Code | 10463-3703 |
| Location Latitude | 40.883197 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -73.905976 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Flow Cont Main Valve Ind | Yes |
| Flow Cont Service Valve Ind | Yes |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2016-09-27 07:46:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1160072 NRC Report How to search |
| Commodity Released Type | Natural Gas |
| Unintentional Release | 1.0 |
| Intentional Release | 0.0 |
| Fatality Ind | Yes |
| Num Emp Fatalities | 0 |
| Num Contr Fatalities | 0 |
| Num Er Fatalities | 1 |
| Num Worker Fatalities | 0 |
| Num Gp Fatalities | 0 |
| Fatal | 1 |
| Injury Ind | Yes |
| Num Emp Injuries | 0 |
| Num Contr Injuries | 0 |
| Num Er Injuries | 1 |
| Num Worker Injuries | 0 |
| Num Gp Injuries | 0 |
| Injure | 1 |
| Ignite Ind | Yes |
| Ignite Datetime | 2016-09-27 07:32:00 |
| How Extinguished | Local/state/federal Emergency Responder |
| Gas Consumed By Fire In Mcf | 1 |
| Explode Ind | Yes |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 30.0 |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2016-09-27 07:32:00 |
| Communication State Fed Ind | Yes |
| Party Initiated Communication | Operator |
| Initial Responder Com Datetime | 2016-09-27 07:46:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2016-09-27 07:14:00 |
| Confirmed Discovery Datetime | 2016-09-27 07:32:00 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Private Property |
| Incident Area Type | Aboveground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Inside A Building |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Privately Owned |
| System Part Involved | Other |
| System Part Details | Investigated By Nypd/other Law Enforcement Agencies |
| Material Involved | Unknown |
| Release Type | Other |
| Release Type Details | Investigated By Nypd And Other Law Enforcement Agencies |
| Class Location Type | Class 4 Location |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 1000000.0 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 651.0 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 14868.0 |
| Est Cost Other | 0.0 |
| Gas Cost In Mcf | 4.0 |
| Est Cost Unintentional Release | 4.0 |
| Est Cost Intentional Release | 0.0 |
| Prpty | 1015523.0 |
| Commercial Affected | 0.0 |
| Industrial Affected | 0.0 |
| Residences Affected | 9.0 |
| Num Persons Hosp Not Ovnght | 4.0 |
| Num Injured Treated By Emt | 31.0 |
| Num Resident Building Affctd | 9.0 |
| Num Business Building Affctd | 0.0 |
| Accident Psig | 58.0 |
| Normal Psig | 58.0 |
| Mop Psig | 91.0 |
| Mop Cfr Section | 192.619(A)(1) View CFR 49 §192 |
| Maop Established Date | 2015-03-26 00:00:00 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop |
| Gas Odorized System Type | Odorized By Others |
| Gas Odorized Level | 5 |
| Scada In Place Ind | No |
| Accident Identifier | Notification From Public |
| Investigation Status | No, the facility was not monitored by a controller(s) at the time of the incident |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | Yes |
| Num Employees Tested | 7 |
| Num Employees Failed | 0 |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Other Incident Cause |
| Cause Details | Miscellaneous |
| Other Type | Miscellaneous |
| Misc Details | The Fire Marshal Investigation Concluded That The Explosion Was Caused By An Accidental Ignition Of Natural Gas Trapped In The Second-Floor Bedrooms. Investigators Found That The Tenants In Control Of The House Had Sealed Second-Floor Bedroom Windows With Foam Boards To Conceal A Marijuana Grow Operation. Although The Gas Leak Was Isolated With Service Turned Off, The Foam Boards On The Second Floor Prevented Emergency Responders From Venting Accumulated Gas, Which Subsequently Exploded. |
| Preparer Name | K**** F**** |
| Preparer Title | Operations Manager - Gas Emergency Response Center |
| Preparer Email | F*****@c****.com |
| Preparer Telephone | (718) 319-2310 |
| Preparer Fax | (718) 904-4607 |
| Authorizer Name | N******* H***** |
| Authorizer Title | Department Manager - Gas Emergency Response Center |
| Authorizer Telephone | (718) 319-2310 |
| Authorizer Email | H******@c****.com |
| Narrative | On september 27, 2016, at 06:36, con edison's gas emergency response center (gerc) received a report from its customer operations call center that a member of the public had called in a strong outside gas odor on tibbett avenue between west 234th and west 236th streets in the bronx. At 06:37, a dispatcher with the fire department of the city of new york (fdny) called con edison's gerc and reported that the fdny was on location for an outside gas odor in the area of a private house located at 300 west 234th street. Con edison's gerc dispatched a leak survey mechanic to the location at 06:39. At 06:45, the fdny reported evacuating the private house at 300 west 234th street because of the gas odor. A multiple resource response event (code murre) was then initiated by con edison and additional personnel - a supervisor and mechanic from con edison's gas distribution services (gds) department - were dispatched to the location by the gerc. The gerc then called the fdny to provide information concerning the location of the curb valve, at which time the fdny reported that it had already closed the curb valve on the gas service line supplying 300 west 234th street. A field operations planner with con edison's gas emergency response group (erg) was dispatched at 07:05. At 07:08, the fdny reported that it had requested assistance from the new york city police department (nypd) because of a possible drug lab at the location. Con edison's leak survey mechanic arrived at 07:14. He entered the basement of 304 west 234th street and, using a gas measurement instrument, detected no gas-in-air in the area of the gas service point of entry. The leak survey mechanic then entered the basement of 300 west 234th street and, using a gas measurement instrument, detected no gas-in-air in the area of the gas service point of entry. The gds mechanic and gds supervisor arrived at 07:26 and 07:28, respectively. Together with the leak survey mechanic, they entered the basement of 300 west 234th street to investigate and verify shutdown of the gas service. When the con edison erg field operations planner arrived at 07:31, he joined the other con edison responders in the basement of the building. Moments later, at 07:32, the gds supervisor and erg field operations planner reported that an explosion occurred on the second floor of the building and that all con edison employees were accounted for. Two of the four con edison employees in the basement at the time of the explosion sustained minor injuries. All four con edison employees were transported to montefiore medical center for evaluation. The area is supplied by a 4-inch high-pressure polyethylene (hppe) gas main, with a 1-inch hppe branch service supplying 300 and 304 west 234th street. Four main valves were closed to isolate gas supply to the area, which interrupted gas service to nine residential customers. A recent leak survey of the area, conducted a week prior to this incident on september 20, 2016, found no leaks. Odorant levels and distribution system pressure supplying the area were checked after the incident and found to be within acceptable ranges. Multiple media outlets were on location. A fdny battalion chief was struck and killed by debris propelled by the explosion. Other injuries were reported. The nypd isolated the area as a crime scene. Multiple municipal agencies were on location. Nysdps, nycdep, and usdot were notified. Nysdps suresh thomas was notified and responded to location. The fire marshal investigation concluded that the explosion was caused by an accidental ignition of natural gas trapped in the second-floor bedrooms. Investigators found that the tenants in control of the house had sealed second-floor bedroom windows with foam boards to conceal a marijuana grow operation. Although the gas leak was isolated with service turned off, the foam boards on the second floor prevented emergency responders from venting accumulated gas, which subsequently exploded. |
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