HL incident on 2015-11-23 — GA

Operator
Colonial Pipeline Co
Cause
Equipment Failure
Commodity
Refined And/or Petroleum Product (Non-Hvl) Which Is A Liquid At Ambient Conditions
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities 0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$0
Incident datetime
2015-11-23 10:30
Report number
Location
GA
Narrative
On 11/23/2015 at 10:30 an employee detected product odor during a routine station check in the vicinity of the line 3 unit 4 pump. The employee found product inside nearby access wells. The control room was immediately notified and resources were dispatched for cleanup. Line 3 was not shut down since there was no visual indication of an active leak source and there was a possibility that the product found was from a recent release near the same area. Based on the estimated release volume exceeding 25 gallons, the ncdenr was notified at 12:59 and a courtesy notification was made to guilford county environmental health at 13:03. A courtesy call was also made to the greensboro fire department later that afternoon. At 10:50 a contract crew arrived at the scene to recover product and begin exploratory digging. During excavation of the pump-side spring assembly of the line 3 unit 4 check valve, product lightly streamed from the bottom of the spring assembly and then stopped within minutes. Excavation continued to the other side of the check valve and by the morning of 11/24/2015 both spring assemblies had been uncovered with no active leak detected. The check was inspected and closely monitored during several unit operations. No leaks were observed. Approximately 20 gallons of free product had been collected within the first 24 hours but the rate had slowed by the morning of 11/24/2015. Digging continued during daylight hours only on 11/24 and 11/25/2015 with monitoring by operations personnel during the thanksgiving holiday on 11/26-11/29/2015. By the morning of 11/30/2015, an additional 24 gallons of free product had been collected in the excavation area with no visible source. Excavation continued through 12/1/2015. At 16:40 on 12/1/2015, line 3 unexpectedly shut down due to a bearing seal failure alarm (unrelated to this event) on the line 3 oil booster. During the shutdown, product began spraying out of the check valve spring assembly. The line was drained and repair of the check valve began. During the repair it was determined that the interior o-rings on both spring assemblies had flattened and were the likely cause of the release. Repairs were completed by 00:50 on 12/2/2015. The line 3 oil booster bearing seal was inspected and found in good condition. The bearing seal alarm had cleared on its own during the check valve repairs. Line 3 was restarted at 01:00 on 12/2/15. Exploratory digging continued from 12/2/2015 to 12/18/2015, with intermittent pockets of product found in diminishing quantities. Total free product collected was 114 gallons. On 12/7/2015 at 15:58 the nrc was notified as soon as response costs were estimated to exceed $50,000. Approximately 73 cubic yards of impacted soil was excavated and placed on plastic with containment. Soil samples were collected and sent to a lab for analysis. The total volume of product released to the soils is calculated at 41 gallons. An incident analysis of this event was conducted on 1/7/2016. The basic cause of the incident was confirmed as the flattening of interior o-rings on the check valve spring assemblies due to normal wear. The design of the spring assembly/spring cover was also found to be a contributing factor since it includes a gap between the main valve body and the spring assembly. As such, the spring assembly cover is an ineffective pressure containment device. The wheatley check valve in question is unique to the operating area. Corrective actions identified during the incident analysis process include: 1) determine if other valves within the company are of the same design. 2)contact the valve manufacturer for an existing solution for the containment issue or design an in-house solution that could be manufactured by a machine shop. 3)if a containment solution cannot be implemented, incorporate access wells into the backfill efforts so that periodic checks could be conducted in order to quickly detect any loss of containment from the check valve in the future.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2015-12-21 00:00:00
Iyear
2015
Report Number
20150468
Supplemental Number
21099
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
Name
Colonial Pipeline Co
Operator Street Address
1000 Lake St.
Operator City Name
Alpharetta
Operator State Abbreviation
GA
Operator Postal Code
30009
Local Datetime
2015-11-23 10:30:00
Location Latitude
Location Longitude
Commodity Released Type
Refined And/or Petroleum Product (Non-Hvl) Which Is A Liquid At Ambient Conditions
Commodity Subtype
Mixture Of Refined Products (Transmix Or Other Mixture)
Unintentional Release Bbls
3.69
Recovered Bbls
3.69
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
Incident Identified Datetime
2015-11-23 10:30:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Pump/meter Station Equipment And Piping
On Off Shore
Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Shutdown Datetime
2015-12-01 16:40:00
Restart Datetime
2015-12-02 01:00:00
On Site Datetime
2015-11-23 10:30:00
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2015-12-07 15:58:00
Nrc Rpt Num
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Greensboro Junction Tank Farm
Segment Name
Line 3, Unit 4 Loop
Onshore State Abbreviation
Nc
Onshore Postal Code
27409
Onshore City Name
Greensboro
Onshore County Name
Guilford
Designated Location
Milepost/valve Station
Designated Name
Location 0821
Federal
No
Location Type
Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
In Underground Enclosed Space (E.g. Vault)
Depth Of Cover
Unknown
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
Item Involved
Valve
Valve Type
Mainline
Valve Mainline Type
Check
Valve Manufacturer
Wheatley
Installation Year
1979
Manufactured Year
Unknown
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Leak
Leak Type
Seal Or Packing
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
Yes
Long Term Assessment
Yes
Remediation Ind
No
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
Yes
Commodity Reached Hca
Yes
High Pop Ind
Yes
High Pop Yes No
Yes
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
310
Est Cost Prop Damage
0
Est Cost Emergency
130000
Est Cost Environmental
15000
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
145310
Accident Psig
544
Mop Psig
960
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Cpm In Place Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
O-ring(s) flattening found in check valve. No indication of any relation to operator activity.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Equipment Failure
Cause Details
Non-Threaded Connection Failure
Eq Failure Type
Non-Threaded Connection Failure
Other Non Threaded Ind
O-Ring
Additional Valve Ind
Yes
Preparer Name
K**** M****
Preparer Title
Compliance Coordinator
Preparer Email
K*****@c******.com
Preparer Telephone
601-765-9168
Preparer Fax
770-754-8489
Prepared Date
2016-02-05 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
D*** L*****
Authorizer Telephone
678-762-2872
Authorizer Title
Manager Phmsa Regulatory Compliance
Authorizer Email
D******@c******.com
Narrative
On 11/23/2015 at 10:30 an employee detected product odor during a routine station check in the vicinity of the line 3 unit 4 pump. The employee found product inside nearby access wells. The control room was immediately notified and resources were dispatched for cleanup. Line 3 was not shut down since there was no visual indication of an active leak source and there was a possibility that the product found was from a recent release near the same area. Based on the estimated release volume exceeding 25 gallons, the ncdenr was notified at 12:59 and a courtesy notification was made to guilford county environmental health at 13:03. A courtesy call was also made to the greensboro fire department later that afternoon. At 10:50 a contract crew arrived at the scene to recover product and begin exploratory digging. During excavation of the pump-side spring assembly of the line 3 unit 4 check valve, product lightly streamed from the bottom of the spring assembly and then stopped within minutes. Excavation continued to the other side of the check valve and by the morning of 11/24/2015 both spring assemblies had been uncovered with no active leak detected. The check was inspected and closely monitored during several unit operations. No leaks were observed. Approximately 20 gallons of free product had been collected within the first 24 hours but the rate had slowed by the morning of 11/24/2015. Digging continued during daylight hours only on 11/24 and 11/25/2015 with monitoring by operations personnel during the thanksgiving holiday on 11/26-11/29/2015. By the morning of 11/30/2015, an additional 24 gallons of free product had been collected in the excavation area with no visible source. Excavation continued through 12/1/2015. At 16:40 on 12/1/2015, line 3 unexpectedly shut down due to a bearing seal failure alarm (unrelated to this event) on the line 3 oil booster. During the shutdown, product began spraying out of the check valve spring assembly. The line was drained and repair of the check valve began. During the repair it was determined that the interior o-rings on both spring assemblies had flattened and were the likely cause of the release. Repairs were completed by 00:50 on 12/2/2015. The line 3 oil booster bearing seal was inspected and found in good condition. The bearing seal alarm had cleared on its own during the check valve repairs. Line 3 was restarted at 01:00 on 12/2/15. Exploratory digging continued from 12/2/2015 to 12/18/2015, with intermittent pockets of product found in diminishing quantities. Total free product collected was 114 gallons. On 12/7/2015 at 15:58 the nrc was notified as soon as response costs were estimated to exceed $50,000. Approximately 73 cubic yards of impacted soil was excavated and placed on plastic with containment. Soil samples were collected and sent to a lab for analysis. The total volume of product released to the soils is calculated at 41 gallons. An incident analysis of this event was conducted on 1/7/2016. The basic cause of the incident was confirmed as the flattening of interior o-rings on the check valve spring assemblies due to normal wear. The design of the spring assembly/spring cover was also found to be a contributing factor since it includes a gap between the main valve body and the spring assembly. As such, the spring assembly cover is an ineffective pressure containment device. The wheatley check valve in question is unique to the operating area. Corrective actions identified during the incident analysis process include: 1) determine if other valves within the company are of the same design. 2)contact the valve manufacturer for an existing solution for the containment issue or design an in-house solution that could be manufactured by a machine shop. 3)if a containment solution cannot be implemented, incorporate access wells into the backfill efforts so that periodic checks could be conducted in order to quickly detect any loss of containment from the check valve in the future.
Report Received Date 2015-12-21 00:00:00
Iyear 2015
Report Number 20150468
Supplemental Number 21099
Report Type Supplemental Final
Operator Id 2552 PHMSA Enforcement
Name Colonial Pipeline Co
Operator Street Address 1000 Lake St.
Operator City Name Alpharetta
Operator State Abbreviation GA
Operator Postal Code 30009
Local Datetime 2015-11-23 10:30:00
Location Latitude 36.07129 Google Maps OpenStreetMap
Location Longitude -79.93687 Google Maps OpenStreetMap
Commodity Released Type Refined And/or Petroleum Product (Non-Hvl) Which Is A Liquid At Ambient Conditions
Commodity Subtype Mixture Of Refined Products (Transmix Or Other Mixture)
Unintentional Release Bbls 3.69
Recovered Bbls 3.69
Fatality Ind No
Fatal 0
Injury Ind No
Injure 0
Accident Identifier Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type Operator Employee
Incident Identified Datetime 2015-11-23 10:30:00
System Part Involved Onshore Pump/meter Station Equipment And Piping
On Off Shore Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind Yes
Shutdown Datetime 2015-12-01 16:40:00
Restart Datetime 2015-12-02 01:00:00
On Site Datetime 2015-11-23 10:30:00
Nrc Rpt Datetime 2015-12-07 15:58:00
Nrc Rpt Num 1135198 NRC Report How to search
Ignite Ind No
Explode Ind No
Num Pub Evacuated 0
Pipe Fac Name Greensboro Junction Tank Farm
Segment Name Line 3, Unit 4 Loop
Onshore State Abbreviation Nc
Onshore Postal Code 27409
Onshore City Name Greensboro
Onshore County Name Guilford
Designated Location Milepost/valve Station
Designated Name Location 0821
Federal No
Location Type Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type Underground
Incident Area Subtype In Underground Enclosed Space (E.g. Vault)
Depth Of Cover Unknown
Crossing No
Pipe Facility Type Interstate
Item Involved Valve
Valve Type Mainline
Valve Mainline Type Check
Valve Manufacturer Wheatley
Installation Year 1979
Manufactured Year Unknown
Material Involved Carbon Steel
Release Type Leak
Leak Type Seal Or Packing
Wildlife Impact Ind No
Soil Contamination Yes
Long Term Assessment Yes
Remediation Ind No
Water Contam Ind No
Could Be Hca Yes
Commodity Reached Hca Yes
High Pop Ind Yes
High Pop Yes No Yes
Est Cost Oper Paid 0
Est Cost Gas Released 310
Est Cost Prop Damage 0
Est Cost Emergency 130000
Est Cost Environmental 15000
Est Cost Other 0
Prpty 145310
Accident Psig 544
Mop Psig 960
Accident Pressure Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind No
Pipeline Function > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind Yes
Scada Operating Ind Yes
Scada Functional Ind Yes
Scada Detection Ind No
Scada Conf Ind No
Cpm In Place Ind No
Investigation Status No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details O-ring(s) flattening found in check valve. No indication of any relation to operator activity.
Employee Drug Test Ind No
Contractor Drug Test Ind No
Cause Equipment Failure
Cause Details Non-Threaded Connection Failure
Eq Failure Type Non-Threaded Connection Failure
Other Non Threaded Ind O-Ring
Additional Valve Ind Yes
Preparer Name K**** M****
Preparer Title Compliance Coordinator
Preparer Email K*****@c******.com
Preparer Telephone 601-765-9168
Preparer Fax 770-754-8489
Prepared Date 2016-02-05 00:00:00
Authorizer Name D*** L*****
Authorizer Telephone 678-762-2872
Authorizer Title Manager Phmsa Regulatory Compliance
Authorizer Email D******@c******.com
Narrative On 11/23/2015 at 10:30 an employee detected product odor during a routine station check in the vicinity of the line 3 unit 4 pump. The employee found product inside nearby access wells. The control room was immediately notified and resources were dispatched for cleanup. Line 3 was not shut down since there was no visual indication of an active leak source and there was a possibility that the product found was from a recent release near the same area. Based on the estimated release volume exceeding 25 gallons, the ncdenr was notified at 12:59 and a courtesy notification was made to guilford county environmental health at 13:03. A courtesy call was also made to the greensboro fire department later that afternoon. At 10:50 a contract crew arrived at the scene to recover product and begin exploratory digging. During excavation of the pump-side spring assembly of the line 3 unit 4 check valve, product lightly streamed from the bottom of the spring assembly and then stopped within minutes. Excavation continued to the other side of the check valve and by the morning of 11/24/2015 both spring assemblies had been uncovered with no active leak detected. The check was inspected and closely monitored during several unit operations. No leaks were observed. Approximately 20 gallons of free product had been collected within the first 24 hours but the rate had slowed by the morning of 11/24/2015. Digging continued during daylight hours only on 11/24 and 11/25/2015 with monitoring by operations personnel during the thanksgiving holiday on 11/26-11/29/2015. By the morning of 11/30/2015, an additional 24 gallons of free product had been collected in the excavation area with no visible source. Excavation continued through 12/1/2015. At 16:40 on 12/1/2015, line 3 unexpectedly shut down due to a bearing seal failure alarm (unrelated to this event) on the line 3 oil booster. During the shutdown, product began spraying out of the check valve spring assembly. The line was drained and repair of the check valve began. During the repair it was determined that the interior o-rings on both spring assemblies had flattened and were the likely cause of the release. Repairs were completed by 00:50 on 12/2/2015. The line 3 oil booster bearing seal was inspected and found in good condition. The bearing seal alarm had cleared on its own during the check valve repairs. Line 3 was restarted at 01:00 on 12/2/15. Exploratory digging continued from 12/2/2015 to 12/18/2015, with intermittent pockets of product found in diminishing quantities. Total free product collected was 114 gallons. On 12/7/2015 at 15:58 the nrc was notified as soon as response costs were estimated to exceed $50,000. Approximately 73 cubic yards of impacted soil was excavated and placed on plastic with containment. Soil samples were collected and sent to a lab for analysis. The total volume of product released to the soils is calculated at 41 gallons. An incident analysis of this event was conducted on 1/7/2016. The basic cause of the incident was confirmed as the flattening of interior o-rings on the check valve spring assemblies due to normal wear. The design of the spring assembly/spring cover was also found to be a contributing factor since it includes a gap between the main valve body and the spring assembly. As such, the spring assembly cover is an ineffective pressure containment device. The wheatley check valve in question is unique to the operating area. Corrective actions identified during the incident analysis process include: 1) determine if other valves within the company are of the same design. 2)contact the valve manufacturer for an existing solution for the containment issue or design an in-house solution that could be manufactured by a machine shop. 3)if a containment solution cannot be implemented, incorporate access wells into the backfill efforts so that periodic checks could be conducted in order to quickly detect any loss of containment from the check valve in the future.

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