Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2015-09-21 — GA
Operator
Colonial Pipeline Co
Cause
Material Failure Of Pipe Or Weld
Commodity
Refined And/or Petroleum Product (Non-Hvl) Which Is A Liquid At Ambient Conditions
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$1,633,000
Incident datetime
2015-09-21 13:37
Report number
Location
GA
Narrative
Due to character limitations, contents of the narrative provided within supplemental report filed 2/5/2017 have been deleted, but are incorporated here as if restated in full. Narrative update 8/11/2017 the national transportation safety board (ntsb) released a pipeline accident brief (pab) on 6/15/2017 which presented the results of its investigation of the centreville incident (pab-17/01, adopted by ntsb on 6/5/2017). As provided in the pab, ntsb determined that the probable cause of the release was a "throughwall corrosion fatigue that developed at a dent in the pipeline due to residual and operational stress & exposure to the underground environment". Colonial concurs that the crack developed due to fatigue caused by multiple factors including pressure cycling, but colonial does not believe that the presence of corrosion at the failure site had any impact on the leak occurrence. Corrosion at the leak location was too limited to have any appreciable impact on the development and full through-wall propagation of a crack. Phmsa's accident investigation division directed colonial to include the specific dates/times as set forth in this form's part a #4, #18a, and #18b. Notwithstanding that, however, colonial maintains: (1) as to #4 - the appropriate date/time of the accident (I.E., when 'accident reporting criteria was met') is "9/21/2015 20:53", when colonial received the call from the fairfax county fire marshal reporting a sheen on the retention pond. (2) as to #18a - the appropriate date/time when colonial 'identified the accident' is "9/23/2015 09:57", when colonial confirmed that the release originated from its pipeline. Prior to that time, colonial had not 'identified the failure' - colonial's pipelines were located some distance away from the pond and there were multiple other potential sources of the odors and/or sheen. In response to the report of a sheen, colonial initiated the shutdown of its pipeline as a precautionary measure, even though the source had not been identified. Colonial reported gasoline 'from an unknown source' to the nrc on 9/22/2015 at 01:32. Colonial 'identified the failure' on 9/23/2015 at 09:57 when product was observed leaking from colonial's line 4 pipeline. Until that time, there was no definitive connection between the sheen on the retention pond and colonial's pipeline, which was some distance away from the pond. (3) as to #18b - the appropriate date/time when colonial 'resources arrived on site' is "9/23/2015 09:57". Colonial resources arrived on the scene prior to that date/time, but this form's instructions provide that #18b must be concurrent with or later than #18a (when the accident was identified by colonial). Update april 2020: during the time period that this release occurred, colonial had experienced several other releases that had the same failure mode. The ia that followed this incident was consolidated with the other recent fatigue crack in dent failures, and was addressed as one comprehensive, system-wide assessment of the factors contributing to the development of fatigue cracks in dents. This approach was taken by colonial to ensure that the lessons learned from all of the incidents could be factored into the corrective action plan and drive improvements system-wide. The ia included metallurgical analyses of three of the dent failures, all confirming that pressure cycling of the dent resulted in through wall fatigue cracks. The presence of the dent concentrated stresses on the pipeline, creating a fatigue crack to form and grow through-wall over time due to pressure cycling.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2015-10-20 00:00:00
Iyear
2015
Report Number
20150367
Supplemental Number
33647
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
2552
Name
Colonial Pipeline Co
Operator Street Address
1000 Lake St.
Operator City Name
Alpharetta
Operator State Abbreviation
GA
Operator Postal Code
30009
Local Datetime
2015-09-21 12:03:00
Location Latitude
38.82684
Location Longitude
-77.435574
Commodity Released Type
Refined And/or Petroleum Product (Non-Hvl) Which Is A Liquid At Ambient Conditions
Commodity Subtype
Gasoline (Non-Ethanol)
Unintentional Release Bbls
95.24
Recovered Bbls
57.52
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Notification From Emergency Responder
Incident Identified Datetime
2015-09-21 13:37:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
On Off Shore
Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Shutdown Datetime
2015-09-21 21:00:00
Restart Datetime
2015-09-25 16:43:00
On Site Datetime
2015-09-21 14:00:00
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2015-09-22 01:32:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1129084
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Upstream Valve Type Ind
Remotely Controlled
Downstream Valve Type Ind
Remotely Controlled
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Line 04/loc 0904
Segment Name
Greensboro Jct. To Dorsey Jct.
Onshore State Abbreviation
Va
Onshore Postal Code
20121
Onshore City Name
Centreville
Onshore County Name
Fairfax
Designated Location
Milepost/valve Station
Designated Name
Mp 241
Federal
No
Location Type
Pipeline Right-Of-Way
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Under Soil
Depth Of Cover
48
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
Item Involved
Pipe
Pipe Type
Pipe Body
Pipe Diameter
32
Pipe Wall Thickness
0.281
Pipe Smys
52000
Pipe Specification
Api 5l
Pipe Seam Type
Dsaw
Pipe Manufacturer
National 2
Pipe Coating Type
Asphalt
Installation Year
1963
Manufactured Year
1963
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Leak
Leak Type
Crack
Wildlife Impact Ind
Yes
Fish Aquatic Impact Ind
Yes
Soil Contamination
Yes
Long Term Assessment
Yes
Remediation Ind
Yes
Groundwater Remed Ind
Yes
Soil Remed Ind
Yes
Water Contam Ind
Yes
Surface Contam Ind
Yes
Amount Released
47.17
Rel Water Name
Storm Drain, Ditch And Retention Pond Near Apartment Complex
Could Be Hca
Yes
Commodity Reached Hca
Yes
High Pop Ind
Yes
High Pop Yes No
Yes
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
4600
Est Cost Prop Damage
1633000
Est Cost Emergency
9500000
Est Cost Environmental
5773500
Est Cost Other
1105000
Est Cost Other Details
Purchase Property For Access, Reimburse Business Losses, Pay Inconvenience
Prpty
18016100
Accident Psig
224.6
Mop Psig
657
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Length Segment Isolated
141498
Internal Inspection Ind
Yes
Operation Complications Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Cpm In Place Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
The lack of any indication of leak in scada data and the controller's shutdown of the pipeline approximately 7 minutes after a report of petroleum odors and a sheen on a pond.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Material Failure Of Pipe Or Weld
Cause Details
Design-, Construction-, Installation-, Or Fabrication-Related
Metallurgical Ind
Yes
Failure Type
Design-, Construction-, Installation-, Or Fabrication-Related
Fatigue Vibr Related
Yes
Failure Subtype
Other
Fatigue Vibr Related Other
Failure: Stress From Dent; Crack Originated, Grew & Failed From Cyclic Fatigue
Additional Dent Ind
Yes
Additional Crack Ind
Yes
Collected Data Ind
Yes
Emat Ind
Yes
Emat Recent Year
2014
Other Recent Year
2013
Has Hydrtst Conduc Before Ind
Yes
Hydrtst Most Rcnt Year
1990
Hydrtst Most Rcnt Pressure
860
Direct Asmnt Conducted
No
Non Destructive Exam Ind
No
Preparer Name
A**** S****
Preparer Title
Compliance Coordinator Ned
Preparer Email
A******@c******.com
Preparer Telephone
410 970 2157
Preparer Fax
770 754 8036
Prepared Date
2020-04-24 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
M*** P*****
Authorizer Telephone
678 762 2531
Authorizer Title
Manager Pipeline Compliance
Authorizer Email
M******@c******.com
Narrative
Due to character limitations, contents of the narrative provided within supplemental report filed 2/5/2017 have been deleted, but are incorporated here as if restated in full. Narrative update 8/11/2017 the national transportation safety board (ntsb) released a pipeline accident brief (pab) on 6/15/2017 which presented the results of its investigation of the centreville incident (pab-17/01, adopted by ntsb on 6/5/2017). As provided in the pab, ntsb determined that the probable cause of the release was a "throughwall corrosion fatigue that developed at a dent in the pipeline due to residual and operational stress & exposure to the underground environment". Colonial concurs that the crack developed due to fatigue caused by multiple factors including pressure cycling, but colonial does not believe that the presence of corrosion at the failure site had any impact on the leak occurrence. Corrosion at the leak location was too limited to have any appreciable impact on the development and full through-wall propagation of a crack. Phmsa's accident investigation division directed colonial to include the specific dates/times as set forth in this form's part a #4, #18a, and #18b. Notwithstanding that, however, colonial maintains: (1) as to #4 - the appropriate date/time of the accident (I.E., when 'accident reporting criteria was met') is "9/21/2015 20:53", when colonial received the call from the fairfax county fire marshal reporting a sheen on the retention pond. (2) as to #18a - the appropriate date/time when colonial 'identified the accident' is "9/23/2015 09:57", when colonial confirmed that the release originated from its pipeline. Prior to that time, colonial had not 'identified the failure' - colonial's pipelines were located some distance away from the pond and there were multiple other potential sources of the odors and/or sheen. In response to the report of a sheen, colonial initiated the shutdown of its pipeline as a precautionary measure, even though the source had not been identified. Colonial reported gasoline 'from an unknown source' to the nrc on 9/22/2015 at 01:32. Colonial 'identified the failure' on 9/23/2015 at 09:57 when product was observed leaking from colonial's line 4 pipeline. Until that time, there was no definitive connection between the sheen on the retention pond and colonial's pipeline, which was some distance away from the pond. (3) as to #18b - the appropriate date/time when colonial 'resources arrived on site' is "9/23/2015 09:57". Colonial resources arrived on the scene prior to that date/time, but this form's instructions provide that #18b must be concurrent with or later than #18a (when the accident was identified by colonial). Update april 2020: during the time period that this release occurred, colonial had experienced several other releases that had the same failure mode. The ia that followed this incident was consolidated with the other recent fatigue crack in dent failures, and was addressed as one comprehensive, system-wide assessment of the factors contributing to the development of fatigue cracks in dents. This approach was taken by colonial to ensure that the lessons learned from all of the incidents could be factored into the corrective action plan and drive improvements system-wide. The ia included metallurgical analyses of three of the dent failures, all confirming that pressure cycling of the dent resulted in through wall fatigue cracks. The presence of the dent concentrated stresses on the pipeline, creating a fatigue crack to form and grow through-wall over time due to pressure cycling.
| Report Received Date | 2015-10-20 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2015 |
| Report Number | 20150367 |
| Supplemental Number | 33647 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 2552 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Colonial Pipeline Co |
| Operator Street Address | 1000 Lake St. |
| Operator City Name | Alpharetta |
| Operator State Abbreviation | GA |
| Operator Postal Code | 30009 |
| Local Datetime | 2015-09-21 12:03:00 |
| Location Latitude | 38.82684 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -77.435574 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Refined And/or Petroleum Product (Non-Hvl) Which Is A Liquid At Ambient Conditions |
| Commodity Subtype | Gasoline (Non-Ethanol) |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 95.24 |
| Recovered Bbls | 57.52 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Notification From Emergency Responder |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2015-09-21 13:37:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | Yes |
| Shutdown Datetime | 2015-09-21 21:00:00 |
| Restart Datetime | 2015-09-25 16:43:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2015-09-21 14:00:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2015-09-22 01:32:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1129084 NRC Report How to search |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Upstream Valve Type Ind | Remotely Controlled |
| Downstream Valve Type Ind | Remotely Controlled |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Line 04/loc 0904 |
| Segment Name | Greensboro Jct. To Dorsey Jct. |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Va |
| Onshore Postal Code | 20121 |
| Onshore City Name | Centreville |
| Onshore County Name | Fairfax |
| Designated Location | Milepost/valve Station |
| Designated Name | Mp 241 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Pipeline Right-Of-Way |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Under Soil |
| Depth Of Cover | 48 |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| Item Involved | Pipe |
| Pipe Type | Pipe Body |
| Pipe Diameter | 32 |
| Pipe Wall Thickness | 0.281 |
| Pipe Smys | 52000 |
| Pipe Specification | Api 5l |
| Pipe Seam Type | Dsaw |
| Pipe Manufacturer | National 2 |
| Pipe Coating Type | Asphalt |
| Installation Year | 1963 |
| Manufactured Year | 1963 |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Leak |
| Leak Type | Crack |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | Yes |
| Fish Aquatic Impact Ind | Yes |
| Soil Contamination | Yes |
| Long Term Assessment | Yes |
| Remediation Ind | Yes |
| Groundwater Remed Ind | Yes |
| Soil Remed Ind | Yes |
| Water Contam Ind | Yes |
| Surface Contam Ind | Yes |
| Amount Released | 47.17 |
| Rel Water Name | Storm Drain, Ditch And Retention Pond Near Apartment Complex |
| Could Be Hca | Yes |
| Commodity Reached Hca | Yes |
| High Pop Ind | Yes |
| High Pop Yes No | Yes |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 4600 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 1633000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 9500000 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 5773500 |
| Est Cost Other | 1105000 |
| Est Cost Other Details | Purchase Property For Access, Reimburse Business Losses, Pay Inconvenience |
| Prpty | 18016100 |
| Accident Psig | 224.6 |
| Mop Psig | 657 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Length Segment Isolated | 141498 |
| Internal Inspection Ind | Yes |
| Operation Complications Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Cpm In Place Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | The lack of any indication of leak in scada data and the controller's shutdown of the pipeline approximately 7 minutes after a report of petroleum odors and a sheen on a pond. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Material Failure Of Pipe Or Weld |
| Cause Details | Design-, Construction-, Installation-, Or Fabrication-Related |
| Metallurgical Ind | Yes |
| Failure Type | Design-, Construction-, Installation-, Or Fabrication-Related |
| Fatigue Vibr Related | Yes |
| Failure Subtype | Other |
| Fatigue Vibr Related Other | Failure: Stress From Dent; Crack Originated, Grew & Failed From Cyclic Fatigue |
| Additional Dent Ind | Yes |
| Additional Crack Ind | Yes |
| Collected Data Ind | Yes |
| Emat Ind | Yes |
| Emat Recent Year | 2014 |
| Other Recent Year | 2013 |
| Has Hydrtst Conduc Before Ind | Yes |
| Hydrtst Most Rcnt Year | 1990 |
| Hydrtst Most Rcnt Pressure | 860 |
| Direct Asmnt Conducted | No |
| Non Destructive Exam Ind | No |
| Preparer Name | A**** S**** |
| Preparer Title | Compliance Coordinator Ned |
| Preparer Email | A******@c******.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 410 970 2157 |
| Preparer Fax | 770 754 8036 |
| Prepared Date | 2020-04-24 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | M*** P***** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 678 762 2531 |
| Authorizer Title | Manager Pipeline Compliance |
| Authorizer Email | M******@c******.com |
| Narrative | Due to character limitations, contents of the narrative provided within supplemental report filed 2/5/2017 have been deleted, but are incorporated here as if restated in full. Narrative update 8/11/2017 the national transportation safety board (ntsb) released a pipeline accident brief (pab) on 6/15/2017 which presented the results of its investigation of the centreville incident (pab-17/01, adopted by ntsb on 6/5/2017). As provided in the pab, ntsb determined that the probable cause of the release was a "throughwall corrosion fatigue that developed at a dent in the pipeline due to residual and operational stress & exposure to the underground environment". Colonial concurs that the crack developed due to fatigue caused by multiple factors including pressure cycling, but colonial does not believe that the presence of corrosion at the failure site had any impact on the leak occurrence. Corrosion at the leak location was too limited to have any appreciable impact on the development and full through-wall propagation of a crack. Phmsa's accident investigation division directed colonial to include the specific dates/times as set forth in this form's part a #4, #18a, and #18b. Notwithstanding that, however, colonial maintains: (1) as to #4 - the appropriate date/time of the accident (I.E., when 'accident reporting criteria was met') is "9/21/2015 20:53", when colonial received the call from the fairfax county fire marshal reporting a sheen on the retention pond. (2) as to #18a - the appropriate date/time when colonial 'identified the accident' is "9/23/2015 09:57", when colonial confirmed that the release originated from its pipeline. Prior to that time, colonial had not 'identified the failure' - colonial's pipelines were located some distance away from the pond and there were multiple other potential sources of the odors and/or sheen. In response to the report of a sheen, colonial initiated the shutdown of its pipeline as a precautionary measure, even though the source had not been identified. Colonial reported gasoline 'from an unknown source' to the nrc on 9/22/2015 at 01:32. Colonial 'identified the failure' on 9/23/2015 at 09:57 when product was observed leaking from colonial's line 4 pipeline. Until that time, there was no definitive connection between the sheen on the retention pond and colonial's pipeline, which was some distance away from the pond. (3) as to #18b - the appropriate date/time when colonial 'resources arrived on site' is "9/23/2015 09:57". Colonial resources arrived on the scene prior to that date/time, but this form's instructions provide that #18b must be concurrent with or later than #18a (when the accident was identified by colonial). Update april 2020: during the time period that this release occurred, colonial had experienced several other releases that had the same failure mode. The ia that followed this incident was consolidated with the other recent fatigue crack in dent failures, and was addressed as one comprehensive, system-wide assessment of the factors contributing to the development of fatigue cracks in dents. This approach was taken by colonial to ensure that the lessons learned from all of the incidents could be factored into the corrective action plan and drive improvements system-wide. The ia included metallurgical analyses of three of the dent failures, all confirming that pressure cycling of the dent resulted in through wall fatigue cracks. The presence of the dent concentrated stresses on the pipeline, creating a fatigue crack to form and grow through-wall over time due to pressure cycling. |
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