Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2015-05-29 — AK
Operator
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co
Cause
Natural Force Damage
Commodity
Crude Oil
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$2,960,000
Incident datetime
2015-05-29 17:00
Report number
Location
AK
Narrative
On may 29, 2015, an excavation crew identified a weep in a below-ground isolation fitting installed on the taps 48-inch mainline at ps10, adjacent to bl2. (this was in a separate, adjacent location from where the excavation work was located; work on the dig was suspended when the weep was sighted.) the purpose of the isolation fitting was to electrically isolate the mainline and facility piping cathodic protection systems to provide optimal corrosion protection. This fitting was installed during initial construction. Currently, the isolation fitting is not needed due to upgrades to the cathodic protection systems, and it has been electrically bypassed. Ps10 has been out of service since 1998 and was straight piped in 2013. Initial reports concerning the weep were that the substance was potentially crude and a spill report was filed. However, due to the absence of lower explosive limit (lel) gas measurements and other characteristics including the presence of tar-based packing material in the isolation fitting, the precise nature of the substance was initially unclear. Thus alyeska sent a sample of the substance from ps10 and a sample of north slope crude out for a laboratory analysis. Test results received june 4, 2015, indicate the weeping moisture on the isolation flange at ps10 is weathered crude oil. Initially, the weep rate was about one drip per second, apparently due to the accumulation of crude within the tar membrane/packing material within the fitting. The original weep later stopped on its own, but there is now additional minor weeping. Alyeska has excavated approximately 5 yards of contaminated soil. All excavation has been done by hand thus far. There is no indication how long the weep has been active and the total volume extruded is uncertain. Technical solutions for repair and remediation are being evaluated. Contingency spill measures have been put in place, including 24-hour site monitoring; secondary containment (pipe cap); staging of a crew with a vac truck; and placement of an rb-100 (actuator) and generator on-site for contingency closure of the valve. Protocols are also being developed for assessment of other isolation fittings (21) located along the taps system. Update: on july 13, 2015, a 60-inch containment sleeve with grout injection and seal welding of plugs was completed. The weep is repaired though alyeska has final installation of conical ends for the sleeve scheduled for the end of september 2015. Alyeska has contracted stress engineering to conduct a cause analysis for this event. Alyeska continues investigations of other isolation fittings on taps to ensure no other failures have occurred. To date, september 10, 2015, no additional leaks have been identified. Update: the conical ends installation was completed in october 2015. Update: the root cause investigation for this incident was complete on march 1, 2016. The cause of this incident was determined to be attributed to both post construction settling causing the pipe to bend, coupled with a 7.9 earthquake in 2002 centered 3 miles from the pipeline. Alyeska has determined that it is highly unlikely that other isolation fittings on taps have been subject to these conditions and in general these isolation fitting are robust.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2015-06-08 00:00:00
Iyear
2015
Report Number
20150214
Supplemental Number
21293
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
26149
Name
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co
Operator Street Address
Pob 196660 Ms 502
Operator City Name
Anchorage
Operator State Abbreviation
AK
Operator Postal Code
99519
Local Datetime
2015-05-29 17:00:00
Location Latitude
63.42546
Location Longitude
-145.7665
Commodity Released Type
Crude Oil
Unintentional Release Bbls
0.24
Recovered Bbls
0.24
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Contractor Working For The Operator
Incident Identified Datetime
2015-05-29 17:00:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
On Off Shore
Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
No
Shutdown Explain
Slow Weep Was Contained And Monitored At The Isolation Fitting.
On Site Datetime
2016-05-29 17:00:00
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2015-05-29 17:28:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1118021
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Upstream Valve Type Ind
Manual
Downstream Valve Type Ind
Manual
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Pump Station 10
Segment Name
Pump Station 10
Onshore State Abbreviation
Ak
Onshore Postal Code
99737
Onshore City Name
Not Within A Municipality
Onshore County Name
Not Within A County Or Parish
Designated Location
Milepost/valve Station
Designated Name
Plmp 585.91
Federal
Yes
Location Type
Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Under Soil
Depth Of Cover
66
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
Item Involved
Other
Item Involved Details
Isolation Fitting For Cp, No Longer Used
Installation Year
1976
Material Involved
Material Other Than Carbon Steel
Material Details
Coupling Seal Components
Release Type
Leak
Leak Type
Seal Or Packing
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
Yes
Long Term Assessment
Yes
Remediation Ind
Yes
Soil Remed Ind
Yes
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
Yes
Commodity Reached Hca
Yes
Other Pop Ind
Yes
Other Pop Yes No
Yes
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
0
Est Cost Prop Damage
2960000
Est Cost Emergency
400000
Est Cost Environmental
300000
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
3660000
Accident Psig
461
Mop Psig
1090
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Length Segment Isolated
1256
Internal Inspection Ind
Yes
Operation Complications Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Cpm In Place Ind
Yes
Cpm Operating Ind
Yes
Cpm Functional Ind
Yes
Cpm Detection Ind
No
Cpm Conf Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
This leak was too small to be detectable through our scada and cpm system.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Natural Force Damage
Cause Details
Earth Movement, Not Due To Heavy Rains/floods
Natural Force Type
Earth Movement, Not Due To Heavy Rains/floods
Earth Subtype
Other
Nf Other Details
This Incident Is Attributed To Both Post Construction Settling Causing The Pipe To Bend, Coupled With A 7.9 Earthquake In 2002 Centered 3 Miles From The Pipeline.
Nf Extreme Weather Ind
No
Preparer Name
J** L*******
Preparer Title
Regulatory Compliance Manager
Preparer Email
J****************@a***************.com
Preparer Telephone
9077878858
Prepared Date
2016-04-05 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
T** S*****
Authorizer Telephone
9077878422
Authorizer Title
Compliance Director
Authorizer Email
T************@a***************.com
Narrative
On may 29, 2015, an excavation crew identified a weep in a below-ground isolation fitting installed on the taps 48-inch mainline at ps10, adjacent to bl2. (this was in a separate, adjacent location from where the excavation work was located; work on the dig was suspended when the weep was sighted.) the purpose of the isolation fitting was to electrically isolate the mainline and facility piping cathodic protection systems to provide optimal corrosion protection. This fitting was installed during initial construction. Currently, the isolation fitting is not needed due to upgrades to the cathodic protection systems, and it has been electrically bypassed. Ps10 has been out of service since 1998 and was straight piped in 2013. Initial reports concerning the weep were that the substance was potentially crude and a spill report was filed. However, due to the absence of lower explosive limit (lel) gas measurements and other characteristics including the presence of tar-based packing material in the isolation fitting, the precise nature of the substance was initially unclear. Thus alyeska sent a sample of the substance from ps10 and a sample of north slope crude out for a laboratory analysis. Test results received june 4, 2015, indicate the weeping moisture on the isolation flange at ps10 is weathered crude oil. Initially, the weep rate was about one drip per second, apparently due to the accumulation of crude within the tar membrane/packing material within the fitting. The original weep later stopped on its own, but there is now additional minor weeping. Alyeska has excavated approximately 5 yards of contaminated soil. All excavation has been done by hand thus far. There is no indication how long the weep has been active and the total volume extruded is uncertain. Technical solutions for repair and remediation are being evaluated. Contingency spill measures have been put in place, including 24-hour site monitoring; secondary containment (pipe cap); staging of a crew with a vac truck; and placement of an rb-100 (actuator) and generator on-site for contingency closure of the valve. Protocols are also being developed for assessment of other isolation fittings (21) located along the taps system. Update: on july 13, 2015, a 60-inch containment sleeve with grout injection and seal welding of plugs was completed. The weep is repaired though alyeska has final installation of conical ends for the sleeve scheduled for the end of september 2015. Alyeska has contracted stress engineering to conduct a cause analysis for this event. Alyeska continues investigations of other isolation fittings on taps to ensure no other failures have occurred. To date, september 10, 2015, no additional leaks have been identified. Update: the conical ends installation was completed in october 2015. Update: the root cause investigation for this incident was complete on march 1, 2016. The cause of this incident was determined to be attributed to both post construction settling causing the pipe to bend, coupled with a 7.9 earthquake in 2002 centered 3 miles from the pipeline. Alyeska has determined that it is highly unlikely that other isolation fittings on taps have been subject to these conditions and in general these isolation fitting are robust.
| Report Received Date | 2015-06-08 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2015 |
| Report Number | 20150214 |
| Supplemental Number | 21293 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 26149 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Alyeska Pipeline Service Co |
| Operator Street Address | Pob 196660 Ms 502 |
| Operator City Name | Anchorage |
| Operator State Abbreviation | AK |
| Operator Postal Code | 99519 |
| Local Datetime | 2015-05-29 17:00:00 |
| Location Latitude | 63.42546 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -145.7665 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Crude Oil |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 0.24 |
| Recovered Bbls | 0.24 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Contractor Working For The Operator |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2015-05-29 17:00:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | No |
| Shutdown Explain | Slow Weep Was Contained And Monitored At The Isolation Fitting. |
| On Site Datetime | 2016-05-29 17:00:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2015-05-29 17:28:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1118021 NRC Report How to search |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Upstream Valve Type Ind | Manual |
| Downstream Valve Type Ind | Manual |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Pump Station 10 |
| Segment Name | Pump Station 10 |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Ak |
| Onshore Postal Code | 99737 |
| Onshore City Name | Not Within A Municipality |
| Onshore County Name | Not Within A County Or Parish |
| Designated Location | Milepost/valve Station |
| Designated Name | Plmp 585.91 |
| Federal | Yes |
| Location Type | Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Under Soil |
| Depth Of Cover | 66 |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| Item Involved | Other |
| Item Involved Details | Isolation Fitting For Cp, No Longer Used |
| Installation Year | 1976 |
| Material Involved | Material Other Than Carbon Steel |
| Material Details | Coupling Seal Components |
| Release Type | Leak |
| Leak Type | Seal Or Packing |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | Yes |
| Long Term Assessment | Yes |
| Remediation Ind | Yes |
| Soil Remed Ind | Yes |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | Yes |
| Commodity Reached Hca | Yes |
| Other Pop Ind | Yes |
| Other Pop Yes No | Yes |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 0 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 2960000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 400000 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 300000 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 3660000 |
| Accident Psig | 461 |
| Mop Psig | 1090 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Length Segment Isolated | 1256 |
| Internal Inspection Ind | Yes |
| Operation Complications Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Cpm In Place Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Operating Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Functional Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Detection Ind | No |
| Cpm Conf Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | This leak was too small to be detectable through our scada and cpm system. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Natural Force Damage |
| Cause Details | Earth Movement, Not Due To Heavy Rains/floods |
| Natural Force Type | Earth Movement, Not Due To Heavy Rains/floods |
| Earth Subtype | Other |
| Nf Other Details | This Incident Is Attributed To Both Post Construction Settling Causing The Pipe To Bend, Coupled With A 7.9 Earthquake In 2002 Centered 3 Miles From The Pipeline. |
| Nf Extreme Weather Ind | No |
| Preparer Name | J** L******* |
| Preparer Title | Regulatory Compliance Manager |
| Preparer Email | J****************@a***************.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 9077878858 |
| Prepared Date | 2016-04-05 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | T** S***** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 9077878422 |
| Authorizer Title | Compliance Director |
| Authorizer Email | T************@a***************.com |
| Narrative | On may 29, 2015, an excavation crew identified a weep in a below-ground isolation fitting installed on the taps 48-inch mainline at ps10, adjacent to bl2. (this was in a separate, adjacent location from where the excavation work was located; work on the dig was suspended when the weep was sighted.) the purpose of the isolation fitting was to electrically isolate the mainline and facility piping cathodic protection systems to provide optimal corrosion protection. This fitting was installed during initial construction. Currently, the isolation fitting is not needed due to upgrades to the cathodic protection systems, and it has been electrically bypassed. Ps10 has been out of service since 1998 and was straight piped in 2013. Initial reports concerning the weep were that the substance was potentially crude and a spill report was filed. However, due to the absence of lower explosive limit (lel) gas measurements and other characteristics including the presence of tar-based packing material in the isolation fitting, the precise nature of the substance was initially unclear. Thus alyeska sent a sample of the substance from ps10 and a sample of north slope crude out for a laboratory analysis. Test results received june 4, 2015, indicate the weeping moisture on the isolation flange at ps10 is weathered crude oil. Initially, the weep rate was about one drip per second, apparently due to the accumulation of crude within the tar membrane/packing material within the fitting. The original weep later stopped on its own, but there is now additional minor weeping. Alyeska has excavated approximately 5 yards of contaminated soil. All excavation has been done by hand thus far. There is no indication how long the weep has been active and the total volume extruded is uncertain. Technical solutions for repair and remediation are being evaluated. Contingency spill measures have been put in place, including 24-hour site monitoring; secondary containment (pipe cap); staging of a crew with a vac truck; and placement of an rb-100 (actuator) and generator on-site for contingency closure of the valve. Protocols are also being developed for assessment of other isolation fittings (21) located along the taps system. Update: on july 13, 2015, a 60-inch containment sleeve with grout injection and seal welding of plugs was completed. The weep is repaired though alyeska has final installation of conical ends for the sleeve scheduled for the end of september 2015. Alyeska has contracted stress engineering to conduct a cause analysis for this event. Alyeska continues investigations of other isolation fittings on taps to ensure no other failures have occurred. To date, september 10, 2015, no additional leaks have been identified. Update: the conical ends installation was completed in october 2015. Update: the root cause investigation for this incident was complete on march 1, 2016. The cause of this incident was determined to be attributed to both post construction settling causing the pipe to bend, coupled with a 7.9 earthquake in 2002 centered 3 miles from the pipeline. Alyeska has determined that it is highly unlikely that other isolation fittings on taps have been subject to these conditions and in general these isolation fitting are robust. |
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