Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
GD incident on 2015-06-15 — HI
Operator
Hawai`igas
Cause
Excavation Issue
Commodity
Synthetic Gas
Program
GD
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
1 injury
Property damage (nominal)
$100,000
Incident datetime
2015-06-15 21:38
Report number
Location
HI, HONOLULU
Narrative
Incident summary on 06/15/2015, road builders ("rb") was cold planing a portion of kapahulu avenue in honolulu with an asphalt milling machine. Between 2115 and 2130, the machine struck a hawaii gas ("hg") underground main line, causing an approximately 9.5-inch tear in the main. The damaged segment was 4-inch steel pipe coated with xtc ("subject segment"). The subject segment began to leak gas and at an unverified time, the gas ignited around the machine. Two rb employees were injured in connection with the fire and one required inpatient hospitalization. The honolulu fire department ("hfd") responded and directed water at the machine to prevent its fuel tanks from overheating. Hg stopped the flow of gas to the subject segment at approximately 0253 on 06/16/2015, the fire dissipated shortly thereafter and hfd announced an "all clear" at approximately 0300. Hg pre-incident activity hg installed the subject segment in 1977. On 02/09/2015, rb submitted one call ticket 15001196 (the "ticket") to the hawaii one call center stating that rb would be excavating an area of kapahulu avenue (the "excavation area"), including the subject segment. Hg responded to the ticket by reviewing excavation area maps and determining that an underground main was located therein. On 02/19/2015, hg performed conductive and inductive toning in the excavation area and marked the approximate location of the main line on the roadway surface with yellow paint. Hg response to incident hg was alerted to the incident in two ways: 1) the hg synthetic natural gas plant recorded a pressure irregularity in the gas pipeline and notified hg dispatch at approximately 2130; and 2) hfd notified hg dispatch at approximately 2138. An hg operations superintendent arrived at the scene at approximately 2200. Other hg personnel were notified between 2145 and 2215, and began arriving at the hg kamakee baseyard between 2215 and 2300. The hg supervisory team concluded that the main line would need to be excavated and stopped at three locations: north, south and west of the incident. Hg personnel installed line stoppers at the north and south sites and pinched the line at the west site. Gas flow to the subject segment was stopped at approximately 0253 on 06/16/15. Statutory and regulatory context (1) hawaii one call statute the hawaii one call statute requires an excavator to provide excavation location to the one call center prior to excavating, and the center notifies utility operators about the proposed excavation. The operator locates and marks on the roadway the approximate location of installations that may be affected by the excavation, but is not required to mark depth under the statute. The excavator must then use hand tools to determine the exact location of the installation. Here, hg responded to the ticket by reviewing maps, performing toning and marking the alignment--but not depth--of the gas main in the excavation area with yellow paint. Hg was in full compliance with the one call statute. Rb does not appear to have hand excavated and located the subject segment in compliance with the statute. (2) subject segment depth federal regulations in 1977 required 24-inch cover for a main line. A main line can be installed with less than 24-inch cover if an underground structure prevents such installation and the line is provided with additional protection. On 06/16/2015, the subject segment was measured at approximately 8 inches below the roadway surface. If the subject segment was installed with less than 24-inch cover in 1977, the above exception applies. City records indicate that a conduit structure runs directly below the subject segment, preventing installation of the subject segment at 24-inch depth. The subject segment was encased in concrete, providing the additional protection required for mains installed with less than 24-inch cover. Please contact hg for additional narrative detail in pdf format.
Detailed record list
Occurred At
2015-06-15 21:38:00
Year
2015
Report Received Date
2015-07-14 00:00:00
Iyear
2015.0
Report Number
20150070.0
Supplemental Number
16117.0
Report Type
Original Final
Operator Id
6243
Name
Hawai`igas
Operator Street Address
515 Kamakee Street (P.o. Box 3000)
Operator City Name
Honolulu
Operator State Abbreviation
HI
Operator Postal Code
96802-3000
Local Datetime
2015-06-15 21:30:00
Location Street Address
645 Kapahulu Ave
Location City Name
Honolulu
Location County Name
Honolulu
Location State Abbreviation
HI
Location Postal Code
96815
Location Latitude
21.279528
Location Longitude
-157.813958
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2015-06-16 00:08:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1119900
Commodity Released Type
Synthetic Gas
Unintentional Release
160.0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
Yes
Num Emp Injuries
0
Num Contr Injuries
0
Num Er Injuries
0
Num Worker Injuries
1
Num Gp Injuries
0
Injure
1
Ignite Ind
Yes
Explode Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0.0
Incident Identified Datetime
2015-06-15 21:38:00
On Site Datetime
2015-06-15 22:00:00
Federal
No
Location Type
Public Property
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Exposed Due To Excavation
Depth Of Cover
8.0
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Privately Owned
System Part Involved
Main
Installation Year
1977.0
Pipe Diameter
4.0
Pipe Specification
Unknown
Pipe Manufacturer
Unknown
Material Involved
Steel
Steel Seam Type
Other
Steel Seam Type Details
Unknown
Wt Steel
0.25
Release Type
Mechanical Puncture
Puncture Axial
9.5
Puncture Circum
0.5
Class Location Type
Class 4 Location
Est Cost Oper Paid
500000.0
Est Cost Prop Damage
100000.0
Est Cost Emergency
10000.0
Est Cost Other
0.0
Est Cost Unintentional Release
3900.0
Prpty
613900.0
Commercial Affected
2.0
Industrial Affected
0.0
Residences Affected
8.0
Accident Psig
12.0
Normal Psig
12.0
Mop Psig
17.0
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop
Scada In Place Ind
No
Accident Identifier
Notification From Emergency Responder
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
Excavation damage caused by third party.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Excavation Damage
Cause Details
Excavation Damage By Third Party
Ex Party Type
Excavation Damage By Third Party
Ex Hydrotest Leak Survey Date
2014-01-01 00:00:00
Ex Hydrotest Conducted Ind
No
Prior Notification Ind
Yes
One Call System Ind
Yes
Excavator Ind
Yes
Contractor Ind
Yes
Notify Cga Dirt
Yes
Public Row Ind
Yes
Public Subtype
City Street
Excavator Type
Contractor
Excavator Equipment
Milling Equipment
Work Performed
Milling
One Call Notified Ind
Yes
One Call Ticket Num
15001196
Locator Type
Utility Owner
Visible Marks
Yes
Root Cause Category
Excavation Issue
Root Cause Type
Improper Excavation Practice Not Listed Above
Preparer Name
C********** H***
Preparer Title
Imp Engineer
Preparer Email
C****@h********.com
Preparer Telephone
808-594-5553
Authorizer Name
T***** Y****
Authorizer Title
Executive Vp And Coo
Authorizer Telephone
808-535-5935
Authorizer Email
T******@h********.com
Narrative
Incident summary on 06/15/2015, road builders ("rb") was cold planing a portion of kapahulu avenue in honolulu with an asphalt milling machine. Between 2115 and 2130, the machine struck a hawaii gas ("hg") underground main line, causing an approximately 9.5-inch tear in the main. The damaged segment was 4-inch steel pipe coated with xtc ("subject segment"). The subject segment began to leak gas and at an unverified time, the gas ignited around the machine. Two rb employees were injured in connection with the fire and one required inpatient hospitalization. The honolulu fire department ("hfd") responded and directed water at the machine to prevent its fuel tanks from overheating. Hg stopped the flow of gas to the subject segment at approximately 0253 on 06/16/2015, the fire dissipated shortly thereafter and hfd announced an "all clear" at approximately 0300. Hg pre-incident activity hg installed the subject segment in 1977. On 02/09/2015, rb submitted one call ticket 15001196 (the "ticket") to the hawaii one call center stating that rb would be excavating an area of kapahulu avenue (the "excavation area"), including the subject segment. Hg responded to the ticket by reviewing excavation area maps and determining that an underground main was located therein. On 02/19/2015, hg performed conductive and inductive toning in the excavation area and marked the approximate location of the main line on the roadway surface with yellow paint. Hg response to incident hg was alerted to the incident in two ways: 1) the hg synthetic natural gas plant recorded a pressure irregularity in the gas pipeline and notified hg dispatch at approximately 2130; and 2) hfd notified hg dispatch at approximately 2138. An hg operations superintendent arrived at the scene at approximately 2200. Other hg personnel were notified between 2145 and 2215, and began arriving at the hg kamakee baseyard between 2215 and 2300. The hg supervisory team concluded that the main line would need to be excavated and stopped at three locations: north, south and west of the incident. Hg personnel installed line stoppers at the north and south sites and pinched the line at the west site. Gas flow to the subject segment was stopped at approximately 0253 on 06/16/15. Statutory and regulatory context (1) hawaii one call statute the hawaii one call statute requires an excavator to provide excavation location to the one call center prior to excavating, and the center notifies utility operators about the proposed excavation. The operator locates and marks on the roadway the approximate location of installations that may be affected by the excavation, but is not required to mark depth under the statute. The excavator must then use hand tools to determine the exact location of the installation. Here, hg responded to the ticket by reviewing maps, performing toning and marking the alignment--but not depth--of the gas main in the excavation area with yellow paint. Hg was in full compliance with the one call statute. Rb does not appear to have hand excavated and located the subject segment in compliance with the statute. (2) subject segment depth federal regulations in 1977 required 24-inch cover for a main line. A main line can be installed with less than 24-inch cover if an underground structure prevents such installation and the line is provided with additional protection. On 06/16/2015, the subject segment was measured at approximately 8 inches below the roadway surface. If the subject segment was installed with less than 24-inch cover in 1977, the above exception applies. City records indicate that a conduit structure runs directly below the subject segment, preventing installation of the subject segment at 24-inch depth. The subject segment was encased in concrete, providing the additional protection required for mains installed with less than 24-inch cover. Please contact hg for additional narrative detail in pdf format.
| Occurred At | 2015-06-15 21:38:00 |
|---|---|
| Year | 2015 |
| Report Received Date | 2015-07-14 00:00:00 |
| Iyear | 2015.0 |
| Report Number | 20150070.0 |
| Supplemental Number | 16117.0 |
| Report Type | Original Final |
| Operator Id | 6243 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Hawai`igas |
| Operator Street Address | 515 Kamakee Street (P.o. Box 3000) |
| Operator City Name | Honolulu |
| Operator State Abbreviation | HI |
| Operator Postal Code | 96802-3000 |
| Local Datetime | 2015-06-15 21:30:00 |
| Location Street Address | 645 Kapahulu Ave |
| Location City Name | Honolulu |
| Location County Name | Honolulu |
| Location State Abbreviation | HI |
| Location Postal Code | 96815 |
| Location Latitude | 21.279528 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -157.813958 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2015-06-16 00:08:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1119900 NRC Report How to search |
| Commodity Released Type | Synthetic Gas |
| Unintentional Release | 160.0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | Yes |
| Num Emp Injuries | 0 |
| Num Contr Injuries | 0 |
| Num Er Injuries | 0 |
| Num Worker Injuries | 1 |
| Num Gp Injuries | 0 |
| Injure | 1 |
| Ignite Ind | Yes |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0.0 |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2015-06-15 21:38:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2015-06-15 22:00:00 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Public Property |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Exposed Due To Excavation |
| Depth Of Cover | 8.0 |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Privately Owned |
| System Part Involved | Main |
| Installation Year | 1977.0 |
| Pipe Diameter | 4.0 |
| Pipe Specification | Unknown |
| Pipe Manufacturer | Unknown |
| Material Involved | Steel |
| Steel Seam Type | Other |
| Steel Seam Type Details | Unknown |
| Wt Steel | 0.25 |
| Release Type | Mechanical Puncture |
| Puncture Axial | 9.5 |
| Puncture Circum | 0.5 |
| Class Location Type | Class 4 Location |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 500000.0 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 100000.0 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 10000.0 |
| Est Cost Other | 0.0 |
| Est Cost Unintentional Release | 3900.0 |
| Prpty | 613900.0 |
| Commercial Affected | 2.0 |
| Industrial Affected | 0.0 |
| Residences Affected | 8.0 |
| Accident Psig | 12.0 |
| Normal Psig | 12.0 |
| Mop Psig | 17.0 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop |
| Scada In Place Ind | No |
| Accident Identifier | Notification From Emergency Responder |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | Excavation damage caused by third party. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Excavation Damage |
| Cause Details | Excavation Damage By Third Party |
| Ex Party Type | Excavation Damage By Third Party |
| Ex Hydrotest Leak Survey Date | 2014-01-01 00:00:00 |
| Ex Hydrotest Conducted Ind | No |
| Prior Notification Ind | Yes |
| One Call System Ind | Yes |
| Excavator Ind | Yes |
| Contractor Ind | Yes |
| Notify Cga Dirt | Yes |
| Public Row Ind | Yes |
| Public Subtype | City Street |
| Excavator Type | Contractor |
| Excavator Equipment | Milling Equipment |
| Work Performed | Milling |
| One Call Notified Ind | Yes |
| One Call Ticket Num | 15001196 |
| Locator Type | Utility Owner |
| Visible Marks | Yes |
| Root Cause Category | Excavation Issue |
| Root Cause Type | Improper Excavation Practice Not Listed Above |
| Preparer Name | C********** H*** |
| Preparer Title | Imp Engineer |
| Preparer Email | C****@h********.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 808-594-5553 |
| Authorizer Name | T***** Y**** |
| Authorizer Title | Executive Vp And Coo |
| Authorizer Telephone | 808-535-5935 |
| Authorizer Email | T******@h********.com |
| Narrative | Incident summary on 06/15/2015, road builders ("rb") was cold planing a portion of kapahulu avenue in honolulu with an asphalt milling machine. Between 2115 and 2130, the machine struck a hawaii gas ("hg") underground main line, causing an approximately 9.5-inch tear in the main. The damaged segment was 4-inch steel pipe coated with xtc ("subject segment"). The subject segment began to leak gas and at an unverified time, the gas ignited around the machine. Two rb employees were injured in connection with the fire and one required inpatient hospitalization. The honolulu fire department ("hfd") responded and directed water at the machine to prevent its fuel tanks from overheating. Hg stopped the flow of gas to the subject segment at approximately 0253 on 06/16/2015, the fire dissipated shortly thereafter and hfd announced an "all clear" at approximately 0300. Hg pre-incident activity hg installed the subject segment in 1977. On 02/09/2015, rb submitted one call ticket 15001196 (the "ticket") to the hawaii one call center stating that rb would be excavating an area of kapahulu avenue (the "excavation area"), including the subject segment. Hg responded to the ticket by reviewing excavation area maps and determining that an underground main was located therein. On 02/19/2015, hg performed conductive and inductive toning in the excavation area and marked the approximate location of the main line on the roadway surface with yellow paint. Hg response to incident hg was alerted to the incident in two ways: 1) the hg synthetic natural gas plant recorded a pressure irregularity in the gas pipeline and notified hg dispatch at approximately 2130; and 2) hfd notified hg dispatch at approximately 2138. An hg operations superintendent arrived at the scene at approximately 2200. Other hg personnel were notified between 2145 and 2215, and began arriving at the hg kamakee baseyard between 2215 and 2300. The hg supervisory team concluded that the main line would need to be excavated and stopped at three locations: north, south and west of the incident. Hg personnel installed line stoppers at the north and south sites and pinched the line at the west site. Gas flow to the subject segment was stopped at approximately 0253 on 06/16/15. Statutory and regulatory context (1) hawaii one call statute the hawaii one call statute requires an excavator to provide excavation location to the one call center prior to excavating, and the center notifies utility operators about the proposed excavation. The operator locates and marks on the roadway the approximate location of installations that may be affected by the excavation, but is not required to mark depth under the statute. The excavator must then use hand tools to determine the exact location of the installation. Here, hg responded to the ticket by reviewing maps, performing toning and marking the alignment--but not depth--of the gas main in the excavation area with yellow paint. Hg was in full compliance with the one call statute. Rb does not appear to have hand excavated and located the subject segment in compliance with the statute. (2) subject segment depth federal regulations in 1977 required 24-inch cover for a main line. A main line can be installed with less than 24-inch cover if an underground structure prevents such installation and the line is provided with additional protection. On 06/16/2015, the subject segment was measured at approximately 8 inches below the roadway surface. If the subject segment was installed with less than 24-inch cover in 1977, the above exception applies. City records indicate that a conduit structure runs directly below the subject segment, preventing installation of the subject segment at 24-inch depth. The subject segment was encased in concrete, providing the additional protection required for mains installed with less than 24-inch cover. Please contact hg for additional narrative detail in pdf format. |
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