Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2014-10-28 — OK
Operator
Blue Racer Midstream, Llc
Cause
Other Outside Force Damage
Commodity
Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$2,034,000
Incident datetime
2014-10-28 03:27
Report number
Location
OK
Narrative
After packing an 8" condensate pipeline, the line ruptured at an exposed area that had been filled with foam breakers to mitigate slippage. Stress engineering (ses) provided technical support during the inspection of the failed section of pipeline, and conducted the metalurgical investigation to determine validity of the proposed explanation that the foam breakers combusted which caused the pipeline to rupture. Ses was onsite for an inspection on october 30th through november 4th, 2014 and had access to the rupture site on november 1st and november 3rd, 2014. Ses performed a preliminary visual examination and provided a cut plan to remove the failed 8-inch pipe from the line on november 4th, 2014. On november 7th, 2014, ses provided a preliminary summary report entitled "inspection of an 8-inch pipeline" to report observations made during ses's site inspection. This report included photographic documentation of the rupture site and a brief summary of the observations made while onsite. Early in this investigation ses considered various damage mechanisms associated with common failures, and deemed them as not likely to have occurred; however, these mechanisms were explored further for added confirmation during the investigation. This included, but was not limited to, stress corrosion cracking, wall loss due to internal or external corrosion, and service related fatigue. No evidence of such damage mechanisms were observed during the investigation. In addition, damages associated with transport and construction related activity, such as mechanical dents or gouges, were also considered. No evidence of such mechanisms were observed during the investigation. On november 15th, 2014, ses provided a pre-inspection protocol that would allow ses to prepare the formal metallurgical testing protocol, which was issued on november 24th, 2014. On december 4th and 5th, 2014, the laboratory examinations were conducted under the supervision of ses personnel and in the presence of personnel from unified investigations and sciences and scientific expert analysis. Modifications to the testing protocol were made during the laboratory examination as agreed to by those attending the inspection. Based on the completed analyses, ses concluded that the rupture occurred due to the loss of material strength, subsequent bulging, and wall thinning all caused by locally overheated line pipe material in combination with the internal pipeline pressure. The local overheating and the internal pressure reduced the pressure required to rupture the pipeline joint of interest by lowering the material strength and reducing the wall thickness.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2014-12-30 00:00:00
Iyear
2014
Report Number
20140440
Supplemental Number
21125
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
39010
Name
Blue Racer Midstream, Llc
Operator Street Address
One Williams Center
Operator City Name
Tulsa
Operator State Abbreviation
OK
Operator Postal Code
74172
Local Datetime
2014-10-28 03:15:00
Location Latitude
39.784839
Location Longitude
-80.96325
Commodity Released Type
Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions
Commodity Subtype
Other Hvl
Commodity Details
Condensate
Unintentional Release Bbls
0
Intentional Release Bbls
0
Recovered Bbls
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Notification From Emergency Responder
Incident Identified Datetime
2014-10-28 03:27:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
On Off Shore
Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
No
Shutdown Explain
Pipeline Was Loaded, But Was Not Operational
On Site Datetime
2014-10-28 04:17:00
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2014-10-28 05:49:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1099483
Ignite Ind
Yes
Explode Ind
Yes
Upstream Valve Type Ind
Automatic
Downstream Valve Type Ind
Automatic
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
8" Berne To Natrium
Segment Name
8" Berne To Natrium
Onshore State Abbreviation
Oh
Onshore Postal Code
43914
Onshore City Name
Cameron
Onshore County Name
Monroe
Designated Location
Survey Station No.
Designated Name
1045+00
Federal
No
Location Type
Pipeline Right-Of-Way
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Other
Incident Area Details
Exposed Due To Slip Mitigation
Depth Of Cover
Unknown
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
Item Involved
Pipe
Pipe Type
Pipe Body
Pipe Diameter
8.625
Pipe Wall Thickness
0.219
Pipe Smys
52000
Pipe Specification
Api 5l
Pipe Seam Type
Erw - High Frequency
Pipe Manufacturer
Paragon Industries
Pipe Coating Type
Fusion Bonded Epoxy(Fbe)
Installation Year
2014
Manufactured Year
2014
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Rupture
Rupture Orient
Circumferential
Rupture Width
8
Rupture Length
8
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
No
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
No
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
No
Commodity Reached Hca
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
10000
Est Cost Gas Released
47000
Est Cost Prop Damage
2034000
Est Cost Emergency
140000
Est Cost Environmental
12000
Est Cost Other
0
Est Cost Other Details
There Were No Other Estimated Costs
Prpty
2243000
Accident Psig
570
Mop Psig
1440
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Length Segment Isolated
31680
Internal Inspection Ind
Yes
Operation Complications Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Gathering
Scada In Place Ind
No
Cpm In Place Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the facility was not monitored by a controller(s) at the time of the accident
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Other Outside Force Damage
Cause Details
Nearby Industrial, Man-Made, Or Other Fire/explosion As Primary Cause Of Accident
Outside Force Type
Nearby Industrial, Man-Made, Or Other Fire/explosion As Primary Cause Of Incident
Preparer Name
J****** B*******
Preparer Title
Regulatory Compliance Coordinator
Preparer Email
J********@b*****************.com
Preparer Telephone
3304479052
Preparer Fax
7404219272
Prepared Date
2016-02-12 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
D***** W********
Authorizer Telephone
214-580-3711
Authorizer Title
Senior Vp Of Engineering And Operations
Authorizer Email
D*****@c***********.com
Narrative
After packing an 8" condensate pipeline, the line ruptured at an exposed area that had been filled with foam breakers to mitigate slippage. Stress engineering (ses) provided technical support during the inspection of the failed section of pipeline, and conducted the metalurgical investigation to determine validity of the proposed explanation that the foam breakers combusted which caused the pipeline to rupture. Ses was onsite for an inspection on october 30th through november 4th, 2014 and had access to the rupture site on november 1st and november 3rd, 2014. Ses performed a preliminary visual examination and provided a cut plan to remove the failed 8-inch pipe from the line on november 4th, 2014. On november 7th, 2014, ses provided a preliminary summary report entitled "inspection of an 8-inch pipeline" to report observations made during ses's site inspection. This report included photographic documentation of the rupture site and a brief summary of the observations made while onsite. Early in this investigation ses considered various damage mechanisms associated with common failures, and deemed them as not likely to have occurred; however, these mechanisms were explored further for added confirmation during the investigation. This included, but was not limited to, stress corrosion cracking, wall loss due to internal or external corrosion, and service related fatigue. No evidence of such damage mechanisms were observed during the investigation. In addition, damages associated with transport and construction related activity, such as mechanical dents or gouges, were also considered. No evidence of such mechanisms were observed during the investigation. On november 15th, 2014, ses provided a pre-inspection protocol that would allow ses to prepare the formal metallurgical testing protocol, which was issued on november 24th, 2014. On december 4th and 5th, 2014, the laboratory examinations were conducted under the supervision of ses personnel and in the presence of personnel from unified investigations and sciences and scientific expert analysis. Modifications to the testing protocol were made during the laboratory examination as agreed to by those attending the inspection. Based on the completed analyses, ses concluded that the rupture occurred due to the loss of material strength, subsequent bulging, and wall thinning all caused by locally overheated line pipe material in combination with the internal pipeline pressure. The local overheating and the internal pressure reduced the pressure required to rupture the pipeline joint of interest by lowering the material strength and reducing the wall thickness.
| Report Received Date | 2014-12-30 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2014 |
| Report Number | 20140440 |
| Supplemental Number | 21125 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 39010 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Blue Racer Midstream, Llc |
| Operator Street Address | One Williams Center |
| Operator City Name | Tulsa |
| Operator State Abbreviation | OK |
| Operator Postal Code | 74172 |
| Local Datetime | 2014-10-28 03:15:00 |
| Location Latitude | 39.784839 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -80.96325 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions |
| Commodity Subtype | Other Hvl |
| Commodity Details | Condensate |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 0 |
| Intentional Release Bbls | 0 |
| Recovered Bbls | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Notification From Emergency Responder |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2014-10-28 03:27:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | No |
| Shutdown Explain | Pipeline Was Loaded, But Was Not Operational |
| On Site Datetime | 2014-10-28 04:17:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2014-10-28 05:49:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1099483 NRC Report How to search |
| Ignite Ind | Yes |
| Explode Ind | Yes |
| Upstream Valve Type Ind | Automatic |
| Downstream Valve Type Ind | Automatic |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | 8" Berne To Natrium |
| Segment Name | 8" Berne To Natrium |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Oh |
| Onshore Postal Code | 43914 |
| Onshore City Name | Cameron |
| Onshore County Name | Monroe |
| Designated Location | Survey Station No. |
| Designated Name | 1045+00 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Pipeline Right-Of-Way |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Other |
| Incident Area Details | Exposed Due To Slip Mitigation |
| Depth Of Cover | Unknown |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| Item Involved | Pipe |
| Pipe Type | Pipe Body |
| Pipe Diameter | 8.625 |
| Pipe Wall Thickness | 0.219 |
| Pipe Smys | 52000 |
| Pipe Specification | Api 5l |
| Pipe Seam Type | Erw - High Frequency |
| Pipe Manufacturer | Paragon Industries |
| Pipe Coating Type | Fusion Bonded Epoxy(Fbe) |
| Installation Year | 2014 |
| Manufactured Year | 2014 |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Rupture |
| Rupture Orient | Circumferential |
| Rupture Width | 8 |
| Rupture Length | 8 |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | No |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | No |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Commodity Reached Hca | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 10000 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 47000 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 2034000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 140000 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 12000 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Est Cost Other Details | There Were No Other Estimated Costs |
| Prpty | 2243000 |
| Accident Psig | 570 |
| Mop Psig | 1440 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Length Segment Isolated | 31680 |
| Internal Inspection Ind | Yes |
| Operation Complications Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | > 20% Smys Regulated Gathering |
| Scada In Place Ind | No |
| Cpm In Place Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | No, the facility was not monitored by a controller(s) at the time of the accident |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Other Outside Force Damage |
| Cause Details | Nearby Industrial, Man-Made, Or Other Fire/explosion As Primary Cause Of Accident |
| Outside Force Type | Nearby Industrial, Man-Made, Or Other Fire/explosion As Primary Cause Of Incident |
| Preparer Name | J****** B******* |
| Preparer Title | Regulatory Compliance Coordinator |
| Preparer Email | J********@b*****************.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 3304479052 |
| Preparer Fax | 7404219272 |
| Prepared Date | 2016-02-12 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | D***** W******** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 214-580-3711 |
| Authorizer Title | Senior Vp Of Engineering And Operations |
| Authorizer Email | D*****@c***********.com |
| Narrative | After packing an 8" condensate pipeline, the line ruptured at an exposed area that had been filled with foam breakers to mitigate slippage. Stress engineering (ses) provided technical support during the inspection of the failed section of pipeline, and conducted the metalurgical investigation to determine validity of the proposed explanation that the foam breakers combusted which caused the pipeline to rupture. Ses was onsite for an inspection on october 30th through november 4th, 2014 and had access to the rupture site on november 1st and november 3rd, 2014. Ses performed a preliminary visual examination and provided a cut plan to remove the failed 8-inch pipe from the line on november 4th, 2014. On november 7th, 2014, ses provided a preliminary summary report entitled "inspection of an 8-inch pipeline" to report observations made during ses's site inspection. This report included photographic documentation of the rupture site and a brief summary of the observations made while onsite. Early in this investigation ses considered various damage mechanisms associated with common failures, and deemed them as not likely to have occurred; however, these mechanisms were explored further for added confirmation during the investigation. This included, but was not limited to, stress corrosion cracking, wall loss due to internal or external corrosion, and service related fatigue. No evidence of such damage mechanisms were observed during the investigation. In addition, damages associated with transport and construction related activity, such as mechanical dents or gouges, were also considered. No evidence of such mechanisms were observed during the investigation. On november 15th, 2014, ses provided a pre-inspection protocol that would allow ses to prepare the formal metallurgical testing protocol, which was issued on november 24th, 2014. On december 4th and 5th, 2014, the laboratory examinations were conducted under the supervision of ses personnel and in the presence of personnel from unified investigations and sciences and scientific expert analysis. Modifications to the testing protocol were made during the laboratory examination as agreed to by those attending the inspection. Based on the completed analyses, ses concluded that the rupture occurred due to the loss of material strength, subsequent bulging, and wall thinning all caused by locally overheated line pipe material in combination with the internal pipeline pressure. The local overheating and the internal pressure reduced the pressure required to rupture the pipeline joint of interest by lowering the material strength and reducing the wall thickness. |
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