Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2014-07-25 — OK
Operator
Oneok Ngl Pipeline, Llc
Cause
Equipment Failure
Commodity
Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$3,334
Incident datetime
2014-07-25 18:45
Report number
Location
OK
Narrative
Area operator responded to a gas detect station lock out, and seal fail lockout on pump 2 at oakhurst. During the investigation, it was discovered that product was releasing from the outboard seal between the gland and lock collar. The majority of product was released into the atmosphere. Upon arrival the area rep blew the remainder of the product down and the pump was placed out of service. Mechanics and supervisor were notified. An estimated 14 bbls of y grade was released into the atmosphere. The root cause identified by champion manufacturing, our internal investigation and cause map determined that a sticky substance possibly a combination of glycol, amine and pipeline rouge had coated the primary seal during operation, which damaged the o-rings preventing them from being able to move freely in turn created heat which ultimately led to the seal fail. The secondary seal fail was caused by the introduction of the same substance after the primary seal let go preventing the secondary seal from sealing. The only feasible solution we arrived at is to try and identify the injection site responsible for introducing the foreign substance by aggressively checking strainers and filters at our injection sites between bridgeport and cleburne boosters. As of 8/22/2014 we have not identified any injection locations that have been determined to be responsible for the foreign substance. 12/17/2014 -- oneok has sampled product from all of the injection sites and has not been able to determine where the substance originated. All injection plants have been reminded of the minimum product quality standards required to inject product into oneok's pipeline.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2014-08-22 00:00:00
Iyear
2014
Report Number
20140303
Supplemental Number
19988
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
32109
Name
Oneok Ngl Pipeline, Llc
Operator Street Address
100 West Fifth Street
Operator City Name
Tulsa
Operator State Abbreviation
OK
Operator Postal Code
74103
Local Datetime
2014-07-25 18:45:00
Location Latitude
30.737681
Location Longitude
-95.340804
Commodity Released Type
Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions
Commodity Subtype
Lpg (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) / Ngl (Natural Gas Liquid)
Unintentional Release Bbls
14
Intentional Release Bbls
2.3
Recovered Bbls
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Cpm Leak Detection System Or Scada-Based Information (Such As Alarm(S), Alert(S), Event(S), And/or Volume Calculations)
Incident Identified Datetime
2014-07-25 18:45:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Pump/meter Station Equipment And Piping
On Off Shore
Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
No
Shutdown Explain
Station Was Shutdown But Pipeline Continued To Flow Around The Station
On Site Datetime
2014-07-25 19:46:00
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Oneok Oakhurst Pump Station
Onshore State Abbreviation
Tx
Onshore Postal Code
77359
Onshore City Name
Oakhurst
Onshore County Name
Walker
Designated Location
Milepost/valve Station
Designated Name
Pump Station
Federal
No
Location Type
Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Aboveground
Incident Area Subtype
Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Intrastate
Item Involved
Pump
Installation Year
2011
Material Involved
Material Other Than Carbon Steel
Material Details
Pump Seal
Release Type
Leak
Leak Type
Seal Or Packing
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
No
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
No
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
Yes
Commodity Reached Hca
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
630
Est Cost Prop Damage
3334
Est Cost Emergency
154
Est Cost Environmental
0
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
4118
Accident Psig
1332
Mop Psig
2160
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
Yes
Scada Conf Ind
Yes
Cpm In Place Ind
Yes
Cpm Operating Ind
Yes
Cpm Functional Ind
Yes
Cpm Detection Ind
No
Cpm Conf Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
Station shutdown on seal fail alarm. Controller had not made any recent changes to pipeline operation.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Equipment Failure
Cause Details
Pump Or Pump-Related Equipment
Eq Failure Type
Pump Or Pump-Related Equipment
Other Pump Ind
Seal/packing Failure
Additional Breakdown Ind
Yes
Preparer Name
N*** J****
Preparer Title
Regulatory Compliance Coordinator
Preparer Email
N*********@o****.com
Preparer Telephone
580-395-6304
Preparer Fax
580-395-2933
Prepared Date
2014-12-17 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
N*** J****
Authorizer Telephone
580-395-6304
Authorizer Title
Regulatory Compliance Coordinator
Authorizer Email
N*********@o****.com
Narrative
Area operator responded to a gas detect station lock out, and seal fail lockout on pump 2 at oakhurst. During the investigation, it was discovered that product was releasing from the outboard seal between the gland and lock collar. The majority of product was released into the atmosphere. Upon arrival the area rep blew the remainder of the product down and the pump was placed out of service. Mechanics and supervisor were notified. An estimated 14 bbls of y grade was released into the atmosphere. The root cause identified by champion manufacturing, our internal investigation and cause map determined that a sticky substance possibly a combination of glycol, amine and pipeline rouge had coated the primary seal during operation, which damaged the o-rings preventing them from being able to move freely in turn created heat which ultimately led to the seal fail. The secondary seal fail was caused by the introduction of the same substance after the primary seal let go preventing the secondary seal from sealing. The only feasible solution we arrived at is to try and identify the injection site responsible for introducing the foreign substance by aggressively checking strainers and filters at our injection sites between bridgeport and cleburne boosters. As of 8/22/2014 we have not identified any injection locations that have been determined to be responsible for the foreign substance. 12/17/2014 -- oneok has sampled product from all of the injection sites and has not been able to determine where the substance originated. All injection plants have been reminded of the minimum product quality standards required to inject product into oneok's pipeline.
| Report Received Date | 2014-08-22 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2014 |
| Report Number | 20140303 |
| Supplemental Number | 19988 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 32109 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Oneok Ngl Pipeline, Llc |
| Operator Street Address | 100 West Fifth Street |
| Operator City Name | Tulsa |
| Operator State Abbreviation | OK |
| Operator Postal Code | 74103 |
| Local Datetime | 2014-07-25 18:45:00 |
| Location Latitude | 30.737681 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -95.340804 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions |
| Commodity Subtype | Lpg (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) / Ngl (Natural Gas Liquid) |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 14 |
| Intentional Release Bbls | 2.3 |
| Recovered Bbls | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Cpm Leak Detection System Or Scada-Based Information (Such As Alarm(S), Alert(S), Event(S), And/or Volume Calculations) |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2014-07-25 18:45:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pump/meter Station Equipment And Piping |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | No |
| Shutdown Explain | Station Was Shutdown But Pipeline Continued To Flow Around The Station |
| On Site Datetime | 2014-07-25 19:46:00 |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Oneok Oakhurst Pump Station |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Tx |
| Onshore Postal Code | 77359 |
| Onshore City Name | Oakhurst |
| Onshore County Name | Walker |
| Designated Location | Milepost/valve Station |
| Designated Name | Pump Station |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Aboveground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Intrastate |
| Item Involved | Pump |
| Installation Year | 2011 |
| Material Involved | Material Other Than Carbon Steel |
| Material Details | Pump Seal |
| Release Type | Leak |
| Leak Type | Seal Or Packing |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | No |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | No |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | Yes |
| Commodity Reached Hca | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 630 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 3334 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 154 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 0 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 4118 |
| Accident Psig | 1332 |
| Mop Psig | 2160 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | Yes |
| Scada Conf Ind | Yes |
| Cpm In Place Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Operating Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Functional Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Detection Ind | No |
| Cpm Conf Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | Station shutdown on seal fail alarm. Controller had not made any recent changes to pipeline operation. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Equipment Failure |
| Cause Details | Pump Or Pump-Related Equipment |
| Eq Failure Type | Pump Or Pump-Related Equipment |
| Other Pump Ind | Seal/packing Failure |
| Additional Breakdown Ind | Yes |
| Preparer Name | N*** J**** |
| Preparer Title | Regulatory Compliance Coordinator |
| Preparer Email | N*********@o****.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 580-395-6304 |
| Preparer Fax | 580-395-2933 |
| Prepared Date | 2014-12-17 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | N*** J**** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 580-395-6304 |
| Authorizer Title | Regulatory Compliance Coordinator |
| Authorizer Email | N*********@o****.com |
| Narrative | Area operator responded to a gas detect station lock out, and seal fail lockout on pump 2 at oakhurst. During the investigation, it was discovered that product was releasing from the outboard seal between the gland and lock collar. The majority of product was released into the atmosphere. Upon arrival the area rep blew the remainder of the product down and the pump was placed out of service. Mechanics and supervisor were notified. An estimated 14 bbls of y grade was released into the atmosphere. The root cause identified by champion manufacturing, our internal investigation and cause map determined that a sticky substance possibly a combination of glycol, amine and pipeline rouge had coated the primary seal during operation, which damaged the o-rings preventing them from being able to move freely in turn created heat which ultimately led to the seal fail. The secondary seal fail was caused by the introduction of the same substance after the primary seal let go preventing the secondary seal from sealing. The only feasible solution we arrived at is to try and identify the injection site responsible for introducing the foreign substance by aggressively checking strainers and filters at our injection sites between bridgeport and cleburne boosters. As of 8/22/2014 we have not identified any injection locations that have been determined to be responsible for the foreign substance. 12/17/2014 -- oneok has sampled product from all of the injection sites and has not been able to determine where the substance originated. All injection plants have been reminded of the minimum product quality standards required to inject product into oneok's pipeline. |
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