Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
GD incident on 2014-10-29 — NY
Operator
Keyspan Energy Delivery - Ny City
Cause
Other Incident Cause
Commodity
—
Program
GD
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$0
Incident datetime
2014-10-29 12:35
Report number
Location
NY, RICHMOND
Narrative
On october 28th of 2014, a national grid staten island field ops crew mobilized to investigate a leak at 45 trantor pl. They found a steel protection plate on top of the service tee cap. As a result, the service tee was leaking and required repair. The crew installed a new service tee, transferred the service connection and installed an adam sleeve over the leaking section as a 'make safe' temporary repair. They monitored the location overnight. The following day (october 29th) the crew returned to the location to make the permanent repair. In order to perform the repair, they needed to isolate the section of main by applying squeeze off devices. They reviewed the nrg maps and contacted gas control to confirm that the main was back fed. The gas control operator utilized the 'connectivity' tool in the nrg mapping system and panned to about 600 scale in order to confirm backfeed. Since the 'connectivity' tool and a pan of the area confirmed that there was a backfeed, approval to perform the squeeze off was granted by gas control. Unfortunately, the 'connectivity' tool did not account for the dead end of the main which is about 1.6 miles from the job location. Field ops nor gas control identified the deadend in the nrg mapping system when they reviewed it because to capture both the job location and the dead end, the user would have to zoom out to 900 scale. The crew installed and monitored pressure gauges prior to the installation of the isolation devices (squeeze offs). Knowledge of the unplanned supply interruption occurred when the national grid call center started to receive no gas calls around 12:00pm. There were 226 customers involved in the outage.
Detailed record list
Occurred At
2014-10-29 12:35:00
Year
2014
Report Received Date
2014-11-21 00:00:00
Iyear
2014.0
Report Number
20140103.0
Supplemental Number
15968.0
Report Type
Original Final
Operator Id
1800
Name
Keyspan Energy Delivery - Ny City
Operator Street Address
1 Metrotech Center
Operator City Name
Brooklyn
Operator State Abbreviation
NY
Operator Postal Code
11201
Local Datetime
2014-10-29 12:07:00
Location Street Address
45 Trantor Place
Location City Name
New York
Location County Name
Richmond
Location State Abbreviation
NY
Location Postal Code
10302
Location Latitude
40.632374
Location Longitude
-74.142818
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2014-10-29 15:06:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1099674
Unintentional Release
0.0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0.0
Incident Identified Datetime
2014-10-29 12:35:00
On Site Datetime
2014-10-29 12:36:00
Federal
No
Location Type
Public Property
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Exposed Due To Excavation
Depth Of Cover
14.0
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Privately Owned
System Part Involved
Main
Installation Year
2000.0
Pipe Diameter
8.0
Pipe Specification
Medium Density Md2406 Yellow
Pipe Manufacturer
Plexco/driscopipe 6500
Material Involved
Plastic
Plastic Type
Polyethylene (Pe)
Plastic Sdr
13.5
Material Pe Pipe Code
2406
Release Type
Other
Release Type Details
No Release Involved
Class Location Type
Class 4 Location
Est Cost Oper Paid
0.0
Est Cost Prop Damage
0.0
Est Cost Emergency
64000.0
Est Cost Other
0.0
Est Cost Unintentional Release
0.0
Prpty
64000.0
Commercial Affected
11.0
Industrial Affected
1.0
Residences Affected
212.0
Accident Psig
44.0
Normal Psig
44.0
Mop Psig
60.0
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Accident Identifier
Other
Accident Details
Numerous Calls From The Public Reporting "no Gas" Conditions In Their Homes.
Investigation Status
Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)
Invest Schedule Ind
Yes
Invest Other Ind
Yes
Invest Other Ind Details
Connectivity Tool In The Nrg Mapping System Malfunctioned Because It Indicated That The 8' Pl 60psi Main On Trantor Pl Was A Viable Isolation Point.
Employee Drug Test Ind
Yes
Num Employees Tested
2
Num Employees Failed
0
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Other Incident Cause
Cause Details
Miscellaneous
Other Type
Miscellaneous
Misc Details
Fld Ops Contacted Gas Control (Gc) To Confirm Connectivity Of The Main. The Gc Oper Used The 'connectivity' Tool (Tool) In The Map Sys To Confirm Connectivity. The Gc Oper Also Reviewed The Area In The Map Sys To About A 600 Scale. The Tool & A Review Of The Area Confirmed That The Main Was Back Fed, Approval To Perform The Sqz Off Was Granted By Gc. The Tool Did Not Account For The Dead End Of The Main Which Is About 1.6 Miles From The Job Location & Would Be Viewed At About A 900 Scale
Preparer Name
D**** A*******
Preparer Title
Manager
Preparer Email
D*************@n***********.com
Preparer Telephone
718 403 3347
Authorizer Name
R***** D********
Authorizer Title
Vp Maint And Constr Ny Gas
Authorizer Telephone
5165454337
Authorizer Email
R***************@n***********.com
Narrative
On october 28th of 2014, a national grid staten island field ops crew mobilized to investigate a leak at 45 trantor pl. They found a steel protection plate on top of the service tee cap. As a result, the service tee was leaking and required repair. The crew installed a new service tee, transferred the service connection and installed an adam sleeve over the leaking section as a 'make safe' temporary repair. They monitored the location overnight. The following day (october 29th) the crew returned to the location to make the permanent repair. In order to perform the repair, they needed to isolate the section of main by applying squeeze off devices. They reviewed the nrg maps and contacted gas control to confirm that the main was back fed. The gas control operator utilized the 'connectivity' tool in the nrg mapping system and panned to about 600 scale in order to confirm backfeed. Since the 'connectivity' tool and a pan of the area confirmed that there was a backfeed, approval to perform the squeeze off was granted by gas control. Unfortunately, the 'connectivity' tool did not account for the dead end of the main which is about 1.6 miles from the job location. Field ops nor gas control identified the deadend in the nrg mapping system when they reviewed it because to capture both the job location and the dead end, the user would have to zoom out to 900 scale. The crew installed and monitored pressure gauges prior to the installation of the isolation devices (squeeze offs). Knowledge of the unplanned supply interruption occurred when the national grid call center started to receive no gas calls around 12:00pm. There were 226 customers involved in the outage.
| Occurred At | 2014-10-29 12:35:00 |
|---|---|
| Year | 2014 |
| Report Received Date | 2014-11-21 00:00:00 |
| Iyear | 2014.0 |
| Report Number | 20140103.0 |
| Supplemental Number | 15968.0 |
| Report Type | Original Final |
| Operator Id | 1800 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Keyspan Energy Delivery - Ny City |
| Operator Street Address | 1 Metrotech Center |
| Operator City Name | Brooklyn |
| Operator State Abbreviation | NY |
| Operator Postal Code | 11201 |
| Local Datetime | 2014-10-29 12:07:00 |
| Location Street Address | 45 Trantor Place |
| Location City Name | New York |
| Location County Name | Richmond |
| Location State Abbreviation | NY |
| Location Postal Code | 10302 |
| Location Latitude | 40.632374 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -74.142818 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2014-10-29 15:06:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1099674 NRC Report How to search |
| Unintentional Release | 0.0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0.0 |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2014-10-29 12:35:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2014-10-29 12:36:00 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Public Property |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Exposed Due To Excavation |
| Depth Of Cover | 14.0 |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Privately Owned |
| System Part Involved | Main |
| Installation Year | 2000.0 |
| Pipe Diameter | 8.0 |
| Pipe Specification | Medium Density Md2406 Yellow |
| Pipe Manufacturer | Plexco/driscopipe 6500 |
| Material Involved | Plastic |
| Plastic Type | Polyethylene (Pe) |
| Plastic Sdr | 13.5 |
| Material Pe Pipe Code | 2406 |
| Release Type | Other |
| Release Type Details | No Release Involved |
| Class Location Type | Class 4 Location |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0.0 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 0.0 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 64000.0 |
| Est Cost Other | 0.0 |
| Est Cost Unintentional Release | 0.0 |
| Prpty | 64000.0 |
| Commercial Affected | 11.0 |
| Industrial Affected | 1.0 |
| Residences Affected | 212.0 |
| Accident Psig | 44.0 |
| Normal Psig | 44.0 |
| Mop Psig | 60.0 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Accident Identifier | Other |
| Accident Details | Numerous Calls From The Public Reporting "no Gas" Conditions In Their Homes. |
| Investigation Status | Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply) |
| Invest Schedule Ind | Yes |
| Invest Other Ind | Yes |
| Invest Other Ind Details | Connectivity Tool In The Nrg Mapping System Malfunctioned Because It Indicated That The 8' Pl 60psi Main On Trantor Pl Was A Viable Isolation Point. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | Yes |
| Num Employees Tested | 2 |
| Num Employees Failed | 0 |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Other Incident Cause |
| Cause Details | Miscellaneous |
| Other Type | Miscellaneous |
| Misc Details | Fld Ops Contacted Gas Control (Gc) To Confirm Connectivity Of The Main. The Gc Oper Used The 'connectivity' Tool (Tool) In The Map Sys To Confirm Connectivity. The Gc Oper Also Reviewed The Area In The Map Sys To About A 600 Scale. The Tool & A Review Of The Area Confirmed That The Main Was Back Fed, Approval To Perform The Sqz Off Was Granted By Gc. The Tool Did Not Account For The Dead End Of The Main Which Is About 1.6 Miles From The Job Location & Would Be Viewed At About A 900 Scale |
| Preparer Name | D**** A******* |
| Preparer Title | Manager |
| Preparer Email | D*************@n***********.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 718 403 3347 |
| Authorizer Name | R***** D******** |
| Authorizer Title | Vp Maint And Constr Ny Gas |
| Authorizer Telephone | 5165454337 |
| Authorizer Email | R***************@n***********.com |
| Narrative | On october 28th of 2014, a national grid staten island field ops crew mobilized to investigate a leak at 45 trantor pl. They found a steel protection plate on top of the service tee cap. As a result, the service tee was leaking and required repair. The crew installed a new service tee, transferred the service connection and installed an adam sleeve over the leaking section as a 'make safe' temporary repair. They monitored the location overnight. The following day (october 29th) the crew returned to the location to make the permanent repair. In order to perform the repair, they needed to isolate the section of main by applying squeeze off devices. They reviewed the nrg maps and contacted gas control to confirm that the main was back fed. The gas control operator utilized the 'connectivity' tool in the nrg mapping system and panned to about 600 scale in order to confirm backfeed. Since the 'connectivity' tool and a pan of the area confirmed that there was a backfeed, approval to perform the squeeze off was granted by gas control. Unfortunately, the 'connectivity' tool did not account for the dead end of the main which is about 1.6 miles from the job location. Field ops nor gas control identified the deadend in the nrg mapping system when they reviewed it because to capture both the job location and the dead end, the user would have to zoom out to 900 scale. The crew installed and monitored pressure gauges prior to the installation of the isolation devices (squeeze offs). Knowledge of the unplanned supply interruption occurred when the national grid call center started to receive no gas calls around 12:00pm. There were 226 customers involved in the outage. |
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