Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
GTG incident on 2014-02-27 — MI
Operator
Dte Gas Company
Cause
Equipment Failure
Commodity
Natural Gas
Program
GTG
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$66,805
Incident datetime
2014-02-27 02:57
Report number
Location
MI
Narrative
On february 27, 2014, at 01:30 a dte gas operator at belle river mills (brm) compressor station received a high differential pressure alarm for the particulate filters on the glycol regeneration skid and a plant shutdown indication at the remote columbus dehydration plant. At 02:00, the brm operator directed a transmission tech to report to columbus compressor station(ccs)to investigate and correct the cause of the shutdown, and the high differential for the particulate filters. Tech arrived at the ccs at 02:45. Tech determined the particulate filters on the glycol skid at the dehydration plant were plugged (cause not clear at the time but assumed to be by salt) causing the increase in pressure differential. Tech noticed that the local control panel indicated the cause of plant shutdown to be high liquid level in the flash tank. Tech drained the cage for the flash tank level switch to reset the switch and this caused the pumps to restart automatically in accordance with the control logic for the plant. Tech proceeded in accordance with normal procedure to bypass and drain the filter casing to remove and replace the filter elements. While changing the filters, tech heard the liquid level control valve on contactor a go wide open. Tech observed a high level of glycol in the contactor sight glass. To shut off the flow of glycol to contactor a, the tech opened the pump bypass valve. The pumps started cavitating, so the tech opened all pump bypass valves which is standard procedure when pump cavitation occurs. The tech observed the level of glycol in the reboiler was high. At this same instant, the tech observed the emission control system (ecs) flare stack ignite with a large flame. Tech attempted to open the reboiler drain valve to drain glycol from the reboiler to the surge tank and stabilize levels in the system.Tech then heard the creaking noise of what appeared to be expanding pipe and immediately evacuated the building. Tech contacted the brm operators to inform them of the fire and to discontinue flow through the ccs. After the tech left the building the sight glass on the reboiler broke spilling 1200 gallons of glycol in the building. Tech did not activate the manual pull station for the safety shutdown system (ssd) for the dehydration plant since the gas relief stacks were in close proximity to the fire in the ecs flare stack. Instead,the tech manually opened the contactor blow-down valves to evacuate gas from the plant building and direct the gas to the blow-down silencer at a safe distance from the fire. The blow-down of contactor a and the compressor fuel gas system was followed by the blow-down of contactor b at approximately 04:00. Additional technicians arrived at the ccs at approximately 04:00 and 04:30. Supervisor arrived at 05:30. Team attempted to use the 150# fire extinguisher to quench the fire on top of the flare stack without success. The fire in the ecs flare stake continued to burn, and the techs observed red light for lel alarm and realized the concentration of gas was building up inside the dehydration building. The techs and the supervisor were unable to determine the source of the leaking gas inside the building since the building was filled with steam from the spilled glycol. Once the glycol cooled, the techs entered the building and observed gas was leaking at the broken sight glass on the reboiler. Initially the techs and supervisor believed that the source of fuel to the ecs was glycol and hydrocarbon and not natural gas. The team found out it was natural gas that was feeding the fire when they turned off the valves to the sight glass on the reboiler and the flame outside on the outside on the ecs flare increased. Upon opening the valves the ecs flame decreased. The team then determined the gas was coming through the check valves from the contactors and pumps out to the ecs.They shut the manual valves downstream of the check valves at contactors a&b and the flame to the ecs extinguished at 07:30.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2014-03-29 00:00:00
Iyear
2014
Report Number
20140034
Supplemental Number
16846
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
12408
Name
Dte Gas Company
Operator Street Address
1 Energy Plaza
Operator City Name
Detroit
Operator State Abbreviation
MI
Operator Postal Code
48226
Local Datetime
2014-02-27 03:30:00
Location Latitude
42.851484
Location Longitude
-82.67567
Nrc Rpt Num
1075691
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2014-03-04 11:01:00
Commodity Released Type
Natural Gas
Unintentional Release
171.8
Intentional Release
0
Accompanying Liquid
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Shutdown Datetime
2014-02-27 07:30:00
Restart Datetime
2014-03-10 11:00:00
Ignite Ind
Yes
Explode Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Incident Identified Datetime
2014-02-27 02:57:00
On Site Datetime
2014-02-27 02:57:00
On Off Shore
Onshore
Onshore State Abbreviation
Mi
Onshore Postal Code
48062
Onshore City Name
Richmond
Onshore County Name
St. Clair
Designated Location
Milepost
Designated Name
Prop Id #6328
Pipe Fac Name
Columbus Compressor Station
Segment Name
Dehydration Plant
Federal
No
Location Type
Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Aboveground
Incident Area Subtype
Inside A Building
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Intrastate
System Part Involved
Onshore Compressor Station Equipment And Piping
Item Involved
Dehydrator/drier/treater/scrubber
Installation Year
1998
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Other
Release Type Details
Check Valve Did Not Hold Due To Salt And Other Materials;
Class Location Type
Class 1 Location
Could Be Hca
No
Pir Radius
5
Heat Damage Ind
No
Non Heat Damage Ind
No
Hca Fatalities Ind
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Unintentional Release
794
Est Cost Intentional Release
0
Est Cost Prop Damage
66805
Est Cost Emergency
6624
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
74223
Accident Psig
5
Mop Psig
1440
Mop Cfr Section
192.619(A)(2)
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Pipeline Function
Transmission System
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
Gas controller was contacted by operator prior to any alert from scada system. Gas controller followed all applicable procedures.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Equipment Failure
Cause Details
Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment
Eq Failure Type
Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment
Instrumentation Ind
Yes
Check Valve Ind
Yes
Additional Vibration Ind
Yes
Additional Valve Ind
Yes
Additional Alarm Ind
Yes
Preparer Name
R***** F*********
Preparer Title
Manager
Preparer Email
F**********@d********.com
Preparer Telephone
313-389-7755
Preparer Fax
313-389-7757
Authorizer Name
R***** F*********
Authorizer Title
Manager
Authorizer Telephone
313-389-7755
Authorizer Email
F**********@d********.com
Narrative
On february 27, 2014, at 01:30 a dte gas operator at belle river mills (brm) compressor station received a high differential pressure alarm for the particulate filters on the glycol regeneration skid and a plant shutdown indication at the remote columbus dehydration plant. At 02:00, the brm operator directed a transmission tech to report to columbus compressor station(ccs)to investigate and correct the cause of the shutdown, and the high differential for the particulate filters. Tech arrived at the ccs at 02:45. Tech determined the particulate filters on the glycol skid at the dehydration plant were plugged (cause not clear at the time but assumed to be by salt) causing the increase in pressure differential. Tech noticed that the local control panel indicated the cause of plant shutdown to be high liquid level in the flash tank. Tech drained the cage for the flash tank level switch to reset the switch and this caused the pumps to restart automatically in accordance with the control logic for the plant. Tech proceeded in accordance with normal procedure to bypass and drain the filter casing to remove and replace the filter elements. While changing the filters, tech heard the liquid level control valve on contactor a go wide open. Tech observed a high level of glycol in the contactor sight glass. To shut off the flow of glycol to contactor a, the tech opened the pump bypass valve. The pumps started cavitating, so the tech opened all pump bypass valves which is standard procedure when pump cavitation occurs. The tech observed the level of glycol in the reboiler was high. At this same instant, the tech observed the emission control system (ecs) flare stack ignite with a large flame. Tech attempted to open the reboiler drain valve to drain glycol from the reboiler to the surge tank and stabilize levels in the system.Tech then heard the creaking noise of what appeared to be expanding pipe and immediately evacuated the building. Tech contacted the brm operators to inform them of the fire and to discontinue flow through the ccs. After the tech left the building the sight glass on the reboiler broke spilling 1200 gallons of glycol in the building. Tech did not activate the manual pull station for the safety shutdown system (ssd) for the dehydration plant since the gas relief stacks were in close proximity to the fire in the ecs flare stack. Instead,the tech manually opened the contactor blow-down valves to evacuate gas from the plant building and direct the gas to the blow-down silencer at a safe distance from the fire. The blow-down of contactor a and the compressor fuel gas system was followed by the blow-down of contactor b at approximately 04:00. Additional technicians arrived at the ccs at approximately 04:00 and 04:30. Supervisor arrived at 05:30. Team attempted to use the 150# fire extinguisher to quench the fire on top of the flare stack without success. The fire in the ecs flare stake continued to burn, and the techs observed red light for lel alarm and realized the concentration of gas was building up inside the dehydration building. The techs and the supervisor were unable to determine the source of the leaking gas inside the building since the building was filled with steam from the spilled glycol. Once the glycol cooled, the techs entered the building and observed gas was leaking at the broken sight glass on the reboiler. Initially the techs and supervisor believed that the source of fuel to the ecs was glycol and hydrocarbon and not natural gas. The team found out it was natural gas that was feeding the fire when they turned off the valves to the sight glass on the reboiler and the flame outside on the outside on the ecs flare increased. Upon opening the valves the ecs flame decreased. The team then determined the gas was coming through the check valves from the contactors and pumps out to the ecs.They shut the manual valves downstream of the check valves at contactors a&b and the flame to the ecs extinguished at 07:30.
| Report Received Date | 2014-03-29 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2014 |
| Report Number | 20140034 |
| Supplemental Number | 16846 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 12408 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Dte Gas Company |
| Operator Street Address | 1 Energy Plaza |
| Operator City Name | Detroit |
| Operator State Abbreviation | MI |
| Operator Postal Code | 48226 |
| Local Datetime | 2014-02-27 03:30:00 |
| Location Latitude | 42.851484 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -82.67567 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1075691 NRC Report How to search |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2014-03-04 11:01:00 |
| Commodity Released Type | Natural Gas |
| Unintentional Release | 171.8 |
| Intentional Release | 0 |
| Accompanying Liquid | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | Yes |
| Shutdown Datetime | 2014-02-27 07:30:00 |
| Restart Datetime | 2014-03-10 11:00:00 |
| Ignite Ind | Yes |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2014-02-27 02:57:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2014-02-27 02:57:00 |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Mi |
| Onshore Postal Code | 48062 |
| Onshore City Name | Richmond |
| Onshore County Name | St. Clair |
| Designated Location | Milepost |
| Designated Name | Prop Id #6328 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Columbus Compressor Station |
| Segment Name | Dehydration Plant |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Aboveground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Inside A Building |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Intrastate |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Compressor Station Equipment And Piping |
| Item Involved | Dehydrator/drier/treater/scrubber |
| Installation Year | 1998 |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Other |
| Release Type Details | Check Valve Did Not Hold Due To Salt And Other Materials; |
| Class Location Type | Class 1 Location |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Pir Radius | 5 |
| Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Non Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Hca Fatalities Ind | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Unintentional Release | 794 |
| Est Cost Intentional Release | 0 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 66805 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 6624 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 74223 |
| Accident Psig | 5 |
| Mop Psig | 1440 |
| Mop Cfr Section | 192.619(A)(2) View CFR 49 §192 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | Transmission System |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Operator Employee |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | Gas controller was contacted by operator prior to any alert from scada system. Gas controller followed all applicable procedures. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Equipment Failure |
| Cause Details | Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment |
| Eq Failure Type | Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment |
| Instrumentation Ind | Yes |
| Check Valve Ind | Yes |
| Additional Vibration Ind | Yes |
| Additional Valve Ind | Yes |
| Additional Alarm Ind | Yes |
| Preparer Name | R***** F********* |
| Preparer Title | Manager |
| Preparer Email | F**********@d********.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 313-389-7755 |
| Preparer Fax | 313-389-7757 |
| Authorizer Name | R***** F********* |
| Authorizer Title | Manager |
| Authorizer Telephone | 313-389-7755 |
| Authorizer Email | F**********@d********.com |
| Narrative | On february 27, 2014, at 01:30 a dte gas operator at belle river mills (brm) compressor station received a high differential pressure alarm for the particulate filters on the glycol regeneration skid and a plant shutdown indication at the remote columbus dehydration plant. At 02:00, the brm operator directed a transmission tech to report to columbus compressor station(ccs)to investigate and correct the cause of the shutdown, and the high differential for the particulate filters. Tech arrived at the ccs at 02:45. Tech determined the particulate filters on the glycol skid at the dehydration plant were plugged (cause not clear at the time but assumed to be by salt) causing the increase in pressure differential. Tech noticed that the local control panel indicated the cause of plant shutdown to be high liquid level in the flash tank. Tech drained the cage for the flash tank level switch to reset the switch and this caused the pumps to restart automatically in accordance with the control logic for the plant. Tech proceeded in accordance with normal procedure to bypass and drain the filter casing to remove and replace the filter elements. While changing the filters, tech heard the liquid level control valve on contactor a go wide open. Tech observed a high level of glycol in the contactor sight glass. To shut off the flow of glycol to contactor a, the tech opened the pump bypass valve. The pumps started cavitating, so the tech opened all pump bypass valves which is standard procedure when pump cavitation occurs. The tech observed the level of glycol in the reboiler was high. At this same instant, the tech observed the emission control system (ecs) flare stack ignite with a large flame. Tech attempted to open the reboiler drain valve to drain glycol from the reboiler to the surge tank and stabilize levels in the system.Tech then heard the creaking noise of what appeared to be expanding pipe and immediately evacuated the building. Tech contacted the brm operators to inform them of the fire and to discontinue flow through the ccs. After the tech left the building the sight glass on the reboiler broke spilling 1200 gallons of glycol in the building. Tech did not activate the manual pull station for the safety shutdown system (ssd) for the dehydration plant since the gas relief stacks were in close proximity to the fire in the ecs flare stack. Instead,the tech manually opened the contactor blow-down valves to evacuate gas from the plant building and direct the gas to the blow-down silencer at a safe distance from the fire. The blow-down of contactor a and the compressor fuel gas system was followed by the blow-down of contactor b at approximately 04:00. Additional technicians arrived at the ccs at approximately 04:00 and 04:30. Supervisor arrived at 05:30. Team attempted to use the 150# fire extinguisher to quench the fire on top of the flare stack without success. The fire in the ecs flare stake continued to burn, and the techs observed red light for lel alarm and realized the concentration of gas was building up inside the dehydration building. The techs and the supervisor were unable to determine the source of the leaking gas inside the building since the building was filled with steam from the spilled glycol. Once the glycol cooled, the techs entered the building and observed gas was leaking at the broken sight glass on the reboiler. Initially the techs and supervisor believed that the source of fuel to the ecs was glycol and hydrocarbon and not natural gas. The team found out it was natural gas that was feeding the fire when they turned off the valves to the sight glass on the reboiler and the flame outside on the outside on the ecs flare increased. Upon opening the valves the ecs flame decreased. The team then determined the gas was coming through the check valves from the contactors and pumps out to the ecs.They shut the manual valves downstream of the check valves at contactors a&b and the flame to the ecs extinguished at 07:30. |
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