Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
GTG incident on 2014-02-28 — ND
Operator
Wbi Energy Transmission, Inc.
Cause
Equipment Failure
Commodity
Natural Gas
Program
GTG
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$521,243
Incident datetime
2014-02-28 09:40
Report number
Location
ND
Narrative
***supplemental report*** unified investigations & sciences, inc. (uis) was contracted to direct and complete an investigation on the gas fired heater incident that occurred on 2/28/14. Uis coordinated the removal of the failed section of piping from the gas fired heater on 4/1/14. An intact exemplar pipe section from a lower elevation within the gas fired heater was also removed at the same time to be analyzed with the failed section. The samples were sent to forensic consultants group, llc (fcg) in denver, co to evaluate the failed pipe section and to determine whether or not material selection, pre-existing damage, user error, operating conditions, and/or design/manufacturing defects caused or contributed to the observed failure. Fcg finding: - the "fishmouth" type rupture in the spool piece showed extensive deformation and thinning typical of a relatively short-term overheat failure. - extensive secondary cracking was noted in both the circumferential welds on either side of the spool piece and in the spool piece material itself. The presence of the extensive secondary cracking along with the cracking that led to the failure shows that the failure was due to a uniform condition in the piping such as excessive temperature, pressure, or inadequate wall thickness rather than an isolated defect. - the ultimate failure of the spool piece was caused by elevated-temperature thinning of the tube wall and the initiation and growth of creep cracks to the point where the remaining cross section could no longer support the internal gas pressure. - the results of the optical emission spectroscopy (oes) of the material showed that the chemical composition was within the requirements for the sa106 grade b material. - the results of the tensile tests indicate that the spool piece and the adjacent piping material met the mechanical property requirements of sa106 grade b material. Wbi has analyzed the findings in the fcg report and have initiated taking several steps to prevent this incident from happening again on the replacement unit and on existing units. During the installation of the new gas fired heater, wbi will require the manufacture of the gas fired heater to be onsite for the startup/commissioning and verification of all logic, system interlocks, and shutdowns. Additional shutdowns will be added to the logic including a shutdown requiring the regen compressor to be in a run state for the gas fired heater to be in operation and a secondary differential pressure shutdown device will be added to measure flow going into the gas fired heater and shutdown on low flow conditions. In addition to the steps wbi will take on the replacement gas fired heater unit, wbi will also take additional steps with our existing units to confirm they are in satisfactory operational condition. Prior to the end of 2014 wbi will: - develop a plan to verify the integrity of the tubing bundles to identify areas of tube swelling and cracking and fully implement this plan within 12 months, - establish criteria and verify that system shutdowns occur quickly enough to prevent any damage from occurring in the case of a unit malfunction, and - inspect and calibrate all gas fired heater equipment. Wbi will standardize the inspection and calibration form and require that all stations inspect and calibrate all gas fired heater equipment annually; and wbi will implement the developed inspection plan of the tubing bundles to be done every three years. Wbi feels implementing the above described processes is a prudent approach to mitigating safety concerns associated with this incident.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2014-03-28 00:00:00
Iyear
2014
Report Number
20140032
Supplemental Number
16468
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
22655
Name
Wbi Energy Transmission, Inc.
Operator Street Address
1250 West Century Avenue
Operator City Name
Bismarck
Operator State Abbreviation
ND
Operator Postal Code
58503
Local Datetime
2014-02-28 09:40:00
Location Latitude
44.991913
Location Longitude
-108.867065
Nrc Rpt Num
1075387
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2014-02-28 11:20:00
Commodity Released Type
Natural Gas
Unintentional Release
224
Intentional Release
0
Accompanying Liquid
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
No
Shutdown Explain
The Damaged Facility Was Safetly Isolated Without Shutting Down The Station.
Ignite Ind
Yes
Explode Ind
Yes
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Incident Identified Datetime
2014-02-28 09:40:00
On Site Datetime
2014-02-28 09:40:00
On Off Shore
Onshore
Onshore State Abbreviation
Wy
Onshore Postal Code
82435-1164
Onshore City Name
Powell
Onshore County Name
Park
Designated Location
Survey Station No.
Designated Name
0+00
Pipe Fac Name
Elk Basin Compressor Station
Segment Name
Gas Fired Heater
Federal
No
Location Type
Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Aboveground
Incident Area Subtype
Inside A Building
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
System Part Involved
Onshore Compressor Station Equipment And Piping
Item Involved
Compressor
Installation Year
2012
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Rupture
Rupture Orient
Longitudinal
Rupture Length
11
Rupture Width
4
Class Location Type
Class 1 Location
Could Be Hca
No
Pir Radius
161
Heat Damage Ind
No
Non Heat Damage Ind
No
Hca Fatalities Ind
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Unintentional Release
1231
Est Cost Intentional Release
0
Est Cost Prop Damage
521243
Est Cost Emergency
900
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
523374
Accident Psig
594
Mop Psig
1137
Mop Cfr Section
Not On Omb-Approved Form When Submitted
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Pipeline Function
Transmission System
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
Yes
Scada Conf Ind
Yes
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
Investigation Status
Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)
Invest Schedule Ind
Yes
Invest No Control Room Ind
Yes
Invest No Controller Ind
Yes
Employee Drug Test Ind
Yes
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Num Employees Tested
3
Num Employees Failed
0
Cause
Equipment Failure
Cause Details
Failure Of Equipment Body (Except Compressor), Vessel Plate, Or Other Material
Eq Failure Type
Failure Of Equipment Body (Except Compressor), Vessel Plate, Or Other Material
Eq Additional Other Ind
Yes
Eq Additional Other Details
See Part H, Narrative Description.
Preparer Name
K*** K***
Preparer Title
Dot Compliance Supervisor
Preparer Email
K********@w********.com
Preparer Telephone
406-359-7222
Preparer Fax
406-359-7244
Authorizer Name
K*** K***
Authorizer Title
Dot Compliance Supervisor
Authorizer Telephone
406-359-7222
Authorizer Email
K********@w********.com
Narrative
***supplemental report*** unified investigations & sciences, inc. (uis) was contracted to direct and complete an investigation on the gas fired heater incident that occurred on 2/28/14. Uis coordinated the removal of the failed section of piping from the gas fired heater on 4/1/14. An intact exemplar pipe section from a lower elevation within the gas fired heater was also removed at the same time to be analyzed with the failed section. The samples were sent to forensic consultants group, llc (fcg) in denver, co to evaluate the failed pipe section and to determine whether or not material selection, pre-existing damage, user error, operating conditions, and/or design/manufacturing defects caused or contributed to the observed failure. Fcg finding: - the "fishmouth" type rupture in the spool piece showed extensive deformation and thinning typical of a relatively short-term overheat failure. - extensive secondary cracking was noted in both the circumferential welds on either side of the spool piece and in the spool piece material itself. The presence of the extensive secondary cracking along with the cracking that led to the failure shows that the failure was due to a uniform condition in the piping such as excessive temperature, pressure, or inadequate wall thickness rather than an isolated defect. - the ultimate failure of the spool piece was caused by elevated-temperature thinning of the tube wall and the initiation and growth of creep cracks to the point where the remaining cross section could no longer support the internal gas pressure. - the results of the optical emission spectroscopy (oes) of the material showed that the chemical composition was within the requirements for the sa106 grade b material. - the results of the tensile tests indicate that the spool piece and the adjacent piping material met the mechanical property requirements of sa106 grade b material. Wbi has analyzed the findings in the fcg report and have initiated taking several steps to prevent this incident from happening again on the replacement unit and on existing units. During the installation of the new gas fired heater, wbi will require the manufacture of the gas fired heater to be onsite for the startup/commissioning and verification of all logic, system interlocks, and shutdowns. Additional shutdowns will be added to the logic including a shutdown requiring the regen compressor to be in a run state for the gas fired heater to be in operation and a secondary differential pressure shutdown device will be added to measure flow going into the gas fired heater and shutdown on low flow conditions. In addition to the steps wbi will take on the replacement gas fired heater unit, wbi will also take additional steps with our existing units to confirm they are in satisfactory operational condition. Prior to the end of 2014 wbi will: - develop a plan to verify the integrity of the tubing bundles to identify areas of tube swelling and cracking and fully implement this plan within 12 months, - establish criteria and verify that system shutdowns occur quickly enough to prevent any damage from occurring in the case of a unit malfunction, and - inspect and calibrate all gas fired heater equipment. Wbi will standardize the inspection and calibration form and require that all stations inspect and calibrate all gas fired heater equipment annually; and wbi will implement the developed inspection plan of the tubing bundles to be done every three years. Wbi feels implementing the above described processes is a prudent approach to mitigating safety concerns associated with this incident.
| Report Received Date | 2014-03-28 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2014 |
| Report Number | 20140032 |
| Supplemental Number | 16468 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 22655 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Wbi Energy Transmission, Inc. |
| Operator Street Address | 1250 West Century Avenue |
| Operator City Name | Bismarck |
| Operator State Abbreviation | ND |
| Operator Postal Code | 58503 |
| Local Datetime | 2014-02-28 09:40:00 |
| Location Latitude | 44.991913 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -108.867065 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1075387 NRC Report How to search |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2014-02-28 11:20:00 |
| Commodity Released Type | Natural Gas |
| Unintentional Release | 224 |
| Intentional Release | 0 |
| Accompanying Liquid | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | No |
| Shutdown Explain | The Damaged Facility Was Safetly Isolated Without Shutting Down The Station. |
| Ignite Ind | Yes |
| Explode Ind | Yes |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2014-02-28 09:40:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2014-02-28 09:40:00 |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Wy |
| Onshore Postal Code | 82435-1164 |
| Onshore City Name | Powell |
| Onshore County Name | Park |
| Designated Location | Survey Station No. |
| Designated Name | 0+00 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Elk Basin Compressor Station |
| Segment Name | Gas Fired Heater |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Aboveground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Inside A Building |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Compressor Station Equipment And Piping |
| Item Involved | Compressor |
| Installation Year | 2012 |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Rupture |
| Rupture Orient | Longitudinal |
| Rupture Length | 11 |
| Rupture Width | 4 |
| Class Location Type | Class 1 Location |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Pir Radius | 161 |
| Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Non Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Hca Fatalities Ind | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Unintentional Release | 1231 |
| Est Cost Intentional Release | 0 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 521243 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 900 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 523374 |
| Accident Psig | 594 |
| Mop Psig | 1137 |
| Mop Cfr Section | Not On Omb-Approved Form When Submitted View CFR 49 §192 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | Transmission System |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | Yes |
| Scada Conf Ind | Yes |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Operator Employee |
| Investigation Status | Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply) |
| Invest Schedule Ind | Yes |
| Invest No Control Room Ind | Yes |
| Invest No Controller Ind | Yes |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | Yes |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Num Employees Tested | 3 |
| Num Employees Failed | 0 |
| Cause | Equipment Failure |
| Cause Details | Failure Of Equipment Body (Except Compressor), Vessel Plate, Or Other Material |
| Eq Failure Type | Failure Of Equipment Body (Except Compressor), Vessel Plate, Or Other Material |
| Eq Additional Other Ind | Yes |
| Eq Additional Other Details | See Part H, Narrative Description. |
| Preparer Name | K*** K*** |
| Preparer Title | Dot Compliance Supervisor |
| Preparer Email | K********@w********.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 406-359-7222 |
| Preparer Fax | 406-359-7244 |
| Authorizer Name | K*** K*** |
| Authorizer Title | Dot Compliance Supervisor |
| Authorizer Telephone | 406-359-7222 |
| Authorizer Email | K********@w********.com |
| Narrative | ***supplemental report*** unified investigations & sciences, inc. (uis) was contracted to direct and complete an investigation on the gas fired heater incident that occurred on 2/28/14. Uis coordinated the removal of the failed section of piping from the gas fired heater on 4/1/14. An intact exemplar pipe section from a lower elevation within the gas fired heater was also removed at the same time to be analyzed with the failed section. The samples were sent to forensic consultants group, llc (fcg) in denver, co to evaluate the failed pipe section and to determine whether or not material selection, pre-existing damage, user error, operating conditions, and/or design/manufacturing defects caused or contributed to the observed failure. Fcg finding: - the "fishmouth" type rupture in the spool piece showed extensive deformation and thinning typical of a relatively short-term overheat failure. - extensive secondary cracking was noted in both the circumferential welds on either side of the spool piece and in the spool piece material itself. The presence of the extensive secondary cracking along with the cracking that led to the failure shows that the failure was due to a uniform condition in the piping such as excessive temperature, pressure, or inadequate wall thickness rather than an isolated defect. - the ultimate failure of the spool piece was caused by elevated-temperature thinning of the tube wall and the initiation and growth of creep cracks to the point where the remaining cross section could no longer support the internal gas pressure. - the results of the optical emission spectroscopy (oes) of the material showed that the chemical composition was within the requirements for the sa106 grade b material. - the results of the tensile tests indicate that the spool piece and the adjacent piping material met the mechanical property requirements of sa106 grade b material. Wbi has analyzed the findings in the fcg report and have initiated taking several steps to prevent this incident from happening again on the replacement unit and on existing units. During the installation of the new gas fired heater, wbi will require the manufacture of the gas fired heater to be onsite for the startup/commissioning and verification of all logic, system interlocks, and shutdowns. Additional shutdowns will be added to the logic including a shutdown requiring the regen compressor to be in a run state for the gas fired heater to be in operation and a secondary differential pressure shutdown device will be added to measure flow going into the gas fired heater and shutdown on low flow conditions. In addition to the steps wbi will take on the replacement gas fired heater unit, wbi will also take additional steps with our existing units to confirm they are in satisfactory operational condition. Prior to the end of 2014 wbi will: - develop a plan to verify the integrity of the tubing bundles to identify areas of tube swelling and cracking and fully implement this plan within 12 months, - establish criteria and verify that system shutdowns occur quickly enough to prevent any damage from occurring in the case of a unit malfunction, and - inspect and calibrate all gas fired heater equipment. Wbi will standardize the inspection and calibration form and require that all stations inspect and calibrate all gas fired heater equipment annually; and wbi will implement the developed inspection plan of the tubing bundles to be done every three years. Wbi feels implementing the above described processes is a prudent approach to mitigating safety concerns associated with this incident. |
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