Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2013-05-12 — LA
Operator
Loop Llc
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Commodity
Crude Oil
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$109,000
Incident datetime
2013-05-12 16:48
Report number
Location
LA
Narrative
On may 12, 2013, a ship was unloading crude oil through the main oil line to the clovelly tank facility at a rate of 60,000 barrels/hour. After filling tank 6401, the flow was diverted to tank 6416. Simultaneously, a 2-person field crew was performing a function test on the tank 6416 42-inch tank inlet valve. The flow was erroneously blocked 8 minutes after the switch to tank 6416 resulting in an overpressure of the pipeline and loss of integrity of mechanical components. The loss of integrity of the mechanical components was the source of the release of the crude oil. An investigation of the incident was conducted. By conducting a cause and effect analysis, the team identified several causes which contributed to the event. These are listed as follows: 1. The instruction in the preventative maintenance procedure (tfrhydvlv) to "verify with omc that the valve can be opened and closed prior to beginning pm" was not performed prior to operating the inlet valve for tank 6416. 2. The trunk line to tank 6416 was flowing when the isolation valve was actuated. 3. The communication between field personnel and omc was incomplete and/or inaccurate. 4. The field personnel were unaware that the scheduling work order to fill tank 6416 was being executed. Corrective actions have been initiated to address the causes and recommendations as listed. These recommendations include: preventive maintenance procedures 1. Update the current tank inlet valve preventive maintenance procedure to clarify each step and instruct employees in the use and execution of the updated preventive maintenance procedure. Lockout/tagout: 2. Update the current tank inlet valve preventive maintenance procedure to include a specific step for lockout/tagout to assure no-flow conditions thru the inlet valve to the tank. Communications: 3. Develop a document that describes a verbal communication protocol for radio use. Conduct training for affected employees. 4. Improve the scheduling work order distribution to improve communication involving daily operations. All corrective actions initiated have been addressed.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2013-06-11 00:00:00
Iyear
2013
Report Number
20130205
Supplemental Number
18829
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
11733
Name
Loop Llc
Operator Street Address
137 Northpark Blvd
Operator City Name
Covington
Operator State Abbreviation
LA
Operator Postal Code
70433
Local Datetime
2013-05-12 16:48:00
Location Latitude
29.44778
Location Longitude
-90.26972
Commodity Released Type
Crude Oil
Unintentional Release Bbls
7.6
Recovered Bbls
7.6
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
Incident Identified Datetime
2013-05-12 16:48:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Terminal/tank Farm Equipment And Piping
On Off Shore
Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Shutdown Datetime
2013-05-12 16:48:00
Restart Datetime
2013-05-12 20:54:00
On Site Datetime
2013-05-12 16:48:00
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2013-05-12 19:14:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1046897
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Loop Llc
Segment Name
Clovelly Tank Facility-Tank 6414 Inlet/outlet Pipe
Onshore State Abbreviation
La
Onshore Postal Code
70345-3935
Onshore City Name
Cut Off
Onshore County Name
Lafourche
Designated Location
Milepost/valve Station
Designated Name
Ctf
Federal
No
Location Type
Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Under Soil
Depth Of Cover
58
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
Item Involved
Other
Item Involved Details
Mechanical Connections Within Piping
Installation Year
2011
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Other
Release Type Details
Overpressure
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
Yes
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
No
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
No
Commodity Reached Hca
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
684
Est Cost Prop Damage
109000
Est Cost Emergency
212000
Est Cost Environmental
0
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
321684
Accident Psig
519
Mop Psig
50
Accident Pressure
Pressure Exceeded 110% Of Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
Yes
Scada Conf Ind
Yes
Cpm In Place Ind
Yes
Cpm Operating Ind
Yes
Cpm Functional Ind
Yes
Cpm Detection Ind
No
Cpm Conf Ind
No
Investigation Status
Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)
Invest No Schedule Ind
Yes
Invest No Schedule Ind Details
The Valve That Was Erroneously Closed(Flow Valve 6416) While Oil Was Flowing Into Tank 6416 Is A Manually Operated, Therefore Not Controlled By The Scada System.
Invest No Control Room Ind
Yes
Invest No Controller Ind
Yes
Employee Drug Test Ind
Yes
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Num Employees Tested
6
Num Employees Failed
0
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Cause Details
Pipeline Or Equipment Overpressured
Operation Type
Pipeline Or Equipment Overpressured
Related Failure Follow Ind
Yes
Category Type
Routine Maintenance
Operator Qualification Ind
Yes
Qualified Individuals
Yes, They Were Qualified For The Task(S)
Preparer Name
C****** A* G**************
Preparer Title
Senior Regulatory Representative
Preparer Email
C********@l******.com
Preparer Telephone
985-276-6299
Preparer Fax
985-276-6290
Prepared Date
2013-12-16 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
C******* J* C***********
Authorizer Telephone
985-276-6282
Authorizer Title
Senior Vice President Administration
Authorizer Email
C***********@l******.com
Narrative
On may 12, 2013, a ship was unloading crude oil through the main oil line to the clovelly tank facility at a rate of 60,000 barrels/hour. After filling tank 6401, the flow was diverted to tank 6416. Simultaneously, a 2-person field crew was performing a function test on the tank 6416 42-inch tank inlet valve. The flow was erroneously blocked 8 minutes after the switch to tank 6416 resulting in an overpressure of the pipeline and loss of integrity of mechanical components. The loss of integrity of the mechanical components was the source of the release of the crude oil. An investigation of the incident was conducted. By conducting a cause and effect analysis, the team identified several causes which contributed to the event. These are listed as follows: 1. The instruction in the preventative maintenance procedure (tfrhydvlv) to "verify with omc that the valve can be opened and closed prior to beginning pm" was not performed prior to operating the inlet valve for tank 6416. 2. The trunk line to tank 6416 was flowing when the isolation valve was actuated. 3. The communication between field personnel and omc was incomplete and/or inaccurate. 4. The field personnel were unaware that the scheduling work order to fill tank 6416 was being executed. Corrective actions have been initiated to address the causes and recommendations as listed. These recommendations include: preventive maintenance procedures 1. Update the current tank inlet valve preventive maintenance procedure to clarify each step and instruct employees in the use and execution of the updated preventive maintenance procedure. Lockout/tagout: 2. Update the current tank inlet valve preventive maintenance procedure to include a specific step for lockout/tagout to assure no-flow conditions thru the inlet valve to the tank. Communications: 3. Develop a document that describes a verbal communication protocol for radio use. Conduct training for affected employees. 4. Improve the scheduling work order distribution to improve communication involving daily operations. All corrective actions initiated have been addressed.
| Report Received Date | 2013-06-11 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2013 |
| Report Number | 20130205 |
| Supplemental Number | 18829 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 11733 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Loop Llc |
| Operator Street Address | 137 Northpark Blvd |
| Operator City Name | Covington |
| Operator State Abbreviation | LA |
| Operator Postal Code | 70433 |
| Local Datetime | 2013-05-12 16:48:00 |
| Location Latitude | 29.44778 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -90.26972 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Crude Oil |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 7.6 |
| Recovered Bbls | 7.6 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Operator Employee |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2013-05-12 16:48:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Terminal/tank Farm Equipment And Piping |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | Yes |
| Shutdown Datetime | 2013-05-12 16:48:00 |
| Restart Datetime | 2013-05-12 20:54:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2013-05-12 16:48:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2013-05-12 19:14:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1046897 NRC Report How to search |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Loop Llc |
| Segment Name | Clovelly Tank Facility-Tank 6414 Inlet/outlet Pipe |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | La |
| Onshore Postal Code | 70345-3935 |
| Onshore City Name | Cut Off |
| Onshore County Name | Lafourche |
| Designated Location | Milepost/valve Station |
| Designated Name | Ctf |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Under Soil |
| Depth Of Cover | 58 |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| Item Involved | Other |
| Item Involved Details | Mechanical Connections Within Piping |
| Installation Year | 2011 |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Other |
| Release Type Details | Overpressure |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | Yes |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | No |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Commodity Reached Hca | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 684 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 109000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 212000 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 0 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 321684 |
| Accident Psig | 519 |
| Mop Psig | 50 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Exceeded 110% Of Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | Yes |
| Scada Conf Ind | Yes |
| Cpm In Place Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Operating Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Functional Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Detection Ind | No |
| Cpm Conf Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply) |
| Invest No Schedule Ind | Yes |
| Invest No Schedule Ind Details | The Valve That Was Erroneously Closed(Flow Valve 6416) While Oil Was Flowing Into Tank 6416 Is A Manually Operated, Therefore Not Controlled By The Scada System. |
| Invest No Control Room Ind | Yes |
| Invest No Controller Ind | Yes |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | Yes |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Num Employees Tested | 6 |
| Num Employees Failed | 0 |
| Cause | Incorrect Operation |
| Cause Details | Pipeline Or Equipment Overpressured |
| Operation Type | Pipeline Or Equipment Overpressured |
| Related Failure Follow Ind | Yes |
| Category Type | Routine Maintenance |
| Operator Qualification Ind | Yes |
| Qualified Individuals | Yes, They Were Qualified For The Task(S) |
| Preparer Name | C****** A* G************** |
| Preparer Title | Senior Regulatory Representative |
| Preparer Email | C********@l******.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 985-276-6299 |
| Preparer Fax | 985-276-6290 |
| Prepared Date | 2013-12-16 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | C******* J* C*********** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 985-276-6282 |
| Authorizer Title | Senior Vice President Administration |
| Authorizer Email | C***********@l******.com |
| Narrative | On may 12, 2013, a ship was unloading crude oil through the main oil line to the clovelly tank facility at a rate of 60,000 barrels/hour. After filling tank 6401, the flow was diverted to tank 6416. Simultaneously, a 2-person field crew was performing a function test on the tank 6416 42-inch tank inlet valve. The flow was erroneously blocked 8 minutes after the switch to tank 6416 resulting in an overpressure of the pipeline and loss of integrity of mechanical components. The loss of integrity of the mechanical components was the source of the release of the crude oil. An investigation of the incident was conducted. By conducting a cause and effect analysis, the team identified several causes which contributed to the event. These are listed as follows: 1. The instruction in the preventative maintenance procedure (tfrhydvlv) to "verify with omc that the valve can be opened and closed prior to beginning pm" was not performed prior to operating the inlet valve for tank 6416. 2. The trunk line to tank 6416 was flowing when the isolation valve was actuated. 3. The communication between field personnel and omc was incomplete and/or inaccurate. 4. The field personnel were unaware that the scheduling work order to fill tank 6416 was being executed. Corrective actions have been initiated to address the causes and recommendations as listed. These recommendations include: preventive maintenance procedures 1. Update the current tank inlet valve preventive maintenance procedure to clarify each step and instruct employees in the use and execution of the updated preventive maintenance procedure. Lockout/tagout: 2. Update the current tank inlet valve preventive maintenance procedure to include a specific step for lockout/tagout to assure no-flow conditions thru the inlet valve to the tank. Communications: 3. Develop a document that describes a verbal communication protocol for radio use. Conduct training for affected employees. 4. Improve the scheduling work order distribution to improve communication involving daily operations. All corrective actions initiated have been addressed. |
External Resources
PHMSA pipeline safety insights.
Product
Features
Company
All rights reserved. Copyright © by ClearPHMSA