Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2012-11-13 — OK
Operator
Magellan Pipeline Company, Lp
Cause
Equipment Failure
Commodity
Refined And/or Petroleum Product (Non-Hvl) Which Is A Liquid At Ambient Conditions
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$1,000
Incident datetime
2012-11-13 17:31
Report number
Location
OK
Narrative
At 1730 a contract inspector working in the area saw product start to spray from a flange that was just upstream of the pig trap leading to the outbound pipeline to hearne, texas. The contractor immediately called one of the technicians to report that we had a leak. The technician called ops control at 1731 and told them to shutdown the hearne line because of a reported release. Ops control did see the sudden drop in pressure and the controller immediately shutdown the line and began making notifications. Local employees were notified to respond and the first technician arrived on site at 1805. The responders took appropriate actions such as mobilizing the emergency trailer and placing absorbent booms and pads in specific areas. Vac trucks where requested to collect product and arrived at 1850 and tas environmental was contacted for site cleanup and remediation. The remaining product was drained from the line and the failed insulating gasket was removed and repairs were made. It was discovered that the gasket was not the standard gasket that magellan uses today. A new standard insulating gasket was installed and magellan completed a visual inspection of the facility to determine if there were additional non-standard gaskets in the system. As a result of the review there was only one insulating gasket that we could not confirm if it met out current standard and therefore we have replaced this gasket as well. Magellan will continue to further investigate the cause of the gasket failure. The analysis of the gasket concluded that the gasket was a rubber coated phenolic gasket. There were no identifiable manufacturer markings on the gasket so they were unable to identify the manufacturer. The gasket had radial cracking indicating that it was over-compressed. There were also indication that it might not have been centered properly when installed made evident by more defined impressions on one side of the gasket versus the other. The gasket also exhibited signs of chemical degradation possibly from non-compatibility of products being shipped in the line.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2012-12-07 00:00:00
Iyear
2012
Report Number
20120353
Supplemental Number
18820
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
22610
Name
Magellan Pipeline Company, Lp
Operator Street Address
100 West 5th Street
Operator City Name
Tulsa
Operator State Abbreviation
OK
Operator Postal Code
74103
Local Datetime
2012-11-13 17:30:00
Location Latitude
32.06432
Location Longitude
-96.86338
Commodity Released Type
Refined And/or Petroleum Product (Non-Hvl) Which Is A Liquid At Ambient Conditions
Commodity Subtype
Diesel, Fuel Oil, Kerosene, Jet Fuel
Unintentional Release Bbls
40
Intentional Release Bbls
0
Recovered Bbls
40
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Contractor Working For The Operator
Incident Identified Datetime
2012-11-13 17:31:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
On Off Shore
Onshore
On Site Datetime
2012-11-13 18:05:00
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2012-11-13 18:05:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1030569
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Upstream Valve Type Ind
Remotely Controlled
Downstream Valve Type Ind
Remotely Controlled
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Frost Station
Segment Name
Hillsboro Jct - Frost 10"
Onshore State Abbreviation
Tx
Onshore Postal Code
76666
Onshore City Name
Frost
Onshore County Name
Narvarro
Designated Location
Milepost/valve Station
Designated Name
9.46
Federal
No
Location Type
Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Aboveground
Incident Area Subtype
Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
Item Involved
Flange Assembly
Installation Year
2005
Material Involved
Material Other Than Carbon Steel
Material Details
Neoprene Gasket
Release Type
Leak
Leak Type
Connection Failure
Leak Type Other
Gasket
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
Yes
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
No
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
No
Commodity Reached Hca
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
2450
Est Cost Prop Damage
1000
Est Cost Emergency
180000
Est Cost Environmental
0
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
183450
Accident Psig
836
Mop Psig
1440
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Length Segment Isolated
52800
Internal Inspection Ind
Yes
Operation Complications Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
Yes
Scada Conf Ind
Yes
Cpm In Place Ind
Yes
Cpm Operating Ind
Yes
Cpm Functional Ind
Yes
Cpm Detection Ind
Yes
Cpm Conf Ind
Yes
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
This was a gasket failure and therefore a mechanical issue.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Equipment Failure
Cause Details
Non-Threaded Connection Failure
Eq Failure Type
Non-Threaded Connection Failure
Other Non Threaded Ind
Gasket
Additional Breakdown Ind
Yes
Eq Additional Other Ind
Yes
Eq Additional Other Details
Contractor Installed A Different Gasket From What Magellan Specified
Preparer Name
D******* C*********
Preparer Title
Compliance Coordinator Sr
Preparer Email
D******************@m*********.com
Preparer Telephone
918-574-7386
Preparer Fax
918-574-7246
Prepared Date
2013-12-12 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
D******* C*********
Authorizer Telephone
918574-7386
Authorizer Email
No Email Address
Narrative
At 1730 a contract inspector working in the area saw product start to spray from a flange that was just upstream of the pig trap leading to the outbound pipeline to hearne, texas. The contractor immediately called one of the technicians to report that we had a leak. The technician called ops control at 1731 and told them to shutdown the hearne line because of a reported release. Ops control did see the sudden drop in pressure and the controller immediately shutdown the line and began making notifications. Local employees were notified to respond and the first technician arrived on site at 1805. The responders took appropriate actions such as mobilizing the emergency trailer and placing absorbent booms and pads in specific areas. Vac trucks where requested to collect product and arrived at 1850 and tas environmental was contacted for site cleanup and remediation. The remaining product was drained from the line and the failed insulating gasket was removed and repairs were made. It was discovered that the gasket was not the standard gasket that magellan uses today. A new standard insulating gasket was installed and magellan completed a visual inspection of the facility to determine if there were additional non-standard gaskets in the system. As a result of the review there was only one insulating gasket that we could not confirm if it met out current standard and therefore we have replaced this gasket as well. Magellan will continue to further investigate the cause of the gasket failure. The analysis of the gasket concluded that the gasket was a rubber coated phenolic gasket. There were no identifiable manufacturer markings on the gasket so they were unable to identify the manufacturer. The gasket had radial cracking indicating that it was over-compressed. There were also indication that it might not have been centered properly when installed made evident by more defined impressions on one side of the gasket versus the other. The gasket also exhibited signs of chemical degradation possibly from non-compatibility of products being shipped in the line.
| Report Received Date | 2012-12-07 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2012 |
| Report Number | 20120353 |
| Supplemental Number | 18820 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 22610 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Magellan Pipeline Company, Lp |
| Operator Street Address | 100 West 5th Street |
| Operator City Name | Tulsa |
| Operator State Abbreviation | OK |
| Operator Postal Code | 74103 |
| Local Datetime | 2012-11-13 17:30:00 |
| Location Latitude | 32.06432 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -96.86338 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Refined And/or Petroleum Product (Non-Hvl) Which Is A Liquid At Ambient Conditions |
| Commodity Subtype | Diesel, Fuel Oil, Kerosene, Jet Fuel |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 40 |
| Intentional Release Bbls | 0 |
| Recovered Bbls | 40 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Contractor Working For The Operator |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2012-11-13 17:31:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| On Site Datetime | 2012-11-13 18:05:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2012-11-13 18:05:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1030569 NRC Report How to search |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Upstream Valve Type Ind | Remotely Controlled |
| Downstream Valve Type Ind | Remotely Controlled |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Frost Station |
| Segment Name | Hillsboro Jct - Frost 10" |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Tx |
| Onshore Postal Code | 76666 |
| Onshore City Name | Frost |
| Onshore County Name | Narvarro |
| Designated Location | Milepost/valve Station |
| Designated Name | 9.46 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Aboveground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| Item Involved | Flange Assembly |
| Installation Year | 2005 |
| Material Involved | Material Other Than Carbon Steel |
| Material Details | Neoprene Gasket |
| Release Type | Leak |
| Leak Type | Connection Failure |
| Leak Type Other | Gasket |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | Yes |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | No |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Commodity Reached Hca | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 2450 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 1000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 180000 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 0 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 183450 |
| Accident Psig | 836 |
| Mop Psig | 1440 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Length Segment Isolated | 52800 |
| Internal Inspection Ind | Yes |
| Operation Complications Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | Yes |
| Scada Conf Ind | Yes |
| Cpm In Place Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Operating Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Functional Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Detection Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Conf Ind | Yes |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | This was a gasket failure and therefore a mechanical issue. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Equipment Failure |
| Cause Details | Non-Threaded Connection Failure |
| Eq Failure Type | Non-Threaded Connection Failure |
| Other Non Threaded Ind | Gasket |
| Additional Breakdown Ind | Yes |
| Eq Additional Other Ind | Yes |
| Eq Additional Other Details | Contractor Installed A Different Gasket From What Magellan Specified |
| Preparer Name | D******* C********* |
| Preparer Title | Compliance Coordinator Sr |
| Preparer Email | D******************@m*********.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 918-574-7386 |
| Preparer Fax | 918-574-7246 |
| Prepared Date | 2013-12-12 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | D******* C********* |
| Authorizer Telephone | 918574-7386 |
| Authorizer Email | No Email Address |
| Narrative | At 1730 a contract inspector working in the area saw product start to spray from a flange that was just upstream of the pig trap leading to the outbound pipeline to hearne, texas. The contractor immediately called one of the technicians to report that we had a leak. The technician called ops control at 1731 and told them to shutdown the hearne line because of a reported release. Ops control did see the sudden drop in pressure and the controller immediately shutdown the line and began making notifications. Local employees were notified to respond and the first technician arrived on site at 1805. The responders took appropriate actions such as mobilizing the emergency trailer and placing absorbent booms and pads in specific areas. Vac trucks where requested to collect product and arrived at 1850 and tas environmental was contacted for site cleanup and remediation. The remaining product was drained from the line and the failed insulating gasket was removed and repairs were made. It was discovered that the gasket was not the standard gasket that magellan uses today. A new standard insulating gasket was installed and magellan completed a visual inspection of the facility to determine if there were additional non-standard gaskets in the system. As a result of the review there was only one insulating gasket that we could not confirm if it met out current standard and therefore we have replaced this gasket as well. Magellan will continue to further investigate the cause of the gasket failure. The analysis of the gasket concluded that the gasket was a rubber coated phenolic gasket. There were no identifiable manufacturer markings on the gasket so they were unable to identify the manufacturer. The gasket had radial cracking indicating that it was over-compressed. There were also indication that it might not have been centered properly when installed made evident by more defined impressions on one side of the gasket versus the other. The gasket also exhibited signs of chemical degradation possibly from non-compatibility of products being shipped in the line. |
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