Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2012-11-05 — TX
Operator
Enterprise Products Operating Llc
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Commodity
Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$25,000
Incident datetime
2012-11-05 10:12
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
Description of accident on 11/5/2012 two welders were welding a b-sleeve at dig #20 on the 10" clinton lateral loop (lid 621) as a part of a rehabilitation project. When welder # 1 came up from the bottom of the pipe to the 9 o'clock position he acquired a new rod; as soon as he arced up on the carrier pipe it started hissing and blew out resulting in a product release. Welder # 1 quickly told welder # 2 they had a problem and to stop welding. The welding inspector removed all personnel from the excavation site and called pipeline control to shut down the pipeline. The leak was then isolated between am 32 and am 35 and the remaining products were flared. Once the area was made safe, the line was exposed to extend the length of excavation to cut-out and replace the pipe. The line was purged and restarted on 11/8/2012. Preliminary analysis the cut-out section was sent to a lab for examination. Preliminary examination of the pipe cut-out via macro-sectioning determined there are no laminations, segregations, and / or anomalies within the body of the pipe. Pre & post incident non-destructive examination verified wall thickness measurements of the pipe were within the approved parameters. Physical measurements using a micrometer of the pipe were conducted after sectioning also confirmed the wall thickness was acceptable. Based on interviews with the welding inspector and welders as well as reviewing the data submitted by the welding inspector, the welders were not being fully monitored during the welding operation. It has also been determined that the welders were welding outside of the specified parameter ranges. Several macro-sections were taken and photographed from areas both outside and of close proximity to the burn-through location. The photographs indicate that previous passes from the responsible welder were welded within acceptable welding parameters. As the macro-sections moved closer to the burn-through location it can be noted that the overall energy inputted into the pipe region increased significantly compared to previous passes. A final report is pending from the lab analysis. Metallurgical analysis findings the metallurgical analysis concluded "the primary cause of this burn-through is the poor welding practice of the subject welder. He used excessive heat input in his welding operations. He consistently deposited large beads and penetrated deep into the pipe. This was particularly evident in the last rod he deposited." in reference to g7 - incorrect operation, the investigation identified that although the welders were qualified per enterprise's oq program, the welding inspector's oq qualifications related to this task expired august 10, 2012. At the time of the incident the welding inspector was certified in accordance with cpwi and nccer.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2012-12-04 00:00:00
Iyear
2012
Report Number
20120348
Supplemental Number
19901
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
31618
Name
Enterprise Products Operating Llc
Operator Street Address
1100 Louisiana Street
Operator City Name
Houston
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
77002
Local Datetime
2012-11-05 10:12:00
Location Latitude
41.73889472
Location Longitude
-90.81978672
Commodity Released Type
Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions
Commodity Subtype
Other Hvl
Commodity Details
Ethane / Propane
Unintentional Release Bbls
0.1
Intentional Release Bbls
1640
Recovered Bbls
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Contractor Working For The Operator
Incident Identified Datetime
2012-11-05 10:12:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
On Off Shore
Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Shutdown Datetime
2012-11-05 10:20:00
Restart Datetime
2012-11-08 11:12:00
On Site Datetime
2012-11-05 10:12:00
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2012-11-05 12:03:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1029694
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Upstream Valve Type Ind
Manual
Downstream Valve Type Ind
Manual
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Clinton Lateral Loop
Segment Name
Lid 621
Onshore State Abbreviation
Ia
Onshore Postal Code
52765
Onshore City Name
Dickson
Onshore County Name
Scott
Designated Location
Milepost/valve Station
Designated Name
32.1
Federal
No
Location Type
Pipeline Right-Of-Way
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Exposed Due To Excavation
Depth Of Cover
48
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
Item Involved
Pipe
Pipe Type
Pipe Body
Pipe Diameter
10
Pipe Wall Thickness
0.188
Pipe Smys
52000
Pipe Specification
Api-5l-X-52
Pipe Seam Type
Erw - High Frequency
Pipe Manufacturer
American Steel
Pipe Coating Type
Other
Pipe Coating Details
Polyken Tape
Manufactured Year
1973
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Other
Release Type Details
Burn-Thru
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
No
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
No
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
No
Commodity Reached Hca
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
18000
Est Cost Prop Damage
25000
Est Cost Emergency
25000
Est Cost Environmental
0
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
68000
Accident Psig
741
Mop Psig
1042
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Length Segment Isolated
17057
Internal Inspection Ind
Yes
Operation Complications Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Cpm In Place Ind
Yes
Cpm Operating Ind
Yes
Cpm Functional Ind
Yes
Cpm Detection Ind
No
Cpm Conf Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
The burn- thru was reported by a maintenance crew welding at the site. The incident was too small for scada or leak detection to detect. The controller was notified of the condition and worked with field personnel to isolate the area of concern.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
Yes
Num Contractors Tested
3
Num Contractors Failed
0
Cause
Incorrect Operation
Cause Details
Damage By Operator Or Operator's Contractor Not Related To Excavation And Not Due To Motorized Vehicle/equipment Damage
Operation Type
Damage By Operator Or Operator's Contractor Not Related To Excavation And Not Due To Motorized Vehicle/equipment Damage
Related Failure Follow Ind
Yes
Category Type
Other Maintenance
Operator Qualification Ind
Yes
Qualified Individuals
No, They Were Not Qualified For The Task(S) Nor Were They Performing The Task(S) Under The Direction And Observation Of A Qualified Individual
Preparer Name
N*** T*****
Preparer Title
Pipeline Compliance Engineer
Preparer Email
N*******@e****.com
Preparer Telephone
7133812493
Prepared Date
2014-11-12 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
N*** T*****
Authorizer Telephone
7133812493
Authorizer Title
Pipeline Compliance Engineer
Authorizer Email
N*******@e****.com
Narrative
Description of accident on 11/5/2012 two welders were welding a b-sleeve at dig #20 on the 10" clinton lateral loop (lid 621) as a part of a rehabilitation project. When welder # 1 came up from the bottom of the pipe to the 9 o'clock position he acquired a new rod; as soon as he arced up on the carrier pipe it started hissing and blew out resulting in a product release. Welder # 1 quickly told welder # 2 they had a problem and to stop welding. The welding inspector removed all personnel from the excavation site and called pipeline control to shut down the pipeline. The leak was then isolated between am 32 and am 35 and the remaining products were flared. Once the area was made safe, the line was exposed to extend the length of excavation to cut-out and replace the pipe. The line was purged and restarted on 11/8/2012. Preliminary analysis the cut-out section was sent to a lab for examination. Preliminary examination of the pipe cut-out via macro-sectioning determined there are no laminations, segregations, and / or anomalies within the body of the pipe. Pre & post incident non-destructive examination verified wall thickness measurements of the pipe were within the approved parameters. Physical measurements using a micrometer of the pipe were conducted after sectioning also confirmed the wall thickness was acceptable. Based on interviews with the welding inspector and welders as well as reviewing the data submitted by the welding inspector, the welders were not being fully monitored during the welding operation. It has also been determined that the welders were welding outside of the specified parameter ranges. Several macro-sections were taken and photographed from areas both outside and of close proximity to the burn-through location. The photographs indicate that previous passes from the responsible welder were welded within acceptable welding parameters. As the macro-sections moved closer to the burn-through location it can be noted that the overall energy inputted into the pipe region increased significantly compared to previous passes. A final report is pending from the lab analysis. Metallurgical analysis findings the metallurgical analysis concluded "the primary cause of this burn-through is the poor welding practice of the subject welder. He used excessive heat input in his welding operations. He consistently deposited large beads and penetrated deep into the pipe. This was particularly evident in the last rod he deposited." in reference to g7 - incorrect operation, the investigation identified that although the welders were qualified per enterprise's oq program, the welding inspector's oq qualifications related to this task expired august 10, 2012. At the time of the incident the welding inspector was certified in accordance with cpwi and nccer.
| Report Received Date | 2012-12-04 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2012 |
| Report Number | 20120348 |
| Supplemental Number | 19901 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 31618 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Enterprise Products Operating Llc |
| Operator Street Address | 1100 Louisiana Street |
| Operator City Name | Houston |
| Operator State Abbreviation | TX |
| Operator Postal Code | 77002 |
| Local Datetime | 2012-11-05 10:12:00 |
| Location Latitude | 41.73889472 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -90.81978672 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions |
| Commodity Subtype | Other Hvl |
| Commodity Details | Ethane / Propane |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 0.1 |
| Intentional Release Bbls | 1640 |
| Recovered Bbls | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Contractor Working For The Operator |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2012-11-05 10:12:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | Yes |
| Shutdown Datetime | 2012-11-05 10:20:00 |
| Restart Datetime | 2012-11-08 11:12:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2012-11-05 10:12:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2012-11-05 12:03:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1029694 NRC Report How to search |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Upstream Valve Type Ind | Manual |
| Downstream Valve Type Ind | Manual |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Clinton Lateral Loop |
| Segment Name | Lid 621 |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Ia |
| Onshore Postal Code | 52765 |
| Onshore City Name | Dickson |
| Onshore County Name | Scott |
| Designated Location | Milepost/valve Station |
| Designated Name | 32.1 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Pipeline Right-Of-Way |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Exposed Due To Excavation |
| Depth Of Cover | 48 |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| Item Involved | Pipe |
| Pipe Type | Pipe Body |
| Pipe Diameter | 10 |
| Pipe Wall Thickness | 0.188 |
| Pipe Smys | 52000 |
| Pipe Specification | Api-5l-X-52 |
| Pipe Seam Type | Erw - High Frequency |
| Pipe Manufacturer | American Steel |
| Pipe Coating Type | Other |
| Pipe Coating Details | Polyken Tape |
| Manufactured Year | 1973 |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Other |
| Release Type Details | Burn-Thru |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | No |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | No |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Commodity Reached Hca | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 18000 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 25000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 25000 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 0 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 68000 |
| Accident Psig | 741 |
| Mop Psig | 1042 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Length Segment Isolated | 17057 |
| Internal Inspection Ind | Yes |
| Operation Complications Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Cpm In Place Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Operating Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Functional Ind | Yes |
| Cpm Detection Ind | No |
| Cpm Conf Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | The burn- thru was reported by a maintenance crew welding at the site. The incident was too small for scada or leak detection to detect. The controller was notified of the condition and worked with field personnel to isolate the area of concern. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | Yes |
| Num Contractors Tested | 3 |
| Num Contractors Failed | 0 |
| Cause | Incorrect Operation |
| Cause Details | Damage By Operator Or Operator's Contractor Not Related To Excavation And Not Due To Motorized Vehicle/equipment Damage |
| Operation Type | Damage By Operator Or Operator's Contractor Not Related To Excavation And Not Due To Motorized Vehicle/equipment Damage |
| Related Failure Follow Ind | Yes |
| Category Type | Other Maintenance |
| Operator Qualification Ind | Yes |
| Qualified Individuals | No, They Were Not Qualified For The Task(S) Nor Were They Performing The Task(S) Under The Direction And Observation Of A Qualified Individual |
| Preparer Name | N*** T***** |
| Preparer Title | Pipeline Compliance Engineer |
| Preparer Email | N*******@e****.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 7133812493 |
| Prepared Date | 2014-11-12 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | N*** T***** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 7133812493 |
| Authorizer Title | Pipeline Compliance Engineer |
| Authorizer Email | N*******@e****.com |
| Narrative | Description of accident on 11/5/2012 two welders were welding a b-sleeve at dig #20 on the 10" clinton lateral loop (lid 621) as a part of a rehabilitation project. When welder # 1 came up from the bottom of the pipe to the 9 o'clock position he acquired a new rod; as soon as he arced up on the carrier pipe it started hissing and blew out resulting in a product release. Welder # 1 quickly told welder # 2 they had a problem and to stop welding. The welding inspector removed all personnel from the excavation site and called pipeline control to shut down the pipeline. The leak was then isolated between am 32 and am 35 and the remaining products were flared. Once the area was made safe, the line was exposed to extend the length of excavation to cut-out and replace the pipe. The line was purged and restarted on 11/8/2012. Preliminary analysis the cut-out section was sent to a lab for examination. Preliminary examination of the pipe cut-out via macro-sectioning determined there are no laminations, segregations, and / or anomalies within the body of the pipe. Pre & post incident non-destructive examination verified wall thickness measurements of the pipe were within the approved parameters. Physical measurements using a micrometer of the pipe were conducted after sectioning also confirmed the wall thickness was acceptable. Based on interviews with the welding inspector and welders as well as reviewing the data submitted by the welding inspector, the welders were not being fully monitored during the welding operation. It has also been determined that the welders were welding outside of the specified parameter ranges. Several macro-sections were taken and photographed from areas both outside and of close proximity to the burn-through location. The photographs indicate that previous passes from the responsible welder were welded within acceptable welding parameters. As the macro-sections moved closer to the burn-through location it can be noted that the overall energy inputted into the pipe region increased significantly compared to previous passes. A final report is pending from the lab analysis. Metallurgical analysis findings the metallurgical analysis concluded "the primary cause of this burn-through is the poor welding practice of the subject welder. He used excessive heat input in his welding operations. He consistently deposited large beads and penetrated deep into the pipe. This was particularly evident in the last rod he deposited." in reference to g7 - incorrect operation, the investigation identified that although the welders were qualified per enterprise's oq program, the welding inspector's oq qualifications related to this task expired august 10, 2012. At the time of the incident the welding inspector was certified in accordance with cpwi and nccer. |
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