Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2012-08-22 — FL
Operator
Tampa Bay Pipeline Co.
Cause
Material Failure Of Pipe Or Weld
Commodity
Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$100,000
Incident datetime
2012-08-22 20:10
Report number
Location
FL
Narrative
Operations control center (occ) received first notification of 'slight' ammonia odor by hillsborough county sherriff's office dispatch @ 19:15 pm on 8/22/2012, patrol officer on scene, no road closures, no visible product release. Pipeline controller follows procedure, shuts down pipeline. Dispatched pipeline personnel, arrived by 20:10 pm. Detected low concentration (<10 ppm) of ammonia being brought to surface by high groundwater levels. Stationed pipeline personnel on scene to monitor until daylight when mitigation materials were available. The location of the source point indicated coming from an existing 'stopple' or line stop fitting installed during a maintenance operation in 2008. From past experience these type of indicators generally point to a 'segment screw' or a t-o-r fitting cap that can be excavated and repaired with little to no disturbance to the surrounding area and no risk to public safety. The excavation and repair was subsequently scheduled for monday 8/27 beginning after 10:00 pm to take advantage of minimal traffic activity. *this time and date was chosen as a result of the mot contractor informing US that they could not get a lane closure for traffic redirection permitted for weekend activity, also at the planning stage tropical storm isaac's projected path and severity remained an unknown. On monday am 8/27, with the westward movement of isaac and the forecast of minimal rain and potentially helpful wind conditions, the call was made to go with the job as planned. When the excavation began we were advancing toward the suspected fitting (approx. 5 foot depth of cover) and began experiencing ditch 'sloughing' and erosion due to high groundwater levels. At ~3:00 pm tuesday 8/28 we were able to visually observe the fitting and it was discovered that there was an apparent defect in the weld of the over sleeve (stopple tee) fitting circumferential weld at approximately the 10:00 o'clock position when viewed from the downstream end of the fitting. This discovery changed the nature of the repair considerably and with the additional safety concerns of the unstable excavation conditions, a more robust repair plan was developed which incorporated dewatering the site into frac tanks, installing a new stopple fitting downstream of the failure, and accessing the existing stopple fitting immediately upstrream (300' wsw) of the failed fitting; for line plugging and blowdown in order to replace the failed fitting with a new section of tested pipe.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2012-09-21 00:00:00
Iyear
2012
Report Number
20120272
Supplemental Number
19236
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
26099
Name
Tampa Bay Pipeline Co.
Operator Street Address
5802 Hartford Street
Operator City Name
Tampa
Operator State Abbreviation
FL
Operator Postal Code
33619
Local Datetime
2012-08-22 19:15:00
Location Latitude
27.8608333
Location Longitude
-82.1983333
Commodity Released Type
Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions
Commodity Subtype
Anhydrous Ammonia
Unintentional Release Bbls
0.1
Intentional Release Bbls
7
Recovered Bbls
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Notification From Emergency Responder
Incident Identified Datetime
2012-08-22 20:10:00
System Part Involved
Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
On Off Shore
Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Shutdown Datetime
2012-08-22 19:16:00
Restart Datetime
2012-09-10 11:19:00
On Site Datetime
2012-08-22 21:15:00
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2012-09-07 16:23:00
Nrc Rpt Num
1023681
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Upstream Valve Type Ind
Manual
Downstream Valve Type Ind
Manual
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Pipe Fac Name
Tampa Pipeline Transport System
Segment Name
Segment #7
Onshore State Abbreviation
Fl
Onshore Postal Code
33547
Onshore City Name
Lithia
Onshore County Name
Hillsborough
Federal
No
Location Type
Pipeline Right-Of-Way
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Under Soil
Depth Of Cover
60
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Intrastate
Item Involved
Weld, Including Heat-Affected Zone
Weld Subtype
Other
Weld Details
Circumferential Weld On Stopple Fitting
Installation Year
2008
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Leak
Leak Type
Pinhole
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
No
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
No
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
Yes
Commodity Reached Hca
Yes
High Pop Ind
Yes
High Pop Yes No
Yes
Est Cost Oper Paid
30000
Est Cost Gas Released
500
Est Cost Prop Damage
100000
Est Cost Emergency
50000
Est Cost Environmental
5000
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
185500
Accident Psig
400
Mop Psig
1362
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Length Segment Isolated
23760
Internal Inspection Ind
No
Unsuitable Mainline Ind
Yes
Other Restrictions Ind
Yes
Operation Complications Ind
No
Pipeline Function
> 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Cpm In Place Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
Accident was the result of an apparent weld seam failure, no abnormal operating conditions or procedural deviations were noted or observed during the on duty controllers shift.
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Material Failure Of Pipe Or Weld
Cause Details
Design-, Construction-, Installation-, Or Fabrication-Related
Field Exam Ind
Yes
Other Analysis Ind
Yes
Other Analysis Details
Td Williamson Masterwelder Examination
Failure Type
Design-, Construction-, Installation-, Or Fabrication-Related
Other Factor
Yes
Other Factor Details
Poor Welding Technique
Pwf Additional Other Ind
Yes
Collected Data Ind
No
Has Hydrtst Conduc Before Ind
No
Direct Asmnt Conducted
Yes, But The Point Of The Accident Was Not Identified As A Dig Site
Direct Asmnt Pnt Not Idntf Yr
2013
Non Destructive Exam Ind
Yes
Exm Dry Mgnt Partcl Rcnt Year
2012
Exm Dry Mgnt Partcl Rcnt Ind
Yes
Preparer Name
W*** R*** T*****
Preparer Title
General Manager
Preparer Email
R******@t************.com
Preparer Telephone
813-623-2431
Preparer Fax
813-628-8266
Prepared Date
2014-04-10 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
W*** R*** T*****
Authorizer Telephone
813-623-2431
Authorizer Title
General Manager
Authorizer Email
R******@t************.com
Narrative
O***************************************************************************************************************************************@ 19:15 pm on 8/22/2012, patrol officer on scene, no road closures, no visible product release. Pipeline controller follows procedure, shuts down pipeline. Dispatched pipeline personnel, arrived by 20:10 pm. Detected low concentration (<10 ppm) of ammonia being brought to surface by high groundwater levels. Stationed pipeline personnel on scene to monitor until daylight when mitigation materials were available. The location of the source point indicated coming from an existing 'stopple' or line stop fitting installed during a maintenance operation in 2008. From past experience these type of indicators generally point to a 'segment screw' or a t-o-r fitting cap that can be excavated and repaired with little to no disturbance to the surrounding area and no risk to public safety. The excavation and repair was subsequently scheduled for monday 8/27 beginning after 10:00 pm to take advantage of minimal traffic activity. *this time and date was chosen as a result of the mot contractor informing US that they could not get a lane closure for traffic redirection permitted for weekend activity, also at the planning stage tropical storm isaac's projected path and severity remained an unknown. On monday am 8/27, with the westward movement of isaac and the forecast of minimal rain and potentially helpful wind conditions, the call was made to go with the job as planned. When the excavation began we were advancing toward the suspected fitting (approx. 5 foot depth of cover) and began experiencing ditch 'sloughing' and erosion due to high groundwater levels. At ~3:00 pm tuesday 8/28 we were able to visually observe the fitting and it was discovered that there was an apparent defect in the weld of the over sleeve (stopple tee) fitting circumferential weld at approximately the 10:00 o'clock position when viewed from the downstream end of the fitting. ******************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************.
| Report Received Date | 2012-09-21 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2012 |
| Report Number | 20120272 |
| Supplemental Number | 19236 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 26099 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Tampa Bay Pipeline Co. |
| Operator Street Address | 5802 Hartford Street |
| Operator City Name | Tampa |
| Operator State Abbreviation | FL |
| Operator Postal Code | 33619 |
| Local Datetime | 2012-08-22 19:15:00 |
| Location Latitude | 27.8608333 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -82.1983333 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Hvl Or Other Flammable Or Toxic Fluid Which Is A Gas At Ambient Conditions |
| Commodity Subtype | Anhydrous Ammonia |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 0.1 |
| Intentional Release Bbls | 7 |
| Recovered Bbls | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Notification From Emergency Responder |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2012-08-22 20:10:00 |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | Yes |
| Shutdown Datetime | 2012-08-22 19:16:00 |
| Restart Datetime | 2012-09-10 11:19:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2012-08-22 21:15:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2012-09-07 16:23:00 |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 1023681 NRC Report How to search |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Upstream Valve Type Ind | Manual |
| Downstream Valve Type Ind | Manual |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Tampa Pipeline Transport System |
| Segment Name | Segment #7 |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Fl |
| Onshore Postal Code | 33547 |
| Onshore City Name | Lithia |
| Onshore County Name | Hillsborough |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Pipeline Right-Of-Way |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Under Soil |
| Depth Of Cover | 60 |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Intrastate |
| Item Involved | Weld, Including Heat-Affected Zone |
| Weld Subtype | Other |
| Weld Details | Circumferential Weld On Stopple Fitting |
| Installation Year | 2008 |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Leak |
| Leak Type | Pinhole |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | No |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | No |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | Yes |
| Commodity Reached Hca | Yes |
| High Pop Ind | Yes |
| High Pop Yes No | Yes |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 30000 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 500 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 100000 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 50000 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 5000 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 185500 |
| Accident Psig | 400 |
| Mop Psig | 1362 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Length Segment Isolated | 23760 |
| Internal Inspection Ind | No |
| Unsuitable Mainline Ind | Yes |
| Other Restrictions Ind | Yes |
| Operation Complications Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | > 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Cpm In Place Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | Accident was the result of an apparent weld seam failure, no abnormal operating conditions or procedural deviations were noted or observed during the on duty controllers shift. |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Material Failure Of Pipe Or Weld |
| Cause Details | Design-, Construction-, Installation-, Or Fabrication-Related |
| Field Exam Ind | Yes |
| Other Analysis Ind | Yes |
| Other Analysis Details | Td Williamson Masterwelder Examination |
| Failure Type | Design-, Construction-, Installation-, Or Fabrication-Related |
| Other Factor | Yes |
| Other Factor Details | Poor Welding Technique |
| Pwf Additional Other Ind | Yes |
| Collected Data Ind | No |
| Has Hydrtst Conduc Before Ind | No |
| Direct Asmnt Conducted | Yes, But The Point Of The Accident Was Not Identified As A Dig Site |
| Direct Asmnt Pnt Not Idntf Yr | 2013 |
| Non Destructive Exam Ind | Yes |
| Exm Dry Mgnt Partcl Rcnt Year | 2012 |
| Exm Dry Mgnt Partcl Rcnt Ind | Yes |
| Preparer Name | W*** R*** T***** |
| Preparer Title | General Manager |
| Preparer Email | R******@t************.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 813-623-2431 |
| Preparer Fax | 813-628-8266 |
| Prepared Date | 2014-04-10 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | W*** R*** T***** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 813-623-2431 |
| Authorizer Title | General Manager |
| Authorizer Email | R******@t************.com |
| Narrative | O***************************************************************************************************************************************@ 19:15 pm on 8/22/2012, patrol officer on scene, no road closures, no visible product release. Pipeline controller follows procedure, shuts down pipeline. Dispatched pipeline personnel, arrived by 20:10 pm. Detected low concentration (<10 ppm) of ammonia being brought to surface by high groundwater levels. Stationed pipeline personnel on scene to monitor until daylight when mitigation materials were available. The location of the source point indicated coming from an existing 'stopple' or line stop fitting installed during a maintenance operation in 2008. From past experience these type of indicators generally point to a 'segment screw' or a t-o-r fitting cap that can be excavated and repaired with little to no disturbance to the surrounding area and no risk to public safety. The excavation and repair was subsequently scheduled for monday 8/27 beginning after 10:00 pm to take advantage of minimal traffic activity. *this time and date was chosen as a result of the mot contractor informing US that they could not get a lane closure for traffic redirection permitted for weekend activity, also at the planning stage tropical storm isaac's projected path and severity remained an unknown. On monday am 8/27, with the westward movement of isaac and the forecast of minimal rain and potentially helpful wind conditions, the call was made to go with the job as planned. When the excavation began we were advancing toward the suspected fitting (approx. 5 foot depth of cover) and began experiencing ditch 'sloughing' and erosion due to high groundwater levels. At ~3:00 pm tuesday 8/28 we were able to visually observe the fitting and it was discovered that there was an apparent defect in the weld of the over sleeve (stopple tee) fitting circumferential weld at approximately the 10:00 o'clock position when viewed from the downstream end of the fitting. ******************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************. |
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