Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
HL incident on 2011-10-15 — TX
Operator
Plains Pipeline, L.p.
Cause
Equipment Failure
Commodity
Crude Oil
Program
HL
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$1,500
Incident datetime
2011-10-15 11:00
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
An initial investigation of this incident indicates that the release was due to the activation of a thermal relief valve which failed to re-seat because of the foreign debris on the valve seat. The flow rate from the thermal relief valve exceeded the sump capacity causing it to overflow. An alarm associated with this sump failed to activate. The thermal relief valve was replaced and re-piped to relieve into a storage tank rather than a sump. The failures related to this incident are still under investigation. Supplemental narrative: as described in the initial report, this incident was caused by the failure of a thermal relief valve to re-seat after activating. The thermal relief valve is installed between a pump discharge and back pressure control valve. The control valve was originally air operated. Due to excessive maintenance requirements, the old control valve was replaced by a new, electric motor operated valve. When the electric operated valve was installed, the electronic technician set the valve to close completely when the pipeline pump was stopped. The air operated control valve did not close completely when the pipeline pump was stopped. Thus, after the electric operated control valve was installed, the pump was starting against a shut valve. This reduced the starting current in the pump motor but also caused the pressure in the line between the pump and valve to rise to a level that caused the thermal relief valve to activate until the control valve opened enough to reduce the pressure to allow the thermal relief to re-seat. The relief valve setting is 550 psig, the mop of the line is 800 psig and the pump shutoff head is 620 psig. This startup procedure was occurring for some time prior to the incident. The repeated activation of the relief valve during system startup could have contributed to it not re-seating. The flow rate from the thermal relief not re-seating exceeded the capacity of the small sump pump. This resulted in a continually rising level in the sump which ultimately overflowed, causing the release. Although equipped with a high sump level alarm, the alarm failed to alert the control room operator because the alarm float became stuck causing the alarm switch not to activate. After a thorough investigation of this incident, several actions were taken to prevent the recurrence of this type of incident: -a review of the startup protocol for this system was conducted. As a result the control valve setting was changed so that the valve did not shut completely when the pump is shutdown. This is allowing flow through the valve upon startup and maintaining the pressure upstream of the valve below the setting of the thermal relief valve; -a "excessive run time" alarm feature was installed on the sump pump to alert the control room operator when the sump pump is running longer than - normal; and -a new thermal relief valve was installed and its discharge re-piped to relief into a storage tank rather than the small sump.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2011-11-14 00:00:00
Iyear
2011
Report Number
20110421
Supplemental Number
17668
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
Name
Plains Pipeline, L.p.
Operator Street Address
333 Clay Street, Suite 1900
Operator City Name
Houston
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
77002
Local Datetime
2011-10-15 11:00:00
Location Latitude
31.960602
Location Longitude
-102.617793
Commodity Released Type
Crude Oil
Unintentional Release Bbls
73
Intentional Release Bbls
0
Recovered Bbls
73
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Accident Identifier
Air Patrol
Operator Type
Contractor Working For The Operator
System Part Involved
Onshore Pump/meter Station Equipment And Piping
On Off Shore
Onshore
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Shutdown Datetime
2011-10-15 12:45:00
Restart Datetime
2011-10-15 14:00:00
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Pipe Fac Name
Goldsmith Station
Onshore State Abbreviation
Tx
Onshore Postal Code
79741
Onshore City Name
Goldsmith
Onshore County Name
Ector
Federal
No
Location Type
Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property
Incident Area Type
Aboveground
Incident Area Subtype
Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Intrastate
Item Involved
Valve
Valve Type
Relief Valve
Installation Year
2011
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Overfill Or Overflow
Wildlife Impact Ind
No
Soil Contamination
Yes
Long Term Assessment
No
Remediation Ind
No
Water Contam Ind
No
Could Be Hca
No
Commodity Reached Hca
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Gas Released
2000
Est Cost Prop Damage
1500
Est Cost Emergency
9000
Est Cost Environmental
29000
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
41500
Accident Psig
550
Mop Psig
800
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Pipeline Function
< 20% Smys Regulated Transmission
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Cpm In Place Ind
No
Investigation Status
No, the facility was not monitored by a controller(s) at the time of the accident
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Equipment Failure
Cause Details
Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment
Eq Failure Type
Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment
Relief Valve Ind
Yes
Eq Additional Other Ind
Yes
Eq Additional Other Details
Debris Is Valve
Preparer Name
S***** N*****
Preparer Title
Compliance Specialist
Preparer Email
S******@p****.com
Preparer Telephone
713-993-5673
Preparer Fax
713-646-4310
Prepared Date
2013-03-25 00:00:00
Authorizer Name
J***** R J****
Authorizer Telephone
713-993-5162
Authorizer Title
Sr Director Env And Regulatory Compliance
Authorizer Email
J******@p****.com
Narrative
An initial investigation of this incident indicates that the release was due to the activation of a thermal relief valve which failed to re-seat because of the foreign debris on the valve seat. The flow rate from the thermal relief valve exceeded the sump capacity causing it to overflow. An alarm associated with this sump failed to activate. The thermal relief valve was replaced and re-piped to relieve into a storage tank rather than a sump. The failures related to this incident are still under investigation. Supplemental narrative: as described in the initial report, this incident was caused by the failure of a thermal relief valve to re-seat after activating. The thermal relief valve is installed between a pump discharge and back pressure control valve. The control valve was originally air operated. Due to excessive maintenance requirements, the old control valve was replaced by a new, electric motor operated valve. When the electric operated valve was installed, the electronic technician set the valve to close completely when the pipeline pump was stopped. The air operated control valve did not close completely when the pipeline pump was stopped. Thus, after the electric operated control valve was installed, the pump was starting against a shut valve. This reduced the starting current in the pump motor but also caused the pressure in the line between the pump and valve to rise to a level that caused the thermal relief valve to activate until the control valve opened enough to reduce the pressure to allow the thermal relief to re-seat. The relief valve setting is 550 psig, the mop of the line is 800 psig and the pump shutoff head is 620 psig. This startup procedure was occurring for some time prior to the incident. The repeated activation of the relief valve during system startup could have contributed to it not re-seating. The flow rate from the thermal relief not re-seating exceeded the capacity of the small sump pump. This resulted in a continually rising level in the sump which ultimately overflowed, causing the release. Although equipped with a high sump level alarm, the alarm failed to alert the control room operator because the alarm float became stuck causing the alarm switch not to activate. After a thorough investigation of this incident, several actions were taken to prevent the recurrence of this type of incident: -a review of the startup protocol for this system was conducted. As a result the control valve setting was changed so that the valve did not shut completely when the pump is shutdown. This is allowing flow through the valve upon startup and maintaining the pressure upstream of the valve below the setting of the thermal relief valve; -a "excessive run time" alarm feature was installed on the sump pump to alert the control room operator when the sump pump is running longer than - normal; and -a new thermal relief valve was installed and its discharge re-piped to relief into a storage tank rather than the small sump.
| Report Received Date | 2011-11-14 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2011 |
| Report Number | 20110421 |
| Supplemental Number | 17668 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 300 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Plains Pipeline, L.p. |
| Operator Street Address | 333 Clay Street, Suite 1900 |
| Operator City Name | Houston |
| Operator State Abbreviation | TX |
| Operator Postal Code | 77002 |
| Local Datetime | 2011-10-15 11:00:00 |
| Location Latitude | 31.960602 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -102.617793 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Commodity Released Type | Crude Oil |
| Unintentional Release Bbls | 73 |
| Intentional Release Bbls | 0 |
| Recovered Bbls | 73 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Accident Identifier | Air Patrol |
| Operator Type | Contractor Working For The Operator |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pump/meter Station Equipment And Piping |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | Yes |
| Shutdown Datetime | 2011-10-15 12:45:00 |
| Restart Datetime | 2011-10-15 14:00:00 |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Pipe Fac Name | Goldsmith Station |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Tx |
| Onshore Postal Code | 79741 |
| Onshore City Name | Goldsmith |
| Onshore County Name | Ector |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Totally Contained On Operator-Controlled Property |
| Incident Area Type | Aboveground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Typical Aboveground Facility Piping Or Appurtenance |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Intrastate |
| Item Involved | Valve |
| Valve Type | Relief Valve |
| Installation Year | 2011 |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Overfill Or Overflow |
| Wildlife Impact Ind | No |
| Soil Contamination | Yes |
| Long Term Assessment | No |
| Remediation Ind | No |
| Water Contam Ind | No |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Commodity Reached Hca | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Gas Released | 2000 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 1500 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 9000 |
| Est Cost Environmental | 29000 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 41500 |
| Accident Psig | 550 |
| Mop Psig | 800 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Mop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | < 20% Smys Regulated Transmission |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Cpm In Place Ind | No |
| Investigation Status | No, the facility was not monitored by a controller(s) at the time of the accident |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Equipment Failure |
| Cause Details | Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment |
| Eq Failure Type | Malfunction Of Control/relief Equipment |
| Relief Valve Ind | Yes |
| Eq Additional Other Ind | Yes |
| Eq Additional Other Details | Debris Is Valve |
| Preparer Name | S***** N***** |
| Preparer Title | Compliance Specialist |
| Preparer Email | S******@p****.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 713-993-5673 |
| Preparer Fax | 713-646-4310 |
| Prepared Date | 2013-03-25 00:00:00 |
| Authorizer Name | J***** R J**** |
| Authorizer Telephone | 713-993-5162 |
| Authorizer Title | Sr Director Env And Regulatory Compliance |
| Authorizer Email | J******@p****.com |
| Narrative | An initial investigation of this incident indicates that the release was due to the activation of a thermal relief valve which failed to re-seat because of the foreign debris on the valve seat. The flow rate from the thermal relief valve exceeded the sump capacity causing it to overflow. An alarm associated with this sump failed to activate. The thermal relief valve was replaced and re-piped to relieve into a storage tank rather than a sump. The failures related to this incident are still under investigation. Supplemental narrative: as described in the initial report, this incident was caused by the failure of a thermal relief valve to re-seat after activating. The thermal relief valve is installed between a pump discharge and back pressure control valve. The control valve was originally air operated. Due to excessive maintenance requirements, the old control valve was replaced by a new, electric motor operated valve. When the electric operated valve was installed, the electronic technician set the valve to close completely when the pipeline pump was stopped. The air operated control valve did not close completely when the pipeline pump was stopped. Thus, after the electric operated control valve was installed, the pump was starting against a shut valve. This reduced the starting current in the pump motor but also caused the pressure in the line between the pump and valve to rise to a level that caused the thermal relief valve to activate until the control valve opened enough to reduce the pressure to allow the thermal relief to re-seat. The relief valve setting is 550 psig, the mop of the line is 800 psig and the pump shutoff head is 620 psig. This startup procedure was occurring for some time prior to the incident. The repeated activation of the relief valve during system startup could have contributed to it not re-seating. The flow rate from the thermal relief not re-seating exceeded the capacity of the small sump pump. This resulted in a continually rising level in the sump which ultimately overflowed, causing the release. Although equipped with a high sump level alarm, the alarm failed to alert the control room operator because the alarm float became stuck causing the alarm switch not to activate. After a thorough investigation of this incident, several actions were taken to prevent the recurrence of this type of incident: -a review of the startup protocol for this system was conducted. As a result the control valve setting was changed so that the valve did not shut completely when the pump is shutdown. This is allowing flow through the valve upon startup and maintaining the pressure upstream of the valve below the setting of the thermal relief valve; -a "excessive run time" alarm feature was installed on the sump pump to alert the control room operator when the sump pump is running longer than - normal; and -a new thermal relief valve was installed and its discharge re-piped to relief into a storage tank rather than the small sump. |
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