Incident details
Operator, cause, commodity and consequences with raw source fields.
GTG incident on 2010-03-27 — TX
Operator
Transwestern Pipeline Company Llc
Cause
Natural Force Damage
Commodity
Natural Gas
Program
GTG
Damage and Injuries
0 fatalities
0 injuries
Property damage (nominal)
$45,852
Incident datetime
2010-03-27 10:22
Report number
Location
TX
Narrative
An ili tool was run on the panhandle lateral (txbp132) on march 9, 2010. The ili company noted during the initial evaluation of the data from the ili tool, that an anomaly was detected and may have a wall loss greater than 70% of the wall thickness of the pipe. Within a few hours of notification to tw, the pipeline was reduced in pressure and an excavation crew was sent out to the site. During the bell hole investigation gas dried soil was noted, so the excavation was temporarily stopped until a gas detector had "sniffed" the area for gas. The gas detector indicated a high ppm of methane gas so all construction was stopped until the pipeline was blown down to atmosphere. Continued investigation found a pin hole leak under a thermite weld that was partially bonded to the pipe. The thermite weld connected both the negative header cable that goes to the rectifier and the test lead wire that goes to the cp test stand. The thermite weld was easily removed with just a small pull on the wiring. The negative header cable lead was a triangle pwc, inc s n-a 1-awg type thhn/thwn, gasoline and oil resistant wire. The insulation on the wire had been heated and had melted the insulation back approximately 3.5 inches from the thermite connection. Some of the metal cable strands where the insulation had melted back showed discoloration. Additionally there was a small amount of discoloration on the surface of the pipe surrounding the leak. No corrosion, dents, cracks or gouges were found on the surface of the pipe. The leak was the size of a pin hole and appears to have occurred due to electrical arcing from the negative header cable to the pipe surface. Corrosion technician reports the cpu unit "simms" was installed in august 1990, and is subject to high lightning strikes and power surges. The rectifier has been struck by lighting a number of times blacking the inside of the rectifier case. On one occurrence, a lighting strike dislodged the connection block from the case of the rectifier. The corrosion technician installed a surgex unit in june 2000 to help reduce the number of repairs to the rectifier and minimize damage from lighting strikes. The rectifier unit is located within 30 ft from where the leak occurred. Transwestern did a through review of cp records from 2003 and found no indication of the cp problems or a change in the cp systems circuit resistance. The over all circuit resistance was from 0.47 ohms to 0.85 ohms. The pipe to soil potentials are between -3 to -4 volts, with instant off readings between -1 to -1.25 volts. The high voltage potentials are associated with the cp ground bed being located within 30 ft. Of the pipeline. Conclusion ' the cause of the leak is attributed to metal loss from electrical arcing between the negative header cable and the pipe surface from lighting strikes. A previous ili tool run that was conducted march 2003 showed no wall loss anomaly's at this location. **this report is being submitted in response to PHMSA's request, (docket id PHMSA-2013-0028), for supplemental reports from operators who submitted reports for incidents occurring after january 1, 2010, with any of the following: (1) ``pipe girth weld'' was selected as the ``item involved in incident'' in part c3 of the report. The revised report collects data about the pipe adjacent to the girth weld. (2) ``function of pipeline system'' is null in part e5f of the report. The revised report collects the function of the pipeline system for all incidents.** this supplemental report is to acknowledge that the two relevant sections in PHMSA's request have been reviewed and no further actions were needed.
Detailed record list
Report Received Date
2010-04-23 00:00:00
Iyear
2010
Report Number
20100016
Supplemental Number
16027
Report Type
Supplemental Final
Operator Id
19610
Name
Transwestern Pipeline Company Llc
Operator Street Address
1300 Main Street
Operator City Name
Houston
Operator State Abbreviation
TX
Operator Postal Code
77002
Local Datetime
2010-03-27 10:22:00
Location Latitude
35.47268
Location Longitude
-101.20379
Nrc Rpt Num
935301
Nrc Rpt Datetime
2010-03-27 14:50:00
Commodity Released Type
Natural Gas
Unintentional Release
1
Intentional Release
10801
Accompanying Liquid
0
Fatality Ind
No
Fatal
0
Injury Ind
No
Injure
0
Shutdown Due Accident Ind
Yes
Shutdown Datetime
2010-03-27 11:25:00
Restart Datetime
2010-03-27 14:15:00
Ignite Ind
No
Explode Ind
No
Num Pub Evacuated
0
Incident Identified Datetime
2010-03-27 10:22:00
On Site Datetime
2010-03-27 10:28:00
On Off Shore
Onshore
Onshore State Abbreviation
Tx
Onshore Postal Code
79097
Onshore City Name
White Deer
Onshore County Name
Carson
Designated Location
Survey Station No.
Designated Name
3641+28
Pipe Fac Name
Panhandle Lateral
Segment Name
P3 To V308
Federal
No
Location Type
Pipeline Right-Of-Way
Incident Area Type
Underground
Incident Area Subtype
Exposed Due To Excavation
Depth Of Cover
50
Crossing
No
Pipe Facility Type
Interstate
System Part Involved
Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites
Item Involved
Pipe
Pipe Type
Pipe Body
Pipe Diameter
24
Pipe Wall Thickness
0.312
Pipe Smys
56000
Pipe Specification
Api 5l
Pipe Seam Type
Longitudinal Erw - Low Frequency
Pipe Manufacturer
A. O. Smith
Pipe Coating Type
Coal Tar
Installation Year
1960
Manufactured Year
1960
Material Involved
Carbon Steel
Release Type
Leak
Leak Type
Pinhole
Class Location Type
Class 1 Location
Could Be Hca
No
Pir Radius
526
Heat Damage Ind
No
Non Heat Damage Ind
No
Hca Fatalities Ind
No
Est Cost Oper Paid
0
Est Cost Unintentional Release
5
Est Cost Intentional Release
45148
Est Cost Prop Damage
45852
Est Cost Emergency
0
Est Cost Other
0
Prpty
91005
Accident Psig
550
Mop Psig
1008
Mop Cfr Section
Not On Omb-Approved Form When Submitted
Accident Pressure
Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop
Pressure Restriction Ind
No
Upstream Valve Type Ind
Automatic
Downstream Valve Type Ind
Remotely Controlled
Length Segment Isolated
103917
Internal Inspection Ind
Yes
Operation Complications Ind
No
Pipeline Function
Transmission System
Scada In Place Ind
Yes
Scada Operating Ind
Yes
Scada Functional Ind
Yes
Scada Detection Ind
No
Scada Conf Ind
No
Accident Identifier
Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors
Operator Type
Operator Employee
Investigation Status
No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
Investigation Status Details
This was a pinhole leak well below the minimum threshold to be identified by any controller and well below the state of the art limitations of any scada technology
Employee Drug Test Ind
No
Contractor Drug Test Ind
No
Cause
Natural Force Damage
Cause Details
Lightning
Natural Force Type
Lightning
Lightning Subtype
Direct Hit
Nf Extreme Weather Ind
No
Preparer Name
N***** H******
Preparer Title
Director Interstate Regulatory Compliance
Preparer Email
N*************@e*************.com
Preparer Telephone
713-857-5479
Authorizer Name
N***** H******
Authorizer Title
Director Interstate Regulatory Compliance
Authorizer Telephone
713-857-5479
Authorizer Email
N*************@e*************.com
Narrative
An ili tool was run on the panhandle lateral (txbp132) on march 9, 2010. The ili company noted during the initial evaluation of the data from the ili tool, that an anomaly was detected and may have a wall loss greater than 70% of the wall thickness of the pipe. Within a few hours of notification to tw, the pipeline was reduced in pressure and an excavation crew was sent out to the site. During the bell hole investigation gas dried soil was noted, so the excavation was temporarily stopped until a gas detector had "sniffed" the area for gas. The gas detector indicated a high ppm of methane gas so all construction was stopped until the pipeline was blown down to atmosphere. Continued investigation found a pin hole leak under a thermite weld that was partially bonded to the pipe. The thermite weld connected both the negative header cable that goes to the rectifier and the test lead wire that goes to the cp test stand. The thermite weld was easily removed with just a small pull on the wiring. The negative header cable lead was a triangle pwc, inc s n-a 1-awg type thhn/thwn, gasoline and oil resistant wire. The insulation on the wire had been heated and had melted the insulation back approximately 3.5 inches from the thermite connection. Some of the metal cable strands where the insulation had melted back showed discoloration. Additionally there was a small amount of discoloration on the surface of the pipe surrounding the leak. No corrosion, dents, cracks or gouges were found on the surface of the pipe. The leak was the size of a pin hole and appears to have occurred due to electrical arcing from the negative header cable to the pipe surface. Corrosion technician reports the cpu unit "simms" was installed in august 1990, and is subject to high lightning strikes and power surges. The rectifier has been struck by lighting a number of times blacking the inside of the rectifier case. On one occurrence, a lighting strike dislodged the connection block from the case of the rectifier. The corrosion technician installed a surgex unit in june 2000 to help reduce the number of repairs to the rectifier and minimize damage from lighting strikes. The rectifier unit is located within 30 ft from where the leak occurred. Transwestern did a through review of cp records from 2003 and found no indication of the cp problems or a change in the cp systems circuit resistance. The over all circuit resistance was from 0.47 ohms to 0.85 ohms. The pipe to soil potentials are between -3 to -4 volts, with instant off readings between -1 to -1.25 volts. The high voltage potentials are associated with the cp ground bed being located within 30 ft. Of the pipeline. Conclusion ' the cause of the leak is attributed to metal loss from electrical arcing between the negative header cable and the pipe surface from lighting strikes. A previous ili tool run that was conducted march 2003 showed no wall loss anomaly's at this location. **this report is being submitted in response to PHMSA's request, (docket id PHMSA-2013-0028), for supplemental reports from operators who submitted reports for incidents occurring after january 1, 2010, with any of the following: (1) ``pipe girth weld'' was selected as the ``item involved in incident'' in part c3 of the report. The revised report collects data about the pipe adjacent to the girth weld. (2) ``function of pipeline system'' is null in part e5f of the report. The revised report collects the function of the pipeline system for all incidents.** this supplemental report is to acknowledge that the two relevant sections in PHMSA's request have been reviewed and no further actions were needed.
| Report Received Date | 2010-04-23 00:00:00 |
|---|---|
| Iyear | 2010 |
| Report Number | 20100016 |
| Supplemental Number | 16027 |
| Report Type | Supplemental Final |
| Operator Id | 19610 PHMSA Enforcement |
| Name | Transwestern Pipeline Company Llc |
| Operator Street Address | 1300 Main Street |
| Operator City Name | Houston |
| Operator State Abbreviation | TX |
| Operator Postal Code | 77002 |
| Local Datetime | 2010-03-27 10:22:00 |
| Location Latitude | 35.47268 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Location Longitude | -101.20379 Google Maps OpenStreetMap |
| Nrc Rpt Num | 935301 NRC Report How to search |
| Nrc Rpt Datetime | 2010-03-27 14:50:00 |
| Commodity Released Type | Natural Gas |
| Unintentional Release | 1 |
| Intentional Release | 10801 |
| Accompanying Liquid | 0 |
| Fatality Ind | No |
| Fatal | 0 |
| Injury Ind | No |
| Injure | 0 |
| Shutdown Due Accident Ind | Yes |
| Shutdown Datetime | 2010-03-27 11:25:00 |
| Restart Datetime | 2010-03-27 14:15:00 |
| Ignite Ind | No |
| Explode Ind | No |
| Num Pub Evacuated | 0 |
| Incident Identified Datetime | 2010-03-27 10:22:00 |
| On Site Datetime | 2010-03-27 10:28:00 |
| On Off Shore | Onshore |
| Onshore State Abbreviation | Tx |
| Onshore Postal Code | 79097 |
| Onshore City Name | White Deer |
| Onshore County Name | Carson |
| Designated Location | Survey Station No. |
| Designated Name | 3641+28 |
| Pipe Fac Name | Panhandle Lateral |
| Segment Name | P3 To V308 |
| Federal | No |
| Location Type | Pipeline Right-Of-Way |
| Incident Area Type | Underground |
| Incident Area Subtype | Exposed Due To Excavation |
| Depth Of Cover | 50 |
| Crossing | No |
| Pipe Facility Type | Interstate |
| System Part Involved | Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites |
| Item Involved | Pipe |
| Pipe Type | Pipe Body |
| Pipe Diameter | 24 |
| Pipe Wall Thickness | 0.312 |
| Pipe Smys | 56000 |
| Pipe Specification | Api 5l |
| Pipe Seam Type | Longitudinal Erw - Low Frequency |
| Pipe Manufacturer | A. O. Smith |
| Pipe Coating Type | Coal Tar |
| Installation Year | 1960 |
| Manufactured Year | 1960 |
| Material Involved | Carbon Steel |
| Release Type | Leak |
| Leak Type | Pinhole |
| Class Location Type | Class 1 Location |
| Could Be Hca | No |
| Pir Radius | 526 |
| Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Non Heat Damage Ind | No |
| Hca Fatalities Ind | No |
| Est Cost Oper Paid | 0 |
| Est Cost Unintentional Release | 5 |
| Est Cost Intentional Release | 45148 |
| Est Cost Prop Damage | 45852 |
| Est Cost Emergency | 0 |
| Est Cost Other | 0 |
| Prpty | 91005 |
| Accident Psig | 550 |
| Mop Psig | 1008 |
| Mop Cfr Section | Not On Omb-Approved Form When Submitted View CFR 49 §192 |
| Accident Pressure | Pressure Did Not Exceed Maop |
| Pressure Restriction Ind | No |
| Upstream Valve Type Ind | Automatic |
| Downstream Valve Type Ind | Remotely Controlled |
| Length Segment Isolated | 103917 |
| Internal Inspection Ind | Yes |
| Operation Complications Ind | No |
| Pipeline Function | Transmission System |
| Scada In Place Ind | Yes |
| Scada Operating Ind | Yes |
| Scada Functional Ind | Yes |
| Scada Detection Ind | No |
| Scada Conf Ind | No |
| Accident Identifier | Local Operating Personnel, Including Contractors |
| Operator Type | Operator Employee |
| Investigation Status | No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) |
| Investigation Status Details | This was a pinhole leak well below the minimum threshold to be identified by any controller and well below the state of the art limitations of any scada technology |
| Employee Drug Test Ind | No |
| Contractor Drug Test Ind | No |
| Cause | Natural Force Damage |
| Cause Details | Lightning |
| Natural Force Type | Lightning |
| Lightning Subtype | Direct Hit |
| Nf Extreme Weather Ind | No |
| Preparer Name | N***** H****** |
| Preparer Title | Director Interstate Regulatory Compliance |
| Preparer Email | N*************@e*************.com |
| Preparer Telephone | 713-857-5479 |
| Authorizer Name | N***** H****** |
| Authorizer Title | Director Interstate Regulatory Compliance |
| Authorizer Telephone | 713-857-5479 |
| Authorizer Email | N*************@e*************.com |
| Narrative | An ili tool was run on the panhandle lateral (txbp132) on march 9, 2010. The ili company noted during the initial evaluation of the data from the ili tool, that an anomaly was detected and may have a wall loss greater than 70% of the wall thickness of the pipe. Within a few hours of notification to tw, the pipeline was reduced in pressure and an excavation crew was sent out to the site. During the bell hole investigation gas dried soil was noted, so the excavation was temporarily stopped until a gas detector had "sniffed" the area for gas. The gas detector indicated a high ppm of methane gas so all construction was stopped until the pipeline was blown down to atmosphere. Continued investigation found a pin hole leak under a thermite weld that was partially bonded to the pipe. The thermite weld connected both the negative header cable that goes to the rectifier and the test lead wire that goes to the cp test stand. The thermite weld was easily removed with just a small pull on the wiring. The negative header cable lead was a triangle pwc, inc s n-a 1-awg type thhn/thwn, gasoline and oil resistant wire. The insulation on the wire had been heated and had melted the insulation back approximately 3.5 inches from the thermite connection. Some of the metal cable strands where the insulation had melted back showed discoloration. Additionally there was a small amount of discoloration on the surface of the pipe surrounding the leak. No corrosion, dents, cracks or gouges were found on the surface of the pipe. The leak was the size of a pin hole and appears to have occurred due to electrical arcing from the negative header cable to the pipe surface. Corrosion technician reports the cpu unit "simms" was installed in august 1990, and is subject to high lightning strikes and power surges. The rectifier has been struck by lighting a number of times blacking the inside of the rectifier case. On one occurrence, a lighting strike dislodged the connection block from the case of the rectifier. The corrosion technician installed a surgex unit in june 2000 to help reduce the number of repairs to the rectifier and minimize damage from lighting strikes. The rectifier unit is located within 30 ft from where the leak occurred. Transwestern did a through review of cp records from 2003 and found no indication of the cp problems or a change in the cp systems circuit resistance. The over all circuit resistance was from 0.47 ohms to 0.85 ohms. The pipe to soil potentials are between -3 to -4 volts, with instant off readings between -1 to -1.25 volts. The high voltage potentials are associated with the cp ground bed being located within 30 ft. Of the pipeline. Conclusion ' the cause of the leak is attributed to metal loss from electrical arcing between the negative header cable and the pipe surface from lighting strikes. A previous ili tool run that was conducted march 2003 showed no wall loss anomaly's at this location. **this report is being submitted in response to PHMSA's request, (docket id PHMSA-2013-0028), for supplemental reports from operators who submitted reports for incidents occurring after january 1, 2010, with any of the following: (1) ``pipe girth weld'' was selected as the ``item involved in incident'' in part c3 of the report. The revised report collects data about the pipe adjacent to the girth weld. (2) ``function of pipeline system'' is null in part e5f of the report. The revised report collects the function of the pipeline system for all incidents.** this supplemental report is to acknowledge that the two relevant sections in PHMSA's request have been reviewed and no further actions were needed. |
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